Unveiled to regulate: the logics and the trajectories of regulatory transparency policies by Corrêa, Izabela Moreira
 1 
	
The	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	
	
	
	
	
	
Unveiled	to	Regulate:		
The	Logics	and	The	Trajectories	of		
Regulatory	Transparency	Policies								Izabela	Moreira	Corrêa																			A	thesis	submitted	to	the	Department	of	Government	of	the	London	School	of	Economics	for	the	degree	of	Doctor	of	Philosophy,	London,	November	2016.		 	
 2 
	
	
	
DECLARATION	OF	AUTHORSHIP				 I	certify	that	the	thesis	I	have	presented	for	examination	for	the	MPhil/PhD	degree	of	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	is	solely	my	own	work	other	than	where	I	have	clearly	indicated	that	it	is	the	work	of	others	(in	which	case	the	extent	of	any	work	carried	out	jointly	by	me	and	any	other	person	is	clearly	identified	in	it).		The	views	and	opinions	expressed	in	this	thesis	are	solely	mine	and	do	not	reflect	the	official	positions	of	any	agency	of	the	Brazilian	government.		The	 copyright	 of	 this	 thesis	 rests	 with	 the	 author.	 Quotation	 from	 it	 is	permitted,	provided	that	full	acknowledgement	is	made.	This	thesis	may	not	be	reproduced	without	my	prior	written	consent.		I	warrant	that	this	authorisation	does	not,	to	the	best	of	my	belief,	infringe	the	rights	of	any	third	party.		I	declare	that	my	thesis	consists	of	88,748	words.		10	October	2017		Izabela	Moreira	Corrêa		 	
 3 
ABSTRACT							 This	thesis	traces	the	creation	and	trajectories	of	regulatory	transparency	policies	 (RTPs)	 within	 what	 I	 define	 as	 the	 three	 ‘logics	 of	 regulatory	transparency’:	 control,	 performance	 and	 transaction.	 Through	 in-depth	case	study	analyses	of	the	birth	and	long-term	evolution	of	selected	RTPs	in	 Brazil	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 this	 study	 shows	 that	 the	 logics	 can	impact	 the	 trajectory	 of	 an	 RTP	 by	 shaping	 the	 power	 and	 priorities	 of	actors	 in	 particular	 ways	 or	 by	 disclosing	 specific	 types	 of	 information.	What	I	refer	to	as	RTPs	in	this	thesis	are	a	specific	class	of	transparency	policies	 that	 carry	 an	 inherent	 regulatory	 goal	 pursued	 through	 the	disclosure	 of	 information	 and	 published	 directly	 by	 governments	 and	regulators.	These	are	not	a	new	class	of	policies;	rather	they	are	studied	from	the	perspective	of	government	transparency	or	from	the	perspective	of	 governance.	 The	 goal	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 creation	 and	evolution	of	RTPs,	identify	eventual	patterns	of	progress,	and	learn	about	the	stability	of	these	policies	and	of	the	multi-actor	interactions	that	take	place	during	or	as	a	result	of	their	creation	and	progress.			 	
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INTRODUCTION	
		
1.	Research	Goals	The	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 trace	 the	 origins	 and	 trajectories	 of	 regulatory	transparency	 policies	 (RTPs)	 within	 what	 I	 define	 as	 the	 three	 ‘logics	 of	 regulatory	transparency’:	 control,	 performance	 and	 transaction.	 The	 thesis’	 central	 research	question	is:	- How	do	regulatory	transparency	policies	emerge	and	evolve	throughout	time?		As	secondary	questions,	I	ask:		- What	shapes	the	origins	and	trajectories	of	RTPS?	- 	How	do	the	logics	of	RTPs	shape	their	trajectories?			 Through	in-depth	case	study	analyses	of	the	long-term	evolution	of	RTPs	in	Brazil	and	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 this	 thesis	 shows	 that	 the	 presented	 ‘logics	 of	 regulatory	transparency’	can	impact	the	trajectory	of	an	RTP	by	shaping	the	power	and	priorities	of	actors	in	particular	ways	and	by	disclosing	specific	types	of	information.			 What	I	refer	to	as	RTPs	in	this	thesis	are	a	specific	class	of	transparency	policies	that	carry	 an	 inherent	 regulatory	 goal	 pursued	 through	 the	 disclosure	 of	 information	 and	published	primarily	by	governments	and	regulators.	These	are	not	a	new	class	of	policies;	rather	 they	are	 studied	 from	 the	perspective	of	 government	 transparency	or	 from	 the	perspective	of	governance.	The	general	aim	of	the	thesis	is	to	further	the	understanding	of	 the	 origins	 and	 trajectories	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 RTPs,	 identify	 eventual	 patterns	 of	progress,	and	learn	about	the	stability	of	these	policies	and	of	the	multi-actor	interactions	that	take	place	during	or	as	a	result	of	their	creation	and	progress.	Regulatory	 transparency	 policies,	 as	 briefly	 mentioned	 above,	 comprise	 the	publication	of	structured	 information	 to	 the	general	public	 in	 response	 to	 a	direct	
regulatory	intervention,	therefore	furthering	a	regulatory	goal.	‘Structured	information’	refers	to	standardised	and	relative	information,	i.e.	comparable	within	a	particular	class,	such	 as	 expenditures,	 performance,	 prices,	 risks	 and	 alike.	 Publication	 to	 the	 ‘general	public’	refers	to	the	proactive	disclosure	of	information.	In	this	sense,	RTPs	differ	from	Freedom	of	Information	Act	(FoIA)	requests,	in	which	information	is	made	available	to	the	public	upon	request	and	not	proactively,	as	with	RTPs.	‘Direct	regulatory	intervention’	refers	to	the	role	of	governments	and	regulators	in	promoting	disclosure	of	structured	
 14 
information	as	a	mechanism	of	regulation,	i.e.	“intentional	intervention	in	the	activities	of	a	target	population”	(Koop	and	Lodge,	2015,	p.	10).	By	conducting	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	evolution	of	RTPs,	this	research	aims	at	addressing	identified	gaps	in	the	literature	concerning	the	underlying	factors	and	actor	roles	 that	 shape	 the	 creation	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	 policies	 in	specific	trajectories.	In	particular,	I	look	for	causal	relationships	between	the	three	logics	of	 RTPs	 examined	 in	 this	 work	 –	 control,	 performance	 and	 transaction	 –	 and	 RTP	trajectories.	 By	 ‘logic’	 I	 refer	 to	 the	 underlying	 rationale	 (or	 purpose)	 of	 a	 regulatory	transparency	policy.	I	propose	that	each	logic	determines	who	the	key	actors	involved	in	an	RTP	are	and	shapes	their	power	relative	to	each	other,	which,	in	turn,	can	impact	the	RTP’s	trajectory	in	particular	ways.		In	 recent	 years,	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	 addressed	 the	 wider	 topic	 of	 this	research,	 i.e.	 the	birth	and	gradual	 change	of	 transparency	policies.	Meijer	 (2013),	 for	instance,	suggests	that	the	social	construction	and	evolution	of	government	transparency	are	products	of	the	interaction	of	strategic,	cognitive	and	institutional	complexities.	He	identifies	 three	 levels	 of	 complexities	 that	 inform	 the	 debate	 of	 the	 creation	 of	governmental	transparency	taking	into	account	wider	changes	in	public	administration.1	While	 Meijer’s	 model	 provides	 an	 insightful	 framework	 about	 the	 construction	 of	government	transparency,	it	does	not	directly	address	how	actor	interactions	influence	and	 are	 influenced	 by	 government	 transparency	 and	 help	 shape	 trajectories	 of	transparency	policies;	a	puzzle	that	this	thesis	attempts	to	tackle	within	the	framework	of	RTPs.	“The	role	of	expected	outcomes	of	changes	in	transparency”,	the	author	suggests,	“needs	to	be	investigated	further	in	order	to	understand	the	positions	of	various	actors”	(Meijer,	2013,	p.	437).	In	Full	Disclosure,	Fung	et	al.	(2007,	pp.	110-111)	study	the	creation	and	trajectories	of	targeted	transparency	policies.	Targeted	transparency	represents	a	category	of	public	policies	 in	 which	 corporations	 or	 other	 actors	 are	 required	 to	 disclose	 standardised,	comparable	and	disaggregated	information	regarding	specific	products	or	practices	to	a	broad	audience	 in	order	 to	achieve	a	 specific	public	policy	purpose	 (2007,	pp.	37-38).	“Targeted	 transparency”,	 suggest	 Fung	 et	 al.	 (2007,	 pp.	 40-41),	 is	 enacted	 when	information	asymmetries	“substantially	increase	the	risks	borne	by	the	public”,	“seriously	impairs	 the	 quality	 of	 critical	 services	 provided	 by	 public	 or	 private	 organisations”,	“perpetuates	 unacceptable	 patterns	 of	 discrimination	 or	 other	 social	 inequalities”,	 or	
                                                1	The	first	complexity	is	related	to	the	political	game	and	behaviour	of	actors,	such	as	responses	and	reactions,	to	the	introduction	of	transparency	policies.	Cognitive	complexities	relate	to	the	content,	format	and	frames	by	which	information	is	disclosed.	Finally,	institutional	complexities	are	the	operating	rules	of	the	political	and	administrative	game.	
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“allow	corruption	to	persist	in	important	institutions	that	serve	the	public”.	The	authors	argue	that	targeted	transparency	policies	are	difficult	to	sustain,	due	to	the	fact	that	they	are	 usually	 enacted	 following	 crises	 and	 scandals,	 after	 which	 public	 support	 and	attention	 to	 such	 policies	 tend	 to	 wane.2	 They	 conclude	 that	 targeted	 transparency	policies	fall	within	the	scope	of	Wilson’s	entrepreneurial	politics	(1980,	p.	370),	according	to	which	they	would	tend	to	degrade	overtime.	In	the	authors’	perspective,	policies	most	prone	to	sustainability	are	those	in	which	many	disclosers	benefit	 from	disclosure	and	those	which	feature	stronger	user	groups.		In	contrast	to	Fung	et	al.,	the	narratives	offered	in	this	thesis	suggest	that	certain	classes	of	transparency	policies	are	self-reinforcing,	and	that	they	are	not	the	outcomes	of	critical	junctures	but	of	incremental	changes,	as	discussed	in	detail	in	the	theoretical	debate	developed	on	Chapter	1.	In	part,	this	divergence	reflects	the	differences	between	the	 concepts	 of	 ‘targeted	 transparency’	 and	 ‘regulatory	 transparency	 policies’,	 which	inform	the	case	selection	of	the	two	studies.	Whereas	Fung	et	al.	focus	on	the	mandatory	publication	of	information	by	private	parties,	I	look	into	disclosures	by	governments	and	regulators	 to	 fulfil	 similar	 regulatory	 goals,	 e.g.	 combating	 corruption,	 attempting	 to	increase	public	service	qualities,	and	reducing	risks	of	lemon	choices,	to	name	a	few.		
1.1.	Relevance	and	Contributions	of	the	Research	As	a	regulatory	solution,	transparency	policies	are	widely	assumed	to	have	the	power	to	change	the	behaviour	and	practices	of	targeted	groups	(Brandeis,	1913;	Behn,	2003;	Fung	et	at.,	2007;	Hood,	2006;	Meijer,	2007;	Baldwin	et	al.,	2012;	among	others).	In	this	vein,	disclosure	is	expected	to	be	effective	in	two	ways.	First,	the	users	of	disclosed	information	can	engage	in	voice	or	exit	acts	(Hirschman,	1970)	–	i.e.	they	can	voice	their	concerns	and	demand	improvements,	or	choose	a	different	provider	for	the	same	service.	In	response,	individuals	 or	 organisations	 that	 are	 the	 targets	 of	 transparency	 can	 look	 for	ways	 to	improve	 levels	of	quality	or	 integrity.	 Secondly,	 organisations	or	 individuals	 regulated	through	transparency	adapt	their	behaviour	as	an	immediate	response	to	transparency,	not	in	response	to	users	of	the	disclosed	information,	but	by	anticipating	their	reactions	(Meijer,	2007).	Transparency,	 however,	 is	 not	 a	 solution	 for	 all	 public	 problems.	 Mismatches	between	information	disclosed,	the	objectives	of	transparency	and	public	disinterest	for	
                                                2	The	authors	define	sustainability	as	a	system	that	 improves	over	time,	 in	one	or	more	of	the	following	dimensions:	 “[E]xpanding	 scope	of	 information	 relative	 to	 the	 scope	of	 the	problem	addressed;	increasing	accuracy	and	quality	of	information;	and,	increasing	use	of	information	to	consumers,	 investors,	 employees,	 political	 activists,	 voters,	 residents,	 and	 /	 or	 government	officials.	(Fung	et	al.,	2007,	p.	109)”	
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information	 can	 lead	 to	 failures	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	 initiatives.	 Since	 Herbert	Simon’s	(1972)	acclaimed	 ‘Theories	of	Bounded	Rationality’,	a	considerable	number	of	studies	has	been	published	demonstrating	individuals’	biases	of	rationality,	casting	doubt	on	 transparency’s	ability	 to	 fulfil	many	of	 its	ambitious	promises.	Yet	 in	spite	of	 these	limitations	and	criticisms,	disclosure	is	still	widely	used	to	regulate	a	series	of	behaviours	and	policies.	This	suggests	that	transparency	as	a	regulatory	mechanism	is	here	to	stay;	at	least	for	the	foreseeable	future	and	in	some	policy	realms.	Therefore	it	is	necessary	to	study	the	trajectories	of	RTPs,	understand	how	they	evolve	over	time,	how	actors	interact	to	push	for	greater	or	lower	levels	of	disclosure,	and	what	future	trajectory	one	can	expect	for	an	RTP.		In	 this	 vein,	 the	 first	 intended	 contribution	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 the	 literature	 is	 the	
original	empirical	evidence	it	presents,	demonstrating	that	the	origins	and	trajectories	of	regulatory	transparency	are	neither	uniform,	nor	exclusively	or	primarily	the	result	of	external	shocks.	To	analyse	the	trajectories,	I	employ	a	pluralist	approach	to	institutional	change	 that	 draws	 insights	 from	 both	 the	 path	 dependency	 arguments	 of	 historical	institutionalism	and	the	actor-focused	analyses	of	rational-choice	institutionalism.	I	take	into	account	the	wider	socio-political	environment	when	making	the	case	that	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing	 processes,	 while	 simultaneously	 acknowledging	 that	 continuous	 actor	interactions	 at	 the	 micro-level	 of	 policymaking	 lead	 to	 incremental	 changes	 in	 the	trajectories	 of	 these	 policies.	 In	 pursuing	 this	 path	 of	 scholarly	 pluralism,	 I	 take	inspiration	 from	Peter	Hall’s	words	 that	 the	 study	 of	 institutions	will	 be	 advanced	 by	“those	willing	 to	borrow	concepts	and	 formulations	 from	multiple	 schools	of	 thought”	(Hall	2010,	p.	220).		My	second	intended	contribution	is	the	introduction	of	the	‘logics	of	regulatory	
transparency	policies’	to	the	literature	as	an	analytical	concept	and	the	discussion	on	the	relationship	between	the	different	underlying	 logics	of	RTPs	and	their	trajectories.	Analysing	the	lives	of	transparency	policies	with	a	regulatory	intent	from	the	perspective	of	the	logics,	which,	as	noted	above,	points	to	the	underlying	rationale	of	an	RTP,	helps	to	identify	 the	 actors	 and	 the	 institutional	 dynamics	 that	 shape	 the	 evolution	 of	 these	policies.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 also	 helps	 us	 to	 understand	 the	 politics	 behind	 these	 policies.	Transparency	is	highly	political	whenever	it	stands	to	expose	or	constrain	the	behaviour	of	governmental	or	corporate	actors.			Finally,	 the	 literature	 on	 regulatory	 transparency	 is	 still	 underdeveloped,	 with	notable	gaps	in	explaining	change	across	time,	as	well	as	within	and	across	countries.	As	suggested	 by	 Grimmelikhuijsen	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 most	 works	 about	 transparency	 are	geographically	concentrated	in	North	America	and	Europe.	This	makes	an	intensive	and	detailed	study	across	countries	and	sectors	particularly	relevant,	not	least	because	some	
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of	 the	 premises	 assumed	 in	 the	 literature	 for	 the	 origins	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	policies	in	the	US	reality	do	not	necessarily	apply	to	other	contexts	where	RTPs	have	also	become	mainstream	policies.	Alongside	providing	original	empirical	findings	for	cases	in	the	UK	context	previously	covered	in	the	literature,	this	thesis	aims	to	contribute	to	filling	this	 geographical	 gap	 by	 presenting	 political	 and	 institutional	 analyses	 of	 regulatory	transparency	policies	in	the	understudied	Brazilian	context.			
2.	Research	Design	The	research	is	based	on	a	qualitative	comparison	of	case	studies.	This	methodological	choice	 is	 justified	 for	 two	main	 reasons.	 First,	 the	 research	 envisages	 to	understand	a	phenomenon	applicable	to	a	larger	class	of	(similar)	cases.	As	George	and	Bennett	(2005,	p.	5)	argue	in	Case	Studies	and	Theory	Development	in	Social	Sciences,	case	studies	allow	for	 “the	 detailed	 examination	 of	 an	 aspect	 of	 a	 historical	 episode	 to	 develop	 or	 test	historical	explanations	that	may	be	generalizable	to	other	events”.	Case	studies,	in	other	words,	offer	a	way	to	explore	causality	by	enabling	scholars	to	identify	and	analyse	all	the	developments	and	dynamics	within	a	particular	case.	Secondly,	understanding	the	origins	and	trajectories	of	regulatory	transparency	requirements	still	demands	an	intensive	and	detailed	study	of	cases,	which	can	highlight	the	actors	and	dynamics	that	may	shape	the	evolution	of	regulatory	transparency	policies	in	certain	directions.	Case	studies	are	also	ideal	in	this	regard,	as	they	help	to	uncover	“variables	that	were	otherwise	left	out	in	the	initial	model”	and	to	develop	hypotheses	“through	the	study	of	deviant	or	outlier	cases	in	the	course	of	field	work”	(George	and	Bennet,	2005,	pp.	20-21).	Considering	the	research	question,	its	hypotheses	and	the	strength	of	case	study	analysis,	 the	 research	 design	 adopts	 a	 comparative	 method	 based	 on	 the	 notion	 of	consilience,	as	proposed	by	Levi-Faur	(2006).	This	method	(1)	aggregates	the	advantages	of	 the	 techniques	 of	 the	 National	 Patterns	 Approach	 (NPA)	 and	 of	 the	 Policy	 Sector	Approach	(PSA),	and	(2)	reduces	the	tensions	between	internal	and	external	validities.	The	 aggregation	 of	 NPA	 and	 PSA	 is	 highly	 relevant	 for	 the	 study	 of	 regulatory	transparency	 policies.	 First,	 the	 level	 of	 openness	 and	 government	 transparency	 vary	widely	across	nations.	A	number	of	 international	NGOs	(Access	 Info	Europe	 and	Global	
Right	to	Information	Rating,	for	example)	and	scholars	(Banisar,	2006;	Hazell	and	Worthy,	2010;	 Michener,	 2011,	 2015;	Wehner	 and	 Renzio,	 2013;	 for	 example)	 have	 provided	evidence	 for	 this	 claim	 concerning	 government	 transparency,	 with	 Freedom	 of	Information	Acts	(FoIA)	being	central	in	most	comparisons.	Still,	regulatory	transparency	policies,	 and	 for	 that	matter	 transparency	 policies	 in	 general,	 vary	 across	 sectors,	 i.e.	variations	of	governance	models	and	practices	take	place	within	the	same	country,	in	the	
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same	 historical	 and	 contextual	 environments.	 As	 regulatory	 transparency	 policies	 are	present	 in	 many	 different	 policy	 areas	 and	 nations,	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 research	approach	is	more	appropriate	than	a	single	case	study,	which	would	tend	to	particularise	the	results	and	not	contribute	to	understanding	the	phenomena	more	broadly.		Finally,	the	consilient	theory	of	comparative	methods	improves	the	quality	of	the	comparative	 research	 design	 by	 providing	 a	 “(…)	 ‘holistic	 picture’	 and	 a	 panoramic	snapshot	of	important	aspects	of	the	cases”	(Levi-Faur,	2006,	p.	375).	Applying	elements	of	NPA	and	PSA	methods	simultaneously	allows	the	researcher	to	assess	cross-national	variations,	 cross-sectoral	 variations,	 similarities	 across	 both	 sectors	 and	 nations,	 and	variations	 across	 both	 sectors	 and	 nations.	 Hence,	 commonalities	 and	 variations	identified	across	countries	and	across	sectors	shed	light	on	the	relevance	of	institutions,	of	 structure	 and	 agency	 characteristics	 to	 understand	 and	 explain	 the	 trajectories	 of	regulatory	transparency,	providing	evidence	to	corroborate	or	falsify	hypotheses.	In	terms	of	the	tensions	between	internal	and	external	validities,	Levi-Faur	(2006,	p.	375)	defends	that	the	comparative	method	based	on	the	notion	of	consilience	reduces	such	 tension	 by	 increasing	 the	 “(…)	 number	 of	 comparisons	 and	 the	 number	 of	 cases	simultaneously	(rather	than	emphasizing	one	of	these	goals)”.	The	author	also	suggests	that	 “The	 internal	 validity	 of	 the	 research	 [one	 that	 applies	 a	 consilient	 comparative	method]	might	 also	 be	 increased	 by	 a	 process-tracing	 technique”	 (Levi-Faur,	 2006,	 p.	376).	Process	tracing	is	an	especially	useful	technique	to	assess	the	trajectories	of	change	and	causation	in	each	case	and	to	clarify	the	mechanisms	that	operate	to	promote	positive	or	negative	feedbacks.	“It	is	the	quality	of	the	observations	and	how	they	are	analysed,	not	the	 quantity	 of	 observations,”	 suggest	 Gerring	 (2007,	 p.	 180),	 “that	 is	 relevant	 in	evaluating	the	truth	claims	of	a	process	tracing	study”.	However,	due	to	the	emphasis	of	this	research	on	empirical	details	as	well	as	on	deductive	reasoning,	it	is	more	suitable	to	harmonise	 the	 consilient	 comparative	method	with	 analytic	 narratives	method,	which	presents	 similar	 features	 to	 process	 tracing.	 Bates	 et	 al.	 (1998,	 p.	 16)	 explain	 the	similarities	and	difference	between	the	two	methods:		 We	can	see	that	the	construction	of	analytic	narratives	is	an	iterative	process,	resembling	 George’s	 method	 of	 process	 tracing	 (George,	 1979;	 George	 and	Bennet,	1998).	Like	George,	we	seek	to	convert	“descriptive	historical	“accounts	into	 “analytic	 ones”	 that	 are	 couched	 in	 “theoretically	 relevant”	 language	(George	and	Bennett,	1998:	14).	Like	George,	we	move	back	and	forth	between	interpretation	and	case	materials,	modifying	the	explanation	in	light	of	the	data,	which	 itself	 is	 viewed	 in	new	ways,	 given	our	evolving	understanding.	What	differentiates	 our	 approach	 from	 the	method	 of	 process	 tracing	 is	 a	 greater	emphasis	on	theory.	
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The	 narratives	 of	 each	 one	 of	 the	 case	 studies	 (selected	 using	 the	 consilient	comparative	methods)	consist	of	an	in-depth	investigation	of	actors,	events	and	context,	in	search	of	extracts	of	explicit	and	formal	 lines	of	reasoning	 in	particular	periods	and	settings,	 which	 facilitate	 the	 clarification	 of	 trajectories	 and	 their	 explanation.	 In	summary,	the	operationalisation	of	the	research	intends	to	move	from	the	rich	context	of	events	 and	 cases	 to	 explanations	 that	 are	 rigorously	 backed	 by	 theory	 and	 subject	 to	empirical	analyses	(Bates	et	al.,	1998,	p.	236).	Section	 2.1,	 below,	 presents	 and	 justifies	 the	 selection	 of	 cases.	 The	 subsequent	sections	provide	detailed	information	about	the	data	collected,	the	period	of	analysis	and	the	operationalization	of	the	research.			
2.1.	Case	selection	The	notion	of	consilience	of	the	comparative	model	“(…)	emphasizes	the	importance	of	concurrence	of	observations	from	different	classes	of	facts”	(Levi-Faur,	2006,	p.	373),	in	which	nations	and	sectors	supply	 two	dimensions	 for	 the	examination	of	observations	concerning	agency	and	causality.	By	doing	so,	it	helps	to	define	the	case	selection	in	a	way	that	minimises	 selection	 bias	 problems	by	 capturing	 similarities	 and	 variations	 in	 the	cases.		For	 the	 country	 selection,	 I	 considered	 two	 national	 features	 of	 their	 political	systems	(Layer	2,	as	further	explained	in	Chapter	1)	that	I	identified	in	the	literature	to	signal	 as	 having	 the	 potential	 to	 impact	 the	 trajectories	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	policies,	 i.e.	 (i)	 the	 institutional	 ‘climate’	 towards	 openness,	 and,	 (ii)	 the	 level	 of	liberalisation	 of	 public	 sector	 reforms.	 The	 cases	 are	 drawn	 from	 two	 countries,	 both	liberal	democracies	(Layer	1),	which	exhibit	important	similarities	in	relation	to	openness	and	 differences	 in	 relation	 to	 economic	 liberalisation.	 Institutional	 ‘climate’	 towards	openness	tries	to	capture	the	tradition	of	the	country	in	the	publication	of	information	to	citizens.	Fung	et	al.	 (2007,	p.	19),	 for	example,	 claim	 that	one	of	 the	 three	 factors	 that	propelled	a	new	generation	of	targeted	transparency	into	mainstream	policy	in	the	United	States	was	a	generation	of	right-to-know	transparency	policies,	the	most	far	reaching	of	them	being	the	federal	Freedom	of	Information	Act.	It	is	assumed	that	countries	with	a	tradition	 of	 disclosing	 information	 to	 its	 citizens	 are	more	 prone	 to	 adopt	 regulatory	transparency	 policies	 than	 countries	 whose	 citizens	 are	 not	 used	 to	 having	 access	 to	governmental	information.	There	is	a	long	list	of	indicators	that	could	capture	countries’	institutional	‘climate’	towards	openness	and	transparency	of	the	public	sector.	Many	of	these	indicators	try	to	signal	the	level	of	openness	of	FoI	legislation.	Given	the	comparability	and	measurability	
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of	FoI	laws,	it	is	a	good	de	jure	indicator	of	countries’	government	openness.	There	is	also	a	set	of	 indicators	that	aggregate	data	about	the	openness	of	FoI	 legislation	with	other	indicators,	 such	 as	 fiscal	 transparency,	 disclosures	 related	 to	 elected	 or	 senior	 public	officials	 and	 citizen	 engagement.	 A	 whole	 different	 list	 of	 indicators	 tries	 to	measure	transparency	as	a	component	of	governance	indicators.	Given	the	aims	of	this	research	to	reflect	 the	countries’	 tradition	of	disclosing	 information	to	 its	citizens,	 it	highlights	the	adoption	of	FoI	as	well	as	other	measures	to	promote	governmental	transparency,	such	as	the	engagement	in	the	Open	Government	Partnership.	The	 cases	 are	 drawn	 from	 two	 countries:	 Brazil	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 The	selection	was	based	on	the	notion	of	consilience	in	the	comparative	model,	and	on	the	literature	 on	 transparency,	 institutional	 change	 and	 regulatory	 reform	 in	 the	 two	countries.	As	noted	above,	Brazil	and	the	UK	exhibit	important	similarities	and	differences	that	 could	 help	 inform	 us	 about	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 trajectories	 of	 regulatory	transparency.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 institutional	 climate	 towards	 openness,	 notably	 in	relation	 to	 freedom	 of	 information	 legislation,	 Brazil	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 share	important	 similarities,	 including	 recently	 taking	 notable	 steps	 towards	 openness.	 The	similarity	in	their	levels	of	commitment	to	openness	allowed	me	to	rule	out	wider	socio-political	 and	 institutional	 discrepancies,	which	 are	 harder	 to	 observe	 and	would	 have	rendered	 the	 countries	 simply	 too	 different	 for	 the	 case	 studies	 to	 serve	 a	 collective	purpose.	Both	countries	brought	 into	 force	Freedom	of	 Information	Acts	 in	 the	2010s,	institutionalising	access	 to	 information	requirements	of	comparable	strength.	 In	2011,	both	 countries	 became	 founding	 members	 of	 the	 Open	 Government	 Partnership,	 a	multilateral	initiative	to	promote	transparency	globally,	which	they	jointly	co-chaired	for	six	months	in	the	following	year.		Unlike	 their	 similar	 institutional	 commitment	 to	openness,	Brazil	 and	 the	United	Kingdom	display	divergent	levels	of	economic	liberalisation	and	public	service	reforms.	These	differences	are	relevant	because	they	shed	light	on	observable	characteristics	of	the	 economic	 and	 institutional-regulatory	 environment	 that	 influence	 actors’	 interests	and	 behaviours	 in	 relation	 to	 RTPs.	 The	 level	 of	 liberalisation	 of	 a	 specific	 country	 is	expected	 to	 influence	 the	 creation	 and	 evolution	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	 policies,	because	in	 liberalised	economies	it	 is	more	likely	that	certain	choices	will	be	 left	to	be	made	by	consumers,	instead	of	by	government.	If,	in	a	liberalised	economy,	citizens	get	to	choose	from	various	products	and	services	they	are	offered,	but	are	not	provided	with	adequate	 information	 on	 these	 products	 and	 services,	 they	 will	 be	 bound	 to	 make	misinformed,	or	‘lemon’,	choices	(Akerlof	1970).	Consequently,	the	notion	of	‘sovereign	consumer’	gains	more	emphasis	as	a	way	to	tackle	information	asymmetry	in	countries	
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that	 undertake	public	 sector	 liberalisation	 reforms,	where	RTPs	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	created	compared	to	less	liberalised	contexts.		In	New	Zealand,	for	example,	where	public	sector	reforms	are	considered	to	have	been	one	of	the	most	liberal	and	comprehensive,	regulatory	transparency	was	enacted	to	require	information	disclosure	to	support	consumers’	decision	making	processes	(Stirton	and	 Lodge:	 2000:	 10).	 According	 to	 Stirton	 and	 Lodge	 (2000:	 11),	 “Disclosure	 rules	increased	over	 time	 in	 their	 robustness	and	detail,	 although	not	 in	 terms	of	 increased	areas	of	 information”.	The	same	authors	also	argue	 that	 in	 Jamaica,	where	 the	 level	of	liberalisation	was	limited	in	the	early	days	of	reforms,	the	level	of	information	disclosure	was	 restricted;	 but	 as	 reforms	 developed,	 it	 was	 expected	 that	 the	 importance	 of	information	disclosure	increased	to	foster	the	sovereignty	of	consumers.	According	 to	 the	 2013	 Index	 of	 Economic	 Freedom,	 for	 example,	 the	 United	Kingdom	is	considered	mostly	free	(i.e.	 liberal)	whereas	Brazil	is	mostly	unfree,	placed	seventh	and	122nd	on	the	Country	Ranking,	respectively.3	In	terms	of	the	institutional	and	regulatory	 environment,	 market-oriented	 reforms	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 were	comprehensive,	whereas	in	Brazil	they	remain	limited.		The	 variation	 in	 the	 level	 of	 economic	 liberalisation	 of	 the	 two	 countries	 is	 also	reflected	 in	 their	 approach	 to	 regulatory	 policy	 and	 governance.	 In	 1997,	 the	 United	Kingdom’s	Better	Regulation	Task	Force	(BRTF)	was	created	as	an	independent	advisory	body	which	would	identify	and	raise	awareness	of	benchmarks	for	good	regulation	within	government.	Within	a	year	of	its	creation,	the	BRTF	published,	and	the	British	government	endorsed,	 its	 principles	 of	 better	 regulation	 (Baldwin,	 2010,	 p.	 260).	 Among	 such	principles	was	that	of	proportionality,	which	often	informs	the	adoption	of	transparency	as	 a	 regulatory	measure.	While	 the	 UK	 has	 created	 and	 re-created	 regulatory	 impact	analysis	units	with	mandates	to	guide	the	regulation	making	processes,	including	raising	awareness	of	transparency	as	a	regulatory	tool,	Brazil	has	strongly	focussed	its	regulatory	policy	agenda	on	regulatory	agencies	(OECD,	2016)	and	continues	 to	 lack	a	regulatory	quality	assurance	unit	 (OECD,	2008,	p.	36).	This	 is	 in	spite	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	
Programme	for	the	Strengthening	of	Institutional	Capacity	for	Regulatory	Management	in	2007,	which	is	still	timid	and	has	also	focused	on	regulatory	agencies.	In	light	of	these	differences	and	similarities	at	the	national	level,	I	chose	the	sectors	based	on	the	three	logics	that	I	address	in	the	thesis,	i.e.	the	control,	the	performance	and	the	 transaction	 logics.	 The	 policy	 justification	 to	 adopt	 transparency	 as	 a	 regulatory	
                                                3	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 equation	 of	 market	 liberalisation	 with	 ‘freedom’	 carries	 certain	ideological	assumptions,	which	can	be	viewed	as	problematic	or	at	the	very	least	debatable.	As	Chapter	1	will	discuss	in	more	detail,	this	neo-liberal	paradigm	has	been	a	driving	and	justifying	force	behind	transparency	in	general	and	RTPs	in	particular	for	the	past	several	decades.		
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mechanism	is	to	constrain	the	behaviour	of	politicians,	shape	the	actions	of	bureaucrats,	limit	the	strategies	of	enterprises,	stimulate	certain	consumer	behaviour,	among	others.	However,	being	designed	by	one	set	of	actors	 to	regulate	 the	behaviour	of	another	set	actors,	the	creation	and	evolutionary	processes	of	regulatory	transparency	policies	will	likely	differ	based	on	who	drives	each	policy,	who	is	targeted,	who	benefits	(or	is	expected	to	benefit)	from	it	and	who	the	intermediaries	are,	as	well	as	the	institutional	power	and	the	willingness	 of	 each	 of	 them	 to	mobilise	 resources	 in	 favour	 or	 against	 regulatory	transparency.	While	all	 transparency	policies	 in	 this	 thesis	are	selected	 for	 fostering	a	regulatory	 perspective	 (as	 opposed	 to	 an	 accountability	 one,	 for	 example),	 the	specificities	 of	 each	 logic	 provide	 insights	 into	 their	 creation	 and	 evolutionary	trajectories.		Put	briefly	for	now,	and	explained	in	depth	on	Chapter	1,	what	differentiates	one	logic	 from	 the	 other	 is	 the	 position	 of	 the	 discloser	 (i.e.	 government	 or	 regulator)	 in	relation	 to	 the	 target	 of	 disclosure	 (i.e.	 those	 regulated	 through	 transparency),	which	influences	 the	 potential	 regulatory	 purposes	 of	 disclosure.	 In	 this	 light,	 I	 chose	 three	policy	 areas	 for	 the	 research	 sample,	 each	 corresponding	 to	 one	 of	 the	 regulatory	transparency	logics	proposed:	ethics	and	anti-corruption	in	the	control	logic;	education	in	 the	performance	 logic;	 and	 financial	 services	 in	 the	 transaction	 logic	 (see	Table	 I.1.	below).	For	the	sake	of	feasibility	and	quality	of	the	research,	I	chose	one	specific	sector	within	each	of	the	policy	areas	I	worked	with,	i.e.	the	Brazilian	federal	government	and	the	British	House	of	Commons	(in	the	ethics	area),	secondary	schools	(in	the	education	sector),	and	banks	(in	the	financial	market).				 Country	/	Sector	/	Dominant	logic	 Public	Officials	&	Congressmen	and	Congresswoman	 Secondary	Schools	 Financial	institutions		Brazil		 Control	Logic		(Activities	taking	place	within	government)	
Performance	Logic		(Activities	carried	out	by	decentralised	policy	delivery	units)	
	Transaction	Logic		(Activities	carried	out	by	private	units,	mostly	in	commercial	transactions)		UK	/		England	
Table	i.1.	Case	Selection	and	Dominant	RTP		
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In	 relation	 to	 ethics	 and	 anti-corruption,	 I	 chose	 one	 initiative	 that	 focuses	 on	 a	broader	 range	 of	 targets	 with	 less	 institutional	 power	 (such	 as	 public	 officials,	beneficiaries	 of	 public	 policies,	 and	 subnational	 units)	 and	 one	 initiative	 in	which	 the	target	 of	 regulation	 are	 politicians.	 This	 distinct	 selection	 of	 institutions	 in	 the	 two	countries	 had	 two	 reasons.	 First,	whereas	 in	Brazil	 the	 federal	 government’s	 financial	transparency	policy,	 the	Transparency	Portal,	was	designed	 in	 the	 logic	 of	 control,	 its	corresponding	policy	in	the	United	Kingdom,	the	Combined	On-line	Information	System	(Coins),	was	designed	as	a	fiscal	transparency	instrument	not	associated	with	ethics	but	with	 fiscal	 control.	 Second,	 the	 selection	 allowed	 me	 to	 question	 how	 targets	 with	different	 institutional	 powers	 in	 the	 same	 RTP	 logic	 influenced	 the	 trajectories	 of	regulatory	transparency.	The	choice	of	education	to	analyse	the	trajectories	of	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic	was	 influenced	by	 the	Brazilian	case,	due	 to	 the	short	 lives	of	 transparency	policies	 in	other	 policy	 areas	 in	 this	 logic	 (e.g.	 health).	 Institutionally,	 the	 secondary	 education	system	in	both	countries	allow	for	the	comparison	in	the	logic	of	performance	because	they	are	regulated	by	central	governments	and	are	provided	by	private,	semi-public	and	public	 actors.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Brazil,	 secondary	 public	 schools	 are	 the	 responsibility	 of	states,	which	may	add	new	layers	of	regulation,	as	long	as	these	do	not	contradict	with	the	applicable	federal	legislation.	Similarly,	in	the	case	of	England,	local	education	authorities	are	responsible	 for	 the	provision	of	 secondary	education	within	 their	 jurisdiction.	The	choice	of	primary	schools	as	case	studies	for	the	trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic	would	not	be	adequate	due	to	the	limitation	of	RTPs	therein,	as	briefly	mentioned	in	Chapters	4	and	5.	Similarly,	the	choice	of	higher	education	to	analyse	the	trajectories	of	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic	would	be	less	adequate	than	that	of	secondary	education,	due	to	the	provision	of	education	model	in	England,	which	could	approximate	the	analysis	to	one	in	the	transaction	logic.	Finally,	it	is	important	to	state	that	the	choice	of	financial	institutions	for	analysing	the	trajectories	of	RTPs	was	primarily	influenced	by	the	fact	that	I	am	a	public	official	for	the	Brazilian	Central	Bank.	However,	 the	choice	 is	 justifiable	methodologically	as	well,	both	because	of	the	actors	that	shape	the	dynamics	of	the	RTPs	analysed,	and	because	of	the	possibilities	for	comparison	between	such	policies.					
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2.2.	Data	collection		The	initial	step	of	data	collection	for	the	thesis	was	to	extract	information	available	in	the	secondary	sources	literature.	Out	of	the	six	case	studies	conducted	in	this	research,	there	are	previous	studies	looking	into	three	from	a	public	policy	perspective	(Thomas,	1998;	West	 and	Pennel,	 2000,	 2012;	Bonamino,	 2002;	Goldstein,	 2003;	West,	 2010;	Worthy,	2014;	Hine	and	Peele,	2016;	among	others).4	Although	these	studies	do	not	address	the	questions	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 research,	 they	 nonetheless	 provide	 an	 informative	background	for	the	institutional	environment	in	which	RTPs	were	adopted	and	for	actors’	reaction	to	them.	Most	importantly,	these	studies	provide	data	over	the	past	twenty	or	thirty	years	about	the	trajectory	of	the	RTPs	being	studied.	As	such,	the	first	step	of	data	collection	consisted	of	a	review	of	the	existing	literature	regarding	the	policies	 in	each	sector	and	country	covered	in	the	research.	Secondly,	I	went	on	to	document	the	normative	changes	that	defined	or	supported	the	 creation	 and	 changes	 in	 the	 trajectories	 of	 RTPs	 for	 each	 case	 study.	 Due	 to	 the	normative	nature	of	changes	to	RTPs	analysed	in	the	thesis,	i.e.	mostly	institutionalised	in	secondary	 legislation,	 I	 placed	 particular	 attention	 to	 the	 enactment	 and	 changes	 to	executive	 decrees	 and	 other	 secondary	 norms,	 such	 as	 regulators’	 guides	 and	recommendations,	as	well	as	to	the	context	in	which	they	were	adopted.		Due	to	the	fact	that	previous	studies	did	not	look	in	depth	into	the	evolution	and	the	politics	of	regulatory	transparency	policies	as	suggested	in	this	thesis,	the	third	step	of	data	collection	still	aimed	to	compile	information	that	informed	about	the	creation	and	evolution	 of	 RTPs	 and	 pointed	 to	 actors’	 reaction,	 engagement	 and	 mobilisation	 to	influence	their	trajectories.	This	was	first	done	through	desk	research,	when	I	collected	material	available	in	newspapers,	opinion	pieces	published	in	important	media	channels,	websites	of	international	and	national	NGOs,	and	alike.	When	I	could	not	trace	detailed	information	about	the	evolution	of	the	regulatory	transparency	policies	of	the	research,	I	contacted	 the	 public	 offices	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 policies	 both	 through	 open	 channels	 of	communication	 (such	 as	 ‘Contact	 Us’)	 and,	 when	 non-existent	 or	 unresponsive,	 by	submitting	 freedom	 of	 information	 requests	with	 specific	 questions	 and	 demands	 for	information.	None	of	the	data	gathered	on	the	first,	second	or	third	steps	of	data	collection	were	considered	more	relevant	than	another,	rather	they	aimed	at	supplementing	each	other	in	order	to	give	me	a	comprehensive	view	of	important	elements	of	the	birth	and	trajectories	of	each	RTP.	
                                                4	The	 three	cases	are	part	of	Chapter	3,	on	Members’	Register	of	Expenses	and	Allowances,	 and	Chapters	4	and	5,	on	the	trajectories	of	secondary	school	performance	tables.	
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The	 final	 stage	of	data	 collection,	 following	a	 comprehensive	 assessment	of	 each	case	 study,	 involved	 in-depth	 interviews	 with	 regulators,	 public	 officials	 and	representatives	of	interest	groups,	such	as	NGOs	and	other	identified	third	parties.	The	interviews	served	 two	 important	purposes:	First,	 they	were	necessary	and	used	 to	 fill	crucial	gaps	of	knowledge	in	the	lives	of	the	specific	RTPs	assessed	in	the	thesis,	to	be	able	to	retrace	each	step	of	their	evolution.	Secondly,	they	were	aimed	at	better	understanding	the	perspectives	of	various	actors	involved	in	the	RTPs	in	question.	Elite	interviews	help	to	 uncover	 the	 perspective	 of	 relevant	 actors,	 who	 play	 key	 roles	 in	 political,	administrative	or	regulatory	organisations,	and	to	clarify	the	links	between	the	narratives	and	the	theoretical	framework	(Marshall	and	Rossman,	2011).		Obtaining	interviews	was	arguably	the	most	challenging	part	of	the	data	collection	process.	For	every	case	study	 in	 the	 thesis	 I	aimed	at	 talking	 to	representatives	of	 the	actors	that	pushed	for	further	regulatory	transparency	(i.e.	the	drivers),	the	actors	that	were	regulated	by	RTPs	(the	targets),	and	actors	that	played	the	role	of	intermediaries.	In	spite	of	the	significant	effort	I	put	into	identifying	and	contacting	interviewees,	I	was	not	able	to	maintain	a	balance	in	the	number	of	drivers,	targets	and	intermediaries	for	each	case	study,	as	I	initially	intended	to.	Due	to	my	previous	work	in	the	Brazilian	government,	it	was	easier	to	connect	with	potential	 interviewees	in	Brazil	than	it	was	in	the	British	case,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	public	 regulators	 and	authorities.	Though	 this	was	quite	challenging	from	the	perspective	of	research	design,	it	is	important	to	state	that,	except	for	 the	 case	 study	 in	 the	 financial	 sector,	 the	 amount	 of	 data	 available	 on	 secondary	sources	 about	 the	 English	 RTPs	 was	 significantly	 more	 extensive	 than	 that	 in	 Brazil.	Therefore,	I	tried	to	address	potential	biases	generated	by	this	imbalance	by	intensifying	the	 research	 on	 secondary	 sources,	 in	 particular	 looking	 for	 previously	 published	interviews	 and	 op-eds	 by	 the	 actors	 underrepresented	 in	 the	 interviews.	 In	 total,	 I	conducted	 26	 interviews.5	 Although	 for	 all	 case	 studies	 I	 put	 considerable	 effort	 to	obtaining	 interviews	 from	 key	 actors,	 I	 had	 to	 focus	 particularly	 intensely	 on	 actor	interviews	 conducted	 for	 the	Brazilian	 school	 performance	 tables	 (Chapter	 4)	 and	 for	regulatory	transparency	policies	on	the	financial	sector	in	both	countries	(Chapters	6	and	7),	as	there	is	little	material	available	about	these	subjects	in	relation	to	the	topic	of	this	research.	Finally,	it	should	be	noted	that	from	2007	to	2012	I	was	the	manager	of	the	Brazilian	Transparency	Portal	(at	the	Brazilian	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General),	which	is	the	RTP	assessed	in	Chapter	2,	and	of	other	transparency	initiatives,	including	the	implementation	of	the	Brazilian	Freedom	of	Information	Act.	As	a	researcher,	I	actively	and	consistently	
                                                5	A	list	of	the	interviews	conducted,	with	additional	information	about	the	interviewees’	positions	and	the	date	of	the	interviews,	is	available	per	chapter	in	the	annexes	to	this	research.	
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aimed	at	addressing	the	potential	bias	of	being	an	internal	observer	by	following	strictly	the	same	research	methods	adopted	for	the	other	cases.	I	am	aware,	however,	that	some	of	my	own	observations	and	analyses	from	my	experience	as	a	practitioner	are	reflected	in	the	chapter.		As	 a	 practitioner,	 I	 share	 the	 view	 that	 transparency	 can	 foster	 the	 important	democratic	value	of	public	accountability	and	that	full	disclosure	should	be	pursued	in	a	number	of	policy	areas,	such	as	public	finance,	and	in	several	administrative	acts	in	public	administration,	such	as	the	results	and	impacts	of	public	policies.	On	the	other	hand,	given	its	 various	 limitations,	 I	 do	 not	 claim	 to	 be	 an	 unconditional	 supporter	 of	 regulatory	transparency	 policies.	 As	 with	 many	 other	 regulatory	 mechanisms,	 transparency	 is	 a	technical	tool,	with	potentials	and	pitfalls,	and	should	be	addressed	as	such,	rather	than	a	solution	for	all	policy	problems.		All	 too	 often,	 the	 hope	 attached	 to	 a	 transparency	 policy	 turns	 out	 far	 more	ambitious	than	what	the	policy	can	and	ultimately	does	deliver,	due	to	inherent	problems	related	 to	 the	motivation	 or	 capacity	 of	 the	 disclosers	 of	 information	 or	 its	 potential	beneficiaries	 (Roberts	 2015).	 Perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 as	 studies	 on	 the	 politics	 of	transparency	have	shown	(Fung	et	al,	2007;	Berliner,	2014;	Birchall,	2014;	Vargovčíková,	2015)	and	as	I	discuss	further	in	Chapter	1,	transparency	is	a	highly	political	tool	that	is	frequently	used	for	purposes	other	than	strengthening	democracy.	“Far	too	often”,	argues	Birchall	(2014),	“disclosures	are	used	to	renew	rather	than	disrupt	the	political	system.”		
2.3.	Period	of	analysis	Each	case	study	in	this	thesis	covers	approximately	a	period	of	twenty	years,	 from	the	early	1990s	to	2015.	There	is	some	variance	of	the	period	of	analysis	between	the	case	studies,	due	to	the	specific	time	of	creation	of	RTPs.	I	adopted	the	initial	period	due	to	the	fact	 that	the	two	countries	went	through	public	sector	and	regulatory	reforms	until	or	during	 the	 90s,	 when	 transparency	 could	 have	 been	 emphasised	 as	 a	 regulatory	mechanism	or	as	a	mechanism	to	increase	the	accountability	of	privatised	services.	The	end	period	of	analysis	is	2015,	a	year	before	the	submission	of	this	thesis,	in	order	to	cover	as	much	 as	 possible	 the	 variations	 in	 RTPs’	 across	 time,	 including	 periods	 of	 reforms	towards	greater	transparency.				
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2.4.	Limitations	of	the	research	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	thesis	has	a	number	of	limitations.	A	potential	criticism	this	research	might	draw	is	related	to	the	generalisability	of	its	conclusions,	given	the	limited	number	 of	 case	 studies	 analysed	 within	 each	 of	 the	 three	 dominant	 logics.	 A	 larger	number	 of	 case	 studies	 in	more	 policy	 areas	 and	more	 countries	 could	 perhaps	 help	reaching	 more	 decisive	 conclusions	 regarding	 patterns	 and	 determinants	 of	 RTP	trajectories.	However,	as	suggested	by	Baumgartner	and	Jones	(2009)	 in	their	seminal	study	 of	 policy	 evolutions,	 no	 group	 of	 public	 policies,	 nine	 or	 twenty-nine,	 could	 be	thought	of	as	a	sufficient	basis	for	generalisation.	In	any	case,	the	number	of	cases	in	this	research	does	not	render	its	findings	any	less	significant.	These	findings	can	be	tested	and	questions	that	arise	regarding	generalisability	can	be	explored	in	further	investigations	and	 supplementary	 case	 study	 analyses.	 As	 is	 often	 the	 case	 with	 research	 projects	involving	limited	time	and	resources,	a	choice	between	going	in-depth	into	a	few	cases	versus	increasing	the	number	of	cases	at	the	risk	of	keeping	the	analysis	more	superficial	is	an	inevitable	one,	and	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis	I	decided	the	former	was	the	more	appropriate	path.	Another	pitfall	of	 the	research	stems	from	the	 limited	availability	of	reliable	data	regarding	the	effective	use	of	disclosed	information	by	beneficiaries	of	disclosure	(such	as	parents,	citizens	or	consumers)	as	a	result	of	the	initiatives	analysed	in	the	case	studies.	This	has	reduced	my	ability	to	make	stronger	assertions	about	the	impact	of	information	use	 by	 beneficiaries	 in	 the	 trajectories	 of	 RTPs.	 As	 Chapter	 1	 will	 discuss,	 the	 use	 of	disclosed	information	by	beneficiaries	may	increase	the	bargaining	power	of	the	drivers	or	targets	of	regulation.	On	the	other	hand,	in	several	cases,	lack	of	information	use	may	empower	the	targets	of	disclosure	to	demand	retrenchment	of	regulatory	transparency.	In	order	 to	overcome	 this	 limitation,	 I	 submitted	a	number	of	 freedom	of	 information	requests	to	regulators	as	well	as	a	series	of	requests	to	private	disclosers	to	find	out	about	the	volume	and	nature	of	access	to	their	main	discloser	channels.		
3.	Thesis	Outline	The	thesis	is	divided	in	eight	chapters,	excluding	this	Introduction.	Chapter	1	reviews	the	literature	on	institutional	change,	debates	the	rise	of	the	cultural	and	institutional	factors	that	 strengthen	 transparency	 as	 a	 social	 norm	and	 a	policy	 solution.	The	 chapter	 also	proposes	 an	 analytical	 framework	 for	 the	 research	 and	 suggests	 that	 regulatory	transparency	 initiatives	 are	 self-enforcing	 and	 proposes	 an	 analytical	 framework	 to	analyse	 RTPs	 based	 on	 their	 ‘logics’,	 actors	 involved	 in	 their	 design	 and	 the	 type	 of	information	disclosed.		
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Chapters	2	to	7	make	up	the	case	studies	of	the	thesis.	These	are	grouped	into	three	parts.	Each	part	includes	two	chapters,	one	on	Brazil	and	the	other	on	the	UK,	focusing	on	one	of	the	three	logics	of	regulatory	transparency.	Part	I	examines	the	logic	of	control.	In	it,	Chapter	2	provides	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	Brazilian	Transparency	Portal,	enacted	as	a	tool	to	provide	citizens	with	information	about	the	federal	government’s	expenses	and	to	enforce	the	country’s	fiscal	responsibility	law	and	advanced	as	one	of	the	federal	government’s	main	 transparency	 initiatives	against	 corruption.	Chapter	3	narrates	 the	story	of	the	enactment	of	transparency	requirements	to	regulate	conflict	of	interest	in	the	House	of	Commons	as	well	as	MPs’	parliamentary	expenses.		Part	 II	 is	 about	 the	 logic	 of	 performance.	 It	 includes	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5,	 which	analyse	 the	 introduction	of	 regulatory	 transparency	 to	Brazil	 and	England’s	 education	systems,	 specifically	 to	 secondary	 schools.	 The	 chapters	 demonstrate	 how,	 in	 spite	 of	different	 policy	 designs,	 some	 of	 the	 struggles	 between	 the	 drivers	 and	 the	 targets	 of	regulatory	transparency	in	the	performance	logic	can	lead	to	similar	trajectories.	Part	III	focuses	on	the	logic	of	transaction.	Chapters	6	and	7	explore	the	evolution	of	regulatory	transparency	 in	 the	 transaction	 logic	 by	 analysing	 initiatives	 in	 the	 area	 of	 personal	current	 accounts	 in	 the	 banking	 sector	 of	 both	 countries.	 Each	 part	 concludes	with	 a	comparative	analysis	of	the	cases	examined	within	the	logics.		Finally,	the	Conclusion	reviews	the	evidence	from	the	case	studies	to	evaluate	the	original	 argument	 that	 regulatory	 transparency	 policies	 are	 self-reinforcing,	 presents	conclusions	on	how	the	logics	of	RTPs	and	actor	interactions	inform	the	evolution	of	these	policies,	and	discusses	findings	and	insights	in	light	of	the	literature	on	transparency.		
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CHAPTER	1:	
A	SCHOLARLY	PLURALISTIC	APPROACH	TO	THE		
TRAJECTORY	CHANGES	OF	RTPs	
		
Introduction	This	chapter	introduces	the	analytical	framework	used	in	this	thesis	to	analyse	the	case	studies.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 literature	on	 institutional	 change	offers	useful	 tools	 for	 the	study	 of	 the	 trajectories	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	 policies	 (RTPs).	 I	 claim	 that	 a	scholarly	 pluralism	 in	 studying	 institutional	 change,	 which	 combines	 elements	 of	historical	institutionalism	and	rational-choice	approaches,	while	taking	into	account	both	the	formal	and	informal	institutional	environment,	provides	the	most	appropriate	model	to	analyse	the	trajectories	of	RTPs.	While	 the	 wider	 socio-political	 environment,	 defined	 by	 culturally	 embedded	norms	and	principles	enshrined	by	key	political	institutions,	provides	a	key	impetus	for	the	creation	of	transparency	policies,	I	suggest	that	once	these	policies	are	in	place,	they	can	expand,	retrench,	stagnate	or	be	contested	even	in	the	absence	of	critical	junctures	like	external	shocks,	crises	or	legislative	turning	points.	The	fact	that	the	RTPs	analysed	in	this	research	are	not	enacted	through	primary	laws	(unlike,	for	instance,	FoIAs),	and	hence	the	procedure	to	amend	them	is	often	less	complex,	also	suggests	that	they	may	be	more	open	to	frequent	modification	after	creation;	this	is	a	story	that	also	emerges	from	the	case	studies.	To	understand	the	determinants	of	the	possible	trajectory	of	an	RTP,	I	argue	that	we	need	to	focus	on	actor	positions	and	interactions,	which	can	be	influenced	by	the	specific	‘logic’	of	the	RTP.			The	chapter	starts	by	engaging	with	the	existing	theoretical	debate	on	institutional	change,	 focusing	on	 the	 scope	of	 institutional	 analysis	 and	questions	of	 abrupt	versus	incremental	change.	Second,	to	shed	light	on	where	the	debate	on	transparency	is	rooted,	and	to	situate	regulatory	transparency	policies	within	the	wider	socio-political	context,	I	introduce	a	three-layer	framework,	which	consists	of	culturally	embedded	norms	(macro	
layer),	 the	political	 system	 (meso	 layer)	 and	 governance	 (micro	 layer).	While	 the	 case	studies	focus	on	the	micro	layer,	I	explore	the	linkages	between	the	three	layers,	which	supports	the	explanation	of	the	policies’	evolutionary	trajectories.		Informed	by	this	framework,	the	third	and	final	section	of	the	chapter	introduces	the	key	hypotheses	of	the	research	concerning	the	trajectory	of	change	in	RTPs.	I	argue	
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that	once	they	are	created,	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing,	i.e.	they	tend	to	follow	the	original	purpose	 (or	 path)	 they	 were	 created	 for.	 This	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 they	 cannot	expand,	stagnate	or	even	retrench	on	this	path.	To	explain	when	and	why	they	would	follow	a	particular	trajectory,	I	propose	looking	at	actors’	interactions,	in	particular	the	ability	and	willingness	of	certain	actors	 to	push	 for	or	resist	disclosure,	as	well	as	 the	specific	 logic	 of	 an	 RTP,	 which,	 I	 suggest,	 can	 influence	 trajectories	 by	 shaping	 actor	relations.			
1.	A	Pluralistic	Approach	to	Institutional	Change		In	 his	 influential	 article	 on	 ‘New	 Institutional	 Economics’,	 Nobel	 prize	 laurate	 Oliver	Williamson	(2000,	p.	595)	makes	a	confession,	an	assertion	and	a	recommendation:		 The	 confession	 is	 that	 we	 are	 still	 very	 ignorant	 about	 institutions.	 The	assertion	is	that	the	past	quarter	century	has	witnessed	enormous	progress	in	the	 study	 of	 institutions.	 The	 recommendation	 is	 that,	 awaiting	 a	 unified	theory,	we	should	be	accepting	of	pluralism.		Nearly	two	decades	on,	there	is	still	no	consensus	on	the	definition	of	an	institution,	nor	 a	 unified	 grand	 theory	 to	 explain	 institutional	 change.	 But	 the	 multiplicity	 of	definitions	 and	 theories	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 a	 weakness	 in	 the	 literature.	 An	increasing	number	of	scholars	of	institutional	change	seem	to	accept	and	suggest	that	a	pluralistic	approach	that	combines	aspects	of	different	traditions	may	be	better	suited	to	understanding	 how	 and	why	 institutions	 change	 (Grief	 and	 Laitin,	 2004;	 Streeck	 and	Thelen,	2005;	Hall,	2010).	Hall,	for	example,	argues	that	“the	greatest	advances	will	be	made	by	 those	willing	 to	 borrow	 concepts	 and	 formulations	 from	multiple	 schools	 of	thought”	 (Hall	 2010,	 p.	 220).	 In	 this	 vein,	 this	 research	 uses	 insights	 from	 historical	institutionalism	and	rational	choice	to	understand	the	trajectories	of	change	in	RTPs.	The	present	section	aims	at	highlighting	some	of	the	key	debates	within	the	literature	that	are	useful	in	conceptualising	a	pluralistic	approach.	Let	me	emphasise	that	what	I	am	putting	forward	here	 is	a	 type	of	 ‘scholarly	pluralism’	–	not	 to	be	confused	with	 ‘pluralism’	 in	democratic	theory.				The	definition	of	an	institution	continues	to	be	debated	and	contested.	Here,	we	can	identify	three	main	strands	in	the	literature.	The	first	one	defines	institutions	as	“formal	rules	 of	 the	 game”,	 i.e.	 constitutions,	 laws,	 treaties,	 enforcement	mechanisms,	 formal	organisations	and	the	institutional	design	of	government	(North,	1990).	A	second	strand	
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defines	institutions	more	broadly	to	refer	to	sociological	concepts,	such	as	mores,	rituals	and	values,	which	tend	to	be	unwritten	and	enforced	informally	(Powell,	1991).	Historical	institutionalists	 emphasise	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	 institutions	 “embedded	 in	 the	organisational	 structure	 of	 the	 polity	 or	 political	 economy”	 (Hall	 and	 Taylor,	 1996).	Mahoney	and	Thelen	(2010,	p.	5)	define	institutions	as	“relatively	enduring	features	of	political	 and	 social	 life	 (rules,	 norms,	 procedures)	 that	 structure	 behaviour	 and	 that	cannot	be	changed	easily	or	instantaneously.”	According	to	Streeck	and	Thelen	(2005,	p.	10),	 the	defining	 feature	of	an	 institution	 is	“that	actors	are	expected	to	conform	to	 it,	regardless	of	what	 they	would	want	 to	do	on	 their	own”.	Finally,	 a	 third	 strand,	used	mainly	by	rational-choice	institutionalists,	views	institutions	as	“self-sustaining,	salient	patterns	 of	 social	 interaction”	 giving	 rise	 to	 “common	 knowledge	 among	 the	 players	regarding	a	particular	equilibrium	path	of	the	game”	(Aoki	2007;	cited	in	Kingston	and	Caballero	2009).		The	relevant	questions	that	arise	from	these	multiple	concepts	and	definitions	are	‘how	 does	 each	 strand	 analyse	 institutional	 change?’	 and,	 more	 specifically	 for	 the	purposes	of	this	research,	‘how	can	they	help	us	understand	the	trajectories	of	regulatory	transparency	policies?’.	Here,	sociological	institutionalism	focuses	on	the	role	of	culture,	while	rational-choice	institutionalism	focuses	on	the	role	of	actor	interactions	and	power	relations.	 According	 to	 the	 latter	 approach,	 institutions	 form	 and	 change	 as	 rational	actors	 pursue	 their	 self-interest.	 Institutions	 are	 stable	 when	 actors’	 interests	 and	expectations	 are	 in	 equilibrium.	They	 change	when	 their	 ‘strategic	 calculus’	 (Hall	 and	Taylor,	1996)	shifts,	 the	equilibrium	is	broken	(‘punctuated’)	and	there	 is	search	for	a	new	equilibrium	(Aoki	2001;	Grief	and	Laitin,	2004).		Whereas	 rational	 choice	 institutionalists	 explain	 institutional	 stability	 with	 an	equilibrium,	 historical	 institutionalists	 use	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘path	 dependence’.	 From	 a	broad	definition,	path	dependence	means	that	past	choices	in	the	design	of	institutions	will	have	an	impact	on	their	future	trajectory.	In	this	regard,	whereas	the	concept	takes	into	account	the	role	of	actors	in	shaping	policy	designs,	especially	at	‘critical	junctures’,	the	 focus	 is	 on	 timing	 and	 sequence	 of	 occurrences.	 However,	 as	 Pierson	 (2000)	 has	noted,	 such	 a	 broad	 definition	 has	 limited	 analytical	 use.	 A	 narrower,	more	 qualified,	definition	emphasises	‘increasing	returns’	(also	described	as	self-reinforcing	or	positive	feedback	 processes),	 which	 suggests	 that	 once	 actors	 take	 a	 specific	 path	 at	 a	 given	moment,	that	path	is	likely	to	persist	because	‘the	relative	benefits	of	the	current	activity	compared	with	other	possible	options	increase	over	time’	(Pierson,	2000,	p.	252),	which	also	makes	it	progressively	costly	to	reverse	the	path.	Levi	(1997)	offers	a	particularly	insightful	way	to	think	about	self-reinforcing	processes.	Rather	than	a	‘path’,	she	uses	the	metaphor	of	a	 ‘tree’,	where	in	“the	same	trunk,	there	are	many	different	branches	and	
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smaller	branches.”	While	 it	 is	possible	 for	a	policy	to	turn	around	and	climb	from	one	branch	to	another	–	“essential	if	the	chosen	branch	dies”	–	the	branch	on	which	the	policy	sets	off	is	the	one	it	will	most	likely	follow	(Levi,	1997;	cited	in	Pierson,	2000,	p.	252).	A	criticism	pointed	at	path	dependence	and	equilibrium	accounts	has	been	 their	reliance	on	exogenous	factors	to	bring	about	change	(Saint-Martin,	2005,	p.	145).	Indeed,	in	 all	 three	 branches	 of	 institutionalism,	 the	 tendency	 has	 been	 to	 conceptualise	institutions	as	resistant	to	change	by	default.	According	to	this	logic,	once	set	on	a	specific	path	or	equilibrium,	institutions	are	stable	until	change	is	imposed	externally	at	critical	junctures	or	moments	of	punctuation.	A	number	of	scholars	have	criticised	this	tendency	and	looked	for	ways	institutions	can	and	do	change	without	the	need	of	an	external	shock	(Grief	and	Laitin,	2004;	Streek	and	Thelen,	2005;	Aoki,	2007;	Mahoney	and	Thelen,	2010).		Significantly,	most	of	the	arguments	for	endogenous	or	gradual	change	came	from	those	 scholars	 who	 combine	 aspects	 of	 rational-choice	 and	 historical	 institutionalist	approaches.	Building	on	a	game-theoretical	framework,	but	also	incorporating	criticisms	from	 historical	 institutionalists	 that	 rational-choice	 institutionalism	 ignores	 historical	processes,	Grief	and	Laitin	(2004)	propose	a	dynamic	model	in	which	institutions	can	be	both	 self-reinforcing	 or	 self-undermining,	 and	 change	 can	 occur	 exogenously	 or	endogenously.6	On	the	other	side	of	the	theoretical	divide,	Streeck	and	Thelen	challenge	the	 common	 historical	 institutionalist	 assumption	 that	 institutions	 experience	 long	periods	of	stability	that	are	interrupted	by	short	periods	of	sudden	change:		 ‘Agency’	and	‘structure’,	in	other	words,	do	not	just	matter	sequentially	–	unlike	in	Katznelson	(2003)	where	 institutions	mostly	constrain	and	where	change	has	 to	wait	 for	 those	 rare	moments	when	agency	defeats	 structure.	Political	institutions	are	not	only	periodically	contested;	they	are	the	object	of	ongoing	skirmishing	as	actors	try	to	achieve	advantage	by	interpreting	or	redirecting	institutions	in	pursuit	of	their	goals,	or	by	subverting	or	circumventing	rules	that	clash	with	their	interests.	(Streeck	and	Thelen,	2005,	p.	19)			Based	 on	 this	 premise,	 Mahoney	 and	 Thelen	 (2010)	 introduce	 their	 “Theory	 of	Gradual	Institutional	Change”	that	focuses	on	the	continuous	power	struggles	that	occur	
                                                6	“An	institution	is	reinforcing	when	the	behavior	and	processes	it	entails,	through	their	impact	on	quasi-parameters,	increase	the	range	of	parameter	values	(and	thus	“situations”)	in	which	the	institution	is	self-enforcing.	[…]	But	such	reinforcing	processes	can	fail	to	occur.	The	processes	an	institution	entails	can	undermine	the	extent	to	which	the	associated	behavior	is	self-enforcing.	Hence,	institutions	can	be	self-undermining	and	the	behaviors	that	they	entail	can	cultivate	the	seeds	of	their	own	demise.	However,	institutional	change	will	endogenously	occur	only	when	the	self-undermining	process	reaches	a	critical	level	such	that	past	patterns	of	behavior	are	no	longer	self-enforcing.”	(Grief	and	Laitin,	2004,	p.	634)	
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within	institutions	even	at	times	of	apparent	stability.	They	hold	that	“there	is	nothing	automatic,	self-perpetuating,	or	self-reinforcing	about	institutional	arrangements.”		 Rather,	 a	 dynamic	 component	 is	 built	 in;	 where	 institutions	 represent	compromises	or	relatively	durable	though	still	contested	settlements	based	on	specific	coalitional	dynamics,	 they	are	always	vulnerable	to	shifts.	 (Mahoney	and	Thelen,	2010,	p.	8)		Going	back	to	Grief	and	Laitin’s	theory	of	endogenous	institutional	change,	I	find	the	harmonisation	 of	 historical	 and	 rational	 choice	 institutionalism	 to	 be	 particularly	insightful,	as	it	allows	to	incorporate	both	the	self-reinforcing	potential	of	institutions	as	well	as	the	possibility	for	gradual	change	through	continuous	actor	interactions:			 Despite	 recent	 advances,	we	 do	 not	 claim	 that	 game	 theory	 is	 sufﬁcient	 for	institutional	analysis	(Greif,	n.	d.,	part	III).	We	recognize	that	while	game	theory	provides	 a	 useful	 analytical	 tool	 for	 studying	 self-enforcing	 beliefs	 and	behavior	 in	a	given	situation,	by	virtue	of	 its	sparseness,	 it	does	not	capture	fully	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 interrelationships	 between	 individuals	 and	 the	institutions	 inﬂuencing	 their	 behavior.	Accordingly,	we	deﬁne	 an	 institution	not	 as	 an	 equilibrium	but	 in	 a	way	 that	 distinguishes	between	 the	object	 of	study	—	institutions	—	and	the	analytical	tools	used	to	study	them.	We	deﬁne	institutions	as	a	system	of	human	made,	nonphysical	elements	–	norms,	beliefs,	organizations,	 and	 rules	 –	 exogenous	 to	 each	 individual	 whose	 behavior	 it	inﬂuences	 that	 generates	 behavioral	 regularities.	 (Grief	 and	 Laitin,	 2004,	 p.	635)		In	 line	 with	 the	 ongoing	 pluralistic	 trend	 in	 the	 scholarship,	 this	 thesis	 draws	insights	 from	both	 the	 interaction-oriented	 rational-choice	approach	and	 the	process-oriented	 historical	 approach	 in	 analysing	 the	 trajectories	 of	 change	 in	 RTPs.	 It	 also	considers	 the	 role	of	 the	 informal	 and	 formal	 institutional	 environment	 in	 setting	 the	socio-political	stage	on	which	actors	engage	in	the	policymaking	processes.	To	this	end,	the	 next	 section	 introduces	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 where	 different	 layers	 of	institutional	 change	 can	 be	 situated	 and	 their	 relationship	 with	 each	 other	 can	 be	discussed.	
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2.	Institutional	Change	in	Regulatory	Transparency	Policies	
	
2.1.	A	Three-Layer	Framework	of	Institutional	Change	Based	 on	 the	 debates	 touched	 upon	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 this	 part	 provides	 a	conceptual	 framework	 that	 aims	 at	 a)	 outlining	 the	 normative	 basis	 and	 political	environment	in	which	current	transparency	debates	are	rooted;	b)	locating	RTPs	within	this	wider	 socio-political	 context;	 and	 c)	 emphasising	 both	 the	 interlinkages	 between	these	levels	and	the	different	ways	they	lend	themselves	to	research.		
		The	framework,	illustrated	in	Figure	1.1,	is	inspired	by	Williamson’s	(2000,	pp.	596–600)	 four-level	social	analysis,	which	he	employs	 in	his	overview	of	New	Institutional	Economics.	These	are	envisioned	as	three	concentric	circles,	where	the	analysis	moves	between	a	macro	level	at	the	outer	circle	and	the	micro	level	at	the	inner	circle.	The	outer	circle,	or	Layer	1,	is	the	most	abstract	layer,	which	deals	with	the	informal	institutions	of	society;	its	norms,	customs	and	traditions	that	tend	to	inform	conventional	value	systems	and	play	a	significant	role	in	shaping	formal	institutions.		 In	Layer	2,	 the	meso	 layer,	we	 look	at	 the	 formal	 institutions	 that	make	up	 the	wider	political	 system	and	define	 the	 ‘rules	of	 the	game’.	These	 include	primary	 laws,	constitutions,	as	well	as	international	conventions	and	organisations	that	enshrine	and	promote	specific	principles,	 implicitly	 (through	 institutional	architecture)	or	explicitly	(through	the	wording	of	the	law).	Based	on	these	principles,	institutions	of	the	political	
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system	 encourage	 certain	 behaviours	 and	 sanction	 others,	 thereby	 setting	 the	 formal	ground	for	regulation	and	policymaking.	Ideological	shifts	often	translate	to	changes	in	the	formal	rules	that	alter	the	push	and	pull	dynamics	of	policymaking.		 In	Layer	3,	which	is	the	empirical	focus	of	this	thesis,	we	zoom	into	the	making	of	policies	in	specific	policy	areas,	highlighting	the	dynamics	of	change	at	the	micro	level	of	governance.	This	is	where	various	actors	and	stakeholders	mobilise	and	engage	with	each	other	continuously	for	policymaking	and	regulatory	purposes.	They	do	so	on	the	basis	of	the	‘formal	rules’	of	the	political	system,	as	well	as	their	perceived	self-interests	and	value	systems.	It	is	therefore	worth	noting	that	actors’	value	systems	are	directly	related	to	the	normative	 framework	 embedded	 in	 Layer	1,	 indicating	 that	 even	when	 acting	 in	 self-interest,	 actors	 take	 into	account	 the	wider	 socio-political	 context.	Hall,	 citing	Streeck	(1997),	 argues	 that	 beyond	 “hard	 headed”	 calculations	 of	 interest,	 actors	 also	 judge	redistribution	of	gains	on	the	basis	of	“conventional	conceptions	of	fairness”:		 Claims	 for	 social	 justice	 are	 not	 simply	 an	 ideological	 patina	 washed	 over	arrangements	negotiated	 for	other	reasons.	They	are	an	 intrinsic	element	of	the	 expectations	 actors	 bring	 to	 decisions	 about	 institutional	 reform.	 (Hall,	2010,	p.	211)		As	the	case	studies	dealing	with	the	control	and	performance	logics	of	regulatory	transparency	will	demonstrate,	considerations	of	proportionality	and	social	justice	are	not	limited	to	distributive	policies	only.	They	also	inform	actor	relations	in	the	making	of	regulatory	policies.	Before	 applying	 this	 three-layered	 framework	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 regulatory	transparency,	I	would	like	to	propose	a	number	of	points	about	the	nature	and	dynamics	of	change	within	and	between	these	layers.	The	first	point	is	about	the	speed	of	change,	which	becomes	faster	as	we	move	from	the	macro	layer	to	the	micro	layer.	Change	in	the	macro	sphere	of	culturally	embedded	norms	takes	place	very	slowly,	usually	measured	in	the	scale	of	centuries	or	longer	(Williamson,	2000,	p.	596),	although	one	can	argue	that	the	speed	of	technological	innovation	has	been	accelerating	this	process	significantly.	In	the	meso	layer	of	political	systems,	institutional	change	still	does	not	occur	very	fast;	it	is	usually	measured	from	decades	to	a	few	centuries.	Finally,	the	micro	layer	of	governance	is	where	changes	are	prone	to	occur	the	fastest,	typically	in	a	matter	of	years	to	a	few	decades.	Correspondingly,	each	case	study	in	this	thesis	covers	a	period	of	approximately	two	decades.	A	 related	 point	 pertains	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 change	 in	 the	 three	 layers,	 and	 the	discussion	 on	 structure	 and	 agency.	 Given	 the	 slow	 moving	 dynamics	 of	 informal	
 36 
institutions,	 the	role	of	structure	appears	more	pronounced	 in	Layer	1.	Change	at	 this	layer	 happens	 through	 evolutionary	 processes,	 i.e.	 as	 long-term	 structural	transformations	 rather	 than	 the	 result	 of	 a	 single	 major	 event	 or	 deliberate	 design	(Streeck	and	Thelen,	2005,	p.	10).	This	is	not	to	deny	any	role	to	human	agency	in	shaping	culturally	embedded	norms.	For	instance,	we	cannot	talk	about	the	ideals	associated	with	the	 Enlightenment,	without	 referring	 to	 Enlightenment	 thinkers.	 The	 point	 here	 is	 to	emphasise	that	change	at	this	macro	layer	is	a	factor	of	a	great	number	of	events,	actor	choices,	interactions	and	design	over	a	long	period	of	time.	Actor	choices	and	institutional	design	become	more	clearly	visible	as	we	zoom	into	the	meso	 layer.	As	 in	Layer	1,	 change	here	 can	happen	 incrementally,	 as	 a	product	of	evolutionary	processes;	think	of	the	British	House	of	Lords	for	instance	(Mahoney	and	Thelen,	 2010,	 pp.	 1-4).	 But	 it	 can	 also	 be	 abrupt,	 as	 a	 result	 of	major	 events,	 such	 as	revolutions,	 systemic	 breakdowns	 or	 regime	 changes.	 Actor	 decisions	 at	 such	 critical	junctures	 can	 break	 paths	 and	 create	 new	 ones.	 Some	 of	 the	 best	 known	 works	 of	historical	institutionalism	have	focused	on	this	meso	layer	(e.g.	Skocpol,	1979;	Hattam,	1993;	Pierson,	1995;	Mahoney,	2001).	Finally,	as	I	will	discuss	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter,	the	dynamics	and	the	impact	of	actor	interactions	are	highly	prominent	at	the	micro	layer.	The	third	point	is	concerned	with	the	interaction	between	the	three	layers.	As	the	two-headed	arrows	in	Figure	1.1	indicate,	the	relationship	between	the	three	layers	is	conceptualised	as	symbiotic,	i.e.	influence	flows	simultaneously	inwards	and	outwards.	Policymaking	 is	 a	 process	 of	 continual	 interaction	 amongst	 various	 actors	 and	stakeholders	 on	 a	 playing	 field	 structured	 upon	 the	 informal	 and	 formal	 institutional	environment.	At	the	same	time,	the	policies	and	mechanisms	produced	as	a	result	of	these	interactions	 also	 remake	 politics,	 as	 they	 impose	 new	 constraints	 and	 incentives	 on	future	interactions	(Saint-Martin,	2005).	Finally,	it	is	important	to	note	that	while	certain	informal	and	formal	institutional	arrangements	can	strengthen	a	particular	policy	trajectory,	they	do	not	pre-determine	policy	designs.	This	is,	first,	because	the	institutions	on	the	macro	and	meso	layers	are	rarely	uncontested	themselves.	Secondly,	policymaking	also	relies	on	a	set	of	dynamics	specific	to	the	micro	layer,	namely,	actor	interests,	power	relations	and	the	intensity	and	priority	of	actor	preferences.	In	other	words,	although	looking	at	Layers	1	and	2	can	give	us	a	good	sense	of	the	playing	field	in	Layer	3,	we	cannot	explain	the	trajectory	of	a	policy	without	exploring	the	specific	dynamics	at	the	micro	layer.	Consequently,	the	main	focus	of	the	case	studies	of	this	thesis	will	be	at	this	micro	layer.			
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2.2.	The	Three	Layers	of	Regulatory	Transparency	This	 section	 will	 discuss	 transparency	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 three-layered	 framework	introduced	 above	 and	 outline	 the	 wider	 normative,	 institutional	 and	 socio-political	environments	 in	 which	 RTPs	 are	 created	 and	 developed.	 Figure	 1.2	 illustrates	 the	framework’s	application	to	transparency,	and	the	informal	and	formal	environment	on	which	RTPs	are	created	and	evolve.			
	
	Transparency	as	a	norm	is	rooted	in	the	Enlightenment	ideals	of	rationalism	and	positivism	(Hood,	2006)	and	in	the	social	and	technical	transformations	of	the	industrial	era.	The	term	‘enlightenment’	implies	illuminating	what	is	in	the	shadow,	or	making	the	unseen	 visible,	 which	 is	 a	 central	 definition	 for	 transparency.	 In	 the	 words	 of	anthropologists	Sanders	and	West	(2003,	p.	7):			 A	social	world	whose	workings	are	transparent	to	all	is	a	social	world	that	is	amenable	 to	 the	 dictates	 of	 reason,	 arrived	 at	 openly	 through	 the	 public	exercise	 of	 irrefutable	 logic	 validated	 by	 society’s	 sovereign	 subjects	themselves.	In	such	a	world,	there	is	no	place	for	suspicion	and	doubt;	there	are	 no	 dark	 recesses	 to	 harbor	 occult	 cosmologies,	 no	 closed	 chambers	 in	which	conspiracies	might	be	hatched.		
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In	the	creation	of	knowledge,	 for	example,	empiricists	 like	 John	Locke	and	David	Hume	 defended	 observation	 over	 belief,	 and	 inquiry	 over	 blind	 trust.	 Jean	 Jacques	Rousseau,	 Immanuel	 Kant	 and	 Jeremy	 Bentham	 identified	 secrecy	 and	 ambiguity	 as	sources	 of	 corruption,	 bad	 governance	 and	 instability.	 Bentham	 declared,	 “The	more	strictly	we	are	watched,	the	better	we	behave”	(cited	in	Hood,	2006,	p.	9).	But	the	same	philosophy	that	empowered	democratic	institutions	also	justified	authoritarianism	in	the	name	of	a	rational	society.	It	was	Bentham	who	designed	the	‘panopticon’	(the	all-seeing	prison	building)	 and	advocated	mass	 surveillance	 in	 the	 interests	of	public	order	 and	utility.	Discussing	Bentham’s	panopticon,	Foucault	in	his	Discipline	and	Punish	(1995,	p.	195)	emphasised	‘permanent	visibility’	was	a	tool	of	domination	that	replaced	physical	chains	in	the	modern	political	systems	of	industrialised	societies.	Openness	 and	 publicity	 also	 gradually	 became	 ideals	 to	 pursue	 in	 regulating	economic	and	financial	activities.	Liberal	thinkers	like	Locke	and	Adam	Smith	called	for	transparency	 in	 commercial	 affairs.	 In	The	Wealth	 of	Nations,	 first	 published	 in	 1776,	Smith	 (2012)	 criticised	 the	 domination	 of	 trade	 by	 secretive	 guilds	 and	 mercantilist	states.	He	made	the	case	for	a	well-functioning	free	market,	which	required	the	gaze	of	an	‘impartial	observer’,	i.e.	a	regulator	that	publicised	reliable	information	to	self-directed	individuals	(Smith,	2002	and	2012;	Mehrpuya	and	Djelic,	2014).	In	the	early	20th	century,	the	 idea	of	greater	visibility	became	 increasingly	seen	as	a	way	 to	regulate	banks	and	prevent	financial	abuses.	US	Supreme	Court	Justice	Louis	Brandeis	argued	that	if	bankers	published	 the	 commission	 or	 profits	 they	 were	 receiving	 when	 issuing	 securities,	excesses	would	reduce	rapidly.	“Publicity,”	he	famously	said,	“is	justly	commended	as	a	remedy	for	social	and	industrial	diseases.	Sunlight	is	said	to	be	the	best	of	disinfectants;	electric	light	the	most	efficient	policeman."7			 The	 ideas	 of	 openness,	 publicity	 and	 accountability	 have	 become	 culturally	embedded	norms	that	underpin	the	foundations	of	many	of	today’s	political	institutions	(Layer	2).	As	Hood	noted,	in	the	course	of	the	20th	century	transparency	attained	“a	quasi-religious	significance	in	debate	over	governance	and	institutional	design”	(Hood,	2006,	p.	3)	 whether	 for	 purposes	 of	 accountability,	 surveillance	 or	 efficiency.	 The	institutionalisation	of	principles	of	transparency	has	occurred	in	two	phases,	overlapping	with	 what	 Huntington	 (1991)	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 second	 and	 third	 waves	 of	
                                                7	“Require	a	full	disclosure	to	the	investor	of	the	amount	of	commissions	and	profits	paid;	and	not	only	will	 investors	be	put	on	 their	guard,	but	bankers’	 compensation	will	 tend	 to	adjust	 itself	automatically	 to	 what	 is	 fair	 and	 reasonable.	 Excessive	 commissions	 –	 this	 form	 of	 unjustly	acquired	wealth	–	will	 in	 large	part	cease.	…	But	the	disclosure	must	be	real.	And	it	must	be	a	disclosure	to	the	investor.	It	will	not	suffice	to	acquire	merely	the	filling	of	a	statement	of	facts	with	 the	 Commissioner	 of	 Corporations	 or	 with	 a	 score	 of	 other	 officials,	 federal	 and	 state.”	Brandeis	(1913,	p.	103-104).	
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democratisation:	first,	the	spread	of	liberal	democratic	systems	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	 World	 War,	 and	 second,	 the	 simultaneous	 processes	 of	 globalisation,	technological	innovation	and	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.		Especially	since	the	1980s,	a	growing	number	of	national	governments	have	been	adopting	 transparency	 policies	 aimed	 at	 combating	 corruption	 and	 public	 distrust	 of	government,	 breaking	 market	 inefficiency	 and	 dismantling	 the	 lack	 of	 democratic	accountability.	A	more	recent	example	is	the	‘Open	Government	Directive’	enacted	by	the	Obama	administration	in	the	US	in	2009.	In	establishing	the	Directive,	President	Obama	made	the	following	promise:		 My	 Administration	 is	 committed	 to	 creating	 an	 unprecedented	 level	 of	openness	in	Government.	We	will	work	together	to	ensure	the	public	trust	and	establish	 a	 system	 of	 transparency,	 public	 participation,	 and	 collaboration.	Openness	 will	 strengthen	 our	 democracy	 and	 promote	 efficiency	 and	effectiveness	in	Government.		Initiatives	 of	 open	 government	 and	 transparency	 are	 actively	 supported	 by	international	 and	 non-governmental	 organisations	 founded	 upon	 liberal	 norms.	 The	Intra-American	 Convention	 against	 Corruption	 and	 the	 UN	 Convention	 against	Corruption,	which	 came	 into	 force	 in	 1997	 and	2005	 respectively,	 are	 legally	 binding	international	conventions	that,	among	other	themes,	promote	transparency	as	a	means	to	 combatting	 corruption.	 In	 recent	 decades,	 national	 and	 international	 donor	organisations	such	as	the	IMF,	the	World	Bank,	the	USAID	and	the	UNDP	have	adopted	transparency	 standards	 both	 for	 self-regulation	 purposes	 and	 as	 precondition	 for	recipients	 to	 qualify	 for	 aid.	 Transnational	 NGOs	 Transparency	 International	 and	 the	Open	Society	Foundation,	both	founded	in	1993,	were	specifically	established	with	the	aim	 of	 furthering	 the	 ideals	 of	 transparency,	 accountability	 and	 good	 governance	 in	public	and	private	spheres.	In	other	words,	there	is	a	wide	range	of	formal	organisations	and	influential	actors	that	 have	 been	 pushing	 for	 more	 transparency.	 Indeed,	 existing	 data	 confirms	 that	governmental	transparency	has	been	on	the	rise	(Banisar,	2006;	Michener,	2011,	2015;	Berliner,	 2014).	 Disclosure	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 also	 increasing,	 along	 with	 the	technologies	 that	 allow	 consumers	 to	 compare	 products	 and	 services.	 From	 the	publication	 of	 school	 performance	 tables	 and	 detailed	 labels	 on	 products	 in	supermarkets,	 to	 comparable	 information	 regarding	 financial	 services	 and	 increased	visibility	of	politicians’	actions,	there	is	little	debate	that	transparency	has	become	a	pillar	of	socio-political	life.	
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This	does	not	mean	that	on	the	level	of	individual	policies	(Layer	3)	transparency	policies	are	guaranteed	to	be	created	and	expand	continuously.	In	spite	of	its	advance	in	recent	decades,	transparency	is	still	far	from	being	accepted	as	the	‘only	game	in	town’.	Within	the	 financial	sector,	 the	2007-08	crisis	revealed	how	banks	and	other	 financial	actors	devised	complex	 instruments	 to	create	opacity	and	bypass	existing	regulations.	While	the	immediate	response	of	many	governments	and	civil	society	organisations	to	the	crisis	was	to	call	for	more	transparency,	the	crisis	also	made	it	clear	that	transparency	alone	was	 not	 a	 sufficient	 regulatory	mechanism;	 it	 had	 to	 be	 accompanied	 by	 other	regulatory	and	governance	tools	(Crotty,	2009,	p.	566).	In	the	public	sector,	Roberts	(2006)	demonstrated	that	despite	the	growing	number	of	FoIAs	around	the	world,	government	secrecy	is	also	expanding,	imposing	significant	barriers	for	citizens	to	access	public	information	held	by	governments.	We	can	speak	of	a	trend	where	governments	limit	the	scope	of	certain	sets	of	information	while	expanding	surveillance	on	citizens	both	on	national	and	security	grounds.	This	has	been	happening	not	just	in	authoritarian	or	semi-democratic	settings	but	also	in	countries	where	political	actors	 and	 institutions	 express	 strong	 commitment	 to	 transparency:	 consider	 the	PATRIOT	 Act	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 National	 Security	 Agency	 (NSA)	 in	 the	aftermath	of	the	11	September	2001	attacks	in	the	United	States.	In	the	21st	century,	the	all	seeing-eye	watching	citizens’	every	physical	step,	in	the	shape	of	omnipresent	CCTV	cameras,	 and	 every	 digital	 step,	 through	 online	 data	 gathering	 by	 governments	 and	corporations,	has	become	an	ominous—yet	widely	tolerated—part	of	everyday	reality	even	in	the	most	democratic	societies.8		In	discussing	the	causes	of	this	trend,	it	is	necessary	to	explore	not	only	the	absence	or	limitations	of	transparency	as	a	regulatory	mechanism,	but	also	the	potentially	adverse	effects	of	existing	 transparency	policies	on	democratic	accountability.	Referring	 to	 the	general	 shift	 towards	 a	 rationale	 that	 views	 transparency	 as	 “beneficial	 for	 economic	efficiency	 and	national	 economic	 competitiveness”,	 rather	 than	a	direct	 component	of	democratisation,	 Erkkilä	 (2012,	 p.	 xi	 –	 xiii)	 argues	 that	 “the	 new	 economic-	 and	performance-driven	 understanding	 of	 transparency	 […]	 creates	 the	 potential	 for	unintended	consequences	and	counter-finalities,	such	as	the	privatization	of	information,	effectively	reducing	public	access	to	government	records,	or	diminishing	public	debate	through	the	pressures	of	globalization.”	Meijer	(2009,	p.	266)	notes	that	the	relationship	between	trust	and	openness	is	an	ambivalent	one,	at	the	heart	of	the	debates	about	new	transparency.	According	 to	O’Neill	 (2002)	while	 transparency	has	 advanced	 in	 recent	
                                                8	Citing	a	2010	poll	in	the	United	States	about	public	reactions	to	WikiLeaks	disclosures,	Roberts	(2012)	pointed	out	that	three	quarters	of	respondents	affirmed	that	“there	are	some	things	the	public	does	not	have	a	right	to	know	if	it	might	affect	national	security.”	
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years,	public	 trust	has	receded.	“Transparency	certainly	destroys	secrecy”,	she	argues,	“but	 it	 may	 not	 limit	 the	 deception	 and	 deliberate	 misinformation	 that	 undermine	relations	 of	 trust.”	 Roberts	 has	 raised	 similar	 concerns	 about	 the	 use	 and	 abuse	 of	disclosure	of	information:			 There	is	no	such	thing,	even	in	the	age	of	the	internet,	as	the	instantaneous	and	complete	 revelation	of	 the	 truth.	 In	 its	 undigested	 form,	 information	has	no	transformative	 power	 at	 all.	 Raw	 data	 must	 be	 distilled;	 the	 attention	 of	 a	distracted	 audience	 must	 be	 captured;	 and	 that	 audience	 must	 accept	 the	message	that	is	put	before	it.	The	process	by	which	this	is	done	is	complex	and	easily	swayed	by	commercial	and	governmental	interests	(Roberts,	2012,	pp.	19–20).			 Seen	in	this	light,	questions	of	who	obtains	information,	who	discloses	it,	how	it	is	disclosed,	 to	whom	 and	 for	what	 purpose	 relate	 to	 transparency	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	power.	As	such,	actors	can	support,	pursue	and	enact	transparency	policies	for	a	host	of	self-serving	 reasons	 that	 might	 range	 from	 benign	 to	 purely	 Machiavellian	 from	 a	democratic	 point	 of	 view.	 Birchall,	 for	 instance,	 emphasises	 the	 sedative	 effect	 of	transparency	as	a	proactive	response	to	public	disquiet	 in	moments	of	crisis	or	moral	failure.	 Because	 it	 is	 “presented	 as	 a	 technical	 rather	 than	 a	 political	 settlement”,	 she	argues,	 “transparency	 has	 attractive,	 palliative	 qualities	 for	 politicians	 and	 CEOs	who	want	to	be	seen	to	be	doing	rather	than	reflecting.”	(2014,	p.	77).	This,	she	notes,	“also	chimes	 with	 a	 (Western)	 culture	 that	 favors,	 at	 least	 on	 the	 surface,	 confession	 and	disclosure	over	 secrecy	as	 a	 general	modus	operandi.”	 It	 should	be	noted	 that	 in	 such	instances,	 transparency	 is	 often	 adopted	 without	 a	 clear	 strategy	 of	 how	 citizens	 or	consumers	will	interpret	and	use	the	information	disclosed.		 Other	 scholars	 have	 pointed	 to	 strategic	 calculations	 of	 political	 gain	 in	competitive	environments	that	can	push	actors	towards	pursuing	transparency	policies.	For	example,	Michener	(2014)	suggests	that	cabinet	size	and	legislative	control	shape	the	strength	of	transparency	laws.	“In	broad	multiparty	coalitions”,	he	writes,	“leaders	trade	secrecy	for	tools	to	monitor	coalition	‘allies’.”	Likewise,	questioning	why	so	many	states	pass	FoI	laws	that	increase	actors’	political	costs	of	using	public	office	for	private	gain,	Berliner	(2014)	points	to	politicians’	uncertainty	over	future	control.	He	argues	that	“in	competitive	political	environments”	the	high	likelihood	of	being	voted	out	of	office	in	the	long	run	“creates	incentives	for	incumbents	to	pass	FOI	laws	in	order	to	ensure	their	own	future	access	to	government	information”.			 A	more	cynical	use	of	transparency	as	an	instrument	of	power	would	be	based	on	the	idea	that	actors	who	control	what	is	disclosed	also	influence	what	is	kept	in	the	dark.	
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Vargovčíkova	 (2015)	 illustrates	 this	point	by	using	Goffman’s	 (1959)	metaphor	of	 the	frontstage	and	the	backstage	of	a	theatre:	in	the	frontstage,	actors	play	roles	keeping	to	expected	 standards	 of	 behaviour,	 whereas	 in	 the	 backstage	 the	 same	 actors	 behave	without	any	constraints.	In	this	setting,	transparency	can	bring	to	the	frontstage	limited	areas	of	the	backstage,	leaving	other	spaces	in	the	dark.	It	can	also	allow	politicians	to	control	the	image	of	what	is	being	made	public,	while	carrying	out	their	activities	in	the	backstage	as	usual.		As	 Part	 I	 of	 this	 thesis	 demonstrates,	 selective	 and	 controlled	 disclosure	 may	ultimately	enable	politicians	to	maintain	and	control	their	privileges,	while	having	only	limited	parts	of	their	behaviours	regulated.	A	comparison	of	the	two	chapters	in	Part	I	also	 highlights	 the	 difference	 between	what	 Lindstedt	 and	Naurin	 (2010,	 p.	 316)	 call	agent	 controlled	 transparency	 (implemented	 by	 the	 agent	 herself)	 versus	 non-agent	controlled	transparency	(pursued	by	a	third	party,	such	as	a	free	press)	in	their	respective	impacts	on	the	control	of	corruption,	with	the	latter	being	more	effective	than	the	former.		Overall,	these	observations	suggest	that,	despite	the	prevailing	norms	and	powerful	institutions	championing	transparency,	the	actors	involved	in	the	creation	or	reform	of	transparency	policies	may	have	diverging	interests	and	intensities	to	promote,	contest	or	resist	concerning	the	evolution	of	specific	RTPs.	Therefore,	while	the	wider	normative	and	 institutional	environment	plays	a	crucial	 role	 in	providing	 the	 initial	push	 for	 the	creation	of	RTPs,	in	order	to	understand	their	subsequent	trajectories,	we	also	need	to	take	an	in-depth	look	at	Layer	3	and	analyse	the	dynamics	of	actor	interactions.	This	final	point	is	discussed	further	in	the	following	section.			
3.	Determinants	of	the	trajectory	of	RTPs	How	and	when	are	transparency	policies	created	and	what	determines	their	subsequent	trajectories?	 As	 noted	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	understanding	 of	 the	 creation	 and	 evolution	 of	 transparency	 policies	 from	 a	 pluralist	approach	 that	 takes	 into	 account	 both	 the	 historical	 institutional	 and	 actor-based	analyses	of	 institutional	 change.	 In	 this	vein,	 this	 section	presents	 the	key	hypotheses	about	the	trajectories	of	regulatory	transparency	policies	that	will	be	tested	on	the	case	studies	 in	 subsequent	 chapters.	 I	 argue	 that	 once	 they	 are	 created,	 RTPs	 are	 self-reinforcing	rather	than	self-undermining.	In	other	words,	they	tend	to	follow	the	original	purpose	 (or	 the	 initial	 path)	 they	 were	 created	 for.	 As	 conceptualised	 in	 Levi’s	 tree	analogy	for	path	dependence,	this	does	not	mean	that	they	cannot	branch	out	in	different	trajectories.	Rather,	it	means	that	the	trajectories	pursued	will	likely	be	an	extension	of	
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the	original	path	chosen	at	creation.	The	hypothesis	that	follows	this	is	concerned	with	the	 trajectories	 RTPs	 follow	 after	 creation,	 i.e.	 the	 process	 of	 branching	 out.	 Here,	 I	consider	 different	 scenarios	 of	 actor	 interactions	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 specific	 logic	 of	transparency	employed	on	the	trajectory	of	an	RTP.		
3.1.	RTPs	as	Self-Reinforcing	Processes	Once	 transparency	 is	 enacted	 as	 the	 preferred	 regulatory	 solution	 in	 a	 given	 field,	 it	becomes	 increasingly	 difficult	 for	 regulators	 to	 switch	 to	 a	 different	 solution	 that	disregards	transparency.	In	other	words,	once	an	RTP	is	created,	it	is	likely	to	continue	on	 the	 path	 it	 started	 from	 due	 to	 increasing	 returns	 processes.	 The	 first	 factor	 that	reinforces	 the	path	of	an	RTP	 is	 the	existence	of	powerful	 informal	norms	and	 formal	institutions	 (i.e.	 Layers	 1	 and	 2	 described	 above)	 that	 encourage	 disclosure	 and	accountability,	 and	 provide	 a	 consistent	 push	 for	 the	 creation	 and	 proliferation	 of	transparency	policies.		This	has	been	widely	recognised	in	the	literature.	“Whether	effective	or	not”,	argue	Fung	et	al.	(2017,	p.	15),	transparency	policies	have	emerged	as	a	politically	viable	means	to	responding	to	crises	in	the	face	of	diminishing	public	trust	in	governments’	capacity	to	solve	problems	alone.	Erkkilä	(2012)	points	to	the	role	of	the	international	discourse	of	good	governance	and	the	knowledge	economy	and	the	consequent	surge	of	international	policy	programmes	that	endorse	transparency	and	access	to	government	information	in	the	creation	of	transparency	policies	by	different	national	governments.	Similarly,	Ruijer	and	Meijer	(2016)	identify	the	discourse	on	democratisation	and	accountability,	together	with	 the	 rise	 of	 new	 technologies,	 as	 “the	 general	 drivers	 of	 the	 current	 thrust	 of	transparency	initiatives.”		This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 every	 country	 will	 establish	 exactly	 the	 same	transparency	regime.	The	studies	cited	above	emphasise	the	importance	of	pre-existing	national	norms	and	institutions	in	shaping	the	transparency	regime	of	a	country,	within	which	RTPs	are	produced.	Erkkilä	(2012)	notes	that	when	these	international	discourses	are	adopted,	they	“tend	to	take	nationally	specific	forms”.	Ruijer	and	Meijer	(2016)	argue	that	transparency	regimes	evolve	against	the	backdrop	of	pre-existing	institutions	and	examine	 historical	 institutional	 characteristics,	 initial	 paths	 and	 critical	 junctures	 to	explain	the	routes	these	regimes	take	in	different	national	settings.	Nonetheless,	 what	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 overarching	 normative	 and	 institutional	framework	suggests	despite	national	differences	is	that	even	if	disclosure	is	against	the	interests	of	certain	actors,	they	may	find	it	politically	too	risky	or	difficult	to	oppose	the	creation	of	transparency	policies	or	repeal	existing	ones.	Actors	may	resist	disclosure	by	
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arguing	that	it	is	not	in	the	public’s	interest,	but	they	still	have	to	argue	against	the	idea	of	“more-transparency-than-thou”,	which	has	become	the	secular	version	of	“holier-than-thou”	(Hood,	2006,	p.	3).	As	a	result,	despite	the	fact	that	RTPs	can	have	multiple	designs	and	 be	 enacted	 to	 advance	 different	 regulatory	 (and	 political)	 objectives,	 their	 core	character	is	not	easily	contested	and	requires	significant	amount	of	institutional	power	and	political	 clout,	 or	 a	major	 change	 in	 the	normative	or	political	 institutional	 levels	(such	as	a	paradigm	shift)	to	be	retracted.				 Secondly,	I	argue	that	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing	because	they	empower	groups	that	would	otherwise	not	have	a	say	in	the	development	of	certain	policies.	Fung	et	al.	have	suggested	that,	once	created,	transparency	policies	are	difficult	to	sustain	as	they	tend	to	distribute	benefits	to	dispersed	users	while	concentrating	costs	on	small	and	organised	groups	that	can	use	their	political	clout	to	limit	the	scope	or	effectiveness	of	disclosure	(2007,	pp.	110	–	111).	While	this	is	certainly	a	possibility	that	is	also	evaluated	in	this	thesis,	 the	 potential	 of	 transparency	 policies	 to	 redistribute	 power	 and	 strengthen	beneficiaries	 and	 create	 new	 interest	 groups	 that	 are	 invested	 in	 their	 continuation	should	also	not	be	ignored.	For	example,	the	disclosure	of	educational	data	for	parents’	use	requires	private	firms	and	organisations	working	in	the	education	sector	to	conduct	student	assessments.	Other	type	of	businesses	may	also	use	the	disclosed	information	to	produce	 statistics	 and	 in	 consulting	 projects.	 These	 new	beneficiaries	 tend	 to	 oppose	retraction	and	certain	types	of	changes	that	would	disadvantage	them.		Finally,	before	information	is	disclosed,	there	is	a	need	to	define	what	information	will	be	collected,	published	and	how	it	will	be	framed	for	disclosure.	In	the	sequence,	the	discloser	needs	to	create	a	mechanism	for	collecting	data	and	publishing	it	according	to	how	 it	 was	 defined	 by	 the	 regulator.	 This	 is	 usually	 a	 costly	 procedure,	 but	 once	 a	mechanism	 for	 extraction	 and	 publication	 of	 data	 is	 created,	 the	 cost	 of	 publication	decreases.	 Shifting	paths	 to	 another	 regulatory	 solution	 implies	 that	 these	 initial	 high	costs	would	be	lost,	making	RTPs	more	resistant	to	change.		Combined,	 these	 factors	 would	 suggest	 that	 RTPs	 operate	 as	 self-reinforcing	processes.	Staying	in	the	same	path,	however,	does	not	mean	that	RTPs	do	not	evolve	or	retract.	On	the	contrary,	they	can	and	do	evolve	in	different	directions,	but	this	is	likely	to	be	an	extension	of	the	original	path	they	started	from.	The	fact	that,	for	example,	the	Brazilian	 Transparency	 Portal,	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	was	 created	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 civil	society	 to	monitor	 government’s	 financial	 expenditure	 information	 did	 not	 prevent	 it	from	becoming	a	fundamental	tool	of	the	government	in	corruption	prevention.	But	its	initial	path	was	maintained	and	strengthened	throughout	its	development.		Following	Hall	(2010),	I	argue	that	it	is	an	assembly	of	coalition	in	favour	of	changes	(or	a	willing	and	able	RTP	driver)	and	their	interaction	with	other	important	actors	and	
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coalitions	involved	in	the	regulatory	process.	But	before	discussing	the	different	actors	and	 actor	 interactions	 that	 determine	 the	 trajectory	 of	 an	 RTP,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 briefly	explain	the	four	possible	trajectories	that	RTPs	can	take,	namely,	stagnation,	expansion,	retraction	and	contestation.		
3.2.	Trajectories	of	RTPs:	Stagnation,	Expansion,	Retrenchment,	Contestation	The	stagnation	of	an	RTP	means	that,	following	its	adoption,	no	additional	sets	of	data	are	made	available	 to	or	withdrawn	 from	public	access.	 It	 also	 implies	 that	no	 formal	change	occurs	after	adoption,	such	as	a	primary	or	secondary	legislation	that	is	directly	related	to	the	policy.	Stagnation	can	be	seen	as	a	moment	of	stability,	where,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	neither	the	drivers	of	an	RTP	nor	its	targets	display	the	ability	or	willingness	to	push	 for	more	or	 less	disclosure	 than	what	 is	present.	This	does	not	mean	that	 the	information	 disclosed	was	 not	 used	 by	 beneficiaries	 or	 intermediaries,	 either	 for	 the	purposes	they	were	originally	intended	or	for	a	different	purpose.	Instead,	it	suggests	that	these	usages	were	not	reflected	on	the	design	of	the	policy.	As	I	discuss	in	more	detail	below,	the	use	(or	non-use)	of	information	by	beneficiaries	and/or	intermediaries	does	not	guarantee	the	expansion	(or	retrenchment)	of	a	specific	policy,	while	it	can	affect	the	disclosers’	or	targets’	ability	or	willingness	to	mobilise	for	a	particular	trajectory.		Expansion	and	retrenchment	point	to	the	occurrence	of	similar	changes	in	opposite	directions.	Expansion	entails	making	more	information	available	to	the	general	public,	improving	the	structure	of	information	disclosed	in	order	to	increase	the	regulatory	effect	of	 transparency,	 or	 increasing	 and	 strengthening	 the	 formal	 incentives	 to	 promote	disclosure	or	compliance	with	disclosure.	In	the	opposite	direction,	retrenchment	(or	retraction)	 suggests	 limiting	 the	 scope	 of	 information	 available	 to	 the	 general	 public,	changing	 the	 structure	 of	 information	 disclosed	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 or	 remove	 their	regulatory	effect,	and	reducing	or	removing	the	formal	obligations	or	penalties	associated	with	disclosure.		Finally,	as	further	discussed	in	the	following	section	under	actors	and	interactions,	
contestation	 takes	 place	 when	 different	 groups	 of	 actors	 attempt	 to	 influence	 the	trajectory	of	an	RTP	in	similarly	high	intensities.	Contestation	entails	a	lack	of	consensus,	between	the	driver	and	the	targets	or	the	intermediaries,	over	an	RTP’s	design,	format	or	the	type	of	data	it	discloses.	It	is	important	to	note	that	during	periods	of	contestation,	it	may	be	possible	to	observe	moments	of	expansion,	stagnation	or	even	retrenchment	in	the	RTP’s	 trajectory.	But	as	 long	as	 the	RTPs	 fail	 to	become	accepted	as	a	norm	by	all	players,	contestation	continues	to	be	the	dominant	feature	of	an	RTP	and	remains	its	main	trajectory.	During	contestation	there	can	be	moments	when	the	RTP	on	this	path	can	give	
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way	to	other	trajectories	if	and	when	one	of	the	sides	ultimately	gathers	more	support	and	mobilises	more	 resources	 to	 expand	or	 retrench	 the	policy,	 or	 the	 actors	 reach	a	consensus	and	the	policy	stagnates.		Table	1.1	below	lists	different	ways	in	which	RTPs	can	stagnate,	expand,	retrench	of	be	contested.		
Table	1.1.	Examples	of	RTP	trajectories	
Stagnation	 Expansion	 Retrenchment	 Contestation	
No	change	in	the	formal	institutions	/	incentives	to	foster	compliance	with	disclosure	
Creation	of	new	formal	institutions	and/or	incentives	to	foster	compliance	with	disclosure	
Weakening	or	repeal	of	formal	institutions	and/or	incentives	to	foster	compliance	with	disclosure	
Targets	or	intermediaries	continuously	challenge	the	formal	institutions	and/or	incentives	to	foster	compliance	with	disclosure	
No	additional	disclosures		
Additional	disclosures	with	content	and	formats	for	regulatory	impact		
Repeal	of	disclosures	or	of	structured	disclosures	
Public	dissatisfaction	with	the	evolution	of	disclosure	information	
Original	format,	structure	of	disclosure	maintained	
Obligation	to	disclose	information	in	an	open	format,	in	addition	to	the	structured	format	already	disclosed	
Restriction	of	the	format	of	information	to	open	data	only9	
Overt	disagreement	among	main	actors	over	the	format	of	information	disclosed	
No	new	mechanisms	for	coercion	and	monitoring	of	compliance	created	
Creation	of	mechanisms	for	coercion	and	monitoring	of	compliance	
Repeal	of	mechanisms	for	coercion	and	monitoring	of	compliance	
Lack	of	consensus	among	actors	over	the	design	or	function	of	mechanisms	for	coercion	and	monitoring	of	compliance			 		
                                                9	This	is	due	to	the	regulatory	aspect	of	RTPs,	which	are	not	fostered	through	open	data.	
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3.3.	Determinants	of	RTP	trajectories:	Actors	and	Interactions	It	would	seem	at	a	first	glance	that	the	main	difference	between	a	command-and-control	regulatory	requirement	and	a	regulatory	transparency	one	is	that	the	latter	requires	the	active	participation	of	the	public.	One	can	assume	therefore	that	the	success	of	an	RTP	depends	on	whether	or	not	citizens	or	consumers	make	good	use	of	the	disclosed	data.	In	practice,	however,	 individual	citizens	are	rarely	the	only,	or	even	the	main,	group	that	disclosers	have	in	mind	when	enacting	these	policies.	Consider,	for	example,	what	is	now	the	 mainstream	 practice	 of	 publishing	 information	 on	 government	 expenditures	 to	promote	fiscal	discipline.	Even	though	budgetary	information	is	theoretically	disclosed	for	 citizens’	 benefit,	 few	 individual	 citizens	 actually	 use	 the	 data	 and	 push	 for	 more	disclosure.	 In	 practice,	 these	 tasks	 are	 carried	 out	 by	 organised	 civil	 society	 groups,	private	firms,	the	media	or	opposition	parties.	Moreover,	the	same	policy	can	be	primarily	promoted	to	signal	to	foreign	investors	that	the	country	is	committed	to	fiscal	discipline.10			Fiscal	 transparency	 is	 just	 one	 example	 to	 show	 that	 regulatory	 transparency	initiatives	involve	multiple	actors.	These	actors	can	be	grouped	in	four	categories	based	on	the	role	they	play	in	these	processes:	the	drivers,	the	targets,	the	beneficiaries	and	the	intermediaries.	The	drivers	are	those	groups	or	individuals	who	push,	lobby	or	campaign	for	the	adoption	and	expansion	of	RTPs.	Consumer	protection	groups,	the	media,	state	agencies	with	a	mandate	to	promote	transparency,	or	political	opposition	groups	can	be	among	 the	 drivers	 in	 different	 scenarios.	 The	 targets	 are	 those	 individuals	 or	 groups	whose	activities	or	performance	is	made	visible	and	regulated	by	the	RTPs.	In	the	case	of	budgetary	transparency,	the	target	would	be	the	government	and	politicians.	In	the	case	of	the	regulation	of	the	financial	sector,	the	target	would	be	the	banks	and	other	financial	actors.			The	beneficiaries	are	groups	who,	in	theory	and/or	practice,	are	expected	to	benefit	from	the	disclosure	of	information.	In	the	example	of	politicians’	salaries,	the	public	at	large	 is	 considered	 the	 main	 beneficiary,	 but	 we	 could	 also	 identify	 more	 specific	beneficiaries,	 such	 as	 think	 tanks	 or	 academics	working	 on	 the	 governance	 of	 public	expenditure.	The	drivers	can	also	be	beneficiaries;	for	instance,	a	group	of	citizens	that	starts	 a	 petition	 for	 MPs	 to	 impose	 a	 ban	 on	 certain	 lobbying	 practices.	 What	 sets	beneficiaries	apart	from	drivers	is	that	the	former	group	generally	lacks	the	resources,	the	organisational	capacity	(Olson,	2002)	or	the	priorities	that	enable	the	drivers	to	push	for	RTPs	actively.		
                                                10	Societal	and	governmental	interests	can	also	change	in	response	to	shifts	in	the	political	and	economic	 environment.	 For	 example,	 Roberts	 (2010a,	 p.	 62)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 concerns	regarding	fiscal	rules	largely	evaporated	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Great	Recession.	
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Finally,	 the	 intermediaries	 are	 those	 actors	 situated	 between	 disclosers	 and	beneficiaries.	They	are	third	parties	that	interpret	the	raw	data	that	is	disclosed	in	RTPs	and	make	it	easier	for	the	public	to	understand.	Keeping	to	the	example	of	politicians’	expenses,	an	intermediary	could	be	an	NGO	that	publishes	rankings	of	these	expenses,	and	monitors	and	reports	how	each	MP	handles	public	resources.	They	can	also	demand	changes	in	the	format	or	contextualisation	of	the	disclosed	information.	In	these	roles,	they	help	to	enhance	the	 impact	of	RTPs.	Fung	et	al.	 (2007),	 for	example,	suggest	that	strengthening	intermediaries	(or	“groups	that	represent	users”)	can	“alter	the	political	imbalance”	of	transparency	policies	and	encourage	their	sustainability.		
	
	
Table	1.2.	Actor	Interactions	and	Potential	Trajectories													 											Intensity	of	Targets	 		 												(Resisting	RTPs)	 		_____________________________________________	High																									Low			Intensity	of	Drivers	(Pushing	for	RTPs)		
	High		
	Contestation	 	Expansion			Low	 	Retrench		
	Stagnation			 			Inspired	by	Fung	et	al.	(2007,	p.113),	Table	1.2.	illustrates	the	possible	variations	of	actor	 interactions	 and	 the	 trajectories	 these	 would	 direct	 RTPs	 towards.	 Intensity	 is	understood	 as	 the	 ability	 and	 the	 willingness	 of	 an	 actor	 or	 a	 coalition	 of	 actors	 to	mobilise	for	or	against	a	particular	RTP.	It	takes	into	account	not	only	the	institutional	and	political	power	(i.e.	ability)	of	actors	to	push	for	or	against	an	RTP.	Willingness,	in	other	 words,	 involves	 an	 interest	 calculation,	 whereby	 actors	 consider	 the	 perceived	benefits	of	action	against	its	perceived	costs	to	decide	how	much	of	their	ability	to	invest	
Increasing	use	of	information	
by	intermediaries/	
beneficiaries	
Increasing	use	of	information	by	intermediaries/	beneficiaries		
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in	pushing	for	or	resisting	an	RTP.	An	example	can	be	politicians,	who	despite	having	the	legislative	power	to	successfully	block	an	RTP,	may	find	 it	 too	costly	politically	due	to	societal	norms	and	pressures,	 and	would	 therefore	 end	up	with	 low	 intensity.	On	 the	other	hand,	a	driver	of	transparency	may	have	low	intensity	for	further	disclosure	if	they	believe	the	set	of	policies	currently	in	place	satisfy	their	expectations	for	the	time	being.		Both	in	the	design	and	the	life	trajectory	of	an	RTP,	it	is	the	drivers	and	the	targets	who	are	likely	to	have	the	highest	intensity	or	stake	in	the	shape	of	an	RTP.	Theoretically,	these	actors	stand	on	opposite	sides,	with	the	driver	pressuring	for	greater	transparency	and	the	target	pushing	for	no	or	less	transparency.	Often	it	is	easy	to	tell	the	drivers	apart	from	the	targets.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	politicians	expenses	in	the	UK,	journalists	are	the	drivers	and	politicians	are	the	targets.	In	other	cases,	however,	the	drivers	and	the	targets	may	 share	 similar	 characteristics.	 This	would	 be	 the	 case	when,	 for	 instance,	opposition	 politicians	 are	 the	 drivers	 of	 a	 particular	 RTP	 and	 politicians	 in	 the	government	are	the	target.	Similarly,	a	firm	that	offers	products	in	lower	prices	than	its	competitors	may	push	for	the	disclosure	of	product	prices	across	the	board	to	improve	its	relative	position	in	the	market.	In	such	cases,	a	closer	look	is	needed	to	differentiate	drivers	from	targets.	The	table	shows	that	when	drivers	and	targets	have	equally	high	levels	of	intensity	regarding	changes	to	an	RTP,	i.e.	one	is	highly	in	favour	of	disclosure	while	the	other	is	highly	resistant	to	it,	the	trajectory	will	be	contested,	with	the	RTP	moving	in	the	direction	(expand	or	retrench)	of	the	actors	with	higher	intensity.	A	key	input	here	can	come	from	the	intermediaries	and	the	beneficiaries.	If	these	groups	appear	to	make	high	use	of	the	information	disclosed	and	attribute	high	value	to	it,	the	drivers	may	choose	to	use	this	to	strengthen	 their	 effort	 to	 maintain	 or	 expand	 the	 type	 of	 information	 disclosed.	Conversely,	if	the	beneficiaries	display	a	lack	of	interest	in	the	disclosed	information,	it	may	become	easier	for	targets	to	mobilise	against	maintenance	of	expansion.	It	should	be	noted	 that	 non-usage	 of	 information	 by	 beneficiaries	 and	 intermediaries	 may	 be	 a	necessary	but	not	a	sufficient	factor	for	the	targets	to	succeed	in	their	opposition	to	an	RTP.	As	argued	previously,	 transparency	policies	are	products	of	culturally	embedded	norms	and	political	institutions.	If,	for	example,	citizens	or	intermediaries	make	no	use	of	schools’	performance	information,	and	schools	demand	their	scrapping,	governments	can	respond	by	arguing	that	the	right	to	know	is	an	end	in	itself	that	needs	to	be	protected,	whether	or	not	citizens	make	high	use	of	that	right.		Table	1.2.	also	shows	that	the	interaction	between	drivers	and	targets	is	not	always	contested.	When	the	level	of	driver	intensity	is	unequal	to	target	intensity,	RTPs	are	likely	to	evolve	in	different	trajectories.	When	the	intensity	of	the	driver	is	high	but	the	intensity	of	the	target	is	low,	the	expected	trajectory	of	an	RTP	is	expansion.	In	contrast,	when	the	
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driver	intensity	is	low	and	the	target	intensity	is	high,	we	can	expect	to	see	retrenchment.	When	neither	the	driver	nor	the	target	have	a	high	intensity,	the	RTP	would	be	expected	to	stagnate,	i.e.	information	would	continue	to	be	disclosed	regularly	without	expansion	or	retrenchment,	based	on	the	original	design.	Driver	or	target	intensity	may	be	low	for	various	reasons.	The	driver	may	conclude	that	the	RTP	as	a	regulatory	mechanism	has	produced	suboptimal	results.	If	there	is	high	resistance	from	the	target	at	this	point,	the	policy	can	retrench,	otherwise	it	would	likely	stagnate.	A	paradigm	shift	in	Layer	2	can	also	reduce	the	intensity	of	the	driver.	Given	the	slower	pace	of	change	at	this	layer,	such	shifts	can	be	expected	to	occur	with	somewhat	limited	frequency.	Over	the	two	decades	covered	for	each	of	the	six	case	studies	in	this	research,	only	one	instance	of	paradigm	shift	was	observed.	As	detailed	in	Chapter	7,	after	the	coalition	of	Conservatives	and	Liberal	Democrats	took	office	in	the	UK	in	2010,	the	government	scrapped	the	disclosure	of	information	on	bank	tariffs	and	created	non-RTP	initiatives	 for	 the	 same	 purpose	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 new	 arguments	 from	 behavioural	economics.	There	are	also	reasons	why	targets	may	have	 low	intensity	 in	mobilising	against	transparency.	First,	 even	 though	RTPs	often	 reveal	much	more	 than	 targets	would	be	inclined	to	show,	compared	to	other	regulatory	mechanisms,	disclosure	of	information	may	be	seen	by	the	targets	as	a	less	impactful	and	intrusive	option.	Targets	may	therefore	prefer	transparency	over	the	alternative	regulatory	options.	The	impact	of	an	RTP	can	also	 be	 limited	 if	 there	 are	 mismatches	 between	 the	 information	 disclosed	 and	 the	cognitive	capacities	of	the	beneficiaries.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	for	instance,	before	a	scandal	brought	the	UK	Member	of	Parliament	Registry	of	Interests	to	public’s	attention,	potential	conflicts	of	interest	were	already	being	published	for	years	with	no	attention	and	 no	 impact.	 Not	 all	 reasons	 for	 low	 target	 resistance	 is	 related	 to	 the	 comparable	weakness	 or	 inefficiency	 of	 RTPs.	 Targets	may	 also	 not	 be	 in	 a	 position	 to	 resist	 the	adoption	or	expansion	of	RTPs	during	periods	of	increased	lack	of	trust,	when	there	are	widespread	expectations	for	increased	transparency.	Knowing	the	type	of	actors	involved	in	the	institutional	change	of	RTPs	as	well	as	the	circumstances	that	can	point	to	the	intensity	of	their	involvement	in	these	processes	can	shed	light	on	when	regulatory	transparency	policies	stagnate,	expand	or	retrench.	It	cannot,	however,	explain	the	relative	power	of	each	actor	in	a	given	scenario,	nor	the	way	the	type	of	information	disclosed	may	affect	actor	interactions.	In	order	to	find	out	about	these,	I	propose	looking	into	the	core	characteristics	of	the	three	main	logics	of	regulatory	transparency.			
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3.4.	Determinants	of	RTP	trajectories:	Logics	of	Transparency	As	noted	in	the	Introduction	to	this	thesis,	the	‘logic’	of	a	regulatory	transparency	policy	refers	 to	 its	 underlying	 rationale	 or	 purpose	 of	 disclosure.	 Regulatory	 transparency	policies	can	be	categorised	in	three	different	logics.	In	each	of	these	logics,	different	sets	of	information	are	disclosed	and	diverse	actors	constitute	drivers,	targets,	beneficiaries	and	intermediaries	that	interact	in	particular	ways	(see	Table	1.3	below).	Specificities	of	each	 logic	 can	 provide	 insights	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 information	 disclosed	 and	 the	organisation	of	actor	interactions.	The	logic	of	transparency,	in	other	words,	can	have	a	potentially	decisive	impact	on	the	trajectory	of	an	RTP	by	influencing	the	intensity	of	key	actors	for	or	against	transparency.	The	logic	of	control	refers	to	those	RTP	initiatives	enacted	to	support	governments	in	controlling	the	behaviour	of	politicians	or	public	officials,	and	making	them	comply	with	various	governmental	disciplines,	such	as	ethics	standards,	fiscal	rules	and	limited	spending.	This	 logic	 can	be	activated	by	a	 government	 to	 control	politicians	or	public	officials	 on	 the	 same	 level,	 or	 adopted	 by	 the	 central	 administration	 to	 control	subnational	units.	In	all	these	cases,	the	logic	of	control	implies	the	publication	of	often	disaggregated	 financial	 and	 administrative	 information.	 Because	 the	 information	disclosed	in	this	logic	amounts	to	full	disclosure	concerning	a	specific	set	of	information	(e.g.	lists	of	family	members	recruited	by	MPs	or	lists	of	expenses	for	each	MP),	retraction	means	repealing	and	expansion	means	disclosure	of	new	sets	of	information.	When	RTPs	are	adopted	to	regulate	the	behaviour	of	politicians	and	public	officials,	the	underlying	assumption	is	that	by	allowing	the	public	to	monitor	their	activities	these	actors	 will	 adjust	 their	 behaviour	 to	 society’s	 expectations.	 We	 can	 expect	 different	trajectories	depending	on	who	the	target	of	a	specific	RTP	is.	The	resources	available	to	politicians,	 i.e.	the	very	actors	who	are	responsible	for	rule	making,	 including	granting	the	public	access	to	government	information,	differ	greatly	from	the	resources	of	public	officials.	 Politicians	 have	much	more	 institutional	 power	 than	most	 public	 officials	 to	determine	what	sets	of	information	will	be	disclosed	by	RTPs.		With	their	legislative	power	and	having	to	regulate	their	own	activities,	politicians	can	be	expected	to	wield	considerable	influence	over	the	shape	of	RTPs.	This	does	not	mean	that	RTPs	will	necessarily	retract	or	even	stagnate,	as	power	is	not	used	only	to	resist	 transparency;	 legislators	may	 push	 for	 greater	 openness	 from	 the	 government.	Similarly,	 as	 noted	 above,	 actors	 within	 large	 coalition	 governments	 may	 push	 for	increased	levels	of	transparency	to	increase	their	ability	to	monitor	the	performance	of	other	 coalition	 partners	 (e.g.	 Michener,	 2015).	 They	 may	 accept	 a	 certain	 level	 of	transparency,	 though	 not	 enough	 to	 threaten	 their	 posts	 or	 their	 parties.	 This	 calls	attention	to	the	fact	that	politicians	could	adopt	RTPs	periodically,	whenever	it	is	in	their	
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benefit	 to	 do	 so,	 leading	 to	 a	 patchwork	 of	 disclosures	 that	 do	 not	 cover	 the	 entire	regulatory	scope	of	a	certain	policy	area.		Finally,	 the	 control	 logic	 of	 transparency	 can	 be	 adopted	 to	 increase	 central	governments’	 regulatory	 power	 over	 decentralised	 policy	 units.	 In	 the	 public	administration	lexicon,	until	the	rise	of	New	Public	Management	(NPM),	the	term	control	was	 related	 to	 hierarchy	 and	 used	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 design	 and	 supervision	 of	 the	operations	(i.e.	activities)	and	outcomes	of	a	subordinate	unit.	With	the	advent	of	NPM	and	the	increasing	disassociation	of	governments	from	direct	provision	of	services,	the	concept	of	control	came	to	 indicate	a	more	decentralised	and	 less	hierarchical	 type	of	relationship.	 The	 new	 institutional	 economics,	 one	 of	 the	 theories	 supporting	 the	emergence	of	NPM,	emphasised	incentive	structures,	contestability	and	transparency	in	opposition	to	traditional	bureaucratic	ideas	of	good	public	administration	(Hood,	1991).	In	 line	 with	 increased	 cuts	 to	 costs	 and	 stricter	 labour	 discipline	 advocated	 by	 the	managerial	model,	there	was	a	need	for	an	effective	yet	fundamentally	different	type	of	control	 mechanism	 (Hoggett,	 1996).	 In	 this	 context,	 governments	 pursued	 the	transparency	of	budgetary	and	financial	information	of	subnational	units,	and	continue	to	do	so,	 in	order	 to	control	 their	expenditure	 (e.g.	Worthy,	2013,	pp.	15–17).	Central	governments	could,	as	often	still	can,	choose	to	disclose	such	information	as	a	unilateral	measure	 to	 increase	 their	 regulatory	 power	 over	 subnational	 units.	 While	 central	governments	 may	 have	 considerable	 ability	 to	 pursue	 this	 strategy,	 the	 power	 of	subnational	governments	to	resist	or	negotiate	disclosure	tends	to	be	limited.	The	 performance	 logic	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	 refers	 to	 the	 publication	 of	indicators	 created	 to	 reflect	 the	 performance,	 and	 where	 available,	 the	 objectives,	 of	decentralised	public	service	units,	 such	as	public	schools,	hospitals,	etc.	The	 literature	highlights	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 reasons	 that	 governments	 use	 to	 justify	 publishing	 the	performance	 records	 of	 decentralised	 policy	 units:	 responding	 to	 citizen	 requests	 for	evidence	of	effectiveness	of	specific	policies,	improving	communication	between	citizens	and	the	government,	improving	accountability	and	policy	decision	processes,	increasing	the	 effectiveness	 of	 public	 programmes,	 enabling	 the	 comparison	 of	 policy	 units’	performance	with	units	of	similar	conditions,	informing	choice	about	public	services,	and	increasing	the	ability	of	the	central	government	to	influence	the	outcomes	of	policy	units	(e.g.	Behn,	2003;	Hienrich,	2003;	Propper	and	Wilson,	2003;	Andrews	et	al.,	2005;	Pidd,	2005;	Van	de	Walle	and	Roberts,	2008;	Boyne	et	al.,	2009;	Woolum,	2011;	Allen	et	al.,	2014;	Hujala	at	al.,	2014;	James	and	Moseley,	2014).			 	
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Table	1.3.	The	Logics	of	Regulatory	Transparency	Policies		 	 CONTROL	LOGIC	 PERFORMANCE	LOGIC	 TRANSACTION	LOGIC		TARGET		[the	public	regulated]		
Politicians	Public	Officials	[Of	central	or	subnational	governments]	
Units	of	public	services	 Private	regulated	units	
	DRIVER	(ENABLER)		[those	who	pressure	for	disclosure]		
Politicians,	Organised	civil	society,	Media,	Political	opponents,	Regulatory	Body	
Central	government	 Consumer	protection	associations	
	BENEFICIARY		[the	direct	beneficiaries	of	disclosure]		
Citizens	 Mixed	category	[Citizens	or	consumers	depending	on	the	RTP	design]		 Consumers		INTERMEDIARY		[those	that	interpret	or	reinterpret	the	disclosed	information	or	use	it	for	a	different	purpose]		
Organised	civil	society	 Media,	unions,	expert	group	organisations	
Private	parties,	including	price	comparing	websites	and	financial	advisers	
TYPE	OF	INFORMATION	DISCLOSED	
Mainly	budgetary	data,	but	it	can	also	include	other	administrative	information	(e.g.	time	the	government	spends	to	approve	an	environmental	license),	always	published	in	raw	format	on	specific	filters		
Usually	aggregated	data,	suggested	as	the	best	indicator	for	the	performance	of	a	specific	unit,	among	a	range	of	other	possibilities	
Raw	data	about	features	of	products	or	services,	such	as	price,	risk,	and	expiry	date	
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Besides	 such	 intended	 practical	 outcomes,	 governments	 use	 disclosure	 of	performance	data	as	a	regulatory	mechanism	that	pressures,	or	are	intended	to	pressure,	decentralised	policy	units	to	adhere	to	the	performance	standards	and	goals	set	out	by	the	government.	The	underlying	rationale	here	is	captured	by	Albert	Hirschman	in	his	
Exit,	Voice	and	Loyalty.	Hirschman	(1970,	pp.	4–5)	suggests	that	the	manager	of	a	firm	can	find	out	about	the	deterioration	of	a	product	via	two	alternative	routes:	exit	(customers	stop	buying	the	product)	or	voice	(consumers	express	their	dissatisfaction	either	directly	to	the	management	or	to	another	authority	to	which	the	firm	is	subordinate).	In	the	same	vein,	by	disclosing	 information	 to	 the	public	 about	 the	performance	of	units	of	public	services,	 governments	 allow	 citizens	 to	 voice	 their	dissatisfaction	or	move	 to	 another	unit,	 therefore	 informing	 the	units	of	 their	own	performance.	This	way,	 in	 theory,	 the	decentralised	units	are	pressured	to	increase	their	own	performance.		Some	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic	are	designed	to	allow	for	exit;	such	as	in	the	case	of	school	performance	charts	in	the	UK,	studied	in	Chapter	5.	In	this	context,	parents,	the	officially	 intended	beneficiaries	of	 the	RTP,	could	use	 the	disclosed	 information	 to	choose	which	schools	to	send	their	children	to.	Others	exclusively	allow	for	voice,	as	in	the	case	of	school	performance	data	disclosed	in	Brazil,	studied	in	Chapter	4.	In	this	case,	parents	did	not	have	the	option	of	choosing	between	schools,	but	the	hope	was	that	the	comparison	of	the	data	would	put	pressure	on	low	performing	schools	to	improve	their	performance.		The	 public	 disclosure	 of	 performance	 indicators	 of	 decentralised	 policy	 units	 is	often	referred	to	by	governments	and	civil	society	groups	as	an	accountability	system.	According	 to	 this	narrative,	 citizens	are	 the	 core	beneficiaries	of	 these	policies,	 either	because	 they	 are	 allowed	 to	 get	 engaged	 in	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	 debate	 about	 the	delivery	of	public	services,	or	because	they	can	make	better	and	more	informed	choice	of	a	public	service.	However,	as	other	case	studies	in	the	literature	have	demonstrated	(e.g.	Meijer,	2007,	pp.	181-182)	and	the	two	case	studies	on	education	in	this	thesis	suggest,	decentralised	 policy	 units	 do	 not	 necessarily	 produce	 better	 results	 in	 response	 to	citizens’	exit	or	voice.	Instead,	performance	increases	mainly	reflect	the	readjustment	of	the	units’	focus	to	the	particular	indicator	that	is	highlighted	and	disclosed	by	the	RTPs.		Choosing	which	 indicator	 to	measure,	 highlight	 and	 disclose	 is	 often	 a	 sensitive	issue.	Because	targets	also	have	a	high	stake	in	this	debate,	policy	units	may	have	strong	reasons	 to	 resist	 performance	 transparency.	 Such	 resistance,	 however,	 is	 rarely	articulated	 as	 a	 categorical	 opposition	 to	 transparency	 as	 an	 idea	 per	 se.	 Since	transparency	transfers	informational	powers	to	other	groups,	especially	citizens,	making	the	case	against	it	becomes	very	difficult.	Consequently,	the	negotiations	between	central	government	(driver)	and	units	of	public	services	(target)	revolve	around	the	definition	of	
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the	indicator	or	group	of	indicators	published,	and	the	objective	of	disclosure.	In	these	negotiations,	targets	can	mobilise	a	range	of	other	ideas,	such	as	fairness	and	privacy.	Finally,	the	transaction	logic	of	regulatory	transparency	refers	to	the	publication	of	information	on	features	of	consumer	products	or	services	to	inform	choice.	This	logic	differs	from	the	logic	of	control,	because	the	main	goal	of	publication	of	information	is	not	to	increase	the	control	over	the	organisation	whose	products	or	services	are	the	object	of	disclosure.	It	differs	from	the	performance	logic,	because	the	type	of	primary	information	disclosed	is	not	of	performance,	but	rather	the	basic	features	of	products	and	services,	such	as	contents,	expiry	date,	weight,	size,	etc.	The	basic	assumption	of	any	transparency	policy	is	that	reducing	information	asymmetries	can	help	improve	the	relative	position	of	an	actor,	be	they	drivers,	citizens	or	consumers.11	An	obvious	context	for	this	 is	the	economic	market,	 in	which	 the	 level	of	 information	about	products,	 services	or	 firms’	production	 processes	 tends	 to	 differ	 significantly	 between	 sellers	 and	 buyers.	 This	asymmetry	of	information	is	the	core	aspect	of	a	series	of	transactional	problems.	In	a	competitive	market	with	 information	asymmetry,	providing	free	access	to	 information	could	reduce	the	chance	of	‘lemon	choices’,	i.e.	the	case	of	the	market	being	flooded	with	low	 quality	 products	 (Akerlof,	 1970),	 by	 informing	 consumers	 about	 the	 relevant	characteristics	of	a	product	or	firm.	There	are	multiple	reasons	for	why	regulators	or	drivers	of	 the	transaction	 logic	would	want	such	commercial	information	to	be	published.	For	example,	for	regulators,	who	 have	 the	 power	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 standardisation	 of	 products,	 publishing	 the	information	could	reduce	enforcement	costs.	A	series	of	other	regulatory	reasons	related	to	 the	 informational	 environment	 available	 to	 consumers	 (intermediaries	 with	commercial	interests	promoting	partial	disclosures,	obfuscation,	differentiation	in	price,	disclosures	 without	 any	 consideration	 of	 behavioural	 aspects,	 among	 others)	 also	justifies	the	regulatory	push	for	the	direct	publication	of	information.	A	particular	aspect	of	the	transaction	logic	RTPs,	which	sets	it	apart	from	the	two	other	 logics,	 is	 that	 the	 information	published	 is	not	always	held	by	regulators,	public	offices	or	governments,	but	instead	by	private	parties.	In	this	regard,	when	information	is	to	be	published,	negotiations	must	take	place	between	the	regulator	and	the	target	of	RTPs,	at	least	to	ensure	regulator’s	access	to	data.	In	this	process,	if	the	driver	does	not	oblige	the	target	to	submit	data	for	disclosure	or	does	not	impose	any	sanction	for	non-submission,	RTPs	may	still	be	created	but	the	full	and	ongoing	cooperation	of	targets	may	
                                                11	It	is	not	naïve	to	claim	that	transparency	policies	are	adopted	in	the	exclusive	circumstance	of	latent	information	asymmetry.	In	many	cases,	information	asymmetry	is	a	key	argument	utilised	by	the	drivers	to	push	for	further	transparency.	
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not	be	assured.	In	turn,	this	could	reduce	the	impact	of	the	policy	or	create	distortions	in	its	intended	outcomes.	Therefore,	in	order	to	be	successful,	the	disclosure	regime	would	have	 to	 offer	 benefits	 to	 the	 targets.	 If	 the	 latter	 is	 resistant	 to	 cooperating	with	 the	regulator	and	if	the	drivers’	intensity	towards	disclosure	is	high,	it	is	expected	that	the	regulator	will	normalise	disclosure.	In	this	case,	the	regulator	may	also	request	that	the	targets	 themselves	 publish	 the	 information,	 making	 RTP	 a	 supplementary	 disclosure	policy.	The	maintenance	of	the	RTP,	in	this	case,	is	dependent	on	the	benefits	foreseen	by	regulators	or	the	pressure	coming	from	the	driver.			
Conclusion	Treating	 transparency	 as	 ‘quasi-religious’	 concept	 is	 paradoxical,	 given	 the	 rationalist	values	and	ideals	that	it	is	historically	rooted	in.	Nevertheless,	in	the	course	of	the	20th	century,	transparency	has	attained	a	central	place	in	liberal	democratic	governance.	Seen	as	a	powerful	remedy	for	a	wide	range	of	ills	from	corruption	to	market	inefficiencies,	it	has	 been	 enshrined	 as	 a	 principle	 to	 strive	 for	 by	 governments,	 international	organisations	 and	 civil	 society	 alike.	 Although	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 long	 term	survival	of	 these	societal	norms	and	 the	 liberal	democratic	system	 looked	 less	certain	than	at	any	time	in	the	recent	past	–	and	the	use	and	abuse	of	transparency	policies	for	various	political	gains	notwithstanding	–	we	can	argue	for	the	time	being	that	these	wider	structures	continue	to	provide	a	push	for	the	creation	of	new	regulatory	transparency	policies.		How	 do	 RTPs	 evolve?	 Inspired	 both	 by	 historical	 and	 rational-choice	institutionalisms,	 this	 chapter	presented	 an	 approach	based	on	 scholarly	pluralism	 to	address	this	question,	and	proposed	that	a)	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing	processes,	i.e.	they	are	likely	to	follow	the	original	path	they	were	intended	for;	b)	their	trajectories	on	this	path	 are	determined	by	 the	 relative	 intensity	 of	 those	 actors	 that	 push	 for	 disclosure	against	 those	who	 resist	 or	 contest	 it;	 and	 c)	 examining	 the	 logic	 (or	 the	 underlying	rationale)	 of	 an	 RTP	 can	 give	 us	 insights	 into	 its	 trajectory	 based	 on	 the	 type	 of	information	disclosed	and	the	distribution	of	actor	intensities.				With	this	framework	and	hypotheses	in	mind,	the	following	three	parts	of	this	thesis	will	explore	the	creation	and	evolution	of	RTPs	across	the	three	logics	and	within	three	sectors	in	Brazil	and	the	UK.	The	discussion	on	the	specific	characteristics	of	the	three	logics	above	would	lead	us	to	expect	the	presence	or	absence	of	a	formal	regulatory	body	with	the	mandate	to	push	for	disclosure	to	play	a	key	role	in	the	logic	of	control.	In	the	performance	 logic,	 the	 type	of	 information	disclosed,	as	well	as	 its	 format,	ownership,	
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contextualisation,	is	likely	to	push	the	targets	to	resist	disclosure	or	have	a	greater	say	in	the	design	of	the	RTP.	I	will	observe	whether	and	how	the	existence	or	the	absence	of	the	‘exit’	option	in	the	performance	logic	impacts	the	evolution	of	an	RTP	in	this	logic.	Finally,	in	 the	 transaction	 logic,	 we	 can	 expect	 the	 availability	 or	 exclusivity	 of	 information	disclosed	to	influence	the	distribution	of	actor	intensities	and	in	turn	the	trajectory	of	an	RTP.		
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PART	I.	
THE	LOGIC	OF	CONTROL	
				As	suggested	in	Chapter	1,	when	adopted	in	the	logic	of	control,	regulatory	transparency	policies	 aim	 to	 restrain	 –	 i.e.	 control	 –	 specific	 behaviours	 through	 disclosure	 of	information,	mainly	budgetary,	published	in	raw	format	and	through	specific	filters.	The	chapters	 included	 in	 this	part	 cover	 in	depth	narratives	of	 three	 case	 studies,	one	 in	Chapter	2	(the	Transparency	Portal	of	 the	Brazilian	Federal	Government)	and	 two	 in	Chapter	 3	 (MPs’	 Expenses	 Scheme	 and	 MPs’	 Register	 of	 Interests	 in	 the	 United	Kingdom).	 The	 three	 cases	 describe	 the	 adoption	 and	 trajectories	 of	 regulatory	transparency	policies	to	curb	corruption	and	promote	integrity.	The	impetus	for	these	policies	can	be	traced	to	the	principles	associated	with	Layer	1,	such	as	the	right	to	know,	and	 the	 institutional	 norms	 and	 frameworks	 embedded	 in	 Layer	 2,	 including	 fiscal	transparency	and	FoIA,	albeit	with	varying	strengths	in	each	case.	The	main	difference	between	the	Brazilian	case	and	the	British	cases	is	the	actors’	relationships.	In	the	case	studied	in	Chapter	2	the	driver	of	regulatory	transparency	is	a	government	agency	with	a	mandate	that	can	be	strengthened	by	disclosure	of	information	and	the	target	is	public	officials	and	politicians	of	the	Executive	branch.	In	both	UK	cases,	MPs	are	the	targets	of	disclosure,	but	in	one	case	(Register	of	Interests)	they	are	also	the	drivers.	In	the	other	UK	case	(Expenses	Scheme)	the	main	drivers	are	the	media,	while	intermediaries	also	take	up	a	driver	role.	A	cross-case	analysis	is	provided	in	the	conclusion	to	Part	I,	where	I	discuss	the	determinants	of	the	RTPs’	trajectories	in	the	logic	of	control.					
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CHAPTER	2:	
THE	BRAZILIAN	TRANSPARENCY	PORTAL	
		 Transparency	 is	 the	 best	 remedy	 to	 curb	mismanagement,	 not	 just	 corruption,	 but	 waste,	negligence,	 lack	 of	 care	with	 public	money.	 (Former	minister	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Office	 of	 the	 Comptroller	General	Jorge	Hage	Sobrinho,	2012)12	The	idea	of	transparency	was	introduced	…	as	a	public	policy,	 with	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Office	 of	 the	Comptroller	 General,	 precisely	 with	 a	 focus	 to	preventing	 and	 combating	 corruption.	 (Former	minister	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Office	 of	 the	 Comptroller	General	Jorge	Hage	Sobrinho,	2015)13			This	chapter	looks	into	the	case	of	transparency	as	a	regulatory	policy	adopted	by	the	Brazilian	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General	to	prevent	and	combat	corruption	in	Brazil.	According	 to	 the	2014	Corruption	Perception	 Index	 (CPI),	published	by	Transparency	International,	Brazil	ranks	69th	place	(out	of	175)	in	the	list	of	most	corrupt	countries	in	the	world,	with	43	points	out	of	a	100	(highest	score	indicating	less	corruption).	From	mid-2014	until	the	time	of	writing,	Petrobras,	the	Brazilian	semi-public	oil	company,	was	the	focus	of	the	biggest	corruption	scandal	in	the	country’s	history,	one	of	the	reasons	why	Brazil	dropped	from	its	76th	position	in	the	previous	year	in	the	CPI	(Transparency	International,	2016,	p.	8).14	In	November	2015,	citizens	ranked	corruption	as	the	worst	problem	 of	 the	 country,	 followed	 by	 health	 problems,	 unemployment,	 education	 and	violence	(Datafolha,	2015,	p.	3).	A	few	years	earlier,	in	2009,	in	a	survey	conducted	by	
Enterprise	 Surveys	 with	 business	 owners	 and	 top	 managers	 of	 1,802	 Brazilian	 firms,	68.8%	reported	corruption	as	a	major	constraint	to	their	businesses	in	the	country.	
                                                12	EBC	(2012)	Hage	explica	Lei	de	Acesso	à	Informação	Pública.	EBC	Serviços.	29	March.	13	Sobrinho,	J.	H.	(2015)	Interview	on	26	June	2015.	[My	translation;	recording	in	my	possession.]	14	It	is	important,	however,	not	to	take	perception	of	corruption	at	face	value,	as	perceptions	of	corruption	 could	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 environment,	 or	 “based	 on	prejudiced	 gossip	 or	 media	 sensationalism”	 (Miller,	 2016,	 p.	 168).	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 other	measurements,	 however,	 the	 CPI	 can	 shed	 light	 about	 the	 state	 of	 corruption	 and	 of	 anti-corruption	measures	in	a	country.	
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During	 the	 same	 period,	 transparency	 has	 been	 intensely	 advocated	 inside	 and	outside	 of	 government	 as	 an	 essential	 tool	 to	 curb	 corruption.	 The	 anticipation	 that	greater	access	to	governmental	information	could	reduce	the	levels	of	misbehaviour	is	based	on	two	distinct	(and	complementary)	explanations.	The	first	is	the	argument	that	once	politicians	or	public	officials	learn	that	their	acts	will	be	exposed	to	the	public	they	change	their	behaviour	by	anticipating	the	public’s	reaction	to	disclosure.	The	second	is	that	 access	 to	 information	 enables	 citizens	 and	 the	 media	 to	 identify	 and	 report	mismanagements	 and,	 therefore,	 corruption	 is	 reduced	 in	 response	 to	 increased	oversight.	The	case	under	examination,	the	Brazilian	Transparency	Portal,	is	an	example	of	the	control	logic	of	regulatory	transparency	and	it	demonstrates	how	the	driver	of	the	policy,	i.e.	the	Brazilian	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General	(Controladoria	Geral	da	União	–	CGU),	pursued	increased	disclosure	of	the	federal	government’s	financial	expenditure	and	the	development	of	queries	to	facilitate	citizens’	searches	as	a	tool	of	‘police	patrol’	to	support	its	mandate	of	internal	control	and	anti-corruption.	The	chapter	explains	and	highlights	the	self-reinforcing	characteristics	of	the	Transparency	Portal	and	provides	insights	into	the	ways	 in	which	 disclosure	 of	 information	 empowered	 new	 beneficiaries,	 including	some	working	with	the	driver,	who	then	supported	further	transparency.	Finally,	the	case	presents	evidence	against	claims	that	RTPs	in	the	logic	of	control	are	created	and	evolve	exclusively	in	response	to	exogenous	shocks,	as	the	expansion	in	question	here	is	of	an	internal	and	incremental	nature.				
1.	Socio-Political	and	Institutional	Context			
1.1.	Fiscal	Responsibility	and	Regulatory	Transparency	The	 legal	 framework	 for	 publication	 of	 budgetary	 and	 governmental	 spending	information	 in	 Brazil	 dates	 to	 the	 year	 2000,	with	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Law	 on	 Fiscal	Responsibility	 (Lei	 de	 Responsabilidade	 Fiscal	 –	 LRF).	 Adopted	 ten	 years	 before	 the	country’s	 Freedom	 of	 Information	 Act	 (FoIA),	 the	 LRF	 was	 the	 legislation	 that	 most	comprehensively	required	the	publication	of	sets	of	information	about	a	specific	policy	area.	 Besides	 its	 primary	 objective	 of	 establishing	 limits	 to	 public	 spending,	 the	 LFR	obliged	 the	 federal,	 state	 and	 municipal	 governments	 to	 make	 core	 budget-related	
 61 
documents	publicly	available,	including	electronically.15	The	central	aim	of	the	Law	was	to	drastically	reduce	public	debt	and	stabilise	it	relative	to	GDP	regardless	of	the	previous	economic	 conditions	 of	 governments	 (Correa	 and	 Spinelli,	 2011).	 The	 formal	introduction	 of	 fiscal	 transparency	 as	 part	 of	 the	 fiscal	 responsibility	 framework	was	officially	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	prevalent	international	arguments	and	evidence	that	showcased	 transparency	 as	 one	 of	 the	most	 effective	 instruments	 for	 attaining	 fiscal	discipline.16		As	 a	 mechanism	 of	 fiscal	 discipline,	 governments	 have	 used	 transparency	 to	counterbalance	the	short-term	limit	rationality	and	incentives	of	elected	politicians	with	regards	to	public	expenditure,	as	well	as	to	signal	to	foreign	lenders	their	commitment	to	fiscal	discipline	(Roberts,	2010a,	p.	58).	Governments	seemed	to	incur	bigger	losses	when	fiscal	 rules	 were	 violated,	 making	 noncompliance	 more	 costly	 and	 their	 adoption	worthwhile	 for	 disciplinary	 matters.	 None	 of	 these	 causal	 relations	 were	 very	straightforward;	 tying	 the	 hands	 of	 bureaucrats	 and	 politicians	 with	 fiscal	 discipline	legislation	did	not	always	produce	the	desired	results,	as	some	treasuries	left	too	much	discretion	for	governments	to	conform	with	the	law	in	their	own	time.	The	notion	that	budgetary	 discipline	 served	 as	 a	 powerful	 signalling	mechanism	 to	 financial	markets	often	appeared	exaggerated,	and	expectations	from	the	law	reduced	significantly	during	crises	 (Roberts,	 2010a,	 pp.	 63-64).	Nonetheless,	 the	 belief	 and	 the	 hope	 in	 budgetary	discipline	and,	consequently,	in	fiscal	transparency	(Layer	1)	as	keys	to	better	governance	supported	the	expansion	of	fiscal	discipline	and	fiscal	transparency	norms	(Layer	2)	in	a	number	of	different	jurisdictions.	Besides	supporting	fiscal	discipline,	the	argument	goes,	fiscal	transparency	is	also	enacted	 to	allow	citizens	and	organised	civil	 society	 to	participate	 in	 the	processes	of	elaboration,	planning	and	expenditure	of	 governmental	budgets.	 Since	 the	 late	1990s,	institutional	documents	in	support	of	budgetary	and	fiscal	responsibility	practices	have	been	adopted	worldwide.	 Currently,	 fiscal	 transparency	 continues	 to	be	 advocated	by	numerous	NGOs	 on	 national	 levels,	 by	 international	 organisations,	 such	 as	 the	World	Bank,	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF)	 and	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD),	as	well	as	by	multilateral	initiatives	such	as	the	Global	Initiative	for	Fiscal	Transparency	(GIFT).	In	Brazil,	the	Law	on	Fiscal	Responsibility	obliged	the	publication	of	the	four-year	Pluri-Annual	 Plan	 (Plano	 Plurianual),	 the	 three-year	 Budget	 Guidelines	 Law	 (Lei	 de	Diretrizes	Orçamentárias),	 the	Draft	Annual	Budget	Law	(Projeto	de	Lei	Orçamentária	
                                                15	Supplementary	Law	101,	4	May	2000	16	E.M.	Interministerial	106/MOG/MF/MPAS,	18	May	1990	
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Anual),	 the	 Annual	 Budget	 Law	 (Lei	 Orçamentária	 Anual),	 in-year	 budget	 execution	reports,	 and	 year-end	 government	 accounts	 and	 their	 prior	 opinion	 before	 being	externally	audited	by	the	Federal	Court	of	Accounts	(Tribunal	de	Contas	da	União	-	TCU)	(OECD,	 2008,	 pp.	 117-118).	 The	 in-year	 reports	 present	 expenditure	 by	 each	organisational	administrative	unit	and	compare	the	executed	and	budgeted	amounts	for	most	 expenditure	 categories,	 but	 not	 per	 government	 programme	 or	 action.	 Extra-budgetary	funds	and	quasi-fiscal	data	are	not	included	in	the	budget	and	are	not	obliged	to	be	disclosed,	limiting	the	scope	of	budget	transparency	in	Brazil	(OECD,	2008,	p.	118).	In	 a	 country	 with	 endemic	 corruption	 problems,	 such	 as	 Brazil,	 governmental	expenditures	did	not	only	indicate	the	priorities	of	governments,	they	carried	the	hope	to	raise	alarm	into	mismanagement.	This	is	in	spite	of	the	fact	that,	as	Wehner	and	de	Renzio	(2013,	p.	10)	argue,	only	a	couple	of	scholarly	papers	have	successfully	demonstrated	the	positive	impact	of	budgetary	and	financial	expenditure	on	anti-corruption.	One	of	them,	by	Reinikka	and	Svensson	(2004),	showed	that	after	the	central	government	of	Uganda	started	publishing	information	about	funds	transferred	to	 local	schools	 in	the	national	newspapers,	and	posting	them	on	school	notice	boards,	the	disbursements	that	reached	schools	rose	from	25.4%,	in	1996,	to	81.8%,	in	2001.	Another	study,	by	Ferraz	and	Finan	(2007),	found	that	the	publication	of	auditing	reports	conducted	by	the	Brazilian	Office	of	 the	 Comptroller	 General,	 when	 revealing	 corruption	 within	 the	 mayor’s	 office,	decreased	 the	 incumbent’s	 likelihood	of	 re-election	by	about	20%.	The	 likelihood	was	higher	in	municipalities	with	radio	stations,	which	increased	the	effect	of	transparency.	Only	 three	 years	 after	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 LFR,	 besides	 documents,	 the	 government’s	financial	information	became	available	to	citizens	in	the	form	of	an	RTP.	The	driver	of	this	idea	and	the	policy	was	the	CGU,	the	same	body	in	charge	of	the	Transparency	Portal.17			
1.2.	The	Brazilian	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General		Created	in	2001,	the	Brazilian	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General	was	first	established	as	the	Inspectorate	General	of	Administrative	Discipline	(Corregedoria-Geral	da	União)	with	the	aim	of	conducting	administrative	investigations	into	potential	misconducts	of	federal	public	officials,	both	ex	officio	and	in	response	to	credible	reports.18	Almost	a	year	later,	the	Federal	Secretariat	of	Internal	Control	(Secretaria	Federal	de	Controle	Interno)	and	
                                                17	This	analysis	focuses	exclusively	on	the	transparency	policies	adopted	by	the	CGU	(the	body’s	name	was	changed	to	Ministry	for	Transparency	and	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General,	in	2017,	due	to	political	reasons).	18	Provisional	Measure	2,143,	2	April	2001.	
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the	Office	of	the	Ombudsman	General,	from	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	joined	the	structure	of	the	Inspectorate	General	of	Administrative	Discipline.19		The	 structure	 of	 the	 CGU	 was	 further	 strengthened	 during	 Lula	 da	 Silva’s	(henceforth	 Lula)	 two	 terms	 in	 the	 presidency	 of	 Brazil.	 Two	 of	 his	 key	 campaign	promises	 had	 been	 to	 promote	 anti-corruption	 measures	 and	 to	 increase	 civic	participation	 in	 governmental	 activities.	 In	 2003,	 the	CGU	was	 elevated	 to	ministerial	level	and	equipped	with	new	mandates	typical	of	those	of	an	anti-corruption	agency,	i.e.	public	oversight,	public	audit	and	internal	control,	prevention	of	corruption,	ombudsman,	public	 transparency	 promotion,	 treatment	 of	 substantiated	 reports	 about	mismanagement	 of	 the	 federal	 patrimony,	 among	 others.	 Additionally,	 a	 Council	 for	Public	Transparency	and	Anti-Corruption	(Conselho	de	Transparência	Pública	e	Combate	à	Corrupção)	was	created	within	the	structure	of	the	CGU,	to	contribute	to	formulating	guidelines	for	policies.20	With	the	Federal	Secretariat	of	Internal	Control	as	part	of	the	CGU,	the	Comptroller	General	was	responsible	for	the	internal	control	of	the	executive	branch	at	federal	level	as	 defined	 by	 Article	 74	 of	 the	 Federal	 Constitution.21	 This	 included	 overseeing	 the	execution	of	 federal	 programmes,	 including	 funds	 voluntarily	 (not	 legally	mandatory)	transferred	 from	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 states	 and	municipalities,	 and	 directly	 to	citizens.	 This	 mandate	 included	 programmes	 that	 were	 present	 in	 every	 city	 of	 the	
                                                19	Decree	4,177,	28	March	2002.	20	With	 the	enactment	of	 the	Brazilian	Federal	Constitution	 in	1988,	Policy	Councils	 linked	 to	ministerial	structures	became	formal	mechanisms	of	ensuring	civil	society	participation	in	the	process	of	policy	formulation.	21	Article	74	from	the	Brazilian	Federal	Constitution	states	that:	The	Legislature,	Executive	and	Judiciary	shall	maintain	integrated	systems	of	internal	control	in	order	to:	I. evaluate	 attainment	 of	 targets	 established	 in	 the	 multi-year	 plan,	implementation	of	governmental	programs	and	the	budgets	of	the	Union	II. determine	the	legality	and	evaluate	the	efficacy	and	efficiency	of	budgetary,	financial	 and	 patrimonial	 management	 by	 agencies	 and	 entities	 of	 the	 federal	administration,	as	well	as	application	of	public	resources	by	private	law	entities	III. exercise	control	over	credit	transactions,	avals,	and	guarantees,	as	well	as	over	the	rights	and	property	of	the	Union	IV. support	external	control	in	the	performance	of	their	institutional	missions.	§1°.	 Upon	 learning	 of	 any	 irregularity	 or	 illegality,	 those	 responsible	 for	 internal	control	 shall	notify	 the	Tribunal	of	Accounts	of	 the	Union	 thereof,	upon	penalty	of	being	jointly	liable.		§2°.	Any	citizen,	political	party,	association	or	syndicate	has	standing,	as	provided	by	law,	to	denounce	irregularities	or	illegalities	to	the	Tribunal	of	Accounts	of	the	Union.	
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country,	 such	 as	 the	 famous	 Brazilian	 cash	 transfer	 programme	 Bolsa	 Família.	 A	 key	program	in	the	efforts	to	lift	millions	of	Brazilians	from	poverty	during	the	presidencies	of	 Lula	 and	 Dilma	 Rousseff,	 Bolsa	 Família	 was	 a	 federal	 programme	 in	 which	municipalities	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 registration	 of	 beneficiaries	 and	 the	 federal	government	is	responsible	for	money	transfer	and	its	oversight.		Soon	after	its	inception,	the	CGU	turned	to	strategies	of	empowering	citizens	to	act	as	auditors	of	federal	funds	transferred	to	their	locality.	This	was	claimed	to	be	a	practical	necessity	 for	 the	 control	 of	 corruption,	 given	 the	 CGU	 had	 a	 team	 of	 less	 than	 two	thousand	auditors	to	cover	a	vast	geographic	area	(namely,	26	states,	one	Federal	District	and	more	than	5.5	thousand	municipalities).	One	such	strategy,	 the	programme	Smart	
Eye	on	Public	Money	(Olho	Vivo	no	Dinheiro	Publico)	was	implemented	in	2003	and	was	still	 in	 effect	 at	 the	 time	 of	writing	 in	 2016.	 The	 initiative	 aimed	 at	 advising	 citizens,	notably	 members	 of	 public	 policy	 councils	 and	 municipal	 leaders,	 in	 overseeing	 the	proper	 use	 of	 funds	 transferred	 from	 the	 federal	 government	 to	 states	 and	municipalities.22	 From	 early	 on,	 the	 CGU	 developed	 strategies	 of	 civic	 engagement	 to	support	its	own	role	as	an	anti-corruption	institution.	In	 the	 same	year,	 the	CGU	 launched	 the	Random	Audit	Programme,	 an	 initiative	jointly	 executed	 with	 the	 national	 lottery	 to	 audit	 randomly	 selected	 municipal	governments	for	the	implementation	of	policies	funded	by	federal	money.	The	idea	was	to	create	an	extra	incentive	for	mayors	and	municipal	officials	to	avoid	mismanagement	or	corruption,	and	to	supplement	the	traditional	audits	conducted	by	the	CGU,	defined	on	the	basis	of	materiality	and	relevance.	The	Random	Audit	Programme	comprised	a	large	share	of	the	annual	audit	activities	of	the	Secretariat	of	Internal	Control,	varying	between	30%	and	70%	between	2005	and	2010	(OECD,	2011,	p.	207).	After	conclusion,	the	audits	were	published	in	the	format	of	reports,	where	the	CGU’s	auditors	identified	their	main	findings,	 including	 evidence	 for	mismanagement.	 As	 I	 noted	 earlier,	 Finan	 and	Ferraz	demonstrated	that	the	publication	of	these	reports	had	a	significant	impact	on	electoral	accountability,	with	corrupt	politicians	having	a	lower	likelihood	of	re-election.	The	process	to	open	up	the	budget	and	later	to	make	it	a	tool	for	fighting	corruption	was	unilateral	and	very	much	centred	on	the	drivers’	(the	executive	branch	and	the	CGU)	own	preferences.	A	number	of	institutional	and	socio-political	factors	contributed	to	this	process.	Institutionally,	budgetary	transparency	was	not	a	legal	novelty;	on	the	contrary,	Brazil	had	already	enacted	LRF	granting	access	to	fiscal	documents	and	information.	In	
                                                22	Public	policy	councils	were	organised	at	all	levels	of	government,	in	response	to	constitutional	requirements,	providing	forums	in	which	citizens	joined	service	providers	and	the	government	mostly	 for	 overseeing	 their	 implementation,	 including	 expenditures,	 which	 needed	 to	 be	approved	by	councils.		
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the	socio-political	realm,	ahead	of	his	first	election	in	2002,	Lula	had	made	managing	a	strong	and	fiscally	responsible	economy	one	of	his	key	campaign	promises	(Anderson,	2011).	Demonstrating	 this	 commitment	via	enhanced	expenditure	 transparency	 could	help	mitigate	risks	while	incurring	benefits	for	his	government.		First,	stock	markets	frequently	feared,	and	therefore	punished,	incoming	left-wing	governments.	Additionally,	this	was	a	particularly	sensitive	moment	in	time,	as	Brazil’s	largest	 neighbour,	 Argentina,	 had	 recently	 declared	 the	 biggest	 sovereign	 default	 in	history,	 and	many	 in	 financial	markets	 looked	upon	Brazil	 as	 the	next	 country	 in	 line	(Anderson,	2011).	Alongside	picking	an	orthodox	team	for	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	for	the	Central	Bank,	transparency	of	public	spending	could	attest	to	the	government’s	commitment	to	fiscal	discipline	and	help	assuage	stock	markets’	fear	of	the	government.	Secondly,	Lula’s	ruling	coalition	was	composed	of	eight	political	parties	at	the	level	of	the	federal	legislature,	while	his	Labour	Party	was	in	charge	of	only	411	municipalities	(out	of	more	than	5.5	thousand).	Given	the	limited	direct	control	over	these	units,	enhanced	transparency	 could	help	 the	 executive	 branch	 increase	 its	 capacity	 to	 oversee	 federal	expenditures	 and	 detect	 potential	 mismanagement	 of	 funds	 across	 government	 (see	Michener,	2015,	for	a	similar	argument	in	this	regard	for	FoIAs).	In	2004	the	CGU	created	the	Transparency	Portal,	a	regulatory	transparency	policy	designed	as	a	website	 to	publish	 the	spending	 information	of	 the	 federal	government.	According	to	Jorge	Hage	Sobrinho,	deputy	minister	at	the	CGU	at	the	time,	the	main	thrust	for	the	creation	of	the	Transparency	Portal	was	the	political	campaign	promise	of	then	President	 Lula	 to	 open	 up	 to	 civil	 society	 the	 Integrated	 System	 of	 Financial	Administration	 of	 the	 Federal	 Government	 (Sistema	 Integrado	 de	 Administração	Financeira	do	Governo	Federal	–	SIAFI),	which	at	the	time	was	only	accessible	to	some	parliamentarians	 (Sobrinho,	2015).23	The	 focus	on	SIAFI,	which	 is	 the	accounting	and	financial	 reporting	 system	 of	 the	 federal	 government,	 indicated	 that	 the	 CGU	 was	emphasising	one	area	of	the	budgetary	process	–	government’s	expenditure	–	to	expand	its	regulatory	transparency	policy.			
                                                23	SIAFI	is	the	accounting	and	financial	reporting	system	of	the	federal	government,	including	the	indirect	administration	of	the	executive,	the	legislature	and	judiciary,	and	hosts	all	the	financial	information	 of	 the	 government.	 The	 system	 is	 operated	 in	 a	 decentralised	 fashion	 by	 public	bodies	which	are	obliged	to	provide	documentation,	such	as	bank	transfers,	in	order	to	insert	data	in	the	system.	It	is	therefore	one	of	the	main	sources	of	internal	and	external	audits.	
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2.	The	trajectory	of	the	Transparency	Portal		
2.1.	Creation	and	Institutionalisation		When	 the	 CGU	was	 negotiating	 opening	 up	 SIAFI	 to	wider	 usage	with	 officials	 at	 the	National	Treasury,	who	were	 in	charge	of	 the	SIAFI	system,	 the	 latter	raised	concerns	about	the	feasibility	of	the	proposal.	First	concern	was	regarding	the	operating	system	of	SIAFI,	which	was	too	old	and	would	not	support	thousands	or	millions	of	simultaneous	accesses.	 The	 second	 point	 raised	 by	 the	 Treasury	 officials	 was	 that	 the	 general	population	 would	 not	 understand	 the	 available	 data	 given	 the	 technicalities	 of	government	accounting.	Additionally,	many	of	the	federal	programmes	widely	known	to	the	public	had	different,	technical,	names	under	SIAFI.	The	CGU	nonetheless	insisted	on	disclosure.	In	the	words	of	Sobrinho	(2015):		 We	concluded	that	we	should	take	another	path;	that	of	creating	a	Portal	that	would	translate	what	was	in	SIAFI	into	citizen	language	[friendly	language]	[…]	 That’s	 when	 we	 thought	 of	 creating	 a	 Portal	 with	 this	 name:	 the	Transparency	Portal.	But	as	you	see,	at	its	genesis	is	the	SIAFI;	the	idea	was	to	work	with	 budgetary	 execution,	 to	 create	 a	 Portal	with	 the	 budgetary	execution,	understanding	that	this	was	the	big	first	step	to	give	transparency	to	 public	 accounts	 and,	 therefore,	 to	 serve	 the	 purpose	 of	 preventing	corruption.	 All	 else	 came	 incrementally,	 i.e.	 adding	 information	 about	agreements	with	states	and	municipalities,	this	and	that,	all	incrementally.		The	solution	agreed	upon	by	the	two	offices	was	the	creation	of	a	public	portal	that	would	disclose	 financial	 information	 in	 a	 format	 and	 language	 that	 could	 be	 more	 easily	understood	by	citizens.	A	facilitated	language,	named	citizen	language	by	officials	at	CGU,	was	adopted	in	order	to	translate	some	of	the	technical	terms	that	could	be	a	barrier	to	citizen	engagement.	The	 Transparency	 Portal	 of	 the	 Federal	 Public	 Administration	 (Portal	 da	Transparência	 -	 www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br)	 went	 online	 in	 November	 2004,	with	 information	 about	 the	 transfers	 of	 resources	 from	 the	 federal	 government	 to	subnational	 governments.	 This	 was	 the	 first	 move	 by	 the	 CGU	 to	 disclose	 financial	information	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 citizens	 would	 help	 monitor	 the	 funds’	 proper	implementation	by	subnational	governments.	Information	about	direct	spending	by	the	federal	administration,	including	the	Federal	Government	Corporate	Card,	which	is	used	by	certain	officials	within	the	federal	government,	was	added	in	2005	in	a	detailed	and	easier-to-read	format	than	the	fiscal	reports	available	to	citizens.	Only	seven	months	after	its	publication,	the	Portal	was	formally	institutionalised,	granting	the	CGU	the	power	to	
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access	data	hosted	by	the	integrated	systems	of	the	federal	government	when	requested,	and	reducing	political	and	bureaucratic	hurdles	that	the	CGU	could	encounter	to	manage	and	 expand	 the	 initiative,	 such	 as	 facing	 difficulties	 or	 delays	 in	 accessing	 data	 from	federal	electronic	systems.24		In	none	of	 these	events,	were	there	any	attempts	or	organised	protests	 from	the	targets	of	 the	policies,	 i.e.	 public	officials	 from	 the	national	 and	 subnational	 executive	levels,	to	avoid	regulatory	transparency.	In	contrast	to	Fung	et	al.’s	argument	about	the	difficulty	of	sustaining	targeted	transparency	policies	due	to	the	imbalance	of	distribution	of	costs	and	benefits	(2007,	p.110),	in	this	case,	the	intensity	of	the	CGU	to	continuously	foster	regulatory	transparency	enabled	the	policy’s	incremental	expansion,	even	though	the	costs	of	disclosure	were	imposed	on	a	small	group	of	targets,	and	the	beneficiaries	constituted	the	large	and	dispersed	group	of	citizens.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	 General	 had	 the	 mandate	 to	 control	 public	 expenditures	 and	 increased	transparency	was	among	the	mechanisms	chosen	by	the	public	body	to	support	this	role.	On	the	other	hand,	at	least	in	part,	subnational	governments	were	not	only	the	targets	but	also	the	beneficiaries	of	the	Transparency	Portal,	as	it	allowed	them	to	better	monitor	online	the	flow	of	federal	resources	that	were	transferred	to	them.	Two	years	after	the	creation	of	the	Portal,	the	Secretariat	for	Corruption	Prevention	and	 Strategic	 Information	 (Secretaria	 de	 Prevenção	 da	 Corrupção	 e	 Informações	Estratégicas	-	SPCI)	was	created	within	the	structure	of	the	CGU	(Loureiro	et	al.,	2012).	Among	the	SPCI’s	mandates	was	promoting	transparency	and	putting	forward	activities	to	foster	the	participation	of	civil	society	in	preventing	corruption,	therefore	becoming	the	 unit	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 Transparency	 Portal	 within	 the	 CGU.25	 Simultaneously,	 the	mandate	to	adopt	transparency	as	a	way	to	curb	corruption	was	further	institutionalised,	making	the	trajectory	of	the	Transparency	Portal	less	likely	to	retrench.	By	the	time	the	Secretariat	 was	 created,	 anti-corruption,	 transparency,	 and	 citizen	 engagement	 to	prevent	corruption	were	pressing	demands	coming	from	citizens,	civil	society,	interest	groups	 and	 the	 international	 community.	 Internationally,	 Brazil	was	 also	 expected	 to	strengthen	 anti-corruption	measures,	 including	 transparency	 of	 government	 data	 and	promotion	 of	 citizens’	 engagement	 for	 their	 use	 in	 response	 to	 the	 Inter-American	Convention	against	Corruption,	and	the	United	Nations	Convention	against	Corruption,	
                                                24	Decree	5,482,	30	June	2005	25	Decree	5,683,	24	January	2006	
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as	well	 as	 to	 the	 recommendations	 issued	by	 the	 corresponding	monitoring	bodies	of	these	Conventions.26	With	 the	creation	of	SPCI,	 the	CGU	strengthened	the	 links	between	transparency	and	 anti-corruption	 not	 only	 in	 legal	 terms,	 but	 also	 in	 practice.	 The	 body	 publicly	promoted	the	idea	that	access	to	information	and	public	oversight	were	central	to	good	governance	and	that	transparency	was	the	best	antidote	to	corruption.	In	terms	of	the	three-layer	 approach	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 CGU’s	justifications	 were	 based	 within	 the	 wider	 normative	 and	 political	 framework	 of	 the	macro	 and	 meso	 layers	 (Figure	 1.2,	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter).	 The	 CGU	 minister	 and	officials	 often	 emphasised	 the	 important	 role	 citizens	 had	 to	 play	 as	 controllers;	advocating	a	system	of	 ‘fire	alarm’,	to	use	the	terminology	of	McCubbins	and	Schwartz	(1984).	Given	the	geographic	vastness	of	Brazil	and	 its	many	administrative	units,	 the	argument	went,	 the	CGU’s	capacity	to	ensure	 integrity	 in	the	use	of	public	money	was	naturally	limited	and	the	help	of	citizens	was	crucial.	Unlike	‘police	patrol’,	in	which	the	public	body	with	an	oversight	mandate	would	have	to	spend	time	and	financial	resources	to	 inspect	 actions	 which	 may	 exhibit	 no	 violations	 or	 irregularities,	 regulatory	transparency	 was	 expected	 to	 trigger	 in-depth	 oversight	 by	 the	 organised	 citizenry,	interest	 groups	 or	 other	 stakeholders.	Moreover,	 by	 doing	 so,	 the	 CGU	 concomitantly	justified	the	difficulty	of	ensuring	full	integrity	in	the	execution	of	federal	funds,	making	it	more	acceptable	that	eventual	cases	were	reported	by	citizens	before	identified	by	law	enforcement	authorities.		In	line	with	the	CGU’s	mandate	as	the	internal	comptroller	of	the	executive	branch	and	the	strategy	of	‘fire	alarm’,	in	May	2007	the	SPCI	developed	an	online	push	system	to	notify	citizens	weekly	about	voluntary	transfers	of	funds	from	the	federal	government	to	states,	 municipalities,	 NGOs	 and	 other	 benefiting	 entities.27	 This	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	automatically	activate	citizens	to	carry	out	local	audits	to	check	if	the	money	transferred	from	 the	 federal	 government	 was	 being	 used	 for	 the	 right	 purposes.	 More	 than	 800	people	voluntarily	registered	to	 the	push	system	within	 its	 first	month	of	existence.	A	year	and	a	half	later,	there	were	17,000	registered	individuals.	By	May	2015,	more	than	91,000	registries	had	been	recorded.	The	CGU	stated	that	numerous	citizens	contacted	the	body	to	ask	further	questions	about	the	transfers	and	to	report	delays	in	the	execution	
                                                26	 In	 2006,	 for	 example,	 the	 Follow-Up	 Mechanism	 to	 the	 OAS	 Anti-Corruption	 Convention	recommended	 further	actions	 to	promote	 transparency	and	civic	participation	 in	Brazil.	 (OAS.	(2006)	SG/MESICIC/doc.168/05	rev.	4)	27	Voluntary	transfers	are	those	made	by	the	federal	government	to	states,	municipalities	or	to	the	federal	district	as	a	result	of	agreements,	adjustments	or	other	formal	instruments	used	to	advance	the	execution	of	public	works	or	services	of	the	interest	of	the	Union	and	a	subnational	level	administration.	
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of	public	works	or	of	provision	of	products	or	 services.	 Several	 registered	 individuals	were	public	 officials	 and	 representatives	 at	 state	 and	municipal	 levels,	who	benefited	from	the	information	to	learn	about	transfers	that	were	being	made	to	their	localities.		
2.2.	Consolidation	and	Expansion		In	early	2008,	a	corruption	scandal	broke	out	on	the	basis	of	the	information	disclosed	at	the	Transparency	Portal,	which	showed	potential	misuse	of	the	Federal	Corporate	Cards	by	ministers.28	The	case	surfaced	after	a	newspaper,	O	Estado	de	S.	Paulo,	published	two	news	articles	about	the	issue;	one	about	the	excessive	use	of	the	cards	during	the	Lula	administration	and	another	highlighting	that	the	then	Minister	for	Racial	Equality,	who	ranked	first	in	the	use	of	cards,	had	spent	more	than	£41,000	in	the	previous	two	years	with	the	card.	Further	analyses	of	the	data	by	the	press	showed	that	more	than	70%	of	the	minister’s	use	of	the	card	had	been	on	car	rentals,	always	from	one	single	firm.	The	remaining	percentage	had	been	spent	on	duty	free	purchases	and	meals.	Journalists	and	citizens	questioned	not	only	the	value	of	these	purchases,	but	also	the	abuse	of	the	card	for	 ministers’	 everyday	 personal	 needs.29	 Ten	 days	 after	 the	 case,	 two	 federal	enforcement	 authorities	 launched	 an	 investigation	 into	 the	 use	 of	 Federal	 Corporate	Cards.	Less	than	twenty	days	after	the	scandal	erupted,	the	Minister	for	Racial	Equality	resigned	 and	 the	 political	 crisis	 led	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 usage	 of	 the	 cards	 and	 to	identification	 of	 other	 cases	 of	 mismanagements	 through	 transparency	 of	 financial	information.	In	March	2008,	after	the	scandal	and	the	creation	of	a	Congressional	Commission	of	Inquiry	to	investigate	the	subject,	a	new	and	succinct	presidential	decree	was	enacted	to	regulate	the	usage	of	the	Federal	Corporate	Credit	Cards	towards	increased	regulatory	transparency	 in	 the	 logic	 of	 control.30	 The	 decree	 brought	 two	 significant	 changes:	 it	restricted	the	possibility	of	federal	public	bodies	to	use	bank	accounts	for	purchases	of	goods	of	small	value	(obliging	the	use	of	a	Card,	which	allowed	for	detailed	transparency	of	purchases	online),	and	banned	cash	withdrawals	using	the	cards,	except	in	the	very	limited	cases	specified	in	the	rule.	The	rationale	for	these	two	changes	was	that,	as	the	case	of	the	Corporate	Credit	Cards	had	just	proved,	transparency	would	both	control	the	
                                                28	 The	 Federal	Government	Corporate	 Cards	 (Cartão	de	Pagamentos	 do	Governo	Federal)	 are	bank	cards	given	to	officials	with	specific	posts	in	the	Federal	Public	Administration,	such	as	a	minister,	that	allows	for	the	rare	purchases	of	goods	of	small	value.	They	are	also	referred	to	as	‘emergency	cards’.	29	In	one	case,	for	example,	a	minister	had	used	the	card	to	purchase	a	£2.00	sandwich,	sparking	a	debate	about	public	morality.	30	Decree	6,370,	1	February	2008.	
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behaviour	of	card	users	and	allow	the	media	and	citizens	 to	collaborate	 in	overseeing	another	set	of	expenditures.		Though	 the	 latent	 need	 to	 recover	 public	 trust	may	 have	 supported	 the	 CGU	 to	advance	 the	 regulation	of	 public	 expenditure	 through	 transparency,	 this	was	 the	 first	time	 that	 a	 political	 scandal	 had	 pushed	 for	 greater	 transparency	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Transparency	Portal.	Until	this	moment,	it	had	been	the	CGU’s	mandate	of	internal	control	and	its	argument	that	officials	restrained	their	behaviour	in	anticipation	of	the	impacts	of	transparency	that	had	informed	the	expansion	of	the	Transparency	Portal.	The	 same	year,	 as	a	 consequence	of	 the	 crisis	 and	 following	a	 suggestion	by	 the	Brazilian	NGO	Transparência	Brasil,	the	CGU	created	a	query	that	granted	users	of	the	Portal	more	direct	 access	 to	 the	expenses	made	by	Corporate	Credit	Card	holders,	 by	allowing	 users	 to	 search	 by	 users	 of	 the	 Cards.	 This	 was	 meant	 to	 facilitate	 media	investigations	and	citizen	monitoring.	Since	2008,	no	allegation	of	misuse	of	the	Cards	has	been	reported	by	prosecutorial	authorities	or	by	 the	media.	However,	despite	 the	expansion	 of	 disclosure	 through	 new	 obligations	 of	 usage	 of	 the	 card,	 secrecy	 still	prevailed	over	transparency	in	a	few	circumstances.	According	to	data	available	at	the	Transparency	 Portal,	 97%	 of	 the	 purchases	 done	 by	 the	 Presidency	 of	 the	 Republic	between	2006	and	2016	were	secret.31	In	2016,	a	senator	from	the	opposition	introduced	a	bill	to	regulate	the	usage	of	the	cards	at	the	Presidency	of	the	Republic,	based	on	data	from	the	Transparency	Portal	that	revealed	the	high	level	of	secrecy.32	Besides	the	changes	related	to	the	Federal	Corporate	Cards,	the	CGU	adopted	new	initiatives	 to	promote	 anti-corruption	 through	 enhanced	 transparency	 in	2008.	These	reflected	the	expansion	of	transparency	as	a	regulatory	mechanism	in	the	logic	of	control	to	other	areas	of	the	CGU’s	mandate,	 indirectly	related	to	public	financial	expenditure.	One	 of	 these	 initiatives	 was	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Registry	 of	 Non-Reputable	 or	Suspended	Companies	(Cadastro	Nacional	de	Empresas	Inidôneas	e	Suspensas	–	CEIS).	CEIS	 presented	 names	 of	 companies	 that	 had	 been	 fined	 due	 to	 mismanagement	 in	contractual	 relations	 with	 the	 federal	 administration	 or	 due	 to	 corruption	 and,	 as	 a	consequence,	were	not	allowed	 to	participate	 in	public	bids.	At	 the	 federal	 level,	CEIS	gathered	information	from	the	Court	of	Accounts,	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General	and	information	published	them	in	the	Official	Newspaper.	When	launched,	the	Registry	included	 information	 from	 the	 federal	 government	 and	 from	 those	 states	 that	 had	voluntarily	signed	up.	By	the	end	of	2014,	15	states	and	the	Federal	District	had	signed	up	to	CEIS.	
                                                31	In	no	other	body	of	the	federal	executive	was	this	the	case.	32	Projeto	de	Lei	do	Senado	62/2016	
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The	main	objective	of	the	publication	of	the	databases	by	the	CGU	was	to	share	with	the	public,	and	especially	with	officials	at	the	national	and	subnational	levels,	the	names	of	companies	and	individuals	(in	the	condition	of	service	providers,	e.g.	consultants)	that	had	not	provided	a	good	service	or	had	been	involved	in	mismanagement	or	corruption.	The	 hope	 was	 that	 this	 would	 lead	 other	 public	 bodies	 from	 different	 levels	 of	government	to	avoid	contracting	firms	banned	at	the	federal	level,	and	discourage	firms	contracting	with	the	government	from	engaging	in	mismanagement.33	In	other	words,	the	CGU	 called	 for	 close	 scrutiny	when	 firms	 held	 liable	 by	 the	 federal	 government	were	providing	services	or	products	to	another	level	of	government,	so	that	other	modes	and	instances	of	corruption	could	be	identified	once	information	was	published.	While	still	preparing	for	the	publication	of	the	first	list	of	CEIS,	the	CGU	identified	an	individual	that	was	the	shareholder	in	59	different	companies	that	negotiated	with	the	public	administration	across	the	country,	which	could	potentially	allow	for	non-banned	companies	to	substitute	banned	ones.34	According	to	reports	of	the	Federal	Inspectorate	within	the	structure	of	the	CGU,	companies	closely	monitored	their	presence	in	CEIS	and	contacted	the	body	frequently	to	make	sure	their	names	did	not	remain	on	the	blacklist	after	the	end	of	their	sanction	period,	which	was	interpreted	by	the	CGU	as	a	sign	of	the	regulatory	 transparency’s	 effectiveness.	 At	 its	 launch,	 a	 thousand	 companies	 were	registered	in	CEIS.	By	May	2015,	almost	12,000	companies	appeared	in	the	Registry.	The	CGU	subsequently	proposed	extending	the	use	of	CEIS	to	the	private	sector,	a	move	that	would	expand	the	body’s	mandate	through	the	logic	of	control.	This	initiative	emerged	out	of	 the	CGU’s	partnership	with	 the	Brazilian	Ethos	 Institute	 for	Corporate	Social	Responsibility,	an	NGO	fostering	the	10th	Principle	of	the	Global	Pact	and	the	OECD	Guidelines	for	Multinational	Enterprises,	among	other	documents.	After	the	creation	of	the	 Registry,	 the	 Ethos	 Institute	 amended	 its	 Directives	 against	 Corruption	 (Pacto	Empresarial	pela	Integridade	e	Contra	a	Corrupção)	to	include	a	clause	stating	that	the	signatories	of	the	Directives	should	avoid	doing	businesses	with	companies	listed	in	CEIS.	Additionally,	if	the	company	was	listed	in	CEIS,	it	would	not	be	allowed	to	join	or	continue	as	a	signatory	of	the	Directives.	By	using	CEIS	in	the	private	sector,	Ethos	and	the	CGU	hoped	to	shrink	the	market	for	companies	considered	non-reputable	by	the	government.	
                                                33	CGU	claimed	that	having	a	public	and	compiled	Registry	would	prevent	companies	 listed	as	non-reputable	or	suspended	from	changing	their	headquarters	from	one	state	to	another	in	order	to	keep	contracting	the	public	administration,	either	at	federal	or	state	level.	Since	the	name	of	the	partners	would	be	the	same,	the	company	could	be	identified.	34	 CGU	 (2009)	 Empresas	 inidôneas	 e	 suspensas	 já	 passam	 de	 mil,	 no	 cadastro	 da	 CGU.	
Controladoria-Geral	da	União,	27	August.	
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More	 than	500	 firms	were	 signatories	of	 the	Ethos	Directives	 in	2010,	 including	some	of	the	biggest	ones	in	Brazil,	such	as	Vale,	Ambev	and	Natura.	With	a	monitoring	methodology	to	ensure	that	parties	fully	adopted	the	clauses	of	the	Directives,	the	Ethos	Institute	published	a	long	list	of	companies	in	2013	that	were	removed	from	the	Pact	for	not	 providing	 information	 for	 analysis.	 According	 to	 the	 Institute,	 companies	 had	reported	not	making	business	with	specific	corporations	because	they	were	listed	in	CEIS.	The	main	question,	which	this	research	could	not	respond	due	to	the	lack	of	data,	is	to	what	extent	these	choices	had	a	real	impact	on	firms’	revenues	and	if	they	did,	whether	firms	were	able	to	trace	their	losses	to	corruption	or	to	shaming	instigated	by	CEIS.	In	this	convoluted	net	of	causalities,	it	is	likely	that	the	impact	may	have	been	limited.	Nevertheless,	 the	experience	of	CEIS	was	soon	replicated	 in	another	area.	On	28	October	 2011,	 President	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 amended	 decree	 7592,	 setting	 new	 rules	 to	ensure	monitoring	of	the	voluntary	transfers	of	money	from	the	federal	government	to	NGOs.35	The	 rule	was	 enacted	 after	 a	 crisis	 involving	 the	Minister	 of	 Sports,	who	had	allegedly	 received	 bribes	 from	 a	 number	 of	 NGOs	 in	 order	 to	 confirm	 the	 voluntary	transfers	 from	 the	 government.	 Reflecting	 the	 government’s	 hope	 that	 transparency	could	be	an	effective	tool	to	damage	the	reputation	of	blacklisted	NGOs	and	reduce	their	chance	to	partner	with	other	public	bodies	in	different	levels	of	government,	the	decree	called	on	the	CGU	to	disclose	blacklisted	NGOs	in	the	Transparency	Portal.36	The	decree	also	defined	that	every	agreement	between	the	federal	administration	bodies	and	NGOs	should	be	suspended	pending	analysis	for	a	period	of	thirty	days,	after	which	they	could	be	 re-established	 if	 no	 irregularity	 was	 detected.	 By	 May	 2015,	 2,495	 NGOs	 were	registered	in	the	Portal	and	multiple	news	stories	had	been	written	demonstrating	that	NGOs	responded	to	special	audits	and	returned	money	to	the	federal	government.		
2.3.		Institutional	mandates	and	political	agendas	Although	 the	 CGU	 decided	 on	 future	 disclosures	 (often	 detailing	 an	 existing	 group	 of	financial	 information)	 and	 technical	 improvements	 of	 the	Transparency	Portal	 on	 the	whole	internally,	a	number	of	external	factors	also	seemed	to	inform	the	trajectory	of	the	RTP.	The	period	from	2010	until	2012	is	particularly	relevant	to	shed	light	on	how	the	Transparency	Portal	expanded	mostly	incrementally,	but	also	as	a	result	of	punctuations,	as	well	as	on	how	the	institutional	power	of	actors	and	their	 interaction	with	the	CGU	
                                                35	Decree	7,592,	of	October	28th	2011,	was	signed	by	former	president	Dilma	Rousseff,	the	then	Head	of	the	Civil	House,	and	the	Minister	of	the	Brazilian	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General.	36	This	was	the	Barred	Private	Non-Lucrative	Entities	(Entidades	Privadas	Sem	Fins	Lucrativos	Impedidas	–	CEPIM)	
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were	influential	in	pushes	for	greater	disclosure.	It	should	be	noted	that	none	of	these	diverted	 the	 original	 role	 and	 trajectory	 of	 the	 Transparency	 Portal	 from	 that	 of	increasing	control	over	public	expenditure.	Starting	 in	May	 2010,	 revenue	 and	 expenditure	 data	were	 updated	 daily	 in	 the	Transparency	Portal	with	a	deeper	level	of	analysis,	including	detailed	documentation	of	explanations	 for	 government	 expenditures.	 This	 was	 in	 response	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	Supplementary	Law	131/2009,	which	amended	the	Fiscal	Responsibility	Law,	obliging	all	 levels	 of	 government	 to	publish	detailed	 information	about	 their	budget	 execution	online	and	in	real	time.37	The	expansion	of	transparency	was	not	particularly	significant	at	the	level	of	the	federal	government,	because	the	Transparency	Portal	already	fulfilled	most	of	the	Law’s	requirements	and	had	been	one	of	the	new	Law’s	reference.	But	it	was	a	significant	step	for	states	and	municipalities	(small	municipalities	had	a	deadline	of	five	years	 to	 create	 their	 Transparency	 Portal)	 and	made	 the	 Transparency	 Portal	 of	 the	Federal	Government	a	model	to	be	followed,	especially	by	subnational	units	that	did	not	yet	 have	 a	 similar	 initiative.	 Sanctions	 for	 non-compliance	 with	 the	 transparency	requirements	 of	 the	 Law	 included	withholding	 voluntary	 transfers	 of	 funds	 from	 the	federal	government,	which	were	important	sums	of	money,	especially	for	smaller	states	and	municipalities.		The	 following	 year,	 a	 query	 of	 the	 Payment	 Cards	 of	 Civil	 Defence	 (Cartão	 de	Pagemento	de	Defesa	Civil)	was	made	available	in	the	Transparency	Portal,	on	the	basis	of	the	logic	of	control	pursued	by	the	CGU	and	the	prevailing	argument	that	government	expenditures	must	be	transparent.	These	cards	were	used	for	the	transfer	of	federal	funds	to	states	and	municipalities	in	cases	of	public	calamity	and	emergencies,	including	due	to	environmental	disasters.	The	Payment	Cards	were	created	in	2011	in	the	aftermath	of	floods	 and	 landslides	 that	 devastated	 several	 mountain	 towns	 near	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro.	Following	 the	 tragedy,	 there	were	claims	of	mismanagement	of	 federal	 funds,	and	 the	Card	was	created	both	 to	ensure	 timely	 transfers	and	 to	provide	 the	government	and	citizens	with	detailed	information	about	the	proper	use	of	the	money.	A	typical	example	of	 the	 logic	 of	 control,	 the	 query	 reassembled	 the	 expansion	 of	 transparency	 of	 the	Corporate	 Card	 and	 presented	 detailed	 information	 of	 purchases	 (date,	 type	 of	transaction,	name	of	establishment	where	product	was	purchased,	and	cost	of	purchase).	Just	a	year	later,	with	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Brazilian	Freedom	of	Information	Act	in	May	2012,	federal	public	bodies	were	obliged	to	proactively	disclose	datasets	that	were	of	public	 interest	 and	which,	 they	anticipated,	would	be	 requested	by	 citizens.38	
                                                37	Supplementary	Law	131,	27	May	2009.	38	Law	12,527,	11	November	2011.	
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Legitimised	 by	 the	 principle	 that	 transparency	 should	 be	 the	 rule	 and	 secrecy	 the	exception	in	public	administration,	one	of	the	queries	created	in	the	Transparency	Portal	granted	 access	 to	 the	 wages	 of	 federal	 public	 officials.	 The	 query	 complemented	 a	previous	 one	which	disclosed	 information	 about	 the	working	hours,	 posts	 and	 career	stages	of	public	officials,	but	not	about	their	individual	wages.39		Based	on	the	political	context	of	 the	time,	 it	could	be	argued	that	the	decision	to	disclose	the	information	on	wages	was	strengthened	by	two	different	reasons.	On	the	one	hand,	 the	Rousseff	 administration	 adopted	 a	 strong	model	 of	 FoIA,	 applicable	 for	 the	federal	and	subnational	units,	and	wanted	to	pioneer	quick	efficacy	to	the	legislation.	A	second	motivation	appeared	to	be	political	in	nature:	at	this	particular	juncture,	President	Rousseff	was	locked	in	a	disagreement	with	several	public	sector	unions	over	demands	for	wage	increases.	With	133%	of	real	increase	in	federal	public	officials’	payrolls	since	the	 beginning	 of	 the	 first	 term	 of	 Labour	 presidency	 in	 2002,	 and	 in	 an	 economic	environment	that	was	decidedly	less	positive	than	in	previous	years,	President	Rousseff	wanted	to	avoid	new	wage	increases	for	public	officials.	Against	this	backdrop,	and	facing	more	than	75	thousand	officials	on	strike,	the	government	could	expect	that	by	disclosing	the	 information	 on	wages,	 it	 could	 engage	 the	 public	 on	 the	 debate	 and	win	 popular	support	in	opposing	further	salary	increases.40	The	CGU	advocated	 the	usage	of	 the	new	dataset	published	 in	 the	Transparency	Portal	 for	 purposes	 of	 democratic	 accountability,	 anti-corruption	 and	 control.	 Before	introducing	 individualised	 data	 about	 public	 officials’	wages,	 the	Transparency	 Portal	already	offered	a	query	to	allow	for	the	identification	of	officials	dedicated	to	activities	incompatible	with	their	public	post	and	to	provide	citizens	with	information	to	identify	external	 signs	 of	 wealth	 disproportionate	 to	 the	 official’s	 salary.	 Yet	 this	 required	extensive	research	and	was	not	a	straightforward	procedure:	it	entailed	the	complex	task	of	correlating	one’s	wealth	with	 their	career	status	on	 the	basis	of	a	statistical	 report,	which	was	time-consuming	and	open	to	misinterpretation.	Moreover,	additional	benefits	earned	 by	 public	 officials	 beyond	 the	 time	 and	 scope	 of	 the	 research	 would	 not	 be	available	to	the	citizens.		
                                                39	This	was	not	the	case	in	every	branch	of	government.	Disclosure	of	financial	information	in	the	Judiciary,	including	of	judges’	salaries,	was	significantly	limited	before	and	after	the	regulation	of	the	FoIA	in	that	branch	of	power,	with	timid	calls	for	disclosure	only	after	Brazil	started	facing	its	economic	crisis	 from	2015.	Only	in	mid	2017,	the	disclosure	of	 judges’	wages	came	into	place,	after	a	scandal	shed	light	on	the	high	values	of	some	of	them.	40	Cruz,	L.	 (2012)	Governo	aumenta	em	133%	despesa	com	folha	de	pagamento	de	servidores	federais	em	oito	anos.	Agência	Brasil,	19	August.		
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In	the	aftermath	of	the	publication	of	public	officials’	wages,	then	Minister	of	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General,	Jorge	Hage	Sobrinho,	affirmed	that	in	response	to	the	‘fire	alarm’	promoted	by	 the	new	query,	 the	CGU	had	started	receiving	citizen	reports	claiming	that	certain	officials	that	had	engaged	in	public	procurements	were	living	lavish	lives	inconsistent	with	the	salaries	displayed	on	the	Transparency	Portal.41	Unlike	at	state	and	municipal	levels	and	within	the	legislative	and	judicial	branches,	where	a	number	of	public	sector	unions	mobilised	and	appealed	to	the	judiciary	to	demand	secrecy	of	public	wages,	the	CGU	responded	to	protests	at	the	federal	executive:		 I	 remember	 these	 initial	 debates	 [about	 disclosure	 of	 officials’	 wages,	including	 judicial	 complaints	 from	 officials	 of	 other	 subnational	governments	that	had	announced	the	measure]	and	having	to	give	multiple	interviews	to	argue	that	the	public	interest	and	transparency	policies	should	prevail	over	private	interests	to	keep	information	secret,	and	that	this	was	not	a	breach	of	privacy.	We	defended	the	argument	that	this	was	not	[private	information],	because	it	was	related	to	the	public,	paid	by	public	money	and	established	 by	 law.	 It	 is	 completely	 different	 from	 the	 private	 profits	 of	someone	[working]	in	the	private	sector,	which	no	one	has	the	right	to	know.	But	 the	wages	of	 public	 officials	 are	 established	 in	 law	and	when	 [public	officials]	choose	the	public	life	they	should	take	into	consideration	that	they	necessarily	accept	giving	up	part	of	their	privacy.	Another	argument	brought	up	by	some	unions	of	public	officials	was	about	the	risk	that	disclosure	could	bring:	death	risks,	robbery,	kidnapping	attempts.	[…]	But	we	defended	our	stance	 and	 it	was	 a	winning	 campaign;	 the	 Judiciary	 recognised	 that	 the	information	could	be	disclosed.	(Sobrinho,	2015)		It	was	also	difficult	to	justify	a	demand	for	non-disclosure	when	the	beneficiaries	of	the	information	made	extensive	use	of	the	information:	data	on	wages	had	become	the	most	searched	query	since	its	publication.	And	without	any	organised	protest	from	the	target	 public	 of	 the	 policy,	 there	 was	 no	 reason	 for	 the	 query	 to	 retrench.	 Besides,	transparency	and	access	to	information	were	high	priorities	in	the	presidential	agenda	at	that	 moment,	 and	 the	 federal	 executive	 had	 become	 the	 reference	 for	 transparency	practices	and	access	to	information	in	the	country.	In	 2012,	 the	CGU	added	 yet	 another	query	 to	 the	Transparency	Portal	 targeting	public	officials.	This	time	it	was	the	list	of	public	officials	who	lived	in	apartments	owned	by	the	federal	government.	The	official	objective	of	this	query	was	to	publish	information	to	allow	 for	 the	 identification	and	control,	 including	 through	 ‘fire	alarm’,	of	particular	recipients	of	 indirect	 federal	benefits.	The	query	had	been	 requested	by	 the	Brazilian	
                                                41	 Kleber,	 L.	 (2012)	 Cidadãos	 passam	 a	 denunciar	 servidores	 que	 levam	 vida	 luxuosa	 e	incompatível	com	a	renda.	Estado	de	Minas,	18	November.	
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media	for	some	time.	But	the	measure	seemed	to	align	with	the	goals	of	a	few	government	bodies,	 although	 these	 were	 never	 officially	 cited	 among	 the	 reasons	 for	 expanded	disclosure.		One	of	the	bodies	that	stood	to	benefit	from	the	disclosure	was	the	Secretariat	for	Patrimony	of	the	Federal	Governmental	(Secretaria	de	Patrimônio	da	União),	which	was	involved	in	multiple	judicial	cases	in	an	effort	to	reclaim	apartments	that	former	public	officials	(including	military	officers	from	the	dictatorship	era)	had	lost	the	right	to	occupy	but	would	 not	move	 out	 from	 (this	was	 the	 case	 for	 121	 out	 of	 498	 federally-owned	apartments	in	Brasília).42		Cases	prepared	by	the	media	after	publication	of	the	query	mainly	focused	on	those	officials	who	lived	in	the	apartments	without	having	the	right	to	do	so	and	who	could	not	be	removed	due	to	ongoing	judicial	cases.	In	one	of	the	news	report	about	the	query,	a	former	public	official	who	lived	in	a	federally	owned	apartment	since	1976,	and	had	lost	the	right	in	1990,	complained	about	the	publication	of	the	information,	claiming	that	it	was	 a	 government	 strategy	 to	 put	 citizens	 and	 the	 media	 against	 former	 officials	 in	positions	like	his	own.43	He	may	have	been	right	in	his	analysis,	but	who	would	question	that	the	disclosure	in	question	did	not	foster	an	underlying	public	interest?		
2.4.	Support	for	intermediaries	Transparency	of	financial	information	by	the	CGU	as	a	mechanism	to	curb	corruption	and	control	federal	expenditure	could	only	have	a	limited	impact	without	the	engagement	of	intermediaries.	First,	as	I	noted,	the	Transparency	Portal	did	not	provide	full	disclosure	of	 information	 due	 to	 claims	 to	 secrecy	 rights.	 Second,	 the	 Portal	 did	 not	 provide	information	 on	 every	 type	 of	 expenditure.	 For	 instance,	 while	 information	 on	 Bolsa	Família	beneficiaries	was	fully	available,	this	was	not	the	case	for	details	on	recipients	of	Ministry	of	Education	scholarships	or	beneficiaries	of	tax	exemptions.	Third,	and	most	importantly,	a	basis	of	the	initiative	still	contained	technical	information	that	could	not	be	 translated	 to	 ordinary	 language.	 It	 was	 therefore	 necessary	 for	 there	 to	 be	intermediaries	 that	 could	 understand	 the	 information	 available,	 process	 it	 and	 take	action,	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	Federal	Corporate	Card	usage.	As	suggested	by	Heald	(2012,	p.	40),		
                                                42	 Nossa,	 L.	 (2012)	 Apartamentos	 funcionais	 do	 Executivo	 são	 ocupados	 irregularmente	 em	Brasília.	O	Estado	de	São	Paulo,	1	September.		43	Ibid	
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‘Missing	users’	 constitute	a	 fundamental	obstacle	 to	 the	achievement	and	maintenance	through	time	of	high	standards	of	eﬀective	ﬁscal	transparency,	with	 heavy	 dependence	 on	 ‘information	 brokers’.	 …	 The	 micro-level	 of	transparency	operates	in	a	diﬀerent	context	and	with	diﬀerent	objectives.	Public	 sectors	 are	 large	 and	 complex,	 often	 involving	 the	 distribution	 of	funds	to	delivery	organizations	(e.g.	healthcare	and	local	government)	that	have	geographically	based	remits.	Much	eﬀort	has	gone	into	the	reﬁnement	of	formula	funding	mechanisms,	with	the	objective	of	making	funding	more	closely	reﬂect	measured	needs.			Although	the	author	focuses	specifically	on	fiscal	transparency,	the	premise	of	usage	of	fiscal	data	for	the	purpose	of	control	of	corruption	is	the	same.	And	in	large	part,	if	the	CGU	aimed	at	 strengthening	 the	Portal	 as	a	 tool	of	 control	 and	 ‘fire	alarm’	 for	 federal	public	 expenditures,	 it	was	necessary	 to	 support,	 and	 even	 encourage,	 intermediaries	that	had	greater	potential	to	identify	mismanagement	using	the	disclosed	information.	Otherwise,	 the	most	 the	CGU	 could	 expect	was	 for	 the	Transparency	Portal	 to	have	 a	control	effect	if	public	officials	behaved	in	anticipation	of	disclosure.	The	CGU	was	aware	of	the	importance	of	intermediaries.	When	asked	about	how	to	measure	the	effectiveness	of	 the	 Transparency	 Portal,	 former	 Minister	 of	 the	 CGU,	 Mr.	 Sobrinho,	 immediately	referred	to	the	works	of	intermediaries:		 Turning	to	a	more	qualitative	analysis,	it	is	possible	to	assess	its	importance	[that	of	 the	Transparency	Portal	 to	 fight	 corruption].	 If	 you,	 for	 example,	measure	 the	 amount	 of	 news	 report	 from	 media,	 in	 general,	 that	 were	published	 in	the	past	years	based	on	searches	conducted	by	 investigative	journalists	on	the	Transparency	Portal,	you	can	have	a	sense	of	the	amount	of	oversight	from	society,	which	was	made	possible	by	the	existence	of	the	Transparency	 Portal.	 […]	 News	 indicating	 illicit	 cases,	 irregularities,	corruption	 problems,	 all	 based	 on	 information	 available	 in	 the	Transparency	Portal.	(Sobrinho,	2015)		Besides	its	own	initiatives	to	mobilise	civil	society	organisations	and	members	of	municipal	 councils	 to	use	 the	Portal,	 the	CGU	 supported	 initiatives	developed	by	 civil	society	 organisations	 with	 similar	 goals.	 In	 2009,	 the	 Brazilian	 Association	 for	Investigative	Journalism	(Associação	Brasileira	de	Jornalismo	Investigativo	–	Abraji)	and	Open	 Accounts	 (Contas	 Abertas),	 an	 NGO	 that	 advocates	 for	 openness	 of	 the	 public	budget,	created	an	online	course	to	instruct	journalists	on	how	to	use	data	disclosed	on	the	 Transparency	 Portal	 and	 other	 similar	 open	 databases.	 From	 2009	 to	 2010,	 the	partnership	 offered	 five	 editions	 of	 the	 course.	 Individually,	 both	 institutions	 also	promoted	courses	to	guide	 journalists	on	the	use	of	 the	available	data	on	government	financial	 expenditure	 both	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 analysing	 policies	 and	 identifying	 potential	
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mismanagement.	While	this	points	to	the	existence	of	societal	interest	in	making	use	of	the	disclosed	datasets,	it	also	demonstrates,	at	least	in	some	cases,	the	inherent	difficulty	of	interpreting	them.	A	research	conducted	by	the	University	of	Brasília	(Universidade	de	Brasília	-	UnB)	and	the	CGU	in	2014	identified	that	the	majority	of	users	of	the	Transparency	Portal	were	public	officials	(41%),	followed	by	students	(14%)	and	employees	from	the	private	sector	(11%)	 (UnB,	 2014).	 Sixty-four	 percent	 of	 the	 respondents	 claimed	 to	 use	 the	Transparency	 Portal	 as	 a	 citizen,	 and	 26%	 for	 professional	 reasons,	 e.g.	 journalists,	members	 of	 NGOs	 or	 public	 officials.	 The	 top	 three	 searches	 were	 about	 federal	government	 expenditures	 (56%),	 transference	 of	 funds	 to	 states	 and	 municipalities	(50%),	 and	 wages	 of	 public	 officials	 (42%).	 Eighty-two	 percent	 of	 respondents	 that	accessed	 the	 Transparency	 Portal	 daily	 agreed	 it	 was	 an	 effective	 tool	 to	 prevent	corruption.	 When	 asked	 about	 the	 tools	 that	 the	 Transparency	 Portal	 should	 make	available	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 search,	 respondents	 chose	 “possibility	 of	associating/crossing	 data	 and	 information”	 as	 the	 most	 important,	 followed	 by	“visualisation	of	federal	expenditures	data	in	maps	and	graphs”.	In	2010,	the	CGU	started	publishing	the	Transparency	Portal’s	data	in	open	format,	fulfilling	the	most	crucial	of	the	eight	principles	of	open	data,	as	defined	in	the	Open	Data	Handbook	 (Inesc,	 2014).	 Disclosure	 of	 data	 in	 open	 format	 followed	 pressure	 from	organised	 groups	 from	 civil	 society,	 and	was	 encouraged	 by	 the	 group	 of	 Open	 Data	within	the	Ministry	of	Planning,	Budget	and	Management	(Ministério	do	Planejamento,	Orçamento	e	Gestão	–	MPOG).	Moreover,	it	followed	a	number	of	tailor	made	extractions	of	data	from	the	Portal	to	organised	civil	society,	before	each	of	which	an	internal	process	of	approval	of	data	sharing	was	conducted.	The	impact	of	the	Transparency	Portal’s	open	data	as	a	mechanism	to	support	the	creation	of	applications	by	civil	society	to	also	raise	‘fire	alarm’	should	not	to	be	downplayed.				 	
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3.	Shadow	cases	for	the	logic	of	control	in	Brazil		The	trajectory	of	the	Transparency	Portal	has	been	closely	linked	to	the	high	intensity	of	the	driver	(the	CGU)	to	push	for	its	expansion	as	part	of	the	CGU’s	regulatory	mandate.	What	happens	to	RTPs	in	the	logic	of	control	when	such	an	intensity	is	absent	in	the	driver	or	when	 the	 targets	display	high	 intensity	 to	 resist	 disclosure?	The	 following	 shadow	cases	from	Brazil	will	briefly	illustrate	these	scenarios.	In	the	case	of	the	Transparency	Pages,	the	low	intensity	of	the	drivers	results	in	a	stagnation	of	the	RTP,	whereas	in	the	case	 of	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	BNDES’s	 operations,	 high	 level	 of	 resistance	 from	 the	federal	executive	has	led	to	delayed	and	ultimately	selective	disclosure,	despite	persistent	demands	for	transparency	by	the	CGU,	the	Congress,	the	judiciary	and	the	civil	society.		
3.1.	The	Transparency	Pages	Shortly	after	the	institutionalisation	of	the	Transparency	Portal,	the	CGU	and	the	Ministry	of	 Planning	 created	 the	 Transparency	 Pages	 (Páginas	 de	 Transparência	 Pública),	reproducing	an	earlier	 initiative	adopted	by	 the	Ministry	of	 Justice.	The	Transparency	Pages	disclosed	detailed	expenditure	information	of	each	federal	public	body,	including	state	owned	enterprises,	in	a	standardised	way	and	in	a	dedicated	area	of	these	bodies’	webpages.		The	 publication	 of	 the	 Pages	 started	 in	 2006,	 when	 they	 were	 regulated	 by	Portaria	 140/2006	 and	 a	 standard	 model	 was	 made	 available	 by	 the	 CGU	 with	 the	minimum	level	of	information	that	should	be	disclosed	by	each	public	body.	The	CGU’s	idea	with	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Pages	was	 to	 strengthen	 the	 transparency	 of	 individual	ministries	and	incentivise	them	to	add	complementary	information	as	they	saw	fit.	The	data	for	the	minimum	level	of	 information	published	on	the	Transparency	Pages	were	extracted	 from	 centralised	 governmental	 systems	 and	 published	 by	 the	 CGU	 itself,	meaning	 that	 in	 most	 cases	 ministries	 did	 not	 put	 any	 individual	 effort	 for	 their	publication,	except	for	establishing	a	link	on	their	website	to	direct	to	the	Pages.	Contrary	to	 the	 Transparency	 Portal,	 however,	 the	 scope	 of	 disclosure	 covered	 by	 the	Transparency	Pages	has	seen	little	expansion	since	creation.	The	CGU	did	not	champion	them	primarily	as	a	regulatory	mechanism	and	therefore	did	not	push	for	their	expansion	after	 creation.	 As	 the	 individual	 federal	 bodies	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	Justice)	demonstrated	little	interest	in	the	expansion	of	the	RTP,	the	Pages	stagnated	in	relation	to	quantity	and	quality	of	information	and	usage.		
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	 The	enforcement	of	the	Pages	has	also	been	weak.44	Brazil’s	biggest	semi-public	multinational	corporation	Petrobrás,	for	example,	had	not	complied	with	the	regulation	until	2012	and	no	sanctions	had	been	applied	to	it	in	this	regard.	But	the	publication	of	the	 Transparency	 Pages	 provided	 extra	 incentive	 for	 the	 various	 ministries	 and	decentralised	federal	bodies	to	 fill	 the	systems	from	where	financial	and	non-financial	information(such	as	contracts)	were	extracted.	This,	in	turn,	strengthened	the	ability	of	the	 CGU	 to	 control	 expenses	 using	 the	 federal	 systems.	 When	 compared	 to	 the	Transparency	Portal,	 little	 could	 be	 said	 about	 the	 actual	 impact	 of	 the	Transparency	Pages	in	the	logic	of	control.	Although	access	to	them	increased	significantly	after	2011,	when	the	Brazilian	FoIA	was	adopted	and	public	bodies	started	redirecting	citizens	for	consultation	on	the	Pages,	I	could	not	identify	any	evidence	suggesting	the	usage	of	the	Pages	for	anti-corruption	purposes.		
3.2.	Transparency	of	the	operations	of	the	BNDES	In	the	presence	of	sufficient	institutional	will	(i.e.	driver	intensity)	and	direct	access	to	relevant	 databases,	 it	 was	 fairly	 unproblematic	 for	 the	 CGU	 to	 publish	 governmental	expenses	 and	 build	 queries	 to	 support	 the	 logic	 of	 control.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 these	conditions,	however,	the	logic	of	control	did	not	properly	function.	Another	case	in	point	is	 the	 transfer	 of	 funds	 to	 firms	 by	 the	 Brazilian	 National	 Economic	 and	 Social	Development	Bank	(Banco	Nacional	de	Desenvolvimento	Econômico	e	Social	–	BNDES).	A	 key	 instrument	 for	 the	 economic	 development	 policies	 under	 the	 Labour	 Party	government,	 the	 operations	 of	 the	 BNDES	 expanded	 significantly	 from	 2010.	 This	expansion	 was	 not,	 however,	 harmonised	 with	 greater	 transparency.45	 The	 press	repeatedly	appealed	to	courts	to	gain	access	to	information	from	BNDES,	with	limited	or	delayed	success.	After	its	entry	into	force,	the	FoIA	was	similarly	used	to	request	access	to	the	Bank’s	operations.		In	view	of	the	contracts	won	by	companies	that	contributed	large	sums	of	money	to	political	 campaigns,	 there	 was	 particular	 public	 concern	 in	 relation	 to	 potential	mismanagement	in	the	operations	of	the	Bank.	In	2011,	for	example,	one	of	the	biggest	Brazilian	newspapers,	Folha	de	São	Paulo,	submitted	a	judicial	request	to	have	access	to	the	Bank’s	 internal	 reports	concerning	concessions	of	more	 than	£24	million.	For	 this	
                                                44	By	2016,	no	 sanction	was	ever	applied	 to	any	 federal	public	bodies	 for	not	 complying	with	Portaria	Interministerial	140/2006,	although	non-compliance	was	registered	in	auditing	reports.	45	From	2008,	the	Bank	published	a	report	titled	BNDES	Transparent	where	selected	information	about	 the	 Banks’	 operations	 was	 made	 available	 (ex.,	 the	 name	 of	 the	 beneficiary,	 brief	description	of	the	project,	value	of	the	operation,	and	in	which	sector	the	company	operated).	
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request,	 a	 final	 decision	 was	 given	 by	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 granting	 access	 to	 the	information	 as	 late	 as	 in	 May	 2015;	 for	 every	 previous	 court	 decision	 calling	 for	disclosure,	 the	Bank	had	 appealed	 for	 secrecy.	Using	 the	Brazilian	FoIA,	 the	CGU	also	requested	 that	 the	 BNDES	 disclose	 information	 about	 its	 financial	 operations,	maintaining	 minimum	 secrecy	 when	 necessary	 and	 only	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 legal	justifications.	Both	within	the	judiciary	and	in	the	executive,	the	BNDES	appealed	as	many	times	as	possible	not	to	provide	access	to	details	of	its	budgetary	expenditures.	In	April	2015,	the	Congress	was	debating	a	provisional	measure	to	authorise	credit	expansion	to	the	BNDES.	The	measure	was	sent	back	for	the	president’s	consideration	with	 an	 unexpected	 amendment	 pushed	 through	 by	 the	 opposition,	 which	 aimed	 at	banning	 the	 secrecy	of	 any	operation	undertaken	by	 the	Bank,	 including	with	 foreign	nations.46	 On	 22	 May	 2015,	 almost	 at	 the	 constitutional	 deadline	 to	 sanction	 the	provision,	 President	 Rousseff	 vetoed	 the	 clause,	 arguing	 that	 the	 level	 of	 proactive	transparency	 at	 the	BNDES	was	 satisfactory.	 The	 veto	was	 a	 potential	 victory	 for	 the	government	 in	 resisting	 the	 disclosure	 of	 information,	 which	 took	 place	 in	 the	 same	month	when	two	court	decisions	obliged	the	Bank	to	disclose	new	sets	of	information		The	first	decision	was	in	a	case	initiated	by	the	Public	Prosecutors’	Office	in	2013,	in	 which	 the	 BNDES	 was	 requested	 to	 publish	 the	 wages	 of	 its	 directors,	 thereby	complying	 with	 the	 decree	 that	 regulated	 the	 FoIA	 at	 the	 federal	 level	 and	 obliged	disclosure	of	a	minimum	set	of	information.	The	second	decision	was	filed	by	the	BNDES	itself,	following	a	2014	request	by	the	Federal	Court	of	Accounts	for	the	Bank	to	provide	information	about	credit	operations	with	JBS	Group,	the	biggest	campaign	financer	in	the	elections	that	year.	In	May	2015,	as	a	response	to	social	and	institutional	pressures	for	disclosure,	the	Bank	published	additional	sets	of	data	about	its	operations,	such	as	the	interest	 rates	 adopted	 in	 selected	 cases,	 the	 identification	 of	 companies	 that	 have	benefitted	 from	 the	 BNDES,	 and	 the	 projects	 that	 these	 companies	 were	 developing.	Information	was	 selectively	 disclosed	 by	 the	BNDES	without	 the	 participation	 of	 civil	society,	audit	and	judicial	institutions.		
	 	
                                                46	Correa,	I.	M.;	Gonçalves,	A.	(2015)	A	caixa-preta	do	BNDES.	O	Estado	de	São	Paulo,	May	21.	
 82 
Conclusion	In	Chapter	1,	I	suggested	that	the	trajectory	of	an	RTP	was	dependent	on	the	interaction	of	 three	 sets	 of	 actors:	 the	 drivers	 of	 the	 RTP,	 its	 targets,	 and	 the	beneficiaries/intermediaries	 of	 disclosure.	 This	 chapter	 has	 narrated	 the	 case	 of	expansion	in	the	existence	of	a	high	intensity	driver,	in	this	case	the	CGU.	Explaining	this	high	intensity	are	both	the	wider	socio-political	environment	and	the	specific	mandate	of	the	CGU	to	prevent	and	fight	corruption.	In	Brazil,	where	new	corruption	cases	emerge	frequently	and	cause	significant	public	outrage,	the	relative	position	of	the	CGU	was	often	stronger	vis-à-vis	the	targets	of	disclosure,	i.e.	public	officials,	including	high	authorities	of	the	federal	executive.	In	relation	to	the	logic	of	control	through	disclosure	of	financial	information	this	was	especially	the	case	after	the	CGU	was	institutionally	created,	which	granted	the	public	body	access	to	information	available	in	the	SIAFI	and	in	other	federal	systems.	Even	if	the	targets	of	the	RTP	did	not	agree	with	disclosures,	their	best	bet	in	most	instances	was	to	question	the	control	mechanism	used,	i.e.	the	‘fire	alarm’	method	used	by	the	Transparency	Portal,	but	hardly	the	idea	of	disclosure.	Questioning	this	core	idea	was	difficult	to	justify	given	transparency’s	association	with	good	governance	and	accountability,	weakening	the	position	of	the	targets	vis-à-vis	the	drivers.	Moreover,	 the	 CGU	 was	 also	 in	 a	 position	 of	 relative	 strength	 as	 the	 driver	 of	disclosure,	 being	 formally	 mandated	 to	 monitor	 the	 internal	 activities	 of	 the	 federal	executive.	It	was	the	body	that	assisted	the	President	of	Brazil	on	issues	of	internal	control	and	anti-corruption,	which	strengthened	its	position	compared	to	other	 institutions	of	the	 same	 hierarchical	 level.47	 However,	 while	 the	 political	 weight	 of	 the	 presidency	provided	the	CGU	with	additional	intensity	for	increased	disclosure	on	various	instances,	the	absence	of	this	support	could	hinder	smooth	and	detailed	disclosure	of	information.	As	demonstrated	in	the	case	of	the	BNDES,	the	reluctance	of	the	presidency	to	assist	in	the	disclosure	of	 the	Bank’s	operational	 information	added	additional	 intensity	 to	 the	targets’	ability	to	resist	disclosure,	at	least	for	an	extended	period	of	time.	I	 should	 also	 note	 the	 role	 played	 by	 beneficiaries	 and	 intermediaries	 in	 the	trajectory	of	the	RTP.	The	main	beneficiaries	of	the	Transparency	Portal	are,	in	theory,	citizens,	 for	 whom	 issues	 of	 public	 expenditures	 and	 expenses	 by	 individual	 public	officials	 constitute	matters	 of	 public	 interest.	 Even	 though	 individual	 citizens	 are	 less	likely	to	organise	to	make	concerted	demands	for	disclosure,	this	task	has	been	carried	out	in	the	case	of	the	Transparency	Portal	by	a	number	of	dedicated	intermediaries.	In	this	 aspect,	 the	 presence	 of	 media	 organisations	 and	 NGOs	 attentive	 to	 issues	 of	
                                                47	After	the	impeachment	of	President	Rousseff	in	2016,	the	CGU	was	stripped	of	its	advisory	role	to	the	Presidency	of	the	Republic	and	was	turned	into	a	ministry.	
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corruption,	through	routine	monitoring	of	public	expenditures	or	production	of	breaking	news	 stories,	 could	 be	 said	 to	 have	 made	 disclosure	 more	 legitimate,	 and	 thereby	contributed	 to	 the	 expansionary	 trajectory	 of	 the	 RTP.	 It	 is,	 however,	 important	 to	highlight	that	the	CGU’s	initiatives	to	support	the	training	of	intermediaries	was	key,	as	the	logic	of	control	had	little	hope	to	be	effective	in	the	absence	of	users	that	could	search	and	identify	mismanagement	using	the	Transparency	Portal.	The	 story	 in	 this	 chapter	 supports	 the	 argument	 that	 RTPs	 are	 self-reinforcing	processes.	Following	the	inception	of	the	Transparency	Portal,	additional	measures	(such	as	 the	Payment	Cards	of	Civil	Defence)	were	created	by	 the	CGU	to	be	 featured	 in	 the	Portal.	 These	 new	measures	 followed	 the	 Portal’s	 original	 path	 (or	 purpose),	 that	 of	increasing	 the	 government’s	 internal	 control	 capacity	 and	 prevention	 of	 corruption	through	transparency.	Similarly,	the	fact	that	information	disclosed	at	the	Portal	was	the	source	 of	 fire	 alarms,	 which	 revealed	 evidence	 of	 mismanagement	 strengthened	 the	incremental	disclosure	of	information	for	the	purposes	of	control.	The	evolution	of	the	Transparency	Portal	took	place	gradually,	without	the	need	for	abrupt	external	shocks,	but	also	in	response	to	external	facts.	However,	even	the	creation	of	the	query	regarding	the	 salaries	 of	 public	 officials,	 which	 was	 developed	 at	 least	 in	 part	 with	 political	motivations,	 advanced	 the	 original	 trajectory	 of	 the	 initiative,	 based	 on	 disclosure	 of	financial	expenditure	selectively	detailed	to	promote	the	logic	of	control.	
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CHAPTER	3:	
MPs	EXPENSE	SCHEME	AND	THE	REGISTER	OF	INTERESTS	
		 What	the	Daily	Telegraph	did	-	the	simple	act	of	providing	information	 to	 the	 public	 -	 has	 triggered	 the	 biggest	shake-up	 in	 our	 political	 system	 for	 years.	 Information	alone	has	been	more	powerful	 than	years	of	 traditional	politics.	Of	course	 it	has	been	a	painful	 time	 for	politics	and	 for	 individual	 politicians	 -	 but	 let	 us	 be	 clear,	 it	 is	without	question	a	positive	development	for	the	country.	…	 That's	 exactly	 as	 it	 should	 be.	 That	 is	 real	accountability.	That	is	people	power,	and	we	need	more	of	it	not	less.	(Former	MP	David	Cameron,	2009)48		 This	chapter	analyses	the	trajectories	of	two	RTPs	in	the	UK	House	of	Commons	established	within	the	control	logic	of	regulatory	transparency.	In	a	broad	sense,	both	pertain	to	issues	of	good	governance	and	anti-corruption,	and	politicians’	acceptance	of	or	resistance	to	the	logic	of	control.	Corruption	is	not	viewed	as	an	endemic	problem	in	the	United	Kingdom;	nor	is	it	absent	from	government	practices.	According	to	the	2013	Global	Corruption	Barometer	data,	a	significant	number	of	respondents	that	had	come	into	contact	with	a	public	service	reported	paying	a	bribe:	21%	of	respondents	reported	paying	a	bribe	to	the	Judiciary,	11%	to	land	services	and	to	registry	and	permit	services,	8%	to	the	police,	and	 lower	percentages	to	other	services,	such	as	education	and	tax	revenues.49	 Furthermore,	 65%	 of	 British	 citizens	 interviewed	 believed	 that	 over	 the	previous	 two	 years	 the	 nation’s	 level	 of	 corruption	 had	 increased,	whereas	 only	 5%	suggested	it	had	decreased	a	little	(28%	of	respondents	claimed	it	had	not	changed).		The	2013	Global	Barometer	research	was	conducted	three	years	after	the	British	Parliament	faced	one	of	its	biggest	corruption	scandals.	That	was	also	when	a	reform	to	enhance	Members	of	Parliament’s	(MPs)	compliance	with	norms	of	ethical	conduct	was	
                                                48	Cameron,	D.	(2009)	David	Cameron’s	full	speech	at	Imperial	College	London.	BBC.	25	June.	49	 The	 2013	 report	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe’s	 Group	 of	 States	 against	 Corruption	 challenged	citizens’	perceptions	and	experiences	with	corruption	in	the	Judiciary,	claiming	that	“Nothing	that	emerged	from	the	evaluation	indicated	that	there	was	any	element	of	corruption	in	relation	to	judges	 nor	 was	 there	 any	 evidence	 of	 their	 decisions	 being	 influenced	 in	 an	 inappropriate	manner”.	 The	 same	 Group,	 however,	 expressed	 a	 less	 optimistic	 view	 of	 the	 anti-corruption	framework	 in	the	 legislative,	calling	 for	 increased	transparency	 in	political	 financing,	 lobbying	and	in	the	civil	service.	
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undertaken,	as	a	result	of	which	a	series	of	structured	information	was	disclosed	to	the	public.	Disclosure	initially	took	place	in	response	to	a	crisis	of	confidence	initiated	by	leaks	of	The	Telegraph	daily	 together	with	refusals	and	attempts	of	MPs	not	 to	share	information	with	the	public,	and	was	further	adopted	as	a	mechanism	to	regulate	the	behaviour	of	MPs.		The	 first	 case	 narrated	 in	 this	 chapter	 looks	 at	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	Register	 of	
Members’	Allowances	and	Expenses,	the	policy	enacted	in	the	aftermath	of	the	expenses	scandal.	As	a	careful	tracing	of	its	course	of	development	will	reveal,	the	trajectory	of	this	 RTP	 has	 been	 punctuated,	 with	 changes	 being	 enacted	 in	 response	 to	 external	shocks.	This	was	also	a	highly	contested	process,	due	to	the	competing	intensity	of	the	drivers	(in	this	case,	journalists	and	opposition	politicians)	and	the	targets	(politicians)	for	and	against	disclosure.	In	this	case,	the	public’s	sustained	attention	to	the	scandal,	and	 thereby	 to	 the	 responses	 of	 the	 parliament,	 ultimately	 left	 MPs	 with	 no	 better	political	solution	than	to	create	an	independent	authority	with	the	mandate	to	oversee	their	 allowances	 and	 expenses	 and	which	made	 significant	 use	 of	 transparency	 as	 a	regulatory	mechanism	in	the	logic	of	control.			The	 second	 case	 study	 in	 this	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	Register	 of	
Members’	Financial	Interests,	the	main	mechanism	to	regulate	conflict	of	interests	and	lobbying	in	the	UK	Parliament.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	this	RTP	also	targeted	MPs,	its	trajectory	was	considerably	different	to	the	first	one.	Unlike	in	the	case	of	the	Register	of	
Members’	Allowances	and	Expenses,	the	expansion	of	transparency	to	regulate	conflict	of	interest	was	not	deemed	to	be	controversial	or	highly	contested,	not	least	because	the	MPs	had	the	opportunity	to	debate	and	decide	on	last	instance	on	what	to	disclose,	and	importantly,	 what	 not	 to	 disclose.	 Therefore,	 the	 trajectory	 of	 this	 RTP	 was	 one	 of	expansion.	I	should	note	at	this	point	that	the	scope	of	this	chapter	does	not	include	the	All-Party	 Parliamentary	 Groups,	 the	 cross-party	 specialist	 subject	 groups	with	 semi-official	status.			
1.	MPs’	Expenses’	Scheme		
1.1.	Socio-political	and	Institutional	Context	The	United	Kingdom’s	Freedom	of	Information	Act	was	approved	in	2000,	a	relative	latecomer	 compared	 to	 the	 information	 revolution	 and	 other	movements	 from	 the	government	towards	openness	(Worthy,	2000,	p.	566	–	568).	Its	implementation	was	
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phased	and	its	complete	entry	into	force	took	place	on	1	January	2005.	The	FoIA	2000	obliged	every	public	authority	 to	make	available	a	 ‘Publication	Scheme’,	 i.e.	 a	 set	of	information	 which	 every	 public	 body	 under	 the	 FoIA	 committed	 to	 publishing	proactively.	 Every	 Publication	 Scheme	 needed	 to	 be	 submitted	 for	 approval	 of	 the	Information	 Commissioner’s	 Office,	 the	 UK's	 independent	 body	 set	 up	 to	 uphold	information	 rights.	 The	 FoIA	 also	 gave	 to	 the	 Commissioner	 the	 power	 to	 approve	model	publication	schemes	to	be	adopted	by	the	public	authorities	falling	in	the	scope	of	the	Act.	The	‘model’	scheme	was	a	minimum	collection	of	information	that	would	be	made	mandatory	to	public	authorities.	In	general,	examples	of	information	that	formed	the	 schemes	 of	 public	 offices	 were	 policies	 and	 procedures,	 minutes	 of	 meetings,	annual	reports	and	financial	information.		The	 Publication	 Scheme	 requirements	 entered	 into	 force	 for	 parliament	 in	November	2002.	Data	on	finance	and	personnel	were	added	to	the	House’s	scheme	in	June	and	December	2003.	In	preparation	to	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Act	in	2005,	the	House	of	Commons	released	information	of	individual	Members’	allowances	in	October	2004.	The	information	covered	the	financial	years	from	2001-02	broken	down	in	nine	categories:	Additional	Cost	Allowance	(ACA),	London	Supplement,	Incidental	Expenses	Provision,	 Staffing	 Allowance,	 Members’	 Travel,	 Members’	 Staff	 Travel,	 Centrally	Purchased	 Stationery,	 Centrally	 Provided	 Computer	 Equipment,	 and	 Other	 Costs.	Transparency	was	 promoted	within	 the	 limits	mandated	 by	 the	 law	 and	 agreed	 by	politicians	in	the	House	of	Commons.		This	was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 individualised	 financial	 data	 for	MPs	 of	 the	 two	Houses	 of	 Parliament	 was	 disclosed	 in	 such	 detail,	 defining	 a	 new	 moment	 for	transparency	 of	 financial	 information	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Commons.	 The	 numbers	immediately	 caught	 public	 attention.	 Newspapers	 reported	 extensively	 about	 the	average	 cost	 of	 an	MP	 in	 the	 British	 democracy,	 i.e.	 how	much	was	 spent	 in	 their	salaries	and	in	expenses.	Some	news	articles	highlighted	who	the	most	expensive	MPs	were,	the	shops	where	they	spent	most	of	their	expenses	allowances,	among	a	series	of	other	comparisons	and	analyses.50	Only	with	the	approval	of	the	FoIA	2000	could	the	public	 and	 the	 media	 have	 so	 much	 access	 to	 the	 House	 financial	 information.	Previously,	 even	 the	 House	 of	 Commons’	 Green	 Book,	 the	 financial	 manual	 of	 the	Commons,	was	secret.	
                                                50	 See,	 for	 example:	 BBC	 (2004)	MPs'	 expense	 accounts	 laid	 bare.	BBC	News.	 21	 February;	Hencke,	D.;	Maguire,	K.	(2004)	Average	MP's	expenses	cost	taxpayer	£118,000.	The	Guardian.	22	 February;	 BBC.	 (2004)	Most	 expensive	MP	 defends	 record.	BBC.	 22	 February;	Helm,	 T.;	Sparrow,	A.;	Carlin,	B.	(2004)	£118,000	expenses,	£57,000	salary	(that's	the	cost	of	your	MP).	
The	Telegraph.	22	February.	
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Before	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 FoIA,	 detailed	 disclosure	 of	 members’	allowance	 followed	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 House	 to	 create	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	Members’	 Estimate	 Committee	 to	 delegate	 matters	 relating	 to	 the	 House	administration.	The	creation	of	the	Committee	had	been	the	result	of	the	investigation	of	the	Leader	of	the	Conservative	Party	MP	Duncan	Smith	by	the	House	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges,	in	the	scandal	known	as	‘Betsygate’.	The	complaint	against	the	MP	was	submitted	by	BBC	journalist	Michael	Crick	after	investigation	showed	that	the	 parliamentarian’s	 wife	 was	 being	 paid	 with	 the	 Leader’s	 Costs	 Allowances	(Standards	and	Privileges	Committee,	2004).	Duncan	Smith	was	not	considered	by	the	Committee	 to	 have	 engaged	 in	 wrongdoing,	 but	 the	 media	 and	 the	 investigation	exposed	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 the	 House’s	 financial	 control.	 Two	 years	 previously,	 a	Commons’	official	had	already	raised	concerns	about	the	House’s	management	of	MPs’	expenses	and	been	assured	that	there	was	no	reason	for	concern	(Worthy,	2014).	In	the	month	of	the	entry	into	force	of	FoIA	2000,	MP	Norman	Baker,	a	Liberal	Democrat	and	member	of	the	opposition,	submitted	a	FoI	request			 (…)	for	a	breakdown	of	the	already	published	aggregate	figure	for	travel	claims	by	MPs,	for	the	most	recent	year	for	which	figures	were	available	…	‘in	a	format	which	would	show	for	each	MP	the	amount	claimed	by	mode	of	 travel,	 and	 therefore	 giving	 specific	 figures	 for	 rail,	 road,	 air	 and	bicycle’.51		The	request	by	MP	Baker,	who	published	the	information	about	himself	on	his	website,	was	motivated	by	a	Telegraph	and	Despatch	Agency	article	uncovering	figures	about	ministers’	 car	 use,	 which	 were	 double	 those	 that	 Baker	 had	 obtained	 from	 the	government	previously.52		A	similar	FoI	request	to	that	of	MP	Norman	Baker	was	submitted	by	Carr	Brown	of	 The	 Sunday	 Times.	 Parliament	 denied	 both	 information	 requests	 as	 well	 as	 first	appeals	on	the	ground	that	it	had	already	disclosed	the	relevant	information,	but	simply	did	 not	 break	 them	 down	 in	 detail.	 The	 denials	 were	 appealed	 to	 the	 Information	Commissioner,	who	upheld	the	complaints	and	required	disclosure	of	the	information	on	February	2006,	after	which	the	House	appealed	to	the	Informal	Tribunal.		
                                                51	UK.	Information	Tribunal.	Appeal	Number	EA/0006/0015	and	0016.	February	2007.	52	Brooke,	H.	(2004)	Anonymous	query	unearths	true	cost	of	ministers’	cars.	The	Telegraph,	31	December.	
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1.2.	Political	Moves	Against	Expenses’	Disclosure	The	 process	 leading	 to	 the	 publication	 of	 MPs’	 Expenses’	 Scheme	 was	 long	 and	politically	charged,	with	several	attempts	by	MPs	to	resist	disclosure.	The	effort	to	limit	public	access	to	information	of	MPs’	expenses	led	to	an	attempt	by	some	MPs	to	change	the	FoIA	itself.	On	18	December	2006,	Conservative	MP	David	Maclean,	introduced	a	bill	to	exempt	both	Houses	of	Parliament	from	the	Act.	According	to	Maclean,	letters	exchanged	 between	 MPs	 and	 public	 authorities	 sent	 on	 behalf	 of	 constituents,	 for	example,	 should	 remain	 confidential	 and	 the	FoIA	2000	was	not	 clear	 about	 this.	 If	approved,	 the	bill	would	also	 statutorily	 exempt	disclosure	of	members’	 allowances	(House	of	Commons	Library,	2007).	Civil	society	pressure	groups,	such	as	the	Campaign	for	 Freedom	 of	 Information,	 and	 the	 media	 vocally	 opposed	 the	 proposal.	 In	 that	context,	the	Leader	of	the	Conservative	Party,	MP	David	Cameron,	requested	peers	to	vote	against	the	bill.53	Eighteen	Conservative	MPs	(out	of	165)	still	voted	in	favour	of	the	 bill,	 as	 did	 78	 Labour	 MPs	 (out	 of	 403),	 including	 the	 government’s	 Treasury	Minister,	Ed	Balls,	an	MP	close	to	Prime	Minister	Gordon	Brown.	Amidst	allegations	of	the	dangers	caused	by	greater	transparency	on	one	side	and	accusations	that	the	bill	would	ultimately	exempt	 corrupt	MPs	 from	greater	openness	on	 the	other	 side,	 the	document	passed	the	Commons	with	96	votes	in	favour	and	25	against.		Coinciding	with	and	contradicting	PM	Brown’s	promises	to	restore	trust	in	politics,	the	outcome	of	the	votes	drew	substantial	heat	on	the	Labour	government,	which	was	seen	to	have	unofficially	supported	the	bill.	After	criticisms	that	the	bill	would	not	allow	access	to	MPs’	detailed	expenses,	the	Prime	Minister	promised	to	“correct”	the	legislation	in	the	House	of	Lords.54	The	passing	of	the	bill	was	also	criticised	by	the	Liberal	Democrat	MP	Norman	Baker,	who	pushed	for	openness	of	the	government.	As	pressure	against	the	bill	increased	outside	Westminster,	the	bill	failed	to	advance	in	the	House	of	Lords.	In	2007,	the	House	of	Commons	lost	another	battle	to	maintain	its	expenses	secret	as	the	Information	Commissioner	ruled	that	the	former	should	publish	the	breakdown	of	MPs'	travel	expenses.	The	2007-08	revision	of	the	rules	of	parliamentary	pay,	pensions	and	allowances,	 conducted	by	 the	Review	Body	on	Senior	Salaries,	proposed	no	other	change	to	MPs’	travel	scheme,	except	for	recommending	that	“partners	of	MPs	who	are	named	in	the	Parliamentary	Contributory	Pension	Fund	as	sole	beneficiaries	should	be	entitled	to	the	same	travel	arrangements	available	to	spouses	and	civil	partners”	(House	of	 Commons,	 2007).	 Detailed	 disclosure	 of	 travel	 expenses	 was	 just	 the	 first	 of	 a	disclosure	list	to	be	demanded	by	the	Information	Commissioner,	ultimately	leading	to	
                                                53	Woodward,	W.	(2007)	Cameron	urges	opposition	to	chief	whip's	bill.	The	Guardian,	23	May.		54	Higgins,	C.	(2007)	Brown	promises	to	reverse	vote	for	secrecy	by	MPs.	The	Guardian,	28	May.	
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the	expenses	scandal.	In	June	2006,	three	journalists	(Heather	Brooke,	also	a	campaigner	for	access	to	information,	Michael	Thomas	and	Ben	Leapman)	requested	a	breakdown	of	MPs’	Additional	Cost	Allowances	(ACA),	including	those	claimed	by	then	Prime	Minister	Tony	Blair	and	other	thirteen	MPs	including	Margaret	Beckett,	Peter	Mandelson,	Gordon	Brown,	David	Cameron	and	George	Osborne.55		Similar	to	the	travel	expenses,	the	House	of	Commons	denied	the	requests	of	access	to	ACA’s	information	and	appealed	to	the	Information	Commissioner,	who	decided	that	the	 House	 should	 provide	 the	 information	 in	 detail	 following	 the	 references	 of	 the	expenses	categories	defined	in	the	Green	Book.	The	Commissioner’s	decision	expanded	the	information	provided	by	the	House	of	Commons,	albeit	not	as	widely	as	was	requested	by	the	appellants.	The	decision	was	not	satisfactory	to	any	of	the	parties	in	the	process	and	both	the	applicants	and	the	House	of	Commons	appealed	against	it	to	the	Information	Tribunal.	The	 House	 lost	 its	 appeal	 in	 February	 2008	 when	 the	 Tribunal	 demanded	 the	publication	 of	 the	 information	 within	 28	 days.	 Still	 refusing	 to	 give	 in,	 the	 House	 of	Commons	 appealed	 against	 the	 Tribunal	 to	 the	 High	 Court.	 Before	 the	 High	 Court	decision,	the	House	of	Commons	disclosed	the	list	used	by	the	Commons	clerks	to	judge	whether	prices	of	MPs’	claims	were	reasonable.	Publication	of	the	information	took	place	in	 response	 to	 another	 freedom	 of	 information	 request,	 this	 time	 from	 the	 Press	Association.	The	information	led	to	a	series	of	debates	and	dialogues	that	shed	light	on	the	potential	of	transparency	as	a	regulatory	and	disciplinary	mechanism.	In	 a	 debate	 between	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 clerk	 and	 Hugh	 Tomlinson,	representing	journalist	Heather	Brooke,	the	former	argued	that		The	true	concern	of	the	House	[...]	was	not	intrusion	into	the	private	lives	but	the	House's	concern	not	to	have	greater	public	scrutiny	of	what	amounts	to	a	self-certified	system	of	expenses.	Many	people	may	have	opinions	about	whether	it	is	reasonable	to	spend	£200	on	a	television	or	not	–	our	job	is	to	look	at	whether	it	is	within	the	rules.56		Tomlinson	responded	that	his	interest	was	not	to	question	the	rules	themselves,	but	the	House’s	management	 of	 them,	 since	without	 greater	 disclosure	 it	was	 not	 possible	 to	ensure	that	discipline	was	being	maintained.	With	previous	experience	in	investigating	
                                                55	Information	Tribunal.	Appeal	Number	EA/2007/0060,	0061,	0062,	0063,	0122,	0123,	and	0131.	February	2008.	56	Griffiths,	E.	(2008)	‘John	Lewis’	List	kept	from	MPs.	BBC,	8	February.	
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politicians’	 expenses	 and	having	been	warned	by	 journalist	Michael	 Crick	of	 potential	abuses	by	MPs,	Heather	Brooke	was	interested	in	the	details	of	the	information.	“What	came	out	in	2004	were	bulk	figures	in	various	categories:	travel,	staff,	second	homes	etc.	I	wanted	the	detail.	 I	wanted	actual	receipts.	That’s	where	you	find	the	truth”	(Brooke,	2010,	p.	229).	In	the	same	period	of	February	to	April	2008,	the	Member’s	Estimate	Committee	started	a	debate	on	MPs’	allowance.	Besides	the	public	debate,	it	followed	a	decision	by	the	 Commons	 that	 the	 Committee	 should	 review	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	Review	Body	on	Senior	Salaries’	(RBSS)	of	its	2007	Review	of	parliamentary	pay,	pensions	and	allowances	 in	relation	to	allowances	(House	of	Commons,	2007).	As	shown	in	the	next	section,	this	was	the	first	step	that	would	eventually	lead	to	a	new	system	for	members’	allowances	and	expenses.	Besides	the	2007	Review	by	the	RBSS,	Estimate	Committee’s	‘root-and-branch’	scrutiny	of	MPs’	allowance	took	 into	consideration	the	report	by	the	Committee	 on	 Standards	 and	 Privileges	 into	 Conservative	 MP	 Derek	 Conway’s	employment	of	his	son	(Members	Estimate	Committee,	2008).	One	of	the	main	targets	of	the	report	was	to	recover	legitimacy	and	trust	in	the	parliament,	although	it	was	less	than	certain	that	revealing	 further	evidence	of	mismanagement	through	more	transparency	would	actually	restore	–rather	than	further	erode	–	trust.57	Before	transparency	became	mandatory,	 the	 party	 leaders	 in	 Westminster	 promoted	 a	 call	 to	 proactively	 disclose	detailed	information	related	to	MP’s	expenses,	notably	in	relation	to	the	employment	of	family	members.	As	evidence	of	mismanagement	increased	public	distrust	for	the	House,	all	political	parties	 acted	 in	 anticipation	 of	 a	 decision	 towards	 greater	 transparency.	 MP	 David	Cameron	announced	that	members	of	the	Conservative	Front	Bench	would	be	obliged	to	fill	a	‘Right	to	Know’	form	and	that	the	back	benchers	were	expected	to	do	the	same.		The	form	will	be	used	by	all	Front	Bench	members	of	the	Conservatives	to	publish	full	details	of	their	office	expenses.	It	will	include	a	comprehensive	list	 of	 staff	 and	 their	 positions,	 an	 indication	 of	 any	 family	 members	employed,	 and	 a	 breakdown	 of	 office	 running	 costs	 and	 expenditure	incurred	by	 'staying	away	 from	main	home.	 (House	of	Commons’	Library,	2008)		
                                                57	The	UK	FoIA	has	not	increased	the	public’s	trust	in	government,	nor	has	it	been	the	main	reason	to	disrupt	it.	As	suggested	by	Worthy	(2010,	pp.	574	–	577),	FoIA	“is	shaped	by	pre-existing	 low	 levels	of	 trust,	 as	 the	MPs’	 case	appear	 to	 show.	The	media	 report	 stories	 that	conform	to	poor	expectations	of	politicians.	Requesters’	lack	of	trust	may	be	reinforced	by	their	use	of	FoIA	to	disagree	with	the	government	or	pursue	a	particular	issue”.	
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PM	Gordon	Brown	similarly	called	for	further	disclosure:		I	have	made	clear	to	all	Labour	MPs	that	they	must	be	fully	transparent	in	their	declarations	and	must	abide,	not	by	April	but	as	soon	as	possible,	with	the	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges'	opinion	that	the	employment	of	family	members	should	be	declared.	(House	of	Commons’	Library,	2008)		Besides	urging	Liberal	Democrat	MPs	to	declare	their	employment	of	 family	members,	the	 party	 leader	 MP	 Nick	 Clegg	 also	 called	 for	 a	 limitation	 in	 the	 number	 of	 family	members	that	could	be	employed	by	MPs:		To	improve	public	faith	in	the	system	there	should	also	be	a	limit	of	only	one	family	member	being	allowed	to	work	in	an	MP's	office.	Unless	all	parties	take	action,	the	public	perception	of	politicians	will	continue	to	worsen.	It	is	time	for	Westminster	to	accept	that	it	needs	to	move	out	of	the	19th	century	and	into	the	21st.58		Following	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Standards	 and	 Privileges	 on	Employment	 of	 family	members	 through	 the	 Staffing	 Allowance,	 the	 House	 agreed	 to	introduce	greater	 transparency	and	paper	monitoring	of	 the	existing	practices	of	MPs’	employment	of	family	members.	As	shown	in	the	analysis	of	the	next	case	study	in	this	chapter,	this	was	not	the	first	time	that	instead	of	a	statutory	solution,	the	decision	makers	opted	for	a	transparency	solution	coordinated	with	increased	enforcement	mechanisms.	On	16	May,	the	High	Court	ruled	in	favour	of	disclosure	of	MPs’	expenses:		We	have	no	doubt	that	the	public	interest	is	at	stake.	We	are	not	here	dealing	with	idle	gossip,	or	public	curiosity	about	what	in	truth	are	trivialities.	The	expenditure	 of	 public	 money	 through	 the	 payment	 of	 MPs'	 salaries	 and	allowances	is	a	matter	of	direct	and	reasonable	interest	to	taxpayers.	They	are	obliged	to	pay	their	taxes	at	whatever	level	and	on	whatever	basis	the	legislature	may	decide,	in	part	at	least	to	fund	the	legislative	process.	Their	interest	is	reinforced	by	the	absence	of	a	coherent	system	for	the	exercise	of	control	 over	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 understanding	 of	 the	 arrangements	which	govern	the	payment	of	ACA.	Although	the	relevant	rules	are	made	by	the	House	 itself,	questions	whether	 the	payments	have	 in	 fact	been	made	within	the	rules,	and	even	when	made	within	them,	whether	the	rules	are	appropriate	in	contemporary	society,	have	a	wide	resonance	throughout	the	body	politic.	In	the	end	they	bear	on	public	confidence	in	the	operation	of	
                                                58	Mulholland,	 H.	 (2008)	MPs	may	 be	 subject	 to	 spot	 checks	 on	 expenses.	The	 Guardian,	 1	February;	Eaglesham,	 J.	 (2008)	MPs	 could	 face	 spot	 checks	on	 expenses.	Financial	Times,	 2	February.	
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our	democratic	system	at	its	very	pinnacle,	the	House	of	Commons	itself.59		 The	Members’	Estimate	Committee	(MEC)	decided	not	to	appeal	against	the	High	Court’s	decision	and	prepare	the	information	and	documents	required	for	publication.	This	was	done,	in	the	first	instance,	for	the	14	MPs	mentioned	in	the	FoI	requests;	the	rest	would	be	prepared	within	a	provisional	timeframe	by	October	2008.	But	less	than	a	 month	 later,	 the	 MEC	 concluded	 it	 would	 take	 longer	 than	 promised	 to	 release	detailed	information	on	ACAs.		
1.3.	The	Creation	of	IPSA	and	of	the	MPs’	Expenses’	Scheme	From	February	to	July	2008,	the	MEC	published	four	reports	on	members’	allowances.	In	its	 first	 report	 it	 decided	 that	 all	 claims	 for	 items	worth	 £25	 or	more,	 instead	 of	 the	previous	de	minimis	£250,	should	be	accompanied	by	receipts	with	effect	 from	1	April	2008	 (Members	 Estimate	 Committee,	 2008a).	 In	 its	 last	 report	 on	 the	 topic,	 the	Committee	proposed	that	members	should	no	longer	be	allowed	to	claim	reimbursement	for	 furniture	 and	 household	 goods	 or	 for	 capital	 improvements	 (known	 as	 the	 ‘John	Lewis’	list).	Among	other	recommendations,	the	report	suggested	that	from	the	start	of	the	2009–10	financial	year	the	threshold	for	transparency	should	be	reduced	from	£25	to	zero,	 and	 that	 the	 Green	 Book	 be	 revised	 to	 specify	 more	 detailed	 rules.	 Though	 as	mentioned	 before	 a	 de	 minimis	 clause	 was	 traditionally	 practiced	 in	 the	 House	 of	Commons,	 under	 high	 social	 pressure	 for	 MPs	 to	 reveal	 details	 of	 their	 practices	transparency	became	more	relevant	than	the	notion	and	principle	of	proportionality.	More	than	half	of	the	proposals	made	by	the	Committee	was	adopted	in	a	divided	vote	(172	in	favour	and	144	against).	The	decision	kept	in	place	the	House’s	ACA	system	and	 the	 ‘John	Lewis’	List,	and	approved	an	auditing	arrangement	 in	which	MPs	would	mandatorily	respond	to	internal	financial	checks	once	per	parliament.	The	result	of	the	vote	 caused	 a	 public	 outcry	 and	was	 portrayed	 by	 the	media	 as	 defying	 the	 citizens’	demand	 for	 a	 tougher	 system	 of	 allowances.	 Shortly	 afterwards,	 on	 15	 July,	 the	Conservative	Party	filed	a	motion	to	revisit	the	decision	about	ACA	and	the	role	of	external	auditors	(House	of	Commons’	Library,	2008a).	The	opening	speech	of	the	session	by	the	Shadow	 Leader	 of	 the	 House,	 MP	 Theresa	 May,	 reflected	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 previous	decision:	 	
                                                59	High	Court	of	Justice.	Case	N.	CO2888/2008.	Corporate	Officer	of	the	House	of	Commons	v	Information	Commissioner,	Heather	Brooke,	Ben	Leapman,	Jonathan	Michael	Ungoed-Thomas.	
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Two	weeks	ago,	the	Commons	had	the	opportunity	to	put	its	house	in	order,	to	 clear	 its	 name	 and	 to	 go	 some	 way	 to	 restoring	 public	 confidence	 in	Parliament	as	a	body	and	hon.	Members	as	 individuals.	 It	 failed	 to	do	 so.	Members	voted	to	keep	the	John	Lewis	list	and	rejected	a	system	of	external	auditing.	 The	 newspapers,	 which	 had	 welcomed	 the	 report	 from	 the	Members	 Estimate	 Committee,	 were	 accordingly	 negative	 about	 the	 vote	taken	by	 this	House.	Of	 course,	we	 should	not	be	driven	by	 the	media	—	[laughter	in	the	House]	I	say	to	those	hon.	Members	who	are	laughing	that	we	should	listen.		The	robustness	of	 the	allowance	reform,	 relying	on	 transparency	as	a	 regulatory	mechanism,	had	proved	to	be	fully	dependent	on	the	public’s	reaction.	In	the	second	vote	held	in	July,	only	21	MPs	from	the	Conservative	Party	voted	against	the	position	that	the	Shadow	Leader	of	the	House	was	now	supporting.	At	that	point,	a	government	proposal	was	approved	calling	for	a	revision	of	the	Green	Book	by	the	Advisory	Panel	on	Members’	Allowances	 (APMA),	 complemented	 by	 two	 independent	 external	 appointees,	 and	defining	certain	requirements	to	be	addressed	in	the	revised	Green	Book.	The	MEC	published	the	Revised	Green	Book	and	audit	of	Members’	Allowances	in	January	2009.	The	paper	was	issued	after	draft	reports	were	prepared	by	the	APMA	and	recommendations	were	issued	by	the	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges.	The	House	of	Commons	disclosed	detailed	information	and	scans	of	receipts	of	MPs’	expenses	in	June	2009.	More	than	a	million	documents	were	made	available	to	the	public.	Disclosure	took	place	 about	 40	 days	 after	 the	 Telegraph	 printed	 the	 first	 in	 a	 series	 of	 leaked	documentation	of	MPs’	second	homes	claims.	These	reports	further	pressured	the	House	to	take	additional	measures	to	address	their	growing	legitimacy	crisis.		The	path	 from	secrecy	of	MPs’	ACA	expenses	 to	 transparency	had	been	 far	 from	smooth.	When	 transparency	was	 finally	 enforced,	 a	 series	of	 expenses	abuses	became	public	knowledge,	constituting	one	of	the	gravest	crises	in	the	British	parliament.	Just	to	mention	 a	 few	 developments,	 six	Ministers	 resigned,	 the	 Speaker	 of	 the	 House	 stood	down,	89	MPs	retired	or	resigned	after	the	scandal,	and	many	Members	re-paid	sums	of	money	in	a	total	of	six	figures	of	British	pounds.60	The	political	impact	was	also	significant.	Although	 an	 objective	 monetary	 measure	 of	 the	 wrongdoing	 did	 not	 matter	 for	 the	resignation	or	electoral	returns	of	MPs,	the	incumbents	involved	in	the	crisis	were	more	likely	to	lose	elections,	if	they	ran	(Eggers	and	Fisher,	2011;	Larcinese	and	Sircar,	2014).		The	measures	that	the	House	had	approved	less	than	a	year	before	the	crisis	proved	
                                                60	See,	for	example:	The	Telegraph	(2010)	MPs’	expenses:	how	the	scandal	was	disclosed.	The	
Telegraph,	 10	 January;	 Barret,	 D.;	 Bloxham,	 A.	 (2010)	 MPs’	 expenses:	 the	 timeline.	 The	
Telegraph,	3	October.	
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insufficient	to	either	tackle	the	problem	of	mismanagement	or	restore	public	trust.	On	June	2009,	after	announcing	his	resignation,	the	Speaker	of	the	House	informed	that	party	leaders	 had	 agreed	 to	 adopt	 tougher	 rules	 for	 Personal	 Additional	 Accommodation	Expenditure	 (second	home	allowance)	and	 that	 the	Prime	Minister	had	a	proposal	 for	regulation	of	the	House	by	an	independent	body.	Although	these	decisions	were	largely	consulted	inside	the	parliament,	it	was	the	government	that	had	taken	the	initiative	when	it	became	apparent	that	MPs	had	failed	to	put	forward	a	proposal	that	would	address	the	issue	in	a	satisfactory	manner	(Hine	and	Peele,	2016).	The	bill	introduced	by	the	government,	the	Parliamentary	Standards	Act	2009,	had	its	first	read	on	23	June	and	was	rushed	through	the	legislature,	receiving	royal	assent	on	21	July	2009,	before	the	parliament’s	summer	recess.	Besides	its	administrative	role,	the	newly	created	Independent	Parliamentary	Standards	Authority	(IPSA)	became	the	body	responsible	 for	preparing	and	revising	an	allowances	scheme	for	MPs	and	for	defining	procedures	for	investigations.61	Hine	and	Peele	(2016)	suggest	that	the	natural	solution	for	the	crisis	was	probably	to	refer	the	issue	to	the	CSPL,	but	with	pressure	from	the	media	the	government	decided	that	there	was	no	time	for	a	lengthy	inquiry.	IPSA	then	became	the	 independent	 regulator	 of	 expenses	 at	 the	 Commons	 and	 the	 driver	 of	 regulatory	transparency	measures	in	the	logic	of	control.	A	month	after	banning	a	range	of	expenses,	such	as	second	home	allowances	and	first	 class	 travel,	 IPSA	 made	 available	 for	 consultation	 a	 proposal	 for	 the	 House	 of	Commons’	 expenses’	 publication	 scheme	 from	 June	2010	 (Independent	Parliamentary	Standards	Authority,	2010).	Supported	by	the	Information	Commissioner,	and	with	the	public’s	support	for	greater	openness,	the	paper	put	forward	proposals	for	publication	of:	(1)	salaries	for	the	staff	of	all	MPs	in	ranges	of	£5000	and	the	full	salary	for	‘connected	parties’	(relatives	employed	by	MPs);	(2)	date,	origin	and	destination	of	MPs’	travels;	(3)	first	half	of	the	postcode	of	MPs’	addresses;	and	(4)	total	amount	claimed	for	security	and	disability	costs,	not	broken	down	by	individual	MP.62		IPSA	 proposed	 to	 publish	 all	MPs’	 claims,	 both	 accepted	 and	 rejected,	 in	 a	 clear	movement	 to	 further	 regulatory	 transparency	 to	 discourage	 MPs	 to	 submit	 claims	unlikely	to	be	accepted.	It	also	suggested	publishing	the	claims	monthly	and	the	raw	data	
                                                61	IPSA’s	board	consists	of	a	Chair	and	four	members.	According	to	the	Parliamentary	Standards	Act	2009,	 one	of	 the	board	members	must	be	 a	person	who	has	held	high	 judicial	 office;	 one	member	must	be	a	person	who	is	a	qualified	auditor;	and	one	member	must	be	a	former	MP.	62	A	“connected	party”,	according	to	IPSA,	is:	a	spouse,	civil	partner	or	cohabiting	partner	of	the	member;	a	parent,	child,	grandparent,	grandchild,	sibling,	uncle,	aunt,	nephew	or	niece	of	the	member	or	of	a	spouse,	civil	partner	or	cohabiting	partner	of	the	member;	or	an	individual	or	organisation	where	there	exists	a	relationship	as	set	out	in	the	Companies	Act	2006.	
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in	open	format	quarterly,	in	order	to	encourage	intermediaries,	e.g.	organised	civil	society,	to	use	the	information.	Transparency,	along	with	a	rigorous	system	of	oversight,	was	the	main	choice	of	IPSA	to	assure	citizens	that	MPs’	misbehaviours	in	2009	would	not	repeat.	The	 choice	 for	 transparency	was	 also	 strongly	 supported	 and	based	on	 the	UK’s	 FoIA	regime.	The	level	of	transparency	and	the	regulatory	burden	created	by	it	as	a	regulatory	mechanism	was	an	issue	of	dispute	between	MPs	and	IPSA	and	led	to	questions	about	the	accountability	and	the	role	of	the	Authority.	On	its	final	Policy	on	Proactive	Publication	of	MPs’	Expense	Claims,	published	in	December	2010,	IPSA	defined	that	information	would	be	 published	 every	 two	months	 and	 additional	 information	 about	MPs’	 use	 of	 public	funds,	e.g.	constituency	offices	and	connected	parties,	annually.		This	dispute	provides	us	with	insights	into	the	impact	that	different	type	of	actors	may	 have	 on	 the	 trajectory	 of	 a	 regulatory	 transparency	 policy.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	proportionality	as	a	priority,	the	rationale	of	an	external	body	like	IPSA	is	likely	to	function	in	the	opposite	direction	to	that	of	self-regulating	politicians.	In	other	words,	mindful	of	reputational	 risks,	 the	 former	would	 be	more	 likely	 to	 overregulate,	while	 conversely	reputational	considerations	could	push	the	latter	towards	under-regulation.63	The	design	of	 the	 Publication	 Scheme	 had	 received	 considerable	 public	 support	 and	 pressure	 of	transparency	from	the	perspective	of	a	democratic	principle.		
1.4.	The	Trajectory	of	the	MPs’	Expenses	Scheme	The	trajectory	of	the	MPs’	Expenses	Scheme	after	the	creation	of	IPSA	has	been	one	of	incremental	expansion,	with	few	developments	between	2010	and	2015.	One	of	these	took	 place	 in	 2013,	 in	 response	 to	 media	 reports	 suggesting	 that	 MPs	 renting	accommodation	 from	other	 standing	MPs	could	be	profiting	 from	 taxpayers’	money	(Independent	Parliamentary	Standards	Authority,	2013).	 In	 its	2013	Annual	Review	IPSA	 put	 forward	 three	 options	 to	 overcome	 the	 concern:	 banning	 the	 practice,	widening	the	definition	of	“connected	party”,	or	publishing	the	name	of	the	landlord.	IPSA	understood	that	in	practice	there	was	little	risk	of	misuse	of	public	money,	and	for	the	 sake	 of	 proportionality	 it	 opted	 for	 greater	 transparency	 as	 a	 regulatory	mechanism.		In	September	2015,	IPSA	expanded	the	use	of	transparency	again	both	to	support	its	 mandate	 and	 as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 regulate	 MPs’	 behaviours.	 Along	 with	 the	publication	of	 the	2014-15	Annual	Business	Costs	and	Expenses	data,	 the	Authority	
                                                63	 The	 issue	 of	 proportionality	will	 be	 discussed	 in	more	 detail	 in	 the	 next	 section	 under	 the	regulation	of	conflict	of	interest	in	the	House	of	Commons.	
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published	the	total	debit	written	off	(£2,105.43)	listed	by	26	MPs.	The	debts	disclosed	in	a	‘name	and	shame’	strategy	concerned	amounts	less	than	£500	per	MP,	which	IPSA	no	longer	considered	cost	effective	to	try	to	recover	(MPs	had	been	contacted	several	times	 about	 the	 outstanding	 sums	 and	 did	 not	 respond	 to	 IPSA’s	 requests).	 The	initiative	 did	 not	 only	 put	MPs	 on	 the	 spot,	 but	 also	 helped	 IPSA	 to	 fulfil	 its	 public	accountability	duties	while	avoiding	reputational	risks.	At	the	time	of	writing	in	2016,	MPs’	expenses	still	attracted	the	media	and	public	attention.	While	the	media	continued	to	report	on	newly	disclosed	information,	there	were	 no	 major	 calls	 for	 further	 transparency.	 Every	 autumn,	 soon	 after	 IPSA’s	publication	 of	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 MPs’	 Expenses	 Scheme,	 media	 channels	published	 their	 analyses	 of	 the	 data.	 Some	 channels	 created	 rankings	 or	 tools	 to	compare	MPs’	expenses	and	single	out	big	spenders.	Such	efforts	were	“contextualised	by	 the	 inveterate	 public	 ire	 over	 perceived	 excesses,	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 on-going	austerity	 measures	 and	 a	 culture	 of	 ‘naming	 and	 shaming’”	 (Heuwieser,	 2015).		Although	at	 times	 these	 led	 to	pre-mature	 judgements	 that	 failed	 to	account	 for	 the	specific	conditions	applicable	to	each	MP’s	expense,	such	as	their	specific	budget	caps,	there	has	been	no	attempt	to	retract	MPs’	transparency	regime	since	2009.	As	pointed	out	by	MP	Douglas	Carswell,	 the	House	of	Commons	 “tried	 to	 solve	 the	problem	by	doing	what	politicians	generally	do.	We	set	up	a	quango,	 IPSA.	But	 this	 is	not	about	bean-counting,	it’s	about	public	confidence.	The	only	way	to	solve	this	is	to	pass	power	outwards	to	the	people.”64	For	the	time	being	at	least,	that	means	transparency.		
	
2.	The	Register	of	Members’	Interests		
2.1.	Socio-Political	and	Institutional	Context	While	 certainly	 not	 absent	 previously,	 the	 emergence	 of	 professional	 parliamentary	lobbying	and	 the	rise	 in	 the	number	of	MPs	working	as	consultants	and	advisers	 to	companies,	 unions	 and	 the	 like	 became	 a	 source	 of	 great	 public	 concern	 in	 the	UK	during	the	1990s	(Nolan,	1995;	Hine	and	Peele,	2016).	The	first	 lobbying	scandal	of	that	decade	took	place	 in	1994	and	 involved	Conservative	MPs	Graham	Riddick	and	David	Treddinick.	The	two	MPs	had	agreed	to	the	offer	of	an	undercover	Sunday	Times	reporter	to	table	parliamentary	questions	in	exchange	for	£1,000.	The	publication	of	the	story	prompted	the	House	of	Commons’	Privilege	Committee	to	investigate	the	case,	
                                                64	Martin,	I.	(2014)	MPs'	expenses:	A	scandal	that	will	not	die.	The	Telegraph,	13	April.		
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nine	months	after	which	the	Committee	suspended	the	MPs	from	service	of	the	House	for	ten	and	twenty	sitting	days,	respectively.	Their	salaries	were	also	suspended	for	the	same	period	(House	of	Commons,	1995).	Only	three	months	after	The	Sunday	Times	story,	The	Guardian	exposed	another	one	 with	 a	 similar	 content.	 Ian	 Greener,	 the	 head	 of	 lobbying	 firm	 Ian	 Greener	Associates,	was	accused	of	paying	Conservative	MPs	Neil	Hamilton	and	Tim	Smith	to	ask	questions	in	the	House	of	Commons	on	behalf	of	Mohamed	Al-Fayed,	the	owner	of	Harrods,	 a	 well-known	 upmarket	 British	 department	 store.	 The	 negotiation	 was	disclosed	to	The	Guardian	by	Mr.	Al-Fayed,	who	claimed	he	felt	it	was	his	civic	duty	to	publicise	these,	given	that	the	Committee	of	Privileges	had	decided	to	go	into	secret	session	about	the	previous	£1,000	cash	for	questions	investigation.	Besides	an	array	of	documents	with	details	of	the	transactions,	Al-Fayed	declared	that	during	his	dialogues	with	Ian	Greener	he	was	told	that	he	needed	to	"rent	an	MP	just	like	you	rent	a	London	taxi."65	Investigations	for	this	case	were	also	opened,	leading	to	the	resignation	of	both	MPs.	Hamilton	 resigned	 after	 pressure	 from	 then	Conservative	Prime	Minister	 John	Major.	Fearing	that	the	cash-for-questions	scandal,	as	the	case	became	known,	would	taint	his	image	and	that	of	the	Conservative	Party,	PM	Major	went	on	to	establish	the	Committee	on	Standards	in	Public	Life	with	the	mandate	to:		Examine	 current	 concerns	 about	 standards	 of	 conduct	 of	 all	 holders	 of	public	office	[including	Members	of	Parliament,	Ministers	and	civil	servants	of	ministerial	and	non-ministerial	bodies],	including	arrangements	relating	to	financial	and	commercial	activities,	and	make	recommendations	as	to	any	changes	 in	 present	 arrangements	which	might	 be	 required	 to	 ensure	 the	highest	standards	of	propriety	in	public	life.		 The	1994	 scandals	 called	public	 attention	 to	 a	 specific	 type	of	misconduct	 by	Commons	MPs	and	to	a	recurrent	flaw	in	the	administration	of	the	House	to	curb	such	behaviour.	At	 the	end	of	 the	day,	 the	 cash-for-questions	 scandal	was	a	 repetition	of	previous	misbehaviours	 related	 to	 lobbying	 and	 conflict	 of	 interests.	 Earlier	 in	 the	decade,	the	same	Ian	Greer	had	admitted	to	have	made	‘Thank	you	payments’	to	MPs,	after	 which	 an	 inquiry	 on	 lobbying	 was	 conducted	 and	 the	 Select	 Committee	 on	Members'	Interests	recommended	that	the	House	create	a	register	for	lobbyists.	The	proposal	had	never	gone	forward.	The	Nolan	Report,	as	the	first	report	of	the	Committee	on	Standards	in	Public	Life	
                                                65	Hencke,	D.	(2004)	Tory	MPs	were	paid	to	plant	questions	says	Harrods	chief.	The	Guardian,	20	October.		
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became	known,	identified	lobbying	as	a	widespread	and	potentially	harmful	activity	in	the	House	of	Commons.	Three	hundred	and	eighty-nine	of	the	566	elected	MPs	(68.7%)	had	 “financial	 relationships	 with	 outside	 bodies	 which	 directly	 relate[d]	 to	 their	membership	of	the	House”.	In	its	first	report	the	Committee	proposed	the	adoption	of	the	so-called	Seven	Principles	of	Public	Life,	namely,	selflessness,	integrity,	objectivity,	accountability,	openness,	honesty,	and	leadership.66	The	proposal	was	approved	by	the	House	and	since	1995	the	‘Principles’	have	served	as	the	guiding	values	of	public	life	in	the	UK.			
2.1.	The	re-Creation	of	the	Register	of	Members’	Interest	To	tackle	problems	with	lobbying	and	conflict	of	interests,	the	Committee	on	Standards	in	Public	Life	considered	and	presented	a	series	of	measures	at	the	end	of	which	the	chosen	regulatory	mechanism	was	transparency.	 It	can	be	argued	that	this	outcome	was	 based	 on	 several	 reasons.	 First	 and	 foremost,	 considering	 the	 regulatory	alternatives	put	forward	to	parliamentarians,	such	as	an	outright	ban	on	paid	work,	transparency	came	across	as	a	less	rigid	regulatory	response	to	settle	the	crisis.	While	advocating	 for	 transparency,	 members	 of	 the	 Committee	 suggested	 that	 the	implications	of	a	ban	could	disrupt	the	ongoing	functioning	of	the	House	and	that	more	information	 was	 needed	 for	 the	 prohibition.	 They	 argued	 that	 transparency	 “is	 a	powerful	and	flexible	mixture	of	the	disclosure	and	enforcement	which	will	serve	the	public	interest	better	than	the	inflexibility	of	statutory	purposes”,	and	proposed	that	“full	 disclosure	 of	 consultancy	 agreements	 and	 payments	 and	 of	 trade	 union	sponsorship	agreements	and	payments,	should	be	introduced	immediately”.	The	Committee	went	on	to	recommend	immediate	update	and	disclosure	of	the	Register	 of	 Members’	 Interests	 (henceforth,	 the	 Register)	 with	 improved	 entry	requirements	 “to	give	a	clearer	description	of	 the	nature	and	scope	of	 the	 interests	declared.”	The	Register	had	been	created	back	 in	1974,	with	the	purpose	of	making	transparent	 the	 pecuniary	 interests	 of	MPs	 on	 a	 continuous	 basis.	 It	 stipulated	 the	registration	of	any	interest	or	action	that	could	be	thought	to	influence	the	deputies’	parliamentary	conduct.	Although	this	was	a	transparency	system	that	yielded	valuable	information	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 interests,	 the	 Committee	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	“introduction	of	the	Register	of	Members’	Interests	[in	1974],	designed	to	further	the	wholly	 admirable	 concept	 of	 disclosure	 of	 interests,	 has	 tended	 to	 create	 a	 false	impression	that	any	interest	is	acceptable	once	it	has	been	registered”.	
                                                66	Also	known	as	the	Nolan	Principles.	
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Hine	 and	 Peele	 (2016)	 suggest	 that	 besides	 the	 regulatory	 dilemma	 of	accountability	and	independence,	only	the	dilemma	of	proportionality	is	as	important	in	ethics	regulation.	“Proportionality”,	the	authors	write,	“is	widely	recommended	as	a	prime	virtue	of	good	regulation,	but	few	observers	have	any	general	guidelines	to	offer	about	its	meaning”	(2016).	Without	any	clear	guidance	about	what	constitutes	over-regulation	and	under-regulation,	conclusions	arrive	as	debates	about	new	cases	or	the	regulatory	design	unfold.	In	debating	institutional	change,	Hall	(2010,	p.	215)	observes	that	even	when	new	institutions	can	be	modelled	as	coordination	games,	distributive	issues	arise	and	are	resolved	based	on	the	relative	power	of	actors	“and	on	normative	beliefs	 about	 fairness”.	 In	 the	 regulation	 of	 ethics,	 proportionality	 is	 the	 normative	belief.	In	terms	of	proportionality,	RTPs	have	at	least	three	characteristics	for	offering	MPs	 large	 opportunity	 costs.	 First,	 MPs	 are	 the	 very	 actors	 regulating	 their	 own	behaviour.	 In	 this	 regard,	MPs	will	 be	 the	 ones	 defining	 the	 specific	 content	 of	 the	information	disclosed,	without	having	to	opt	for	intrusive	bans.	Most	likely	RTPs	will	control	conflicts	of	interest	and	illegal	lobbying	at	least	to	some	extent	because	it	makes	engaging	in	these	acts	more	complex.	For	example,	an	MP	that	eventually	wants	to	take	a	consultancy	 job	 that	clashes	with	his	duties	at	 the	Commons	will	have	 to	provide	credible	explanations	to	the	public	or	will	not	comply	with	the	RTP	requirement,	which	increases	risks	of	liability.	Second,	if	transparency	can	control	misbehaviour	to	some	extent,	in	the	occurrence	of	minor	lobbying	scandals,	it	is	the	individual	that	becomes	exposed,	not	the	regulatory	framework	adopted	by	MPs.	The	last	reason	is	in	fact	an	assumption:		 The	assumption	is	that	the	elected	representative	is	resistant	to	improper	lobbying	and	that	the	public	interest	will	be	safeguarded	by	the	process	of	socialisation,	 honour,	 the	 rules	 on	 transparency,	 declarations	 of	 interest,	and	ultimately	the	need	for	re-election	(Hine	and	Peel,	2016,	p.	202).		 In	 response	 to	 the	 Nolan	 Report,	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 adopted	 a	 Code	 of	Conduct	self-regulating	probity	and	integrity	and	restating	the	validity	of	the	Register,	which	then	innovated	in	relation	to	its	1975	version	by	obliging	members	to	disclose	the	amount	of	remuneration	obtained	in	other	paid	works,	by	explicitly	describing	the	categories	of	registrable	interests,	and	by	clarifying	the	cases	in	which	disclosure	was	expected.	 Published	 soon	 after	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 new	 Parliament	 and	 annually	afterwards,	and	updated	in	a	loose	leaf	form,	the	Register’s	purpose	was			
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To	provide	information	of	any	pecuniary	interest	or	other	material	benefit	which	a	Member	receives	which	might	reasonably	be	thought	by	others	to	influence	his	or	her	actions,	speeches	or	votes	in	Parliament,	or	actions	taken	in	his	or	her	capacity	as	a	Member	of	Parliament.	(Select	Committee	on	Members’	Interests,	1992)		In	addition	 to	 the	Register,	 the	House	reiterated	 its	1947	Resolution	that	prohibited	members	from	engaging	in	advocacy	on	behalf	of	outside	bodies	or	persons	from	whom	they	received	payment.		
2.2.	The	Trajectory	of	the	Register	The	waters	 did	 not	 calm	 in	 the	 years	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Nolan	 Report,	 as	lobbying	and	conflict	of	interest	controversies	continued	to	remain	an	issue.	In	2001,	following	a	divisive	decision	of	the	House	of	Commons	not	to	reappoint	Elizabeth	Filkin	as	Commissioner	for	Standards,	Sir	Nigel	Wicks	was	designated	for	the	post	and	started	an	investigation	of	the	regulation	of	conduct	in	the	House.67	The	final	report,	published	almost	a	year	later,	argued	that	it	was	not	time	yet	to	statutorily	regulate	the	conduct	of	MPs.	To	deal	with	the	issue	of	monitoring	and	to	convey	trust	about	an	evolving	issue,	MPs	approved	the	report’s	recommendation	that	the	Code	of	Conduct	and	Guide	to	the	practices	in	the	House	should	be	initiated	by	each	parliament.	Consequently,	a	new	Code	and	Guide	to	the	Rules	of	Conduct	entered	into	force	in	the	House	 of	 Commons	 in	 2002,	 following	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 Committee’s	Ninth	Report	 to	remove	a	 loophole	about	 lobbying	 for	reward	or	consideration.	The	revised	Guide	amended	the	rules	of	the	House	to	clarify	that	paid	advocacy	was	banned	whenever	an	MP	took	part	in	any	parliamentary	proceeding	or	made	any	approach	to	a	minister	or	servant	of	the	Crown	which	sought	to	confer	benefit	exclusively	upon	a	body	(or	individual)	outside	parliament,	from	which	the	MP	received,	was	receiving,	or	was	expected	to	receive	a	pecuniary	benefit,	or	upon	any	registrable	client	of	such	a	body	(or	individual)	(Select	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges,	2002).	Moreover,	the	Committee	clarified	that	failing	to	provide	information	to	the	Register	of	Members’	Interests	would	be	regarded	as	a	serious	breach	of	conduct.68	
                                                67	 Elizabeth	 Filkin’s	 departure	 was	 allegedly	 due	 to	 government	 pressure,	 after	 her	investigation	 of	 Labour	 MP	 Keith	 Vaz	 led	 to	 the	 latter’s	 one-month	 suspension	 from	 the	Commons.	The	MP	had	accepted	payments	from	a	solicitor	and	had	failed	to	register	them.	In	September	 2016,	 the	 same	 MP	 was	 the	 centre	 of	 a	 similar	 scandal,	 when	 he	 was	 being	questioned	for	not	declaring	hospitality	in	the	Commons	Register	of	Interest.	68	 Incremental	 ımprovements	 ın	 the	Regıster	also	 ıncluded	oblıgatıon	 to	dısclosure	benefits	received	by	partners	or	by	spouses.	
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On	the	retraction	side,	interests	for	which	values	did	not	exceed	one	per	cent	of	the	parliamentary	salary	(about	£550	at	the	time)	did	not	have	to	be	registered,	unless	the	MP	thought	the	material	benefit	received	could	be	thought	by	others	to	influence	his	or	her	actions	as	an	MP.	The	proposal	of	a	“Realistic	de	minimis	figure”	was	justified	by	the	Select	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges	on	the	grounds	that	“interests	in	the	Register	which	are	of	substance	will	be	obscured	by	the	proliferation	of	relatively	insignificant	benefits,	the	recording	of	which	do	not	serve	the	Register's	main	purpose”.	Although	 it	 reduced	 the	 amount	 of	 information	 available	 to	 the	 public,	 adopting	de	
minimis	clauses	was	a	widespread	practice	in	the	UK	government	and	in	Westminster	based	 on	 arguments	 of	 proportionality.	 Moreover,	 it	 was	 socially	 accepted	 and	congruent	with	the	design	of	the	Register,	giving	MPs	other	principles	to	adopt	than	uniquely	those	related	to	accountability	and	transparency	existent	in	Layer	2.69	The	 content	 of	 the	 Register	 was	 not	 modified	 significantly	 until	 2008,	 when	information	about	MPs’	employment	of	family	members	paid	with	staffing	allowance	was	introduced.	The	decision	followed	an	investigation	of	a	complaint	by	the	Sunday	
Times.	The	newspaper	alleged	that	Conservative	MP	Derek	Conway	was	employing	his	son	as	research	assistant	and	paying	him	with	parliamentary	staffing	allowance,	while	the	youngster	was	still	in	full-time	education.	Approached	by	the	newspaper,	the	MP	refused	to	share	details	about	the	activities	his	son	performed	and	the	number	of	hours	he	worked.	After	 investigating	 the	 case,	 the	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges	settled	 that	Derek	Conway	paid	 excessive	 bonus	 and	 infringed	 the	 rules	 on	 staffing	allowances	(House	of	Commons,	2008a).		In	 response	 to	 the	 public	 outcry	 surrounding	 the	 case,	 the	 Committee	 on	Standards	in	Public	Life,	with	the	support	of	the	Labour	Party,	the	Conservative	Party	and	 the	 Liberal	 Democrats,	 proposed	 a	 new	 category	 in	 the	 Register	 for	 family	members	employed	and	remunerated	through	staffing	allowance.	This	was	agreed	by	the	House	on	March	2008,	taking	compulsory	effect	from	August	2008.	The	Committee	recommended	procedures	to	be	followed	by	MPs	when	hiring	relatives	(e.g.	if	they	had	the	 adequate	 skills	 for	 the	 post),	 but	 defended	 that	 banning	 the	 practice	 was	unnecessary	 and	 undesirable	 (House	 of	 Commons,	 2008).	 In	 this	 particular	 case,	proportionality	was	also	a	matter	of	fairness.	If	MPs’	families	had	to	abandon	their	jobs	to	move	to	London	and	if	they	could	professionally	support	MPs’	work,	the	argument	went,	the	practice	should	be	monitored,	not	banned.	This	was	especially	the	case	in	the	absence	 of	 any	 meaningful	 pressure	 from	 citizens	 for	 a	 ban.	 The	 chairman	 of	 the	
                                                69	The	threshold	for	some	categories	were	higher,	due	to	specific	reasons.	Sponsorship	(one	of	the	 categories	 of	 the	 Register),	 for	 example,	 was	 higher	 (of	 £1,000),	 in	 line	 with	 the	requirements	of	the	Political	Parties,	Elections	and	Referendums	Act	2000.		
 102 
Standards	and	Privileges	Committee,	MP	George	Young,	reasoned:		 Essentially,	faced	with	the	situation	following	our	fourth	report,	there	were	three	possible	options	concerning	the	employment	of	family	members.	One	was	to	do	nothing,	the	second	was	to	ban	the	practice	and	the	third	was	to	introduce	greater	transparency.	I	simply	do	not	believe	that	the	do-nothing	option	 is	 tenable	 against	 the	 climate	of	public	 opinion.	The	 second	 is	 the	possibility	of	a	ban,	as	the	chair	of	the	Committee	on	Standards	in	Public	Life	accepted	in	his	statement	of	30	January,	although	he	conceded	that	it	could	‘seem	 a	 rather	 harsh	 answer	 to	 the	 problem’.	 He	went	 on	 to	 say	 that	 ‘an	alternative	approach	would	be	to	insist	on	greater	transparency	and	proper	monitoring	of	existing	requirements,	which	is	generally	better	than	creating	new	rules	and	prohibitions.’	 I	agree	with	that;	we	should	not	compel	hon.	Members	to	dismantle	arrangements	that	have	enabled	them	to	provide	a	high-quality	service	to	their	constituents.		 In	the	field	of	ethics	regulation	“there	is	clearly	a	trade-off	between	the	deterrence	of	 misconduct	 and	 broader	 costs	 like	 loss	 of	 flexibility,	 initiative	 and	 public-sector	entrepreneurship”	 (Hine	 and	 Peel,	 2016,	 p.	 15).	 As	 I	 mentioned	 earlier,	 it	 may	 be	difficult	to	assess	what	the	right	trade-off	is	in	many	cases.	As	MPs,	who	decide	on	the	issue	do	not	desire	and	tend	to	refrain	from	over-regulation,	transparency	becomes	the	mainstream	regulatory	mechanism	to	resolve	conflicts	of	interest,	as	was	the	case	in	the	 UK	House	 of	 Commons	 in	 this	 instance.	 The	 RTP	 fulfilled	 both	 the	 principle	 of	proportionality	in	the	House,	and	the	MPs	desire	to	provide	an	immediate	response	to	the	public	using	another	principle	accepted	and	desired	by	society.		Lobbying,	just	as	it	should	not	be	abused,	should	not	be	banned	altogether	either.	This	brings	other	principles	(Layer	1)	and	norms	(Layer	2),	such	as	proportionality,	into	the	centre	of	the	debate	on	the	regulation	of	ethics.	“Much	of	the	work	of	an	ethics	commission”,	 write	 Hine	 and	 Peele	 (2016)	 about	 the	 Commission	 for	 Standards	 in	Public	Life,	“covers	behaviour	where	the	precise	definition	of	right	and	wrong	is	elastic	and	hard	to	pin	down”.	In	such	cases,	transparency	serves	as	a	useful	tool.	
	
2.3.	A	Consistently	Expansive	Trajectory		The	2009	version	of	the	Code	of	Conduct	obliged	the	disclosure	of	information	about	donations	 MPs	 received	 in	 the	 course	 of	 their	 parliamentary	 duties	 (House	 of	Commons,	 2009).	 Registration	 of	 donations	 to	 party	 organisations	 followed	 the	investigation	 of	 the	 conduct	 of	 an	 MP,	 this	 time	 Conservative	 MP	 George	 Osborne.	Labour	MPs	Kevan	Jones	and	John	Mann	filed	a	complaint	against	Osborne	a	day	after	the	Mail	on	Sunday	newspaper	published	an	article	suggesting	that	the	MP	had	failed	to	include	in	his	Register	of	Members’	Interest	a	sum	of	approximately	£500,000	paid	
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through	the	Conservative	Party	(House	of	Commons,	2008b).	The	two	MPs	reported	that	 “Mr.	 Osborne	 failed	 to	 include	 in	 his	 personal	 entry	 in	 the	 Register	 details	 of	donations	made	to	the	Conservative	Party	and	used	by	the	Party	to	support	the	cost	of	running	his	office	as	Shadow	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer”.		During	the	investigation	of	the	case,	the	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges	concluded	that	the	conduct	of	George	Osborne	was	in	fact	adopted	by	most	members	of	 the	 Shadow	 Cabinet.	 Recommendations	 were	 addressed	 to	 all	 members	 of	 the	Shadow	Cabinet,	 including	 those	 in	more	 junior	posts.	 The	Committee	decided	 that	each	political	party	should	register	under	the	MPs’	names	the	donations	to	the	party	that	had	an	 indication	of	a	 specific	MP	as	 the	 final	beneficiary.	Members	 in	Shadow	Cabinets	were	given	four	weeks	from	the	report’s	publication	to	disclose	information	about	donations	made	in	the	mentioned	terms.	The	Committee	further	stipulated	that	if	members	complied	with	this	recommendation	and	continued	to	register	donations	when	the	donors	expressed	how	they	wished	the	money	to	be	spent,	complaints	about	previous	instances	of	non-registration	would	not	be	investigated.70	As	suggested	in	the	previous	section,	the	expenses	scandal	dominated	the	debates	in	the	House	of	Commons	in	2009.	Moves	and	proposals	to	deal	with	the	crisis	came	from	 multiple	 sides,	 e.g.	 parties,	 individual	 MPs,	 House	 Committees	 and	 the	government.	In	one	of	the	motions	tabled	by	the	Leader	of	the	House	on	April	2009,	the	Commons	 agreed	 to	 the	 government’s	 proposal	 and	 dropped	de	minimis	 clause	 for	employment	in	the	Register.	According	to	the	same	motion,	MPs	would	start	registering	allowances	for	the	work	or	services	they	provided	on	a	monthly	basis,	while	providing	information	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 their	work,	 the	 number	 of	 hours	 and,	with	 limited	exception,	 details	 of	 the	 person	 or	 organisation	 they	 received	 money	 from.	 The	Committee	 on	 Standards	 in	 Public	 Life	 raised	 concerns	 regarding	 some	 of	 the	 new	clauses:	 	The	Committee	takes	the	view	that	it	is	important	that	constituents	have	access	 to	as	complete	 information	as	possible	about	 the	extent	of	 their	MPs’	activities	outside	the	House	of	Commons.	Recording	the	number	of	hours	worked,	as	well	as	the	payment	received	will	increase	transparency.	In	particular,	it	will	inform	the	public	so	that	they	can	judge	the	extent	of	an	MP’s	commitment.	However,	it	is	also	important	that	the	issue	is	dealt	with	 proportionately.	 The	 new	 arrangements	 should	 therefore	 be	reviewed	early	in	the	next	Parliament	to	assess	whether	they	are	working	
                                                70	Details	of	donation	disclosure	were	defined	in	the	2009	review	of	the	Code	of	Conduct	also	in	 order	 to	 promote	 adequacy	 to	 disclosure	 obligations	 imposed	 by	 the	 Political	 Parties,	Elections	and	Referendums	Act	2000	(PPERA),	as	amended	by	the	Electoral	Administration	Act	2006,	such	as	loans	and	credit	arrangements	over	£500.00	relating	to	political	activities.	
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effectively	 and	 without	 disproportionate	 effort.	 This	 should	 include	consideration	 of	 a	 sensible	 de	minimis	 rule	 for	 registering	 individual	payments.	[…]	Fascinating	as	some	may	find	it	to	know	which	Members	have	 received	 jars	 of	 honey	 or	 bunches	 of	 flowers,	 this	 has	 little	 if	anything	to	do	with	the	purpose	of	the	Register,	which	is	to	enable	anyone	to	form	a	view	as	to	whether	a	Member	has	received	a	material	benefit	which	 might	 reasonably	 be	 thought	 to	 influence	 his	 or	 her	 actions,	speeches	or	votes	(Committee	on	Standards	in	Public	Life,	2009).		
De	minimis	clause	was	dropped	as	an	urgent	response	to	a	public	outcry.	Over	the	course	 of	 the	 following	 year,	 a	 calmer	 socio-political	 environment	 allowed	MPs	 to	debate	 the	 consequences	 and	 practicalities	 of	 the	 decision.	 The	 Committee	 on	Standards	and	Privileges	 (2011)	argued	 that	 the	 lack	of	a	 threshold	had	 led	MPs	 to	spend	 an	 excessive	 amount	 of	 their	 time	 reporting	 information	 about	 gifts	 as	 a	compensation	for	a	service	provided,	leading	to	an	unnecessary	amount	of	disclosure	and	 making	 the	 Registry	 to	 lose	 its	 main	 purpose.	 Also	 considering	 the	 recent	establishment	of	new	regulatory	mechanisms,	like	IPSA,	to	monitor	MPs’	expenditures,	the	 House	 determined	 that	 dropping	 de	 minimis	 clause	 had	 been	 a	 case	 of	 over-regulation.	 Subsequently,	 the	 clause	 was	 readopted,	 suggesting	 that	 when	transparency	is	not	the	same	game	in	town,	drivers	can	propose	their	retrenchment	with	less	opposition.	This	particular	case	supports	the	argument	of	Fung	et	al	(2007,	p.	110)	 that	 transparency	 laws	 tend	 to	 degrade	 overtime,	 as	 “…	 the	 dependence	 of	momentary	 public	 attention	 also	 makes	 them	 vulnerable.	 As	 crisis	 fades,	 so	 does	support”,	although	as	this	thesis	suggests	this	is	the	case	only	in	a	limited	number	of	circumstances.	The	 MPs’	 preference	 to	 transparency	 and	 resistance	 to	 statutorily	 regulate	lobbying	was	really	put	 to	 test	after	2010,	 following	another	scandal,	known	as	 the	‘Dispatches	Case’.	 The	 scandal	was	 triggered	when	undercover	 journalists	 from	 the	
Sunday	Times	and	producers	of	the	Channel	4	series	Dispatches	approached	a	number	of	MPs	who	were	due	to	stand	down	in	the	forthcoming	general	elections.	Pretending	to	be	representatives	of	a	fictitious	company,	the	undercover	reporters	requested	the	MPs	 to	 provide	 them	with	 access	 to	ministers	 and	officials.	 After	 the	Sunday	Times	broke	the	story,	some	of	the	MPs	who	had	taken	part	in	these	‘negotiations’	referred	themselves	to	the	Standards	and	Privileges	Committee.	The	body	investigated	six	MPs,	five	from	the	Labour	Party	and	one	Conservative.71	Three	Labour	MPs	were	penalised.	MP	Geoff	Hoon,	Secretary	under	Tony	Blair,	had	to	return	his	Parliamentary	photopass	for	 five	 years	 and	 apologise	 to	 the	 House.	 MP	 Stephen	 Byers,	 a	 former	 Transport	
                                                71	The	newspaper	contacted	20	MPs	and	scheduled	meetings	with	ten	of	them.	
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Secretary,	was	barred	 for	 two	years.	And	Richard	Caborn,	a	 former	Sports	Minister,	was	ordered	to	apologise	and	banned	for	six	months	for	failing	to	register	his	financial	interests.		Despite	the	political	fallout	from	the	scandal,	the	Committee,	echoing	some	of	its	earlier	 decisions,	 suggested	 that	 the	 investigation	 had	 “not	 of	 itself	 provide[d]	sufficient	basis	for	specific	recommendations	for	changes	to	the	rules”.	The	Committee	did	conclude,	however,	that	the	scandal	had	provided	a	solid	reason	to	review	the	rules	on	lobbying,	notably	in	relation	to	paid	advocacy,	activities	of	 former	Members,	and	meetings	 with	 officials	 (Select	 Committee	 on	 Standards	 and	 Privileges,	 2010).	 The	scandal	had	exposed	MPs,	but	the	specific	case	had	really	shed	light	on	how	the	British	Government	was	open	to	abuse	by	lobbying.	On	the	eve	of	the	2010	general	election,	the	 case	 prompted	 responses	 from	 the	 government,	 but	 no	 change	 in	 the	House	 of	Commons.	A	bill	to	regulate	lobbying	was	introduced	by	the	government	in	2013,	three	years	after	the	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	coalition	was	formed.	While	the	bill	targeted	the	 inadequate	 transparency	of	 lobbying	within	 the	executive	branch,	 it	did	not	put	forward	any	clause	to	strengthen	the	regulation	of	conflict	of	 interests	and	lobbying	regime	in	the	House	of	Commons.	By	the	time	that	the	‘Transparency	of	Lobbying,	Non-Party	 Campaigning	 and	 Trade	 Union	 Administration	 Bill’	 was	 approved,	 Kathryn	Hudson,	the	Parliamentary	Standards	Commissioner,	expressed	“grave	concern”	that	changes	proposed	to	tighten	controls	on	lobbying	on	the	House’s	Code	of	Conduct	had	been	put	forward	in	2012	and	not	yet	debated	by	the	House.72	Commissioner	Hudson’s	criticism	of	the	sluggishness	of	parliament	to	debate	the	Committee’s	2012	proposals	was	 included	 in	 the	2013-14	Annual	Report	of	 the	Parliamentary	Commissioner	 for	Standards,	coincidentally	published	a	few	months	after	the	resignation	of	Conservative	MP	Patrick	Mercer	 for	 tabling	parliamentary	questions	 after	 accepting	£4,000	 from	undercover	reporters.73	Unlike	the	two	previous	lobbying	scandals	that	triggered	the	proposal	 of	 the	 government’s	 lobbying	 bill,	 this	 one	 highlighted	 the	 inability	 of	Westminster	to	regulate	the	behaviours	of	its	own	members.		
                                                72	 On	 December	 2012	 the	 House	 agreed	 to	 appoint	 Lay	 Members	 to	 the	 Committee	 on	Standards,	following	a	report	from	the	Committee	on	Standards	and	Privileges.	Since	January	2013	besides	the	Committee	on	Standards,	a	separate	Committee	of	Privileges	was	established.	73	The	case	was	a	result	of	an	investigation	by	The	Daily	Telegraph	and	the	BBC’s	Panorama.	
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2.4.	Expansive	Trajectory	in	Spite	of	Effectiveness	In	its	2012	report,	the	Commissioner	for	Standards	recommended	that	MPs	should	be	subject	to	lobbying	restrictions	for	two	years	after	their	departure	from	the	House	in	relation	 to	 any	 approach	 they	 made	 to	 ministers,	 other	 MPs	 or	 public	 officials	(Transparency	 International,	 2015).	 Further	 in	 the	 process,	 the	 Standards	 and	Privileges	Committee	rejected	the	proposal	of	a	two-year	ban.	Instead	it	settled	for	a	ban	of	six	months,	despite	agreeing	with	the	Commissioner	for	Standards	that,	for	the	interests	of	public	confidence	in	the	parliament,	MPs	should	not	be	perceived	as	driven	in	their	official	capacities	by	the	expectation	of	making	personal	gains	(Standards	and	Privileges	Committee,	2012).	The	proposal	harmonised	the	ban	for	MPs	with	the	ban	imposed	on	minister	and	public	officials.		The	changes	to	the	Code	of	Conduct	of	the	House	of	Commons	were	not	finalised	until	March	2015.	MPs	debated	and	approved	a	report	proposed	by	the	Parliamentary	Committee	for	Standards,	which	would	be	adopted	by	the	upcoming	parliament.	The	Committee	suggested,	among	other	proposals,	to	improve	regulatory	transparency	and	lower	 the	 threshold	 for	 registration	 of	 certain	 gifts	 and	 benefits.	 Approved	 by	 the	House	in	2015,	the	Code	obliged	MPs	to	register	family	members	engaged	in	lobbying	and	obliged	“Former	members	[to]	abide	by	the	restrictions	of	the	lobbying	rules	for	six	months	after	their	departure	from	the	House	in	respect	of	any	approach	they	make	to	ministers,	other	members	or	public	officials”.	The	approval	of	the	House’s	Code	of	Conduct	ban	followed	the	lobbying	scandal	known	as	“cash	for	access”,	which	targeted	Labour	MP	Jack	Straw	and	the	Conservative	MP	Sir	Malcolm	Rifkind.	Similar	to	previous	lobbying	cases	in	the	House	of	Commons,	this	 one	 involved	MPs	 offering	 the	 advantages	 of	 their	 public	 position	 to	 business	representatives,	who	were	 in	reality	undercover	reporters	 from	the	Daily	Telegraph	and	Channel	4’s	Dispatches,	 in	exchange	for	thousands	of	pounds	in	payment.	In	the	meeting	arranged	by	the	newspaper	with	MP	Jack	Straw,	he	explicitly	stated	that	he	would	only	agree	to	the	job	after	he	left	parliament	in	May.74	Straw	suspended	himself	from	the	parliamentary	Labour	Party	and	Rifkind	resigned	as	head	of	the	Intelligence	and	Security	Committee	and	as	a	candidate	for	the	upcoming	elections.	The	 trajectories	 of	 changes	 made	 to	 the	 Registration	 of	 Members’	 Financial	Interests	and	the	statutory	changes	to	fight	abuse	in	lobbying	since	the	early	90s	have	nonetheless	been	deemed	insufficient	by	a	number	of	organisations	and	think	tanks,	
                                                74	Dearden,	L.	(2015)	'Cash	for	access'	scandal:	What	is	it	about,	what	impact	will	it	have	and	who	is	involved?	The	Independent,	23	February.	
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including	Transparency	International	(TI).	At	the	launch	of	its	report	“Lifting	the	Lid	on	Lobbying”,	TI	Director	Robert	Barrington	highlighted	that			 Many	recent	lobbying	scandals	have	largely	fallen	within	the	rules,	clearly	demonstrating	that	the	current	regulatory	regime	is	inadequate.	It’s	curious	and	 confusing	 that	 something	 is	 permitted	 in	 the	 Lords	 but	 not	 the	Commons,	 and	 that	 the	 devolved	 assemblies	 have	 better	 rules	 than	Westminster.	If	politicians	are	serious	about	cleaning	up	politics,	they	need	to	close	the	lobbying	loopholes	that	open	the	door	to	corruption.		 According	 to	 Transparency	 International,	 within	 the	 UK	 Parliament	 and	Assemblies,	 the	House	of	Commons	had	the	weakest	rules	to	tackle	 illegal	 lobbying.	Nonetheless,	a	wide	range	of	information	to	prevent	conflict	of	interests	and	abuse	in	lobbying	was	available,	giving	the	illusion	that	a	regime	to	prevent	conflict	of	interest	and	lobbying	was	in	place.		 There	must	remain	doubt,	however,	that	simply	shedding	light	–	however	comprehensively	–	on	the	subject	matter,	timing	and	content	of	meetings,	or	even	the	financial	rewards	to	lobbying	companies	that	flow	from	it,	will	ever	get	ahead	of	public	and	media	scepticism	about	the	purpose	and	the	effect	 of	 lobbying.	 […]	 A	 rise	 in	 use	 of	 information	 about	 lobbying,	therefore,	will	probably	not	create	any	parallel	 rise	 in	public	 trust	and	confidence.	(Hine	and	Peel,	2016,	p.	213)		
	
Conclusion	The	two	case	studies	narrated	in	this	chapter	share	a	number	of	similarities.	Both	cases	feature	 similar	 structures	 of	 disclosed	 information	 and	 type	 of	 drivers,	 targets,	beneficiaries	and	intermediaries	involved	in	the	processes.	In	both	RTPs,	the	primary	beneficiaries	are	argued	to	be	citizens,	given	that,	in	theory,	transparency	is	a	tool	to	better	 governance,	which,	 in	 the	 logic	 of	 control,	 restrain	 the	 behaviour	 of	 specific	targets	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 more	 robust	 democracy	 by	 threatening	 to	 and	 exposing	mismanagement.	 The	 main	 drivers	 of	 disclosure	 in	 both	 cases	 are	 journalists	 and	politicians	themselves,	and	the	targets	of	disclosure	are	MPs	and	their	behaviours	in	their	official	capacities.	This	 last	point	puts	 the	 two	cases	under	 the	category	of	 the	control	logic	of	transparency,	and	emphasises	the	potential	difficulties	associated	with	self-regulation,	especially	when	influential	politicians	are	both	the	targets	and	at	the	same	time	opponents	of	disclosure.		
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While	public	attention	played	a	role	in	influencing	the	way	the	House	dealt	with	both	 the	 expenses	 and	 conflict	 of	 interest	 and	 lobbying	 scandals,	 this	 was	 largely	thanks	 to	 the	 resilience	 and	 institutional	 power	 and	 capacity	 of	 key	 drivers,	 in	particular	the	media	organisations	that	pursued	and	broke	the	stories,	rather	than	high	usage	of	 the	disclosed	data	by	 individual	citizens.	Finally,	we	can	argue	that	 in	both	cases,	 the	targets	ultimately	promoted	regulatory	transparency	over	other	available	methods	of	more	direct	and	stringent	regulation.	That	being	said,	they	were	much	more	openly	resistant	to	transparency	in	the	first	case	than	in	the	second	one.	While	in	both	cases,	the	RTPs	expanded	over	time,	this	difference	of	intensity	had	a	profound	impact	on	the	way	this	expansion	occurred.	In	 other	 words,	 the	 two	 RTPs	 reveal	 significantly	 different	 ways	 towards	expansion	 when	 the	 target	 of	 disclosure	 has	 a	 high	 or	 low	 intensity	 towards	information	disclosure.	In	the	case	of	MPs	expenses,	politicians	displayed	a	high	level	of	resistance	to	transparency,	working	to	challenge,	block,	limit,	delay	or	influence	the	process	of	disclosure	within	the	constraints	of	the	law,	their	public	reputation	and	the	prevailing	 social	 norms.	 This	 might	 explain	 why	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 Register	 of	Members’	 Allowances	 occurred	 exclusively	 by	 means	 of	 exogenously	 sourced	punctuations	 or	 shocks	 before	 IPSA	 became	 responsible	 for	 it.	While	 this	 does	 not	mean	that	the	Register	of	Members’	Allowances	and	Expenses	could	not	have	evolved	incrementally	in	the	absence	of	the	expenses	scandal,	it	is	simply	the	case	that	what	triggered	 the	 impetus	 for	 extension	 were	 leaked	 reports	 from	 the	 media,	 that	corroborated	existing	suspicions	from	media	itself	and	from	the	public,	together	with	FoI	requests	submitted	by	journalists,	which	brought	to	public	view	previously	unseen	details	of	MPs	expenditures,	immediately	catching	the	public’s	attention.	In	this	case,	not	only	 the	 targets,	 but	 also	 the	drivers	 and	 intermediaries	of	 the	RTP	had	 strong	institutional	power	to	pursue	openness,	making	the	way	towards	the	adoption	of	the	Register	 significantly	 contested.	 For	 political	 purposes,	 the	 members	 of	 the	 House	ultimately	 agreed	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 independent	 body,	 IPSA,	 that	 expanded	 the	Register	to	periodically	publish	updated	information	of	the	same	class	of	information	shared	with	the	public	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis.	Conversely,	in	the	case	of	the	incremental	trajectory	of	regulatory	transparency	of	conflict	of	interest	and	lobbying,	as	both	drivers	and	targets	at	the	same	time,	MPs	had	the	opportunity	 to	design	the	regulatory	transparency	mechanisms	themselves.	There	were	several	reasons	 for	why	this	was	the	case.	Unlike	 the	expenses	scandal,	which	 implicated	a	very	 large	number	of	MPs,	 the	 lobbying	controversies	touched	a	relatively	limited	number	of	MPs	per	crises.	Furthermore,	while	in	the	case	of	expenses	the	normative	standards	of	good	behaviour	and	the	right	to	know	(Layer	1)	seemed	
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rather	obvious	and	widely	shared,	in	the	case	of	lobbying	the	distinction	between	good	and	bad	practice	was	blurrier	and	harder	to	associate	with	by	the	wider	public.	This	meant	the	scandals	in	this	case	were	less	severe,	for	being	supported	by	less	shared	principles	and	norms	in	society	(Layers	1	and	2),	and	therefore	the	manoeuvring	space	of	 the	 MPs	 more	 extensive.	 MPs	 preferred	 to	 adopt	 RTP	 in	 the	 case	 of	 lobbying	regulation,	because	they	saw	it	as	a	less	intrusive	response,	whose	design	they	could	control.	 This	 seems	 to	 validate	 concerns	 that,	 despite	 in	 cases	 having	 a	 powerful	regulatory	 potential,	 transparency,	 especially	when	 applied	 selectively,	may	 not	 be	sufficient	 to	 change	 the	 overall	 behaviour	 of	 politicians	 (Lindstedt,	 2010;	Vargovčíková,	2015).	Related	to	this	last	point,	we	should	identify	the	specific	value	(Layer	1)	furthered	by	transparency	in	the	two	RTPs,	both	increasing	the	support	for	their	adoption	but	also	 for	 their	 sustainability	 overtime.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 MPs	 expenditures,	 the	 value	furthered	by	transparency	is	that	of	democratisation,	public	accountability	and	public	interest,	while	the	regulatory	objective	of	disclosure	may	look	limited	and	secondary.	In	the	case	of	lobbying,	MPs	willingly	adopted	transparency	primarily	as	a	regulatory	mechanism,	not	so	much	because	of	public	interest.	Lobbying	is	a	difficult	activity	to	regulate.	It	is	not	necessarily	a	bad	practice	in	itself;	on	the	contrary,	when	not	abused,	lobbying	can	be	seen	as	a	pillar	of	representative	democracy,	 just	 like	 transparency	itself.		
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Comparative	Analysis:		
The	Brazilian	and	the	UK	cases	in	the	logic	of	control	
		The	 cases	 analysed	 in	 Chapters	 2	 and	3	narrated	how	 transparency	was	 adopted	 to	control	the	activities	and	behaviours	of	politicians	and	bureaucrats	specifically	in	order	to	avoid	and	reduce	abuses	and	excesses.	In	these	cases,	it	is	argued	that	the	eyes	of	the	public	can	serve	as	a	control	mechanism	on	the	actions	of	those	who	govern	them.	For	fulfilling	the	purpose	of	limiting	the	power	of	those	in	government,	the	disclosures	in	these	cases	are	often	related	to	ideas	of	liberal	democracy,	and	of	citizens’	right	to	know	and	 the	 corresponding	 governments’	 duty	 of	 transparency,	 which	 have	 become	themselves	directly	associated	with	more	robust	democracies.	These	are	the	values	of	Layer	1	that	are	reflected	in	many	of	the	arguments	that	supported	the	expansion	of	the	RTPs	studied	in	this	Part	of	the	thesis.	In	 spite	 of	 being	 initially	 pushed	 and	 supported	 by	 the	 same	 normative	 and	institutional	contexts	(Layers	1	and	2),	the	type	of	change	and	trajectory	observed	for	the	 Brazilian	 Transparency	 Portal,	 covered	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 differs	 from	 the	 cases	 in	Chapter	3.	As	suggested	in	the	narrative	of	the	case,	this	is	because	the	driver	in	this	case	was	an	external	actor	with	an	auditing	mandate	and	a	clear	set	of	objectives	and	benefits	for	making	information	publicly	available.	Moreover,	because	the	CGU	had	institutional	access	to	public	data,	its	intensity	to	push	for	transparency	was	mostly	dependent	on	its	willingness.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 as	 the	 case	 showed,	 the	 ability	 of	 targets	 to	 oppose	transparency	was	relatively	low.	This	is,	first,	because	the	information	disclosed	by	the	CGU	is	a	detailed	part	of	government	expenditures	and	falls	into	the	category	of	public	interest	and	citizens’	right	to	know,	which	is	often	difficult	to	oppose,	as	corroborated	by	the	disclosure	of	information	about	public	officials’	wages	and	official	apartments.	Second,	because	 the	 information	periodically	released	by	 the	Portal	also	empowered	beneficiaries	and	intermediaries,	and	at	times	was	even	proposed	by	them.	In	theory,	the	higher	the	use	of	information	by	users	and	intermediaries,	stronger	the	incentive	of	CGU	to	disclose	information,	as	it	also	increased	the	chances	of	fire	alarms.	This	case	is	illustrated	in	Table	I.1.					
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Table	I.1.	Trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	Control	Logic			 												Intensity	of	Targets			 												(resistance	to	RTPs)			_____________________________________________					High																									Low			Intensity	of	Driver	(pushing	for	RTPs)		
	
High		
	 	
Expansion	
	Low	 		 		
				The	 type	of	 institutional	 change	observed	 in	 this	 case	 is	 of	 internal	 and	 incremental	change.	This	contrasts	with	the	punctuated	changes	witnessed	in	the	UK	expenses	case.		 One	of	the	relevant	aspects	of	the	logic	of	control	is	the	fact	that	the	targets	of	the	RTPs	can	also	be	the	actors	with	the	institutional	power	(legislative	and/or	regulatory)	to	 regulate	 their	 own	 actions	 and	 behaviours.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 drivers	 have	significant	 influence	 over	 the	 scope	 and	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 RTPs	 that	 they	 enact,	especially	when	the	beneficiaries	or	intermediaries	of	the	RTPs	are	not	entrusted	with	institutional	 power	 nor	 collectively	 organised	 to	 contest	 such	 choices.	 In	 such	circumstances,	acting	as	both	the	drivers	and	the	targets	of	disclosure,	politicians	can	negotiate	 and	 agree	 on	 the	 type	 and	 scope	 of	 the	 data	 to	 be	 disclosed.	 One	 of	 the	potential	outcomes	of	such	distribution	of	power	is	‘selective	transparency’.	Selectivity	is	not	a	problem	per	se;	nor	can	it	be	fully	avoided	in	the	case	of	RTPs.	However,	in	the	control	logic,	it	can	imply	that	politicians	hand-pick	data	that	is	not	compromising	(or	minimally	 compromising)	 of	 their	 past	 and	 future	 behaviour	 while	 they	 can	 leave	important	information	outside	the	light	of	public	scrutiny.		 This	duality	of	roles	is	visible	in	Chapter	3,	both	in	the	UK	expenses	and	lobbying	cases.	In	the	case	of	the	MPs’	Expenses’	Scheme,	before	the	FoIA	entered	into	full	force	in	2005,	MPs	agreed	on	a	minimum	 level	of	 information	on	expenses	 that	was	 to	be	
Increasing	use	of	information	
by	intermediaries/	
beneficiaries	
Increasing	use	of	information	by	intermediaries/	beneficiaries		
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disclosed	as	part	of	the	Publication	Scheme.	The	data	disclosed	at	the	time	did	not	cause	controversies	 or	 scandals,	 as	 it	 did	 not	 include	 the	 detailed	 information	 that	 later	revealed	 the	misconduct	 of	MPs.	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 lobbying	 regulation	 in	 the	House	 of	 Commons,	 MPs	 have	 incrementally	 expanded	 the	 Members’	 Register	 of	Financial	Interests.	In	this	case,	however,	although	the	disclosed	information	was	based	on	consensual	agreements	among	MPs	as	the	more	proportional	and	preferable	option	among	other	regulatory	solutions,	expansion	has	often	been	in	the	aftermath	of	cases	of	individual	 illegal	 lobbying	uncovered	by	 the	media.	This	 suggests	 that	 in	 the	 control	logic	where	the	drivers	are	also	the	targets	of	the	RTPs,	the	initial	push	for	change	can	be	expected	to	come	as	an	external	shock	or	crisis	that	strongly	increase	the	incentives	of	politicians	 to	 take	action	 reactively.	However,	 the	 reasons	 for	politicians	 to	 adopt	RTPs	are	not	limited	to	issues	of	trust;	other	reasons	can	include	overseeing	their	peers,	for	example.		 Based	on	the	discussion	above,	the	two	trajectories	that	RTPs	in	the	control	logic	can	be	expected	to	follow	are	illustrated	in	Table	8.1.	The	first	case	reflected	on	the	table	is	that	of	UK	lobbying,	in	bold,	where	there	is	little	resistance	from	politicians	towards	disclosure	for	reasons	explained	above.	The	second	case	refers	to	the	re-adoption	of	de	
minimis	 clause,	 indicating	 the	 amount	 below	which	MPs	were	 not	 obliged	 to	 report	expenses,	 after	 it	was	 scrapped	 in	 the	midst	of	 the	MPs	expenses	 scandal.	While	 the	clause	was	dropped	as	part	of	their	response	to	a	public	outcry,	following	the	scandal	the	 House	 debated	 on	 it	 again	 and	 agreed	 to	 re-adopt	 it.	 As	 this	 thesis	 was	 being	finalised,	on	March	2017,	IPSA	decided	to	stop	publishing	information	about	the	places	MPs	travelled	to	or	from	when	they	claimed	mileage	and	the	names	of	MPs’	landlords.	The	decision	followed	increased	concern	with	MPs’	safety	after	the	murder	of	Labour	MP	Jo	Cox	in	2016	and	a	terror	attack	in	Westminster	earlier	in	the	month.75	Therefore,	although	the	example	of	de	minimis	clause	and	of	MPs’	travel	details	appear	to	be	less	common,	they	also	prove	that	transparency	is	not	the	only	game	in	town	nor	the	only	value	mobilised	from	Layer	1	by	drivers	and	targets	when	deciding	about	the	design	of	the	 RTPs.	 RTPs	 can	 and	 do	 retrench,	 although	 because	 of	 the	 often	 high	 costs	 of	retrenchment,	it	seems	more	common	to	expect	them	to	stagnate,	as	illustrated	in	the	case	underlined	in	Table	I.2	below.				
                                                75	BBC	(2017).	IPSA	to	stop	publishing	MPs'	travel	details	amid	'attack'	fears.	BBC,	30	March.	
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Table	I.2.	Trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	Control	Logic			 												Intensity	of	Politicians	 		 												(Resistance	to	RTP)				 	 	 	 	 _____________________________________________	
High																									Low	 		
				 	The	expected	trajectory	in	the	control	logic	would	be	different	in	the	presence	of	high	intensity	external	drivers	of	disclosure	that	are	not	in	a	position	of	self-regulation.	In	the	existence	of	a	high	intensity	external	driver,	the	expected	trajectory	would	be	towards	expansion	(in	the	case	of	low	resistance	from	targets)	or	contestation	(in	the	case	 of	 high	 resistance).	 The	 former	 case	 relates	 to	 the	 CGU	 and	 the	 Transparency	Portal	in	Brazil.	The	latter	was	the	case	when	journalists	used	the	UK	FoIA	to	request	information	about	MPs’	expenses	and	allowances	beyond	those	defined	by	politicians	at	first	for	composing	the	MPs’	Publication	Scheme.	The	MPs	resisted	disclosure,	but	after	leaks	from	the	media	and	a	long	judicial	battle,	they	were	obliged	to	disclose	more	information	 to	 the	 public.	 Hence,	 the	 RTP	 was	 created	 following	 a	 period	 of	contestation,	 captured	 in	 Table	 8.2	 below,	 after	 which	 its	 trajectory	 was	 mostly	expansive.		 	
	Intensity	of	Politicians	(Pushing	for	RTPs)		
	
High		
		 	Expansion			
Low	
	
(Retrench)		
	
Stagnation	
Increasing	use	of	information	by	intermediaries/	beneficiaries		
Increasing	use	of	information	
by	intermediaries/	
beneficiaries	
 114 
	
Table	I.3.	Trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	Control	Logic			 												Intensity	of	Politicians	 		 												(Resistance	to	RTPs)	 		_____________________________________________	
High																									Low	 	
			 		It	must	 be	 noted	 that	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 control	 logic,	 expansion	means	 the	disclosure	 of	more	 detailed	 information.	 Contestation	 takes	 place	 not	 because	 those	who	demand	more	disclosure	contest	and	disagree	with	the	design	of	the	information	disclosed	(as	will	be	seen	in	the	performance	and	transaction	logics),	but	with	how	much	that	 information	 reveals	 about	 the	 world	 of	 politicians	 and	 bureaucrats.	 Instead	 of	contesting	the	content	or	the	methodology	of	the	existing	information,	beneficiaries	and	intermediaries	 request	 more	 information.	 In	 this	 regard,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 MPs’	expenses,	 as	 soon	 as	 an	 independent	 judicial	 body	 ruled	 for	 greater	 disclosure,	contestation	gave	way	to	expansion	and,	eventually,	as	the	media	did	not	drive	for	new	information,	to	stagnation.	Finally,	the	case	studies	in	Chapters	2	and	3	show	that	once	a	set	of	information	in	the	control	 logic	 is	published,	 they	 tend	not	 to	 retrench	or	 to	 just	partially	 retrench.	However,	following	episodes	of	expansion,	very	often	the	trajectory	of	the	RTP	can	turn	to	 stagnation.	 Stagnation	 can	 happen	 under	 three	 scenarios.	 First,	 once	 the	 driver	succeeds	in	guaranteeing	the	disclosure	of	the	information	it	had	pushed	for,	it	may	no	longer	feel	the	need	to	fight	for	further	disclosure.	At	the	same	time,	because	the	target	
	Intensity	of	External	Drivers	(Pushing	for	RTPs)		
	
High	
	
	
Contestation	
		
	Low	 			
		
Increasing	use	of	information	
by	intermediaries/	
beneficiaries	
Increasing	use	of	information	by	intermediaries/	beneficiaries		
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adapts	its	behaviour	in	relation	to	the	new	information	available,	it	lowers	its	intensity	to	resist.	A	second	scenario	is	where	the	target	would	still	prefer	to	oppose	the	RTP,	but	the	information	disclosed	is	used	by	intermediaries	and/or	beneficiaries,	or	at	least	the	target	assumes	this	is	the	case.	Last	scenario	is	that	in	which	the	disclosed	information	becomes	a	social	norm,	and	none	of	the	actors	expects	secrecy.					 	
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PART	II.	
THE	LOGIC	OF	PERFORMANCE	
				The	 performance	 logic	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	 refers	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	performance	 information	 of	 decentralised	 policy	 units,	 in	 the	 expectation	 that	 such	disclosures	will	influence	these	units	to	adhere	to	the	published	performance	standards	and	goals,	through	the	mechanisms	and	underlying	logics	explained	in	Chapter	1.	The	two	chapters	in	this	part	analyse	the	regulatory	transparency	policies	adopted	in	Brazil	and	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	relation	to	secondary	schools.	Although	both	countries	publish	the	schools’	performance	results,	the	cases	present	an	important	difference.	As	shown	in	Chapter	4,	there	is	no	school	choice	in	Brazil	in	the	public	sector	and,	therefore,	the	disclosure	of	school	performances	is	justified	based	on	its	expectation	to	inform	and,	therefore,	engage	society	in	the	debate	about	the	quality	of	education	and	the	hope	that	it	would	prompt	citizens	to	question	and	support	the	managers	of	individual	schools	in	improving	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 service	 provided.	 Chapter	 5	 traces	 the	 creation	 and	trajectory	of	the	disclosure	of	secondary	school	performance	tables	in	England,	where	there	is	school	choice.	In	spite	of	such	a	notable	difference,	the	trajectory	of	both	RTPs	follow	a	parallel	pattern	–	that	of	contestation	–	in	which	the	driver	of	the	RTP,	i.e.	central	government,	is	often	and	incrementally	promoting	changes	to	the	policies,	both	to	reflect	its	own	ideas	and	regulatory	purposes	and	to	accommodate	demands	from	society.					 	
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CHAPTER	4:	
DISCLOSURE	OF	SECONDARY	SCHOOL	PERFORMANCE	IN	BRAZIL	
	
	 Even	 if	 MEC	 [Ministry	 of	 Education]	 publishes	the	 index	 in	 the	media,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 raise	better	 awareness	 of	 Prova	 Brasil	 inside	 the	schools,	 [on]	 how	 the	 process	 takes	 place,	 how	the	 index	 is	 calculated,	 [how	 to]	 make	 use	 of	MEC’s	guidelines,	[how	to]	articulate	the	results	with	every	school’s	syllabus	in	order	to	introduce	these	with	quality	to	students.	(Municipal	school	coordinator,	2013)76	In	 every	 area,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 promote	accountability.	Why	should	 it	not	be	the	case	 in	education?	[…]	One	can	make	a	pro-mobilisation	discourse.	 We	 tried	 to	 make	 that	 discourse.	(Former	 president	 of	 the	 National	 Institute	 of	Education	 Studies	 and	 Research,	 Reynaldo	Fernandes,	2015)77		Unlike	several	other	countries	that	also	promote	transparency	of	school	performance	indicators,	such	as	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States	or	Chile,	in	Brazil	there	is	no	school	choice	in	the	public	system	of	education.78	Because	of	this,	the	justification	for	performance	transparency	in	Brazil	is	limited	to	its	potential	to	boost	improvements	of	performance	–	through	raising	awareness	of	schools	of	their	performance	deficiencies	and/or	 fostering	 competition	 among	 them	 for	 better	 positions	 in	 rankings	 –	 and,	 as	argued	by	many,	 to	promote	accountability,	which	 carries	a	 strong	normative	weight	(grounded	in	Layer	1).	Increasing	performance	through	transparency	can	take	place	in	two	ways.	First	is	when	subnational	policy	units	(the	targets	of	regulatory	transparency)	act	 as	 if	 they	 had	 received	 signals	 given	 by	 parents,	 the	 educational	 community,	 the	media	 and	 alike	 (beneficiaries	 and	 intermediaries)	 about	 the	 school’s	 performance	regardless	of	whether	these	signals	were	in	practice	sent	(Meijer,	2007).	The	second	way	is	based	on	Hirschman	(1970)	and	suggests	that	in	the	absence	of	an	exit	option	(opting	out	of	a	company,	product	or	service	–	in	this	case,	a	school	–	because	of	performance	
                                                76	Melo,	2014	77	Fernandes,	R.	(2015)	Interview	on	10	July	2015.	[My	translation;	recording	in	my	possession]	78	The	municipality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	is	an	exception	in	this	regard.	
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issues	without	making	an	effort	to	improve	it),	voice	is	likely	to	increase	(complaining	about	an	existing	problem	and	trying	to	remedy	the	defects).	The	performance	logic	of	transparency	in	play	in	this	case	is	expected	to	offer	a	different	 set	 of	 operational	 dynamics	 than	 those	 observed	 in	 the	 control	 logic,	 in	particular	with	regards	to	the	nature	of	actors’	interactions.	Since	an	RTP	in	this	logic	is	primarily	 used	 to	 regulate	 the	 goals	 of	 subnational	 units	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 central	government’s	relationship	with	subnational	units,	the	engagement	of	beneficiaries	may	be	less	central	to	the	outcome.	The	main	focus,	rather,	will	be	on	the	targets’	capacity	and	willingness	to	comply	with	the	goals	of	the	RTP.	The	 mandate	 and	 management	 of	 primary	 and	 secondary	 schools	 in	 Brazil	 is	mainly	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 states	 and	 municipalities.	 The	 formal	 responsibilities	 of	 the	federal	government,	which	publishes	 the	performance	data	of	schools,	municipalities	and	states,	 include	coordination	and	monitoring	of	the	national	system.	Among	these	responsibilities	are	elaborating	the	National	Education	Plan	with	the	support	of	states	and	municipalities,	providing	technical	and	financial	assistance	at	the	subnational	levels,	defining	 the	 goals	 and	 guidelines	 to	 primary	 and	 secondary	 education	 with	 the	contribution	of	states	and	municipalities,	and	ensuring	national	evaluations	of	student	performances,	 in	order	 to	 inform	the	definition	of	priorities	and	 the	 improvement	of	service	 quality.	 Transparency	 of	 secondary	 schools’	 performance	 was	 introduced	 in	2006,	under	the	Labour	Government	of	Lula	da	Silva	and	was	subject	to	changes	in	the	course	of	the	following	decade.	This	 chapter	 follows	 the	 creation	 and	 trajectory	 of	 performance	 indicators,	adopted	to	assess	the	quality	of	education	provided	in	secondary	schools	 in	Brazil.	 It	traces	both	the	origins	and	the	evolution	of	the	RTP	over	a	period	of	a	decade,	starting	in	2005.	In	particular,	I	focus	on	two	main	components	of	the	RTP	–	Prova	Brasil	and	Ideb	 –	 which	 display	 different	 evolutionary	 patterns,	 due	 to	 divergent	 levels	 of	resistance	from	targets	and,	in	particular,	highly	engaged	intermediaries.				
1.	Socio-Political	and	Institutional	Context	The	creation	of	 the	national	exams	in	Brazil	 is	a	result	of	 two	processes:	 first,	on	the	national	 level,	 the	 reorganisation	 of	 the	 education	 system	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	enactment	of	the	last	Constitution,	and	second,	on	the	international	level,	the	emergence	of	national	exams	as	a	consolidated	tendency.	The	1988	Federal	Constitution	of	Brazil	defined	 ‘quality’	 as	 one	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 education.	 In	 1996,	 Constitutional	
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Amendment	14	attributed	to	the	federal	government	the	duty	of	ensuring	a	minimum	quality	standard.	Whereas	the	literature	is	limited	on	the	influence	of	civil	society	and	the	 legislative	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	National	 System	 for	 Assessment	 of	 Basic	 Public	Schools	(Sistema	Nacional	de	Avaliação	do	Ensino	Público	-	SAEP),	the	role	of	the	Federal	Constitution	and	the	World	Bank	(WB)	in	its	creation	has	been	comprehensively	studied.	At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 WB	 advised	 the	 Brazilian	government	 to	 start	 measuring	 the	 quality	 of	 education	 for	 the	 Northeast	 Project	(Projeto	 Nordeste),	 adopted	 as	 part	 of	 the	 VI	 Agreement	 between	 the	 Ministry	 of	Education	 (Ministério	 da	 Educação	 –	 MEC)	 and	 the	 International	 Bank	 for	Reconstruction	 and	 Development.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 negotiations	 between	 the	 two	institutions,	in	1988	the	Ministry	of	Education	created	and	adopted	a	pilot	of	SAEP	in	the	states	of	Paraná	and	Rio	Grande	do	Norte	to	test	the	adequacy	and	applicability	of	the	exam.	After	 this	pilot,	 in	1990	 the	 federal	government	designed	and	adopted	 the	System	for	Assessment	of	Basic	Education	(Sistema	de	Avaliação	da	Educação	Básica	-	SAEB),	introduced	in	cycles.		Each	cycle	of	SAEB	increased	the	depth	of	information	that	the	federal	government	obtained	from	the	subnational	units.	The	objective	of	the	first	cycle	was	to	improve	the	evaluative	capacity	of	the	education	management	units,	i.e.	MEC	and	state	and	municipal	agencies,	 across	 the	 nation.	 In	 1992,	 the	National	 Institute	 of	 Education	 Studies	 and	Research	Anıśio	Teixeira	(Instituto	Nacional	de	Estudos	e	Pesquisas	Educacionais	Anıśio	Teixeira	–	INEP),	an	entity	linked	to	MEC,	was	given	the	mandate	to	conduct	the	national	assessment	of	 the	education	system.	SAEB’	 second	cycle,	 launched	 in	1993,	aimed	at	providing	 information	 to	 support	 education	 policies,	 coinciding	with	 the	 period	 that	Brazilian	 states	 started	 developing	 their	 own	 evaluations,	 adding	 another	 level	 of	regulation	that	was	more	region-focused	and	aligned	with	states’	policies	(Bonamino,	2002).	 Both	 cycles	 were	 organised	 in	 coordination	 with	 subnational	 units	 and	emphasised	 the	 pedagogic	 and	 managerial	 practices	 of	 local	 and	 state	 school	management.		In	the	first	two	cycles	of	SAEB,	the	exams	included	samples	of	students	from	the	1st,	3rd,	5th	and	7th	grades	of	fundamental	education,	who	responded	to	questions	aimed	at	measuring	knowledge	in	reading	skills,	mathematics	and	science.	In	the	first	cycle,	schools	also	responded	 to	contextual	 tests,	which	contained	questions	about	policies	adopted	 by	 states	 and	 municipalities	 towards	 fostering	 the	 universalisation	 of	education,	 democratisation	 of	 management	 and	 information	 regarding	 teaching	conditions	and	competencies	(Bonamino	and	Franco,	1999).	The	second	cycle	included	a	significant	number	of	contextual	questions	about	the	work	condition	and	capacity	of	teachers	 and	 the	 management	 of	 schools,	 including	 existing	 equipment,	 activities	
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developed	 by	 the	 school	 and	 the	 management	 style	 of	 directors.	 These	 two	 cycles	reflected	 an	 interest	 in	 diagnosing	 the	 effect	 of	 intra-school	 indicators	 in	 the	performance	of	students,	in	a	dynamic	that	tried	to	increase	the	federal	government’s	level	of	knowledge	about	education	beyond	the	previously	available	data.	Shortly	 before	 the	 end	 of	 President	 Itamar	 Franco’s	 government	 in	 December	1994,	his	Minister	of	Education	Murillo	A.	Hingel	institutionalised	SAEB	as	the	national	education	exam,	highlighting	that	effective	outcomes	in	the	education	sector	required	permanent	 monitoring,	 and	 that	 the	 evaluative	 process	 had	 to	 be	 systematically	organised,	 involving	 all	 levels	 of	 government,	 universities	 and	 research	 centres,	 and	finally	 that	 information	should	be	publicly	available	 to	ensure	 the	participation	of	all	members	of	society.79		In	1995,	when	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	of	the	Brazilian	Social	Democrat	Party	succeeded	 Franco	 as	 president,	 he	 expanded	 the	 scope	 of	 SAEB.	 The	 president	 to	undertake	the	most	comprehensive	administrative	and	liberalisation	reforms	in	Brazil	since	the	re-democratisation	period,	Cardoso	shared	the	view	of	the	World	Bank	that	the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 should	 define	 and	 control	 the	 goals	 of	 evaluation	 and	commission	its	execution.	This	policy	was	adopted	for	the	1995	exam	and	financed	by	the	WB.	 Besides	 including	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 profile	 of	 students,	another	 change	 introduced	 to	 the	 1995	 SAEB	 exam	 was	 the	 centralisation	 of	 its	conceptualisation	and	execution	at	the	level	of	the	federal	government.	From	that	year	onwards,	SAEB	was	adopted	as	a	biannual	exam	assessing	the	performance	of	students	of	the	public	and	private	systems	in	the	last	grades	of	primary	and	secondary	education,	of	urban	and	rural	areas,	in	sample	surveys.80	Until	 2005,	 SAEB	 filled	 the	 role	 of	 informing	 the	 design	 and	 reformulation	 of	policies.	Several	programs	were	designed	at	the	federal	level	based	on	SAEB	results	and	in	an	attempt	to	improve	the	quality	of	primary	and	secondary	education.	These	include	the	National	Programme	Library	at	School	(Programa	Nacional	Biblioteca	na	Escola),	Programme	for	Training	current	Teachers	(Programa	de	Formação	de	Professores	em	Exercıćio),	 National	 Network	 for	 Permanent	 Training	 of	 Teachers	 (Rede	Nacional	 de	Formação	Continuada	de	Professores),	and	Programme	to	Support	Municipal	Education	
                                                79	Portaria	1,795/1994	80	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Cardoso	 government,	 a	 study	 commissioned	 by	 an	 educational	government	body	concluded	that	the	abilities	taught	across	states	were	significantly	different	in	the	four	sampled	grades,	less	so	in	the	last	years	of	primary	and	secondary	education;	that	the	use	of	different	statistical	methods	could	provide	further	information	without	increasing	the	number	 of	 questions	 students	 had	 to	 respond;	 and	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 increase	 the	comparability	 of	 exams	 throughout	 years	 and	 among	 the	 grades	 assessed.	 This	 research	informed	part	of	the	changes	during	President	Cardoso’s	term.	
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Administrators	(Programa	de	Apoio	aos	Dirigentes	Municipais	de	Educação).	In	2005,	under	the	government	of	President	Lula	da	Silva	of	the	Brazilian	Labour	Party,	SAEB	expanded	to	became	the	Evaluative	System	of	Basic	Education	(Sistema	de	Avaliação	 da	 Educação	 Básica	 -	 SAEB),	which	 comprised	 of	 two	 national	 exams:	 the	National	Assessment	of	Basic	Education	(Avaliação	Nacional	da	Educação	Básica)	and	the	National	Assessment	of	Education	Performance	(Avaliação	Nacional	do	Rendimento	Escolar	–	Prova	Brasil).	Both	exams	were	national,	standardised,	biannual,	accompanied	by	 socio-economic	 questionnaires,	 and	 aimed	 at	 assessing	 the	 quality	 of	 education	offered	by	the	Brazilian	education	system.	The	Prova	Brasil	exam	was	applied	to	every	public	school	with	more	than	30	students	(rural	schools	were	included	in	2007).	The	institutionalisation	 of	 this	 exam	was	 justified	 by	 INEP	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 need	 to	supplement	the	information	produced	by	SAEB.81	Moreover,	 in	spite	of	the	success	of	SAEB	in	informing	the	federal	government	and	society	about	the	status	of	the	Brazilian	education	 system,	 it	 had	 proved	 to	 be	 ineffective	 in	 prompting	 the	 decentralised	education	systems	to	formulate	policies	and	increase	the	quality	of	education.			
2.	The	Trajectory	of	Prova	Brasil	and	Ideb		
2.1.	Creation	and	Institutionalisation	of	Prova	Brasil	Prova	Brasil	was	developed	as	a	voluntary	instrument,	with	results	being	published	since	the	 creation	 of	 the	 examination.	 Fernandes	 (2015),	 the	 president	 of	 INEP	 at	 Prova	Brasil’s	 inception,	 suggests	 that	 the	 publication	 of	 Prova	 Brasil’s	 results	 followed	 an	international	 trend	 of	 publishing	 the	 results	 of	 schools’	 individualised	 exam	 results.	Additionally,	because	of	Brazil’s	decentralised	system	of	provision	of	basic	education,	INEP	deemed	it	important	that	those	providing	education	services	had	access	to	exam	results,	 especially	 as	 some	 of	 them	 did	 not	 have	 the	 financial	 means	 or	 capacity	 to	develop	their	own	exams.		Notable	 resistance	 to	 Prova	 Brasil	 came	 from	 some	 educators	 and	 experts	 of	education	 assessments	 (intermediaries)	 who	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 not	 statistically	necessary	for	all	schools	across	the	country	to	be	sampled	for	the	government	to	have	a	good	diagnosis	of	the	general	level	of	education.	Therefore,	publication	of	Prova	Brasil’s	information	endured	largely	due	to	the	alleged	accountability	function	it	came	to	serve.	
                                                81	INEP	(2005)	Portaria	931,	21	March	2005	
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Here,	the	normative	weight	of	transparency	and	accountability	arguably	increased	the	institutional	 power	 of	 MEC	 and	 INEP	 (the	 drivers	 of	 RTP)	 to	 push	 for	 regulatory	transparency.	In	the	words	of	Fernandes	(2015):		 The	publication	[of	Prova	Brasil	results]	was	all	negotiated	[with	states	and	municipalities].	 I	 mean,	 not	 negotiated,	 Prova	 Brasil	 is	 voluntary,	 if	 a	municipality	does	not	want	to	adopt	it,	it	will	not	have	its	results	published.	But	what	happened	is	that	nobody	gave	up.	[…]	It	was	hard	to	say	no.	São	Paulo	hesitated,	it	became	[politically]	difficult,	people	said	‘they	are	trying	to	hide’	[the	results].	Everybody	adopted	it.	From	the	political	perspective,	we	did	 encounter	 difficulties,	which	were	 in	 large	 part	 overcome,	 I	 think	often	easier	than	I	had	thought	[it	would	be].	There	are	groups	that	resist	[Prova	 Brasil]	 up	 to	 today.	 These	 groups	 see	 it	 as	 something	 a	 little	Thatcherite	 or	 Reaganite.	 The	 main	 focus	 of	 resistance	 are	 scholars	 of	education.	The	managers	like	it,	especially	if	they	don’t	have	the	means	[to	run	an	 independent	exam].	They	are	upset	sometimes	when	the	numbers	are	published	and	the	results	aren’t	good,	but	they	want	to	see	[the	results],	they	want	it	for	themselves.		As	already	noted,	with	the	exception	of	the	municipality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	school	choice	does	not	exist	 in	the	Brazilian	public	education	system.	Therefore,	the	push	to	disclose	individualised,	structured	and	comparable	data	for	schools	did	not	emerge	as	a	consequence	of	a	system	in	which	parents	needed	information	to	decide	where	to	enrol	their	 children.	 Officials	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	performance	 data	 to	 mobilise	 the	 public	 and	 inform	 members	 of	 the	 education	community	(for	example	directors	and	teachers	at	schools	of	the	municipal	and	state	level)	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 schools	 and	 of	 the	 education	 system.	 Transparency,	 the	government	argued,	aimed	at	wider	civic	participation,	with	the	hope	and	expectation	that,	in	the	absence	of	choice,	published	results	would	lead	parents	to	voice	demands	for	increased	 performance	 in	 their	 children’s	 schools	 (Hirschman,	 1970)	 and	 increase	accountability.	 If	 the	 notion	 of	 accountability	was	 important	 to	 increase	 the	 relative	intensity	of	MEC	and	INEP	in	pushing	towards	disclosure,	and	reduce	that	of	targets,	the	same	idea	applied	for	the	promise	of	increased	performance.	The	results	of	Prova	Brasil	undertaken	in	2005	were	published	in	June	2006,	with	individualised	 scores	 for	 schools,	 municipalities,	 states	 and	 for	 the	 country.	 Every	participating	public	school	received	a	leaflet	with	technical	 information	of	the	exams,	and	 two	 posters,	 one	 with	 general	 information	 about	 the	 exam	 and	 another	 with	performance	 data.82	 The	 latter	 showed	 the	 results	 achieved	 by	 each	 school	 in	
                                                82	Portaria	INEP	69,	dated	4	May	2005,	defined	the	content	of	the	document	sent	to	schools.	
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comparison	 to	 the	municipal,	 state	and	national	averages,	all	 in	comparative	 fashion:	percentages	of	approval,	fail	rates,	and	drop	outs;	the	average	of	daily	hours	taught;	the	percentage	of	teachers	with	higher	education;	and	age	–	grade	distortion.83	The	graphic	and	 illustrative	 format	 chosen	 for	 disclosure	 of	 the	 results	 attempted	 to	 make	 the	information	more	easily	understood	by	 teachers,	 school	directors	and	municipal	and	state	managers.	Despite	INEP’s	consistent	efforts	to	simplify	and	clarify	the	data,	for	instance	by	providing	detailed	explanatory	notes	to	teachers,	individual	school	scores	still	caused	a	degree	 of	 confusion	 among	 the	 targets.	 Based	 on	 Prova	 Brasil,	 INEP	 disclosed	information	 on	 school	 performances	 on	 a	 specific	 webpage,	 along	 with	 data	 of	 the	education	 census	 that	 could	 influence	 the	 quality	 of	 pupil	 and	 school	 performances.	These	included	the	number	of	school	retention	rates	(pass,	fails	and	dropouts),	average	daily	school	hours,	age-grade	distortion	and	the	number	of	teachers	with	high	education.	Lacerda	(2015)	suggested	that	the	published	data	was	too	technical:	“The	debate,	using	SAEB’s	scale,	was	always	very	difficult	[to	promote].	A	score	of	150	and	that	is	more	than	a	hundred,	but	the	measure	goes	up	to	525.	These	are	scales	that	are	technical,	but	not	popular”.84	However,	the	decision	not	to	employ	scales	preferred	and	routinely	used	by	teachers,	 e.g.	 from	zero	 to	10	or	 zero	 to	100,	had	been	a	deliberate	one.	 It	meant	 to	highlight	the	differences	between	the	design	of	performance	ratings	and	exams	used	in	school,	where,	for	instance,	not	every	question	would	be	weighed	equally	according	to	the	item	response	theory	(Fontanive,	Elliot,	and	Klein,	2007).	A	first	expected	consequence	of	the	transparency	of	school	results	on	Prova	Brasil	was	 increased	 pressure	 on	 school	 directors	 and	 politicians	 on	 subnational	 levels	 to	improve	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 schools	 under	 their	management.	 Then	Minister	 of	Education,	Fernando	Haddad,	spoke	about	the	role	that	Prova	Brasil	played	in	fostering	schools	to	improve	their	performance:		 The	data	is	important	for	everybody	to	define	their	performance	goals	for	the	 next	 edition	 of	 Prova	 Brasil.	 The	 innovation	 of	 this	 program	 is	 to	transform	 an	 evaluation	 considered	 passive	 to	 one	 that	 can	mobilise	 the	education	 community.	 We	 are	 supporting	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	evaluation,	 because	 it	 will	 increase	 the	 level	 of	 responsibility	 and	commitment,	 and	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 people	 engaged	 in	 achieving	quality	goals.	(Faria,	2006)		
                                                83	See	Appendix	III	for	an	example	of	the	mentioned	leaflets.	84	Lacerda,	M.	P.	(2015)	Interview	on	8	July	2015.	[My	translation;	recording	in	my	possession.]	
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Fernandes	 (2015)	 similarly	 explained	 how	 transparency	 could	 allegedly	 lead	school	managers	to	try	to	reach	higher	compliance	when	performance	indicators	were	defined	at	the	federal	level:		 People	often	confuse	responsiveness	with	fault.	That	was	not	the	point.	We	showed	that	the	performance	of	students	in	one	school	was	worse	than	in	others.	Managers	may	have	good	explanations	for	that,	for	example	the	area	may	be	 very	 violent	 and	 schools	 are	 constantly	 closing.	But	 they	have	 to	come	 public	 and	 state	 that.	 And	 then	 they	 have	 to	 try	 to	 improve	 the	performance.		Although	 the	 general	 concept	 of	 performance	 is	 fairly	 uncontroversial,	 what	defines	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 unit	 is	 hardly	 ever	 straightforward	 or	 socio-politically	neutral.	A	performance	indicator	may	emphasise	outcomes	with	or	without	taking	into	account	the	conditions	under	which	they	were	achieved.	It	may	weigh	performance	by	economic	or	social	indicators.	In	doing	so	it	may	use	more	progressive	or	conservative	theories	 and	 criteria.	 Indicators	 can	 respond	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 bureaucracies,	 for	example,	which	may	differ	 from	 those	 of	 citizens	 (Woolum,	2011).	By	deciding	on	 a	specific	 set	 of	 indicators,	 governments	 emphasise	 their	 importance	 and	 validity	 as	proxies	of	 the	practical	performance	of	a	school,	hospital,	prison,	or	any	other	policy	unit.	By	deciding	on	the	transparency	of	such	indicators,	governments	can	manage	to	increase	their	regulatory	influence	over	policy	units.	As	suggested	by	Bevan	and	Hood:	“What’s	measured	is	what	matters”	(2006,	p.	517).	Though	no	study	has	yet	decoupled	the	regulatory	effects	of	Prova	Brasil	from	that	of	the	transparency	of	its	results,	several	articles	have	highlighted	changes	of	teaching	focus	due	to	attempts	of	improved	scores	on	the	exam.	A	research	analysing	the	impact	of	the	exam	in	the	pedagogic	practices	of	Portuguese	language	in	the	municipal	schools	of	Costa	Rica,	in	the	state	of	Mato	Grosso,	concluded	that	although	the	exams	shed	light	to	the	many	aspects	of	education	in	Brazil,	“data	collected	revealed	that	Prova	Brasil	was	more	 characterised	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	 regulation,	 with	 a	 strong	 inductive	 aspect”	(Correa,	2012,	p.	113).	Another	study,	which	evaluated	the	use	of	Prova	Brasil	data	by	the	Education	Secretariat	of	the	Federal	District,	identified	that			 In	 the	 activities	developed	by	 the	 Secretariat	 of	Education	of	 the	Federal	District,	what	prevails	 is	 the	control	of	 the	average	grade	obtained	 in	 the	evaluation	 and	 of	 Ideb	 goals,	 leading	 to	 increased	 competition	 among	schools	and	holding	them	responsible	for	quality	improvement.	When	they	felt	pressured,	the	school	teams	tended	to	standardise	their	pedagogic	work	in	order	to	prepare	the	students	to	the	exam	and	increase	the	position	of	the	
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school	in	the	ranking.	(Oliveira,	2011,	p.	viii)		This	 makes	 explicit	 the	 hierarchical	 position	 in	 which	 Prova	 Brasil	 put	 subnational	schools	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 standards	 defined	 by	 federal	 institutions.	 Applying	Hood’s	typology	of	control	to	discuss	dysfunctionalities	in	public	services	measurement,	Pidd	suggests	that	when	the	staff	works	to	meet	“externally	defined	norms	and	procedures,	then	the	hierarchist	position	seems	the	best	way	to	regard	them.	[…]	It	seems	most	likely	that	a	hierarchist	position	will	apply	in	the	public	sector”	(Pidd,	2005,	p.	491).	In	the	ten	municipalities	of	Ceará	studied	by	Vieira	and	Vidal	there	was	unanimous	acceptance	of	Prova	Brasil	and	its	matrices	as	the	guideline	for	curriculum	proposals	(Vidal	 and	Vieira,	2011,	p.	430).	Ovando	and	Freitas	 (2011,	p.	975)	pointed	out	 that	several	 school	 systems	 used	 the	 result	 of	 the	 exams	 as	 a	managerial	 instrument	 to	improve	 quality	 of	 education.	 The	 authors	 suggested	 that	 in	 most	 of	 these	 school	systems	the	national	exams	were	perceived,	especially,	as	a	regulatory	mechanism	of	the	 federal	government	 to	 control	 and	coordinate	 the	 state	and	municipal	 education	systems.85	 Looking	 at	 ten	 municipalities	 in	 the	 same	 state,	 Ovando	 (2011,	 p.	 96)	concluded	that	the	exams	were	supporting	the	improvement	in	subnational	education,	given	their	inductor,	regulatory,	characteristic.		
2.2.	Creation	and	Institutionalisation	of	Ideb	A	year	after	Prova	Brasil’s	results	were	published	for	the	first	time,	in	his	2006	electoral	campaign,	incumbent	presidential	candidate	Lula	da	Silva	pledged	to	promote	education	in	 cooperation	with	 states	 and	municipalities	 (Camini,	 2010).	 In	 line	with	 this	 goal,	considering	 previous	 government	 plans	 for	 education	 and	 in	 coordination	 with	 a	nationwide	education	movement	entitled	All	for	Education	(Todos	pela	Educação),	the	government	 approved	 the	 Programme	 of	 Commitment	 to	 Goals	 “All	 for	 Education”	(Plano	 de	 Metas	 Compromisso	 Todos	 pela	 Educação).86	 The	 mechanism	institutionalised	further	coordination	and	collaboration	in	promoting	higher	quality	of	education	among	the	federal	government,	subnational	units,	civil	society	and	the	private	sector,	the	last	two	of	which	being	intermediaries.		
                                                85	The	authors	also	explain	that,	in	organising	and	developing	educational	policies,	municipalities	have	taken	into	account	the	national	exams	and	the	monitoring	produced	as	a	result	of	the	routine	access	to	information.	86	Todos	pela	Educação	(All	for	Education	-	TPE)	is	a	movement	created	in	2006,	financed	by	the	private	sector,	with	the	aim	of	bringing	together	stakeholders	of	the	community	to	contribute	for	guaranteeing	quality	in	primary	and	secondary	education	for	all	Brazilian	children	and	youth	by	2022.	
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The	new	index	for	measuring	school	performances,	the	Index	of	Basic	Education	Development,	 known	 as	 Ideb	 (Ijndice	 de	 Desenvolvimento	 da	 Educação	 Básica),	 was	created	 in	 the	 abovementioned	 socio-political	 context.	 Applicable	 to	 primary	 and	secondary	education	and	to	high	schools,	the	index	introduced	a	new	concept	to	define	the	quality	of	education,	which	considered	pupil	retention	rates,	i.e.	rates	of	approval,	failure	and	dropout.	The	inclusion	of	retention	rates	in	the	performance	indicators	did	not	only	follow	demands	from	civil	society,	but	also	of	INEP’s	technical	acknowledgment	of	the	negative	impact	of	persistent	failure	and	retention	of	students,	which	was	on	the	rise	 in	Brazil.	 Furthermore,	 Ideb	 created	 individual	 goals	 for	 all	 the	 targets	 of	 Prova	Brasil’s	disclosure.	“The	idea	[with	the	creation	of	Ideb]”,	argued	Fernandes	(2015),	“was	to	have	a	system	of	targets,	[…]	plans	to	reach	the	targets,	and	to	allow	for	the	analysis	of	what	later	became	PAR	(Plan	for	Articulated	Actions)”.	For	the	calculation	of	Ideb,	INEP	used	biannually	collected	census	data	to	calculate	retention	rates	and	Prova	Brasil	for	student	performances.	A	specific	Ideb	goal	was	set	for	each	school,	municipality,	state	and	for	Brazil,	i.e.	each	school	had	its	own	Ideb	goals	until	2021.	Calculation	of	each	individual	index	was	based	on	data	of	the	2005	exams	and	 defined	 the	 year	 in	 which	 every	 state	 in	 Brazil	 should	 converge	 to	 the	 same	education	 level	 (INEP,	 2007).	 All	 individual	 goals	 were	 defined	 by	 INEP	 based	 on	 a	national	 target,	which	aimed	at	 increasing	 the	quality	of	 education	 to	 the	average	of	OECD	countries	on	PISA	by	the	year	2022.	The	decision	to	set	the	Ideb	goals	until	the	end	of	2021	was	aligned	to	the	date	defined	by	the	movement	All	for	Education,	although	the	specific	goals	of	the	Movement	were	tighter	than	those	set	by	government.	The	short	and	medium	Ideb	goals	for	each	school	and	school	network	were	also	specified	and	were	expected	to	contribute	to	reducing	the	nationwide	inequality	in	education	quality.	Moreover,	instead	of	a	complex	scale	as	used	by	Prova	Brasil	(with	a	range	from	zero	 to	 350	 in	 Portuguese	 and	 to	 375	 in	 Mathematics	 and	 with	 nine	 different	performance	points)	which	many	school	teachers,	directors	and	citizens	claimed	not	to	understand,	 Ideb	provided	a	 simple	 scale	of	 one	 to	 ten,	where	 a	higher	 score	meant	higher	education	quality.	 “The	debate	about	 Ideb	came	 from	this”,	 suggested	Lacerda	(2015),	 “from	 the	 need	 to	 create	 an	 index	 that	was	 understood	 by	 the	 large	 part	 of	society,	that	was	not	limited	to	the	results	of	the	Portuguese	and	Mathematics	tests,	and	that	also	considered	schools	that	failed	students	more,	because	these	are	variables	that	clearly	 influence	 the	 quality	 of	 schools”.	 Publication	 of	 the	 results	 was	 within	 the	mandate	of	 INEP,	but	 creating	awareness	of	 the	 results	became	a	 shared	mandate	of	every	participating	school	and	subnational	unit	in	2007.87	
                                                87	Decree	N.	6,094,	24	April	2007.	
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In	 theory,	 assigning	 every	 school,	 municipality	 and	 state	 with	 a	 unique	 goal,	different	from	one	another,	would	help	foster	comparisons	of	performance	within	each	unit	 over	 time,	 rather	 than	 a	 comparison	 across	 units,	 given	 the	 latter’s	 potentially	problematic	aspects.	By	publishing	schools’	Ideb	goals	INEP	aligned	the	expectation	of	parents	 and	 of	 the	 education	 community	 vis-à-vis	 the	 performance	 that	 they	 should	expect	for	every	unit.	In	practice,	however,	the	performances	of	schools,	municipalities	and	states	were	compared	both	according	to	their	specific	goals	and	relative	to	other	units.		Unlike	 Prova	 Brasil,	 the	 negotiation	 for	 participation	 in	 and	 publication	 of	 the	index’s	results	did	not	prove	to	be	controversial.	First,	Ideb	was	the	indicator	that	would	be	used	by	the	federal	government	for	the	development	and	implementation	of	other	educational	 policies,	 in	 line	 with	 what	 Lula	 da	 Silva	 had	 promised	 in	 his	 political	campaign.	 Second,	 the	 indicator	 for	 individual	 school	 performance	 used	 in	 Ideb	was	Prova	 Brasil,	 which	 was	 already	 adopted,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 implementation	 and	disclosure,	 by	 most	 public	 schools.	 Last,	 Ideb	 had	 been	 adopted	 within	 the	 larger	framework	of	the	Plan	All	for	Education,	by	the	federal	government	in	partnership	with	subnational	 governments	 and	 civil	 society,	which	 provided	 28	 guidelines	 for	 federal	government’s	 financial	 and	 technical	 support	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 education	policies	by	subnational	governments.	Alejandra	Valesco,	Coordinator	of	Movement	All	for	Education,	suggested	that	the	indicator	also	pleased	some	civil	society	organisations		 For	 organisations	 similar	 to	 All	 for	 Education,	 Ideb’s	 creation	 was	 great	news.	It	gave	objectivity	to	the	debate	about	quality	of	education,	it	put	into	discussion	the	logic	of	working	for	certain	results.	[Minister]	Haddad	was	very	much	recognised	for	taking	that	step,	which	was	a	courageous	one.	[…]	Resistance	 came	 more	 from	 those	 that	 thought	 that	 the	 evaluations	themselves	 are	 not	 good	 for	 the	 education	 sector,	 that	 they	 could	 be	demoralising	 for	 the	 teacher,	 and	 in	 this	 regard	 there	 were	 other	intermediary	positions.	[…]	When	one	talks	about	civil	society	it	 is	not	all	one	sided.88		By	mid-2008	 all	 the	 states	 and	 almost	 every	municipality	 (5,563	 out	 of	 5,570)	 had	signed	up	to	Ideb.		After	the	MEC	started	using	Ideb,	 it	detected,	 for	example,	 that	out	of	 the	1,242	municipalities	 with	 the	 lowest	 index,	 none,	 except	 one,	 had	 ever	 benefited	 from	
                                                88	Valesco,	A.	(2015)	Interview	on	22	July	2015.	[My	translation;	recording	in	my	possession.]	
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voluntary	 transfers	 from	 the	 federal	 government.89	According	 to	Lacerda	 (2015),	 the	Secretary	for	Primary	and	Secondary	Education	at	the	MEC	from	June	2007	to	January	2012:		 After	 Ideb,	MEC	started	prioritising	 support	 to	 these	municipalities	 [with	low	 Ideb].	Among	 these	was	one	 [state]	 capital:	Macapá.	Among	 the	 rest,	80%	[of	the	municipalities]	were	in	the	northeast	and	the	remaining	20%	were	distributed	all	over	Brazil.	This	was,	for	me,	the	most	significant	result	of	Ideb,	i.e.	to	have	created	instruments	to	support	municipal	[educational]	management	 […]	 and	 to	 direct	 MEC’s	 policies	 to	 municipalities	 that	 had	worse	results	[in	the	index].	That,	for	me,	is	the	big	result.		In	 its	2007	edition,	Prova	Brasil	 included	rural	schools	(end	of	 the	 first	cycle	of	fundamental	education)	and	expanded	 its	 range	 from	schools	with	a	minimum	of	30	pupils	to	schools	with	a	minimum	of	20.	The	publication	of	Prova	Brasil	results	was	not	allowed	in	a	number	of	cases	for	technical	reasons	(schools	or	municipalities	that	did	not	have	at	least	50%	of	students	participating;	public	schools	with	less	than	20	students	enrolled	in	each	of	the	grades	assessed;	private	schools	that	were	selected	to	be	part	of	a	 sample	 for	 states,	 region	 and	 the	 country	 schools	 that	 opted	 out	 of	 Prova	 Brasil;	schools	with	exclusive	professional	teaching)	and	was	optional	in	two	others	(schools	that	 requested	no	 transparency	of	 the	 results	 for	having	adopted	 the	evening	 school	system	for	fundamental	education	on	the	previous	year;	and,	schools	that	have	less	than	20	students	but	that	participated	in	a	special	edition	of	Prova	Brasil	for	the	purpose	of	gathering	information	for	calculation	of	Ideb).90	These	were	not	evidence	of	the	RTP’s	retraction,	as	some	of	these	measures	were	mere	adaptations	to	a	revised	methodology	of	Ideb.	In	 analysing	 the	 influence	 of	 Ideb	 in	 the	 activities	 of	 schools,	 several	 studies	suggested	 that	 Ideb,	 often	 due	 to	 being	 based	 on	 Prova	 Brasil,	 produced	 regulatory	impacts.	By	 studying	municipal	 schools	 in	Paraiba,	 Silva	 (2012,	p.	12)	 identified	 that	directors	and	teachers	had	a	generally	positive	assessment	of	the	index,	considering	it	an	 instrument	 that	 helped	 to	 improve	 quality	 of	 education	 by	 helping	 schools	 and	teachers	 to	 develop	 actions	 to	 improve	 their	 index.	 The	 study	 identified	 that	 most	
                                                89	A	voluntary	transfer	is	one	that	is	not	constitutionally	or	legally	mandatory	(which	is	the	case	of	those	that	obliged	the	transference	for	the	purchase	of	books,	school	lunch,	transportation).	If	municipalities	or	states	present	a	proposal	to	the	federal	government	and	such	proposal	is	approved,	the	money	is	transferred	for	implementation	of	the	suggested	actions.	90	The	last	case	was	valid	for	the	editions	of	Prova	Brasil	in	2011,	in	accordance	with	Portaria	INEP	N.	403,	October	31st	2011,	and	in	2013,	in	accordance	with	Portaria	INEP	N.	304,	21	June	2013.	
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teachers	and	school	directors	had	a	positive	assessment	of	the	policy	and	thought	that	the	disclosure	of	the	index	helped	to	improve	the	quality	of	education	offered	by	schools.	Another	study	suggested	that	in	São	Desidério	municipality,	in	the	state	of	Bahia,	Ideb	generated	valuable	information	for	schools	and	their	management	boards,	although	it	also	promoted	a	competitive	environment	among	the	municipal	schools	(Melo,	2014).	The	 municipality’s	 mayor	 had	 a	 positive	 view	 of	 the	 exams	 and	 said,	 “we	 made	 an	analysis	of	our	situation,	we	showed	our	failing	rates,	the	index	of	drop-outs,	grades	on	Prova	Brasil,	we	compared	[ourselves]	with	other	municipalities,	proving	our	reality	and	showing	that	it	was	possible	[to	improve	performance].”	It	 might	 be	 useful	 to	 compare	 the	 regulatory	 purpose	 and	 outcomes	 of	 the	disclosure	of	Ideb	scores	with	a	parallel	initiative	also	undertaken	by	INEP	that	did	not	involve	disclosure.	In	2007,	INEP	created	an	external	exam,	known	as	the	Brazil	Little	Exam	(Provinha	Brasil),	in	order	to	measure	the	literacy	levels	in	the	second	grade	of	primary	school.	The	results	of	this	exam	were	not	publicised;	they	were	meant	solely	for	purpose	 of	 keeping	 school	 teachers	 and	 administrations	 informed	 of	 the	 changing	literacy	levels	of	their	students.	The	exam	was	developed	in	order	to	support	the	goal	of	the	Plan	All	for	Education,	which	stated	that	every	child	should	be	literate	by	the	age	of	eight.	Non-disclosure	was	a	deliberate	decision	by	the	government,	as	transparency	was	not	deemed	to	contribute	to	this	larger	purpose.	Lacerda	(2015)	stated	that		 There	was	a	firm	position	by	my	team	not	to	disclose	the	results	of	Provinha	Brasil.	If	we	did,	Provinha	Brasil	would	lose	its	characteristic	of	instructing	teachers.	 It	 is	an	 instrument	 for	 teachers	 to	know	how	their	students	are	doing	in	the	beginning	of	the	year	and	what	they	could	and	should	do	in	that	year	to	guarantee	to	each	student	the	necessary	learning	during	the	period	when	 they	 are	 becoming	 literate.	 If	 the	 results	 started	 being	 published,	instead	 of	 being	 an	 instrument	 to	 instruct	 teachers,	 it	 [Provinha	 Brasil]	would	become	one	of	pressure	and	the	results	would	be	manipulated.		Manipulation	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 students’	 exam	 results	 would	 be	 falsified	 or	changed	by	teachers,	but	rather	that	teachers	and	school	managers	would	adapt	their	focus	to	the	structure	of	the	exams.	In	contrast	to	Provinha	Brasil,	Prova	Brasil	aimed	at	regulating	performance	through	transparency,	as	the	external	pressure	generated	by	the	publication	of	Ideb	scores	pushed	schools	and	subnational	units	precisely	towards	this	type	of	adaptation.	Differently	 to	 the	 suggested	 regulatory	 impact	 produced	 by	 Ideb,	 the	 RTP’s	officially	 declared	 accountability	 goal	 faced	 a	 significant	 challenge	 related	 to	 the	transparency	 system	 itself,	 i.e.	 in	 making	 sure	 that	 the	 potential	 beneficiaries	
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understood	the	disclosed	information.	Ernesto	Faria,	a	then	member	of	QEdu,	a	well-known	educational	project	by	the	non-profit	Lemann	Foundation	(Fundação	Lemann),	acknowledged	 the	 targets’	 cognitive	 difficulties	 in	 making	 sense	 of	 the	 data.91	 “We	understand	that	the	average	data	of	Prova	Brasil”,	he	said	“is	hard	to	be	interpreted	[…]	and	 if	 a	parent	or	director	 sees	 the	average	of	 their	 school,	but	do	not	know	what	 it	means,	they	ask	themselves	if	it	is	good	or	bad.”	Although	Ideb	as	an	indicator	was	in	theory	more	easily	understood	than	Prova	Brasil	it	also	faced	significant	difficulties	in	promoting	the	public	engagement	expected	by	the	government.	According	to	Lacerda	(2015),	who	referred	to	the	transparency	of	performance	indicators	as	an	accountability	mechanism,		 There	was	a	large	debate	among	managers	and	the	leading	media,	but	there	was	 not	 –	 as	 there	 still	 is	 not	 today	 –	 such	 a	 strong	 engagement	 of	 civil	society.	To	me,	this	is	a	significant	problem,	because	what	one	expects	in	an	accountability	 policy	 is	 that	 society	 puts	 pressure	 on	 the	 government	 to	explain	why	certain	results	are	not	satisfactory.	But	that	did	not	happen	[…]	There	 was	 a	 great	 amount	 of	 work	 from	 MEC,	 we	 created	 leaflets,	 an	explanatory	poster	about	the	position	of	each	school	in	terms	of	their	Ideb	grade,	 but	 there	 still	was	not	 a	 national	mobilisation	 –	 as	 there	 still	 isn’t	today.	[…]	Eventually,	politicians	got	more	involved	and	Ideb	became	a	part	of	political	campaigns,	particularly	on	 the	municipal	–	rather	 than	state	–	level.	But	the	expected	social	mobilisation	was	not	achieved.		Oliveira	 (2011),	 however,	 demonstrated	 how	 the	 low	 level	 of	 understanding	 of	Ideb’s	 data,	 counterintuitively,	 led	 municipalities	 of	 the	 Federal	 District	 to	 try	 and	improve	their	performance	in	Prova	Brasil,	thus	fulfilling	its	regulatory	purpose,	even	in	complete	lack	of	understanding	of	the	assumptions	behind	it:		 The	 strategy	 of	 INEP	 to	 raise	 awareness	 of	 Prova	 Brasil	 was	 considered	inadequate	by	many	in	the	municipal	schools,	because	of	its	rankings,	and	insufficient	 given	 that	 directors	 and	 teachers	 have	 doubts	 about	 the	evaluation,	notably	in	terms	of	the	information	it	provides.	In	consequence,	one	 notices	 that	 in	 the	 activities	 developed	 by	 the	 Secretariat,	 what	 are	prevalent	are	 the	control	of	 the	average	grade	 in	 the	evaluations	and	 the	goals	 of	 Ideb,	 leading	 to	 competition	 between	 schools	 and	 holding	 them	accountable	 for	 quality	 improvement.	 When	 they	 feel	 pressured,	 school	teams	 tend	 to	 standardise	 their	 pedagogic	work	 in	 order	 to	 prepare	 the	students	to	the	exam	and	improve	the	position	of	the	school	in	the	ranking.		
                                                91	Faria,	E.	(2015)	Interview	on	19	May	2015.	[My	translation;	recording	in	my	possession.]	
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The	 difficulty	 of	 the	 potential	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	 policy	 to	 engage	 with	 the	information	 disclosed	 and	 dissatisfaction	 with	 aspects	 of	 the	 indicator	 propelled	intermediaries	to	develop	initiatives	and	demand	changes	in	the	methodology	behind	the	disclosure	system,	highlighting	the	importance	of	the	role	of	intermediaries	in	the	evolution	of	the	RTP.			
2.3.	The	role	of	intermediaries	in	the	evolution	of	Ideb	In	spite	of	being	widely	adopted,	several	education	groups	and	experts	saw	Ideb	as	a	problematic	 indicator	 in	 many	 different	 aspects.	 One	 criticism	 was	 about	 the	 way	performance	 goals	 were	 calculated.	 In	 order	 to	 set	 the	 goals	 for	 individual	 schools,	municipalities	and	states,	the	indicator	considered	the	performance	of	schools	on	Prova	Brasil	 in	 the	 year	 of	 2005.	 Therefore,	 as	 some	 critics	 noted,	 schools	 that	 performed	exceptionally	bad	or	exceptionally	well	on	that	year	had	unrealistic	goals.	In	2008,	for	example,	a	journalist	reported	the	story	of	a	school	in	the	state	of	Bahia,	in	which	the	quality	of	education	was	considered	“deplorable”	despite	the	fact	that	its	2011	goal	had	already	been	reached.92	In	other	cases,	schools	that	had	performed	very	well	before	the	definition	of	the	Ideb	targets	had	significant	difficulties	reaching	their	goals.93	Another	criticism	was	about	 the	assumption	that	by	 the	 final	year	 for	which	the	performance	targets	were	defined,	schools	had	to	reach	unrealistically	high	scores,	way	above	any	performance	ever	attained	by	a	school	in	Brazil.	Perhaps	most	importantly,	the	indicator	allegedly	had	a	significant	relation	to	pupils’	socio-economic	status.94	Among	 many	 of	 the	 problems	 diagnosed	 by	 intermediaries	 in	 relation	 to	 the	indicator	were	problems	with	the	disclosure	system,	namely	with	the	publication	of	the	data	 itself.	 The	 above-mentioned	 education	 initiative	 QEdu	 was	 created	 in	 this	framework	by	Fundação	Lemann	in	late	2012.	Its	stated	aim	was	to	support	education	policies	and	“give	life	to	data	in	order	to	support	better	choices	in	education”.	A	founding	motivation	for	the	initiative	was	the	understanding	that	education	“data	was	being	used	to	 create	 a	 ranking,	 but	 not	 to	 provide	 guidelines	 to	 schools	 about	what	 they	 could	actually	do	[to	tackle	low	performance]”	(Faria,	2015).	QEdu	addressed	the	necessity	to	overcome	 teachers	 and	 school	 directors’	 cognitive	 difficulties	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	publicised	results	in	order	to	develop	more	informed	and	comprehensive	policies.	It	also	highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 acknowledging	 the	 impact	 of	 pupils’	 socio-economic	
                                                92	Aranha,	A.	(2008)	O	que	os	números	não	mostram.	Revista	Época,	30	June.	93	Schwartzman,	S.	(2013)	Metas	que	não	conversam	com	a	realidade.	Simon’s	Blog,	19	July.		94	See,	for	example,	Almeida,	Dalben	and	Freitas	(2013)	
 132 
background	 on	 school	 performances	 by	 providing	 comparisons	 among	 schools	 of	similar	socio-economic	levels.	Besides	launching	a	more	user	friendly	website	to	explain	and	promote	the	use	of	Ideb	data,	QEdu	used	an	indicator	called	“adequate	level	of	learning”	independent	from	Ideb.	The	indicator	was	created	by	the	committee	of	experts	of	All	 for	Education	and	used	by	a	wide	range	of	education	experts,	 including	the	Education	Secretariat	of	the	State	of	São	Paulo.	QEdu	also	used	data	from	Prova	Brasil	but	arranged	it	in	a	different	way	to	Ideb.	The	scale	of	‘learning’	used	by	QEdu	was	based	on	the	points	pupils	scored	on	Prova	Brasil,	divided	in	four	categories:	insufficient,	basic,	proficient	and	advanced.	The	 last	 two	 categories	 were	 considered	 “adequate	 learning”.	 The	 creation	 and	promotion	 of	 an	 alternative	 indicator	 to	 Ideb	 was	 carried	 out	 on	 the	 basis	 of	disagreements	with	the	statistical	assumptions	of	Ideb,	the	fact	that	the	pedagogic	use	of	 the	 exams’	 data	 was	 limited,	 and	 concerns	 that	 the	 official	 index	 insufficiently	acknowledged	the	impact	of	other	indicators,	especially	socio-economic	status.		The	creation	of	a	supplementing	indicator	to	Ideb	was	a	challenge	to	the	federal	government’s	 monopoly	 on	 defining	 the	 metrics	 by	 which	 the	 public	 perceived	 the	schools.	In	other	words,	it	could	potentially	reduce	the	government’s	regulatory	power.	Whether	or	not	the	targets	and	beneficiaries	would	resort	to	non-official	indicators	also	depended	on	the	benefits	the	subnational	units	would	incur	from	complying	with	the	metrics	 promoted	 by	 the	 central	 government.	 For	 the	 large	 part,	 QEdu	 users	 were	journalists,	teachers	and	managers	of	municipal	and	state	school	systems.	By	the	time	of	writing	in	2016,	QEdu	had	received	an	average	of	1.5	million	visits	per	year,	still	30	times	 less	 than	 Ideb’s	website.95	When	asked	whether	Fundação	Lemann	planned	 to	facilitate	 the	 use	 of	 data	 by	 parents,	 Faria	 stated	 that	 it	 had	 been	 debated,	 but	 data	needed	to	be	well	contextualised	and	disclosed	in	order	not	to	mislead	parents.	One	of	the	concerns	of	the	organisation	was	that	the	performance	of	a	school	on	the	national	exams	 overlooked	 many	 important	 variables	 that	 impacted	 children’s	 performance.	Mobilising	parents	based	on	indicators,	which	could	not	convey	a	comprehensive	idea	of	 the	 conditions	 underlying	 the	 performance	 of	 schools,	 therefore	 ran	 the	 risk	 of	fostering	mobilisation	on	wrong	or	misleading	grounds.	Other	 intermediaries	 created	 other,	 smaller,	 initiatives	 to	 allow	 individuals	 to	supplement	Prova	Brasil	with	other	school	indicators	or	to	advance	its	pedagogic	use.	‘The	School	We	Want’	(A	Escola	que	Queremos),	for	example,	is	a	website	that	allows	users	to	add	variables	to	schools’	performance	and	calculate	personalised	indicators	of	schools,	matching	what	users	think	schools	should	have.	Some	of	these	extra	variables	
                                                95	Calculated	based	on	annual	visits	from	2011	to	2015,	as	informed	by	INEP.	
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include	 infrastructure,	 existence	 of	 libraries,	 provision	 of	 quality	 food	 during	 school	time,	offer	of	didactic	books,	functioning	of	democratic	councils,	and	the	pedagogic	team	of	 the	 school,	 among	 others.	 The	 website	 and	 application	 were	 created	 during	 a	‘hackathon’	promoted	by	Inep	and	Fundação	Lemann	in	2013	with	the	aim	of	promoting	the	creation	of	initiatives	that	could	engage	and	mobilise	more	people	around	the	Prova	Brasil	data	and	the	education	census.	The	initiative’s	creators	explained	that	its	goal	was	to	try	to	provide	an	alternative	to	the	logic	of	ranking,	often	pursued	by	the	media,	and	to	deconstruct	Ideb	as	the	only	education	quality	indicator	in	the	country.96	The	combination	of	standardised	indicators	and	the	low	level	of	understanding	by	the	general	population	 led	 to	a	range	of	news	reports	comparing	and	ranking	school	performances,	 highlighting	 the	 extremes	 every	 year	 when	 the	 indicators	 were	published.	This	sensationalist	media	focus	diverged	public	debate	from	one	of	the	main	goals	 voiced	 by	 government,	 i.e.	 that	 of	 engaging	 school	 communities	 to	 support	improvements	in	schools,	towards	anecdotes	of	extreme	failures	or	extreme	successes.	Against	this	trend,	more	recently	a	number	of	analytical	articles	started	focusing	on	how	certain	education	strategies	were	helping	schools	reach	sustainable	and	higher	scores	in	 Prova	 Brasil	 and	 Ideb.	 In	 mid-2016,	 the	 Brazilian	 Journalists’	 Association	 for	Education	 (Associação	 de	 Jornalistas	 de	 Educação)	 was	 created	 in	 order	 to	 publish	valuable	 journalistic	 news	 about	 education	 and	 to	 provide	 training	 for	 journalists	interested	 in	 covering	 the	 topic	 of	 education.	According	 to	 journalist	 and	 researcher	Rodrigo	Ratier,	99%	of	Brazilian	journalists	who	reported	on	education	in	the	country	were	untrained	to	cover	the	topic.97	Writing	about	how	the	media	approached	one	of	these	‘success	stories’,	journalist	and	education	campaigner	Antônio	Gois	argued:		 A	Google	search	to	 identify	news	 from	the	time	[that	a	city	was	very	well	analysed]	will	prove	that	there	are	many	narratives	to	justify	the	success	of	the	 city:	 an	 attentive	 look	 to	 the	 students,	 a	 partnership	 with	 a	 private	university,	attention	with	teachers,	use	of	structured	didactic	material,	small	number	of	students	in	class…	We	[journalists]	produced	theses	for	all	tastes,	to	the	left	and	to	the	right	on	the	educational	field.98		José	 Francisco	 Soares,	 president	 of	 INEP	 from	 February	 2014	 to	 March	 2016,	
                                                96	 Campagnucci,	 F.	 (2013)	 Projeto	 vencedor	 de	 maratona	 hacker	 no	 Inep	 propõe	 ampliar	conceito	de	qualidade	da	educação.	Open	Knowledge	Brasil,	24	April.	97	Associação	Brasileira	de	Imprensa	(2016)	Jeduca	chega	para	qualificar	cobertura	de	educação.	
Associação	Brasileira	de	Imprensa,	23	June.	98	Gois,	A.	(2016)	Cuidado	com	os	extremos	no	Ideb:	lições	de	São	Paulo	e	do	Paraná.	Jeduca,	7	August.	
 134 
blamed	the	news	media	for	its	inability	to	produce	good	reporting	on	Ideb.	He	argued	that	 the	 indicator	 was	 intended	 as	 a	 summary	 that	 helped	 monitor	 a	 large	 and	heterogeneous	system,	but	that	it	had	“led	immediately	to	creating	hierarchies	as	a	way	of	analysing	the	context	of	education.	A	large	portion	of	the	press	is	limited	to	producing	this.	 This	 is	 not,	 however,	 a	 limitation	 of	 the	 indicator”	 (Soares	 and	 Xavier,	 2013).	Reynaldo	Fernandes,	one	of	the	creators	of	INEP	and	its	president	between	2005	and	2009,	also	criticised	the	media	coverage	of	educational	indicators.	“Most	importantly”,	he	argued,	“media	coverage	cannot	produce	oversimplified	analysis	of	the	results	that,	besides	not	helping	about	how	to	improve	education,	can	contribute	to	increasing	the	rejection	 of	 large	 scale	 examinations	 by	 some	 education	 professionals”.99	 As	 an	intermediary	 of	 Ideb’s	 transparency	 system,	 one	 could	 argue	 that	 the	 media	 often	contributed	with	more	noise	than	clarification	about	the	performance	of	schools.	In	 mid-2014	 the	 National	 Campaign	 Right	 to	 Education	 (Campanha	 Nacional	Direito	 a	 Educação),	 a	 network	 of	 around	 200	 organisations	 working	 on	 education,	published	an	open	letter	to	the	president	of	INEP	requesting	pupil	performance	results	to	be	published	alongside	 the	 socio-economic	 level	 of	 their	 families	 and	 the	 schools’	geographic	 areas,	 until	 other	 educational	 indicators	 that	 internalised	 these	 variables	were	developed	by	the	Institute.100	Contextualisation	of	 Ideb	had	been	the	request	of	education	 organisations	 for	 some	 time,	 based	 on	 the	 view	 that	 the	 index	 did	 not	internalise	social	indicators	and	media’s	ranking	were	mostly	considered	unfair	to	such	organisations.		In	response	to	societal	demands,	mostly	from	education	organisations,	and	in	line	with	its	renewed	managerial	body,	INEP	published	the	results	of	Prova	Brasil	along	with	a	 socio-economic	 indicator	 and	 an	 indicator	 for	 assessing	 the	 adequacy	 of	 teachers’	capacities.	Whereas	 the	 provision	 of	 information	 about	 the	 socio-economic	 status	 of	students	had	been	a	negotiated	process	with	the	education	community,	information	on	the	adequate	level	of	teachers	seemed	to	have	been	adopted	by	INEP	based	on	a	series	of	 federal	 norms	 that	 regulated	 the	 desired	 degree	 and	 trainings	 of	 teachers.101	 The	indicators	 were	 published	 exclusively	 on	 the	 internet	 and	 allowed	 for	 comparisons	between	schools	within	the	same	micro-region,	same	localisation	(urban	or	rural)	and	similar	socio-economic	conditions.102	
                                                99	Fernandes,	R.	(2016)	O	risco	que	a	imprensa	corre	ao	procurar	novidades	no	Ideb.	Jeduca,	7	August.	100	Campanha	Nacional	pelo	Direito	à	Educacao	(2014)	Carta	Aberta	ao	INEP.		101	INEP	(2014)	Nota	Técnica	N.	020/2014.	Indicador	de	adequação	da	formação	do	docente	da	educação	básica.	INEP.	102	INEP	(2014)	Nota	Técnica	-	Perfil	de	“Escolas	Similares”.	INEP.	
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The	 limitations	 of	 the	 RTP,	 however,	 were	 not	 only	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 variables	included	 in	 the	 indicators.	 As	 previously	 mentioned,	 Prova	 Brasil	 had	 also	 been	criticised	for	failing	as	a	tool	to	help	improve	the	pedagogic	capacities	of	schools	and	teachers,	 and	 instead	 becoming	 exclusively	 a	 regulatory	 mechanism.	 In	 2015,	 INEP	published	 a	 new	 internet-based	 platform	 named	 Pedagogic	 Returns	 (Devolutivas	Pedagogicas).	 The	 government	 developed	 the	 platform	 in	 partnership	 with	 All	 for	Education	 and	 the	 Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Education	 Assessments	 (Associação	Brasileira	de	Avaliação	Educacional),	and	with	the	support	from	the	Lemann	Foundation	and	 other	 entities,	 in	 response	 to	 requests	 by	 schoolteachers	 and	 directors,	 and	demands	from	education	movements	and	associations,	to	simplify	school	performance	data	 so	 that	 it	 could	be	used	 for	pedagogic	planning.	Besides	providing	comparisons	with	a	series	of	different	categories	of	schools,	the	platform	offered	analyses	of	Prova	Brasil’s	 questions	 and	 the	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 required	 of	 students	 to	 correctly	respond	 to	 them	 as	 well	 as	 statistical	 analysis	 of	 students’	 responses	 to	 the	 exam	questions.	 The	 platform	 did	 not	 only	 serve	 purposes	 of	 pedagogic	 support,	 but	 also	strengthened	the	RTP’s	regulatory	power	by	facilitating	teachers’	understanding	of	the	exam	and	what	students	needed	to	learn	to	attain	better	scores.	Pedagogic	Returns	aimed	at	overcoming	the	limitations	of	the	publication	of	Prova	Brasil	as	mainly	a	regulatory	instrument	eventually	turned	into	a	ranking	by	the	media,	by	providing	explanatory	information	about	students’	level	of	proficiency	in	the	exams,	further	 explaining	 to	 teachers	 the	 meaning	 of	 data	 and	 providing	 comments	 and	statistical	 data	 for	 individual	 questions	 in	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 exams.	 This	 last	 one	proved	to	be	one	of	the	most	popular	initiatives	taken	by	Pedagogic	Returns,	since	it	was	the	first	time	that	exam	questions	were	used	to	present	to	teachers	what	was	expected	by	students	in	each	measured	ability	and	what	each	kind	of	response	indicated	about	students’	 proficiency	 level.	 For	 its	 launch,	 the	 coordinator	 of	 All	 for	 Education	programme	explained:	“We	believe	that	connecting	teachers	and	school	managers	with	Prova	 Brasil	 by	 means	 of	 pedagogically	 organised	 and	 contextualised	 questions	broadens	the	focus	of	the	external	assessment	from	mere	accountability	to	transforming	teaching	practice”.	As	INEP	made	a	move	to	strengthen	the	pedagogic	 impact	of	Ideb,	three	bills	 introduced	in	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	suggested	a	different	trajectory	for	the	index.					
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2.4.	Contestation	of	Ideb’s	Transparency	System		Three	bills	were	introduced	to	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	in	2011	with	the	aim	to	oblige	schools	and	municipalities	to	display	their	Ideb	scores	at	the	entrance	of	each	school.103	The	bills	were	presented	by	three	congressmen	of	different	centre-right	parties.	The	first	two	 bills	 were	 introduced	 in	 June	 2011,	 following	 the	 recommendation	 of	 Gustavo	Ioschpe,	 a	 Brazilian	 education	 economist,	 published	 in	 Veja,	 a	 leading	 conservative	weekly	newspaper.104	In	the	article,	Ioschpe,	following	a	rationale	similar	to	the	one	on	which	 Prova	 Brasil	 was	 first	 adopted,	 suggested	 that	 good	 public	 schools	 had	 good	management,	parental	engagement,	a	culture	of	success	(as	opposed	to	acceptance	of	failure),	 good	 teachers	 and	monitoring	 and	 evaluation.	 All	 of	 these,	 according	 to	 the	economist,	 could	 be	 boosted	 if	 parents	 and	 the	 education	 community	 were	 given	 a	greater	voice.	In	another	article,	Ioschpe	stated:		 I	am	convinced	that	as	long	as	the	parents	of	our	pupils	are	wrongly	satisfied	with	the	quality	of	education	and	transfer	to	their	children	the	pressure	that	should	be	placed	on	teachers,	school	managers	and	politicians,	we	will	not	have	 significant	 reforms	 in	 our	 schools.	 […]	 I	 have	 real	 difficulties	understanding	 how	 someone	 could	 criticise	 a	 measure	 such	 as	 this	 one,	given	 that	 it	 is	 simply	a	 transparency	 instrument.	 […]	Recent	 research	by	Victor	 Civita	 Foundation	 showed	 that	 47%	 of	 pedagogic	 coordinators	 of	Brazilian	 schools	 do	 not	 know	 Ideb.	 […]	 If	 this	 is	 the	 situation	 for	professionals,	imagine	for	the	parents	of	pupils	in	poor	schools.105		The	measure	was	adopted	in	the	municipality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	within	less	than	two	months	of	its	suggestion	through	an	executive	decree.	It	was	part	of	an	attempt	by	the	Mayor	of	Rio	to	transfer	the	experience	of	a	particularly	successful	school	(Rio	das	Pedras)	to	other	public	schools	in	the	municipality.	After	failing	to	achieve	its	Ideb	goal	in	2009,	the	director	of	Rio	das	Pedras,	located	in	a	Rio	slum,	had	decided	to	paste	these	goals	on	every	wall	around	and	inside	the	school	as	part	of	an	intensive	reform	drive.106	The	 director,	 however,	 had	 also	 resorted	 to	 other	measures,	 such	 as	 changes	 in	 the	curricula	 and	 training	 of	 teachers.	 The	 director	 supported	 extended	 transparency	 of	Ideb	in	Rio,	based	on	the	argument	that	performance	was	not	necessarily	linked	to	socio-economic	conditions;	supporting	this	argument	was	the	fact	that	some	of	the	highest	
                                                103	Bills	1530/11,	1536/2011	and	1600/2011.	104	Veja.	(2011)	Para	pobre	analfabeto...	Tae	kwon	do!	Veja,	5	June.	105	Ioschpe.	G.	(2011)	A	favor	do	Ideb	na	escola:	“Pela	transparência	e	o	aprendizado”	Ultimo	
Segundo,	1	August		106	Balmant,	O.	(2011)	Redes	colocam	notas	e	metas	na	porta	das	escolas.	O	Estado	de	São	Paulo,	31	July.	
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performing	schools	in	Rio	were	found	in	the	more	disadvantaged	areas.	Soon	after	the	decree	of	the	Rio	municipality	came	into	force,	it	was	challenged	in	court	by	the	National	Movement	of	Human	Rights.	Advocates	and	scholars	of	human,	children	and	adolescent	rights	argued	that	exposing	Ideb	scores	to	everyone,	including	those	not	engaged	in	the	education	community,	 threatened	to	demoralise	students	 in	low	performing	schools	and	offended	their	constitutional	right	of	human	dignity.	The	opinion	of	pupils	from	public	schools	also	varied	in	relation	to	the	initiative.	Whereas	those	that	studied	in	public	schools	with	high	Ideb	value	supported	the	measure,	those	that	studied	in	low	value	Ideb	schools	believed	that	they	would	be	stigmatised	as	“a	pupil	from	that	horrible	school”,	although	some	pupils	in	the	latter	category	also	accepted	the	initiative	 as	 a	 measure	 to	 potentially	 improve	 schools’	 performances.107	 Several	education	experts	expressed	reluctance	to	label	schools	exclusively	based	on	Ideb,	given	that	parents	would	not	be	in	a	position	to	solve	all	problems	that	affected	the	schools’	performance.	The	Ministry	of	Education	noted	that	the	debate	was	necessary,	but	given	that	Prova	Brasil	was	voluntary,	extended	transparency	risked	reducing	the	number	of	schools	willing	to	adopt	the	test.	After	the	municipality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro,	the	states	of	Goiás	and	Minas	Gerais	also	adopted	 the	measure,	 as	 part	 of	wider	 educational	 and	 administrative	 reforms.108	 In	Goiás,	for	example,	the	measure	was	implemented	in	the	scope	of	a	significantly	broader	reform	 to	 reclaim	 managerial	 power	 in	 relation	 to	 schools	 and	 creating	 prizes	 for	schools	 that	 fulfilled	 their	 goals,	 as	 well	 as	 adding	 a	 range	 of	 measures	 related	 to	pedagogic	 instructions.	According	to	Erick	Jacques,	 former	Director	at	the	Secretariat	for	Education	of	Goiás,	many	of	the	criticisms	about	the	display	of	Ideb’s	scores	and	goals	on	the	entrance	of	schools	came	not	from	school	staffs	or	the	larger	community	but	“…	from	 education	 experts,	 whom	 I	 guess	 were	 reluctant	 about	 the	 stigmatisation	 of	schools”.109	 Jacques	reported	that	parents	had	become	increasingly	 interested	in	Ideb	and	that	parents	whose	children’s	school	had	not	yet	put	up	the	Ideb	scores	had	been	demanding	 their	disclosure.	That	being	said,	 the	direct	regulatory	effect	of	expanded	transparency	of	Ideb	in	Goiás	was	believed	to	be	limited,	mainly	because	the	Prova	Brasil	results	were	 published	 after	 that	 of	 state	 exams,	which	were	 the	main	 basis	 for	 the	design	of	education	measures	by	the	Secretariat	of	Education.	Although	in	2014,	Goiás	improved	 its	 education	 performance,	 the	 practice	 of	 displaying	 Ideb	 scores	 at	 the	
                                                107	Gomide,	R.	(2011)	Alunos	do	Rio	aprovam	nota	do	Ideb	na	escola,	desde	que	seja	boa.	IG,	1	August.		108	The	two	states	had	the	third	(Minas	Gerais)	and	the	ninth	(Goiás)	highest	GDPs	in	the	country.	109	 Jacques,	 E.	 (2015)	 Interview	 on	 28	 January	 2016.	 [My	 translation;	 recording	 in	 my	possession.]	
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entrance	of	schools	was	discontinued	with	the	end	of	one	government	and	the	start	of	a	new	one,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	governing	party	had	not	changed	and	that	reforms	were	being	made	to	include	social	organisations	in	schools’	administration.110	According	to	Jacques	the	new	education	team	did	not	support	the	measure.		In	 a	 debate	 in	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 about	 the	 proposals	 to	 display	 Ideb’s	results	in	the	entrance	of	each	school,	criticisms	came	from	different	political	parties.	Most	of	them	referred	to	potential	prejudices	towards	schools	and	pupils	of	schools	with	low	performance,	to	the	limitation	of	Ideb	as	an	indicator	of	school	performance,	and	to	the	fact	that	the	index	should	be	used	primarily	as	a	tool	to	support	the	work	of	teachers	and	school	managers,	in	the	same	fashion	as	a	statistical	tool.	Interestingly,	although	not	expressed	in	these	terms,	there	appears	to	have	been	considerable	recognition	that	the	disclosure	of	Prova	Brasil	and	Ideb	data	did	not	constitute	accountability	measures.	The	bills	 also	 faced	 significant	 opposition	 from	 a	wide	 range	 of	 education	 organisations,	many	 of	 them	 representing	 employees	 of	 schools	 (for	 example	 the	 National	Confederation	 of	Workers	 in	 Education,	 the	 National	 Council	 of	 State	 Secretaries	 of	Education,	and	the	Union	of	Municipal	Directors	of	Education),	and	others	defending	children’s	rights	(for	example,	the	Brazilian	Association	of	Toy	Producers).		
Conclusion	As	 this	 Chapter	 has	 shown,	 the	 federal	 government	 adopted	 disclosure	 of	 school	performance	 data	 following	 the	 international	 trend	 of	 using	 RTPs	 to	 improve	 the	performance	 of	 subnational	 policy	 units.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 Brazil’s	 education	 system,	where	 there	 is	 no	 school	 choice,	 the	 link	 between	 transparency	 and	 accountability	seemed	to	have	played	a	considerable	role	in	the	design	and	justifications	of	INEP	to	adopt	 a	 transparency	 system	 for	 secondary	 schools’	 performance.	 In	 spite	 of	 this	expressed	intent,	its	success	as	an	accountability	tool	that	engages	society	in	general	is	debatable.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 discussion	 about	 the	relationship	between	transparency	and	accountability.	Although	transparency	and	accountability	are	often	assumed	to	be	synonymous	and	used	interchangeably,	the	literature	shows	that	this	is	a	misleading	equivalence.111	First,	 accountability	 does	 not	 in	 all	 cases	 imply	 that	 information	 needs	 to	 be	 made	
                                                110	According	to	Brazilian	 legislation,	during	election	period,	every	government	material	 that	carries	its	logo	should	be	taken	out	of	circulation	to	prevent	propaganda.	During	the	elections	of	2014,	the	signs	were	removed	and	not	placed	again.	111	For	more	extensive	debates	about	the	relationship	between	transparency	and	accountability,	see	Lodge,	2004;	Fox,	2007;	Hood,	2010;	and	Meijer,	2014.	
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available	to	the	general	public.	In	many	instances,	agencies	of	the	executive	branch	give	account	to	parliament	and	justify	specific	courses	of	action	without	having	to	disclose	every	 detail	 pertaining	 to	 their	 decision	 (Hood,	 2010).	 Second,	 accountability	 is	 a	mechanism	that	starts	with	the	provision	of	information,	but	is	followed	by	debates,	and	ends	 in	 potential	 sanctions	 (Bovens,	 2007;	 Bovens,	 Goodin,	 and	 Schillemans,	 2014).	Transparency,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 does	 not	 intrinsically	 imply	 the	 last	 two	 steps.	Although	it	is	often	desired	that	transparency	will	lead	to	wider	citizen	participation	-	and	there	are	cases	of	higher	level	of	civic	participation	and	engagement	being	reached,	notably	in	cases	where	choice	option	is	not	available	(e.g.	Reinikka	and	Svensson,	2004;	Dowding	and	John,	2011)	-	this	is	not	guaranteed	by	disclosure	policies.	Another	 widespread	 assumption	 is	 that	 accountability	 and	 transparency	 are	different	concepts	but	that	they	complement	and	strengthen	one	another.	Authors	who	back	this	assumption	argue	that	accountability	“meets	obligations	of	transparency	and	helps	 to	 ensure	 that	 public	 administrators	 pursue	 publicly	 valued	 goals	 and	 satisfy	legitimate	 performance	 expectations”	 (Considine,	 2002).112	 According	 to	 this	 view,	transparency	 promotes	 accountability	 through	 active	 citizens	 and	 engaged	 interest	groups,	who	support	public	understanding	of	 the	 information	disclosed	and	promote	debates	of	public	 interest.	Practical	evidence,	however,	points	that	transparency	does	not	always	promote	answerability	(Meijer,	2014,	pp.	514-521).		Whereas	the	accountability	outcomes	of	the	performance	logic	of	transparency	are	uncertain,	 the	 literature	 offers	 more	 conclusive	 suggestions	 about	 the	 attempt	 to	increase	 central	 governments’	 power	 by	 promoting	 transparency	 of	 performance	indicators,	as	decentralised	units	tend	to	try	to	live	up	to	high	–	or	higher	–	performance	expectations.	 The	 underlying	 assumption	 is	 that	 comparative	 benchmarks	 make	 it	easier	 for	 the	 public	 to	 understand	 performance	 indicators	 and	 pressure	 public	managers,	 who	 consider	 reputational	 effects,	 career	 risks,	 etc.,	 to	 increase	 the	performance	of	 the	units	 they	manage	(Pidd,	2005;	Van	de	Walle	and	Roberts,	2008;	James	and	Moseley,	2014).	This	research	identified	a	number	of	studies	that	show	that	schools	by	and	large	try	to	increase	their	performance	by	taking	into	consideration	the	structure	of	Prova	Brasil.		In	 spite	 of	 the	 regulatory	 role	 of	 Prova	 Brasil,	 the	 trajectory	 of	 Ideb	 has	 been	contested	by	intermediaries.	It	has	triggered	numerous	objections	and	criticisms	from	a	wide	range	of	actors,	especially	from	education	organisations;	questions	of	fairness	and	accuracy	have	triggered	intense	debates	and	demands	from	organised	civil	society;	
                                                112	Also	see	Romzek	and	Dubnick,	1987;	Agranoff	and	McGuire,	2001;	Hujala,	Andersson,	and	Wikström,	2014.	
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and,	 recently,	 INEP	 started	 publishing	 contextual	 information.	 A	 powerful	 notion	around	which	targets	and/or	intermediaries	have	been	able	to	mobilise	effectively	and	influence	the	trajectory	of	an	RTP	in	the	performance	logic	is	the	idea	of	‘fairness’.	This	has	 also	 been	 the	 case	 with	 Ideb.	 Much	 of	 the	 contention	 to	 the	 RTP	 came	 from	intermediaries,	such	as	organised	civil	society	groups	and	experts,	who	criticised	the	RTP	on	 the	basis	of	 its	methodology	and	particularly	 for	not	 taking	 into	account	 the	underlying	socio-economic	factors.	The	civil	society	challenged	the	methodology	of	the	performance	indicator	and	demanded	change	via	two	main	ways:	by	coordinating	with	government	to	modify	aspects	of	the	indicator,	and	by	suggesting	visualisation	of	the	official	exam	results	alongside	other	variables	that	they	deemed	important.	Whereas	the	former	way	implied	a	change	in	the	outcome	for	all	targets,	the	latter	route	has	implied	a	 more	 isolated	 impact,	 although	 this	 could	 potentially	 escalate	 depending	 on	 who	supports	the	alternative	indicator.	The	 story	 shows,	 however,	 that	 the	 desire	 to	 modify	 and	 contextualise	 the	indicator	is	not	universally	shared	among	all	intermediaries	and	targets.	As	highlighted	by	the	three	bills	introduced	in	the	Congress	and	the	example	of	the	Rio	municipality,	there	is	also	the	view,	shared	by	a	group	of	experts,	politicians,	civil	society	groups	and	school	 administrators,	 that	 the	 transparency	 system	of	 Ideb	 should	 be	 implemented	more	 widely	 (i.e.	 displaying	 the	 results	 on	 school	 entrances)	 by	 the	 educational	community.	 The	 fact	 that	 this	 perspective	 has	 prevailed	 in	 a	 few	 administrations	(whenever	 the	 state	 or	 local	 administration	 decided	 to	 expand	 the	 transparency	 of	Ideb),	 emphasises	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 RTP	 may	 –	 and	 does	 –	 follow	 different	trajectories	 when	 adopted	 in	 decentralised	 units	 with	 distinct	 views	 about	 the	regulatory	 role	 of	 Ideb.	 At	 federal	 level,	 the	 issue	 is	 still	 being	 debated	 within	 the	legislative	 and	 civil	 society,	 suggesting	 that	 aspects	 of	 the	 RTP	 will	 continue	 to	 be	contested	in	the	foreseeable	future.		 	
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CHAPTER	5:	
THE	ENGLISH	SECONDARY	SCHOOL	PERFORMANCE	TABLES	
		 I	believe	people	do	want	choice,	in	public	services	as	in	other	services.	But	anyway,	choice	isn't	an	end	in	itself.	It	is	one	important	mechanism	to	ensure	that	citizens	can	indeed	secure	good	schools	and	health	services	in	their	 communities.	 …	 Choice	 puts	 the	 levers	 in	 the	hands	of	parents	and	patients	so	that	they	as	citizens	and	consumers	can	be	a	driving	force	for	improvement	in	their	public	services.	(Former	Prime	Minister	Tony	Blair,	2004)113	The	 rise	 of	 the	 annual	 performance	 tables	 has	 been	synonymous	 with	 greater	 central	 direction	 over	schools.	It	has	proved	as	powerful	a	weapon	of	control	as	the	medieval	thumbscrew.	Almost	since	the	league	tables	began,	governments	have	found	ways	of	moving	the	goalposts.	The	 terrified	victims	have	 complained	and	moaned	and	have	rushed	to	comply.	The	trouble	is,	 like	 confessions	 produced	 by	 torture,	 the	 results	have	 not	 always	 been	 the	 whole	 truth.	 (Education	Correspondent	for	the	BBC	Mike	Baker,	2007)114	
	The	case	study	analysed	in	this	chapter	explores	the	creation	and	evolution	of	regulatory	transparency	for	secondary	education	in	England,	notably	for	Key	Stages	3	and	4,	namely	the	 ‘Secondary	Education	Performance	Tables’.	The	sets	of	governmental	 information	most	 familiar	 to	 English	 citizens	 are	 probably	 the	 performance	 indicators	 of	 public	service	 units,	 such	 as	 schools,	 universities,	 and	 hospitals.	 The	 transparency	 of	performance	of	public	service	units,	a	widely	known	example	of	regulatory	transparency	policy	in	the	performance	logic,	and	now	a	mainstream	policy	around	the	world,	dates	back	 to	 the	 last	decade	of	 the	 twentieth	century.	The	United	Kingdom	was	one	of	 its	pioneers,	 having	 inaugurated	 the	 RTP	 for	 secondary	 schools	 in	 1992,	 during	 the	Conservative	government	of	John	Major.	The	publication	of	schools’	standards	was	at	the	centre	 of	 the	 education	 reforms	 started	 in	 1988	 and	 aligned	with	 the	 government’s	overall	agenda	of	strengthening	the	market	ideology	of	public	services	(Le	Grand,	1991).		I	have	 two	aims	 in	 this	chapter.	First,	 through	the	narrative	of	 this	case	study,	 I	
                                                113	Blair,	T.	(2004)	Blair	on	public	services.	BBC,	June	23.		114	Baker,	M.	(2007)	League	tables:	only	half	the	story.	BBC,	13	January.	
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intend	 to	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 regulatory	 purpose	 and	 effect	 in	 designing	 and	disclosing	 performance	 indicators,	 which	 put	 pressure	 on	 schools,	 the	 immediate	targets	 of	 the	 performance	 tables	 as	 an	 RTP,	 to	 adopt	 the	 priorities	 and	 meet	 the	standards	set	by	the	government.	The	regulatory	effect	of	disclosing	school	performance	tables	 is	 highlighted	 by	 the	 recurrent	 testimonies	 and	 boycott	 attempts	 of	 teachers	protesting	the	exams’	effect	of	covering	too	many	subjects,	weighing	the	value	of	English	and	maths	on	the	performance	tables,	or	narrowing	learning	by	forcing	teachers,	targets	of	the	RTP	together	with	schools,	to	focus	on	the	subjects	covered	in	the	national	exams.	The	 second	 goal	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 to	 narrate	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 RTP	 and	demonstrate	the	remarkable	sustainability	of	the	RTP	in	question	amidst	a	lifespan	of	constant	and	significant	changes,	most	of	which	carried	out	for,	rather	than	with,	their	designated	 beneficiaries	 and	 targets.	 As	 this	 chapter	 suggests,	 what	 supports	 the	sustainability	of	the	performance	tables	across	time	are	the	core	arguments	present	in	Layer	1,	related	to	choice	and	accountability,	i.e.	that	parents	have	a	right	to	choose	their	children’s	 schools	 and	 that	 an	 accountability	 system,	 which	 the	 disclosure	 of	 exam	results	 is	claimed	to	provide,	 is	desirable.	These	key	notions	 inform	the	behaviour	of	actors	 and	 how	 they	 interact	 to	 push	 for	 the	 evolution	 of	 transparency	 or	 for	 its	retrenchment.	 The	 case	 study	 shows	 how	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 drivers	 for	 greater	transparency	 and	 of	 targets	 for	 reforms	 to	 the	 transparency	 system	 have	made	 the	trajectory	 of	 the	 RTP	 contested.	 But	 it	 also	 shows	 how	 stable	 and	 embedded	 in	 the	educational	systems	the	schools’	secondary	tables	seem	to	have	become.			
1.	Socio-Political	and	Institutional	Context	A	continuous	stream	of	criticisms	of	the	status	of	education	in	England	in	the	mid-1980s	slowly	led	to	public	acceptance	that	the	education	system	needed	improvements	and	to	political	 championing	 of	 reforms.	 Before	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 1988	 educational	reform,	Margaret	Thatcher	claimed	that	it	was	necessary	to	place	schools’	performance	in	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 educational	 reforms	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 previous	government	 policies.	 In	 defending	 a	 new	 model	 of	 educational	 reforms,	 the	 Prime	Minister	reasoned	that:		 The	starting	point	for	the	education	reforms	outlined	in	our	general	election	manifesto	was	a	deep	dissatisfaction	 (which	 I	 fully	 shared)	with	Britain’s	standard	of	education.	There	had	been	improvement	in	the	pupil	–	teacher	ratio	 and	 real	 increases	 in	 spending	 per	 child.	 But	 increases	 in	 public	spending	had	not	by	and	large	led	to	higher	standards.	(Whetton,	2009)	
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	With	the	entry	into	force	of	the	1988	Education	Reform	Act	(henceforth	the	1988	Act),	 the	 framework	 and	 governance	 of	 secondary	 schools	 underwent	 a	 sequence	 of	changes,	 shifting	 responsibilities	 among	 education	 authorities,	 concentrating	managerial	responsibilities	in	the	central	government	and	with	parents,	and	away	from	local	authorities.	Besides	the	creation	of	new	types	of	schools,	key	novelties	introduced	by	 the	 1988	 Act	 were	 the	 concepts	 of	 national	 curriculum,	 key	 stages	 and	 national	assessments.	The	English	National	Curriculum	set	out	the	minimum	body	of	knowledge	that	 every	 public	 school	 needed	 to	 adopt.115	 Besides	 establishing	 the	 core	 and	foundation	subjects,	the	national	curriculum	was	arranged	around	key	stages,	for	each	of	 which	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 set	 a	 programme	 of	 study,	 attainment	 targets,	 and	assessment	 arrangements.116	 Key	 stages	 and	 the	 national	 assessments	 formed	 the	framework	for	students’	evaluations,	and	for	teachers’	regulatory	system.	At	or	near	the	end	of	each	key	stage,	arrangements	 for	assessing	pupils	were	expected	 to	be	put	 in	place	and	their	results	to	be	published.117			Complementing	 the	 idea	 of	 simultaneous	 marketisation	 and	 regulation	 of	education	 (this	 combination	 came	 to	 be	 known	 as	 ‘quasi-market’),	 the	 government	promoted	the	disclosure	of	student	attainments	in	structured	format	in	order	to	fulfil	the	 purpose	 of	 providing	 parents	 with	 information	 to	 guide	 school	 choice	 for	 their	children.	 Publication	 of	 structured	 data	 about	 secondary	 education	 in	 England	 was	intrinsically	 related	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 school	 choice,	 creation	 of	 the	 Standard	Assessment	Tests	(SATs)	and	had	at	its	birth	a	competition	and	regulatory	objective,	i.e.	providing	 parents	with	 information	 to	 foster	 a	 free	market	where	 schools	would	 be	measured	up	against	each	other	and	against	other	schools	nationally.	The	expectation	and	the	prevailing	assumption	was	that	this	would	improve	schools’	performances.		Whereas	Margaret	 Thatcher’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 possibilities	 of	 educational	reforms	prior	to	1988	was	that	the	English	system	could	either	move	further	along	the	path	of	centralisation	or	along	the	path	of	decentralisation,	the	outcome	of	the	1988	Act	
                                                115	1988	Education	Reform	Act,	Part	I,	Chapter	I,	2.		116	‘Key	stage’	was	introduced	by	the	1988	Act	to	refer	to	four	education	cycles	in	a	student’s	life	from	five	to	sixteen	years	of	age.	Key	stage	1	comprised	students	from	ﬁve	to	seven	years	old;	key	stage	2,	students	of	eight	to	11	years	old;	key	stage	3,	students	of	12	to	14	years	old;	and	key	stage	4,	students	of	15	to	16	years	old.	117	According	 to	 the	1988	Act	 the	 government	was	 required	 to	 edit	 regulation	 requiring	 the	publication	of	three	sets	of	information:	a.	the	curriculum	for	maintained	schools,	b.	syllabus	to	be	 followed	 by	 the	 pupils,	 and	 c.	 the	 “the	 educational	 achievement	 of	 pupils	 at	 the	 school	(including	 the	 results	 of	 any	 assessments	 of	 those	 pupils,	 whether	 under	 this	 Chapter	 or	otherwise,	for	the	purpose	of	ascertaining	those	achievements)”.	
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was	 a	 mix	 of	 both	 solutions.	 A	 higher	 level	 of	 teacher	 and	 school	 regulation	 was	combined	 with	 parental	 choice,	 both	 performed	 through	 the	 combination	 of	 the	enactment	of	a	national	curriculum	and	the	disclosure	of	school	performances.	This	was	the	closest	model	to	voucher	schools	politically	viable	in	England.	“Keith	Joseph	and	I	had	 always	 been	 attracted	 by	 the	 education	 voucher”,	 reasoned	 Thatcher,	 “The	arguments	 against	 this	were	more	 political	 than	 practical.	 […]	 Through	 the	 assisted	places	 scheme	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 parental	 choice	 of	 school	 under	 our	 1980	 Parents’	Charter	we	were	moving	some	way	towards	this	objective	without	mentioning	the	word	‘voucher’”	(Thatcher,	1995,	p.	184).	Already	 since	1981,	 schools	were	obliged	 to	publish	details	 of	 the	 examination	results	 they	were	subject	 to	under	 the	government’s	School	 Information	Regulations,	and	to	publish	this	information	in	a	common	and	consistent	form	ten	years	later	(West	and	 Pennel,	 2000).	 In	 1992,	 when	 the	 compilation	 and	 publication	 of	 school	comparisons	of	the	General	Certificate	of	Secondary	Education	(GCSE)	was	inaugurated	by	the	Department	for	Education	and	Employment	(DfEE),	then	British	Prime	Minister	John	Major	spoke	of	an	alleged	pressure	from	low	performers	against	transparency,	and	emphasised	parents’	 right	 to	know	and	to	choose	–	 the	main	pillars	 for	performance	transparency.	“Four	years	ago,”	Major	said,	“as	Chief	Secretary	to	the	Treasury,	I	was	the	guardian	of	the	public	purse”:		 You	may	be	surprised	that	it	was	ever	thought	unsafe	for	parents	and	public	to	know	this	sort	of	thing.	Well,	I	think	I	can	tell	you	why.	It	was	inconvenient	to	some	of	the	providers.	It	might	expose	poor	performance	to	the	criticism	it	deserved.	But	poor	performance	should	be	exposed	if	we	are	to	correct	it.	[...]	 We	 are	 giving	 parents	 a	 greatly	 increased	 voice	 in	 their	 children’s	education	–	a	voice	they	should	never	have	lost.	And	at	the	same	time	we	are	also	letting	employers,	 local	business	people,	and	so	on	see,	how	effective	their	schools	are.118		Voicing	the	need	to	accompany	and	monitor	the	work	of	education	experts	(e.g.	teachers,	 teacher	 trainers,	 local	 education	 authority)	 was	 part	 of	 the	 government’s	discourse	to	strengthen	the	reform.	“The	‘natural’	conclusion	to	the	sustained	attack	on	the	 professionalism	 of	 teachers	 was	 the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 need	 for	 greater	accountability”	(Perryman	et	al.,	2011).	At	least	in	part,	this	mutual	suspicion	between	the	central	government	(driver	of	the	RTP)	and	schools	(target	of	the	RTP)	has	informed	the	contested	trajectory	of	school	performance	tables.	
                                                118	Major,	J.	(1992)	Mr.	Major's	Speech.	The	Economist	Conference	on	the	Streamlining	of	the	Public	Sector.	The	Economist,	27	January.	
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2.	The	Trajectory	of	the	Secondary	School	Performance	Tables		
2.1.	Creation	and	Institutionalisation	of	the	Tables	The	 publication	 of	 the	 tables	 was	 promised	 on	 the	 Parent’s	 Charter	 1991,	 which	“…signalled	the	start	of	an	information	revolution	to	extend	parental	choice	and	raise	standards”.119	Besides	access	 to	 the	performance	 tables	 for	 local	 schools,	 the	Charter	guaranteed	to	give	parents	access	to	four	other	documents	to	increase	their	role	on	their	children’s	 education:	 a	 report	 on	 their	 child's	 progress	 at	 least	 once	 a	 year,	 regular	reports	on	their	school	from	independent	inspectors,	a	prospectus	or	brochure	about	individual	schools,	and	an	annual	report	from	the	school's	governors.120	Despite	a	range	of	existing	data	to	compare	schools	against	one	another,	the	focus	of	the	government,	and	then	of	the	media,	was	the	GCSE,	given	that	the	exam	measured	performance	at	the	end	 of	 compulsory	 education.	 Of	 the	 GCSE	 indicators	 produced	 to	 measure	 school	performance,	the	main	focus	was	on	the	percentage	of	students	who	scored	five	or	more	high	grades	 (A*,	A,	B	and	C),	 since	 these	 reflected	 the	 standards	 likely	 to	be	used	by	schools	or	colleges	for	students	to	study	General	Certificate	of	Education	Advanced	(GCE	A)	levels	and	then	to	apply	to	universities	(West	and	Pannel,	2000,	pp.	424).	Defining	the	subject	areas	that	were	the	focus	of	the	exams	formed	the	basis	of	school	performance	regulation.		The	examinations	were	also	sources	of	information	for	the	Office	for	Standards	in	Education	(Ofsted)	in	its	inspection	processes.	These	inspections	could	result	in	a	series	of	 consequences	 for	 schools,	 from	 being	 labelled	 satisfactory	 or	 as	 requiring	improvement,	which	could	put	their	existence	into	risk	(West,	2010,	pp.	25).	Moreover,	performing	higher	could	also	be	associated	with	additional	revenue	funding,	given	that	schools	had	a	higher	chance	of	becoming	specialist	schools.121	Two	main	statutory	assessment	methods	were	available	for	testing	students,	i.e.	external	 tests	 and	 teacher	 assessments	 of	 pupils’	 attainment.	 In	 the	 latter,	 “teachers	make	an	assessment	of	each	pupil’s	level	of	attainment	on	the	scale	of	levels	in	relation	
                                                119	Department	for	Education	and	Science	(1991)		120	The	enactment	of	the	Parent’s	Charter	took	place	in	the	political	and	institutional	framework	of	the	Citizen’s	Charter,	adopted	with	the	aim	of	creating	incentives	to	improve	the	delivery	of	public	 services,	 notably	 by	 promoting	 competition,	 privatisation	 and	 raising	 standards	with	measures	such	as	performance	related	payment.	121	Specialist	 schools	are	public	 secondary	schools	designated	 in	1993	with	 the	aim	of	being	centers	 of	 excellence	 in	 specific	 areas,	 and	 benefitted	 from	 public	 funding	 for	 that	 specific	purpose.	 They	 were	 supported	 by	 the	 Labour	 government	 and	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2010	 they	constituted	over	95%	of	secondary	schools	in	England.	
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to	the	attainment	targets	of	the	core	subjects”	(Clarke	and	Gipps,	2000).	Teachers	were	allowed	to	design	the	assessments,	but	certain	practices,	such	as	observation,	regular	informal	assessment	and	examples	of	work,	were	particularly	encouraged.	A	group	or	panel	of	teachers,	experts	and/or	moderators	moderated	teacher	assessments	in	order	to	make	sure	that	they	met	a	common	standard.	Though	teacher	assessments	were	also	publicly	available,	the	league	tables	published	by	the	media	were	based	on	test	results	alone,	proving	their	strength	as	a	regulatory	mechanism.	The	 data	 was	 published	 per	 school	 and	 allowing	 comparison	 with	 the	 Local	Education	 Authority	 (LEA)	 and	 national	 averages,	 both	 featuring	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	indicator	search.	Comparison	is	a	common	practice	used	by	governments	when	they	aim	at	 increasing	 competition	 of	 markets	 or	 reducing	 the	 information	 asymmetry	 of	consumers	to	support	them	in	better	purchases.	It	has	been	persuasively	argued	that	when	opinions	and	abilities	cannot	be	determined	by	reference	to	the	physical	world,	individuals	search	for	comparisons	to	inform	their	decision	making	process	(Festinger,	1954).		This	is	an	important	aspect	of	the	transaction	logic	that	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	two	chapters,	however	it	is	also	applicable	and	relevant	in	the	performance	logic	where	choice	is	available.			The	publication	of	raw	examination	results	caused	immediate	criticism.	Jack	Straw,	Shadow	 Education	 Secretary	 in	 1991,	 categorised	 the	 school	 tables	 as	 ‘crude’	 and	demanded	the	publication	of	a	value	added	measure	that	considered	characteristics	of	intake	 students	 (Reed	 and	 Hallgarten,	 2003).	 In	 1992,	 the	 left-oriented	 daily	 The	
Guardian	 tried	 to	 avoid	 publishing	 the	 GCSE	 and	 league	 tables	 and	 called	 for	 the	publication	of	value	added	analysis	(Maw,	1999).	A	number	of	other	newspapers	warned	about	the	limitations	of	the	tables	as	instruments	of	parental	choice,	but	published	them	anyway	given	 their	 commercial	 value.122	Various	education	practitioners	and	experts	also	 voiced	 concern	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 students’	 intake	measures,	 arguing	 that	 the	performance	measures	did	not	reflect	the	work	done	by	schools.	Scholars	suggested	that	schools’	 intakes	 influenced	 school	 performances	 significantly,	 and	 that	 they	 were	responsible	for	up	to	70-75%	of	school	variation	in	16-year-old	performers	(Thomas,	1998).		Opposition	to	the	assessments	and	publication	of	performance	tables,	i.e.	the	RTP,	also	came	from	some	of	the	targets	of	disclosure.	A	boycott	of	the	national	assessments	was	spearheaded	by	the	National	Union	of	Teachers	(NUT)	and	the	National	Association	of	Schoolmasters	Union	of	Women	Teachers	(NASUWT),	and	involved	all	teacher	unions,	
                                                122	The	Times	Educational	Supplement,	for	example,	introduced	the	school	performance	data	as	“Tables	to	be	served	with	a	pinch	of	salt”.	
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multiple	governing	bodies	and	mass	parental	support.	The	1993	boycotts	started	as	an	opposition	specifically	to	the	English	tests	for	Key	Stage	3	pupils	(14	year	olds,	Year	9)	and	teachers’	overload,	but	the	“wider	opposition	to	the	tests	embraced	a	rejection	of	the	whole	Conservative	market	model	of	education	with	its	reliance	on	crude	school	by	school	comparisons	in	the	form	of	league	tables”	(Coles,	1994).		At	 that	 juncture,	 the	 position	 assumed	 by	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	 tables	was	 a	decisive	factor.	The	government	tried	to	gain	support	from	parents	by	placing	adverts	on	 national	 newspapers,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 urging	 teachers	 and	 governors	 to	enforce	the	law.	When	these	strategies	failed,	the	government	promised	to	slim	down	the	tests	in	the	future.123	But	the	boycott	went	on.	For	1993,	no	performance	tables	were	published.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 boycotts,	 teachers	 were	 able	 to	 influence	 the	government’s	 regulatory	 proposals,	 which,	 in	 response,	 simplified	 the	 national	curriculum	and	suspended	school	performance	tables	at	ages	seven	to	14.	This	was	just	the	first	change	the	tables	would	go	through	among	a	series	of	future	others.	In	 1994,	 an	 updated	 version	 of	 the	 Parent’s	 Charter	 featured	 for	 the	 first	 time	school	results	for	the	GCE	A	(Advanced)	and	AS	(Advanced	Supplementary),	besides	the	core	performance	information.	But	the	real	novelty	was	the	comparative	publication	of	absence	record	for	pupils	of	compulsory	school	age,	lesson	time	and	the	total	number	of	pupils	with	statements	of	special	educational	needs	(SEN).	These	were	essentially	not	the	 type	 of	 data	 that	 could	 help	 parents	 assess	 the	 value	 added	 by	 each	 school	 in	students’	performance,	such	as	socioeconomic	information	or	the	performance	of	intake	students	 (West	 and	 Pannel,	 2000,	 pp.	 432).	 First	 of	 all,	 they	 did	 not	 feature	 on	newspapers’	league	tables.	Moreover,	their	impact	on	school	performances	was	dubious.	Attendance	was	very	much	related	to	students’	socio-economic	background,	which	was	itself	 related	 to	 students’	 performance	 (O’Keeffe,	 1994).	 With	 regards	 to	 special	educational	needs,	although	the	government	claimed	that	schools	with	more	than	two	per	 cent	 of	 pupils	 with	 special	 needs	 could	 impact	 examination	 results,	 research	suggested	 that	 it	 was	 unrelated	 to	 GCSE	 passes	 and,	 consequently,	 to	 school	performances	(West	et	al.,	1999).	In	reality,	the	newly	disclosed	sets	of	information	supported	another	goal	of	the	government’s	complimentary	educational	agenda.	Whereas	transparency	was	claimed	by	 the	government	 to	be	a	 tool	 to	 inform	choice,	 it	also	supported	government	 in	 its	regulation	of	schools.	This	was	clearly	stated	by	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	and	Employment	on	his	foreword	to	the	1994	National	Pupil	Absence	Tables:		
                                                123	Baker,	M.	(2009)	School	tests	boycott:	Déjà	vu?	BBC.	27	march.	
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The	 Government	 believes	 that	 all	 schools	 -	maintained	 and	 independent,	primary	and	secondary	-	should	pay	particular	attention	to	maintaining	high	levels	of	attendance.	We	recognise	that	many	factors	contribute	to	irregular	attendance	and	that	some	of	these	-	notably	family	problems	-	lie	outside	the	direct	control	of	schools.	Nevertheless,	every	unjustified	absence	is	a	serious	matter	 because	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 precious	 learning	 time	 and	 needs	 to	 be	properly	investigated.124		Just	 before	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Conservative	 government,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	Education	 and	 Employment	 announced	 that	 a	 research	 conducted	 by	 the	 DfEE	 had	concluded	that	two	thirds	of	parents,	whose	children	were	being	enrolled	in	secondary	schools	for	the	first	time,	had	consulted	the	tables.	For	the	first	time	it	also	declared	that	the	tables	should	be	one	of	many	sources	of	information,	listing	as	additional	sources	the	individual	school	prospectuses,	governors’	annual	reports	and	inspection	reports	by	the	Office	 for	Standards	 in	Education	(Ofsted),	 some	of	which,	as	already	mentioned,	reinforced	the	use	of	the	exam	results.		Ever	since	their	inception,	non-performance	related	information	about	schools	in	the	tables	has	seen	very	little	change.	These	were,	namely,	address	and	telephone,	type	of	school	(county	school,	voluntary	aided	school,	independent,	etc.),	admissions	policy,	whether	for	girls	only,	boys	only	or	co-ed,	and	the	age	range.	Overall,	it	was	the	classes	of	information,	which	related	to	the	performance,	that	were	subject	to	changes.		
2.2.	Contextualisation	of	performance	information	Elected	 in	 1997,	 the	 Labour	 Party	 government	 (or,	New	Labour)	 expressed	 a	 strong	commitment	to	make	education	one	of	its	main	priorities.	Following	in	the	footsteps	of	his	 two	 Conservative	 predecessors,	 Prime	Minister	 Tony	 Blair	 supported	 the	 league	tables.	“This	was	the	first	signal	from	Blair”,	argues	Barber,	that	“in	reforming	the	public	services,	education	included,	he	would	place	himself	firmly	on	the	side	of	the	consumer	rather	than	the	producer”	(Barber,	2007,	p.	22).	The	New	Labour,	in	other	words,	would	maintain	the	British	government’s	old	commitment	to	quasi-market	in	education.	In	his	White	Paper,	titled	Excellence	in	Schools,	presented	to	parliament	two	months	after	the	Labour	 government	 took	 office,	 the	 Secretary	 for	 Education	 and	 Employment	highlighted	 an	 underperformance	 by	 UK	 students,	 both	 compared	 to	 national	expectations	 and	 international	 standards.	 The	 document	 also	 emphasised	 the	significant	inequality	within	the	English	educational	system,	in	which	excellence	at	the	
                                                124	Shephard,	G.	(1994)	Foreword	of	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Education.	National	Pupil	Absence	
Tables	1994.	
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top	was	not	matched	with	high	standards	for	the	majority	of	English	children.		Schools’	education	standards	were	thus	once	again	at	the	centre	of	the	educational	policy,	albeit	with	a	new	emphasis	on	more	egalitarian	standards	of	performance,	an	ideal	arguably	as	strong	as	accountability	in	its	normative	weight	(also	rooted	in	Layer	1),	and	that	would	be	reflected	in	the	evolution	of	the	RTP.	To	support	higher	levels	of	standards,	New	Labour	defended	and	maintained	the	publication	of	 the	performance	tables,	and	expanded	the	number	and	nature	of	the	information	disclosed.125	Amongst	an	ambitious	list	of	goals	to	be	reached	by	2002,	the	White	Paper	on	Education	asserted	that	“School	performance	tables	will	be	more	useful,	showing	the	rate	of	progress	pupils	have	made	as	well	as	their	absolute	levels	of	achievement”	and	“Better	information	will	be	 provided	 for	 parents”.	During	New	Labour’s	 first	 term	 in	 government,	 “standards	matter	more	than	structures”	(Barber,	2007,	p.	23)	was	the	prevailing	philosophy	for	the	education	area.	The	 public	 discourse	 of	 New	 Labour	 concerning	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 tables	 just	partially	broadened	that	of	the	previous	government.	While	the	use	of	tables	for	school	choice	 was	 supported	 and	 recommended,	 parents	 were	 also	 encouraged	 to	 engage	directly	with	schools	in	order	to	support	their	progress	and	that	of	their	own	children.	However,	 the	performance	 tables	were	unlikely	 to	 serve	as	an	 instrument	 for	debate	about	 education	 in	 England,	 given	 the	 possibility	 of	 choice	 together	 with	 the	comparative	 information	published.	Hirschman	suggested	 that	 the	presence	of	 ready	alternatives	to	a	badly	performing	service	makes	it	less,	rather	than	more,	likely	that	the	weakness	of	the	services	will	be	fought	rather	than	indulged.	“The	presence	of	a	ready	and	satisfactory	substitute	for	the	services	public	enterprise	offers	merely	deprives	it	of	a	 precious	 feedback	 mechanism	 that	 operates	 at	 its	 best	 when	 the	 customers	 are	securely	locked	in”	(Hirschman,	1970,	pp.	44).	Not	even	when	citizens	are	locked	in	with	a	provider,	however,	is	voice	guaranteed,	as	other	variables	influence	voice	(James	and	Moseley,	2014,	pp.	504-505).	This	would	especially	be	the	case	if	teachers	were	feeling	overloaded	with	tests	to	mark	and	classes	to	prepare.	In	the	case	of	New	Labour	and	the	performance	tables,	parents’	channels	for	voice	were	 not	 linked	 to	 the	 tables	 nor	 were	 parents	 ensured	 that	 their	 complaints	 and	considerations	about	how	their	children’s	school	worked	would	be	used	for	schools	to	improve	their	outcomes.	New	Labour’s	practice	prioritised	choice,	including	developing	guidance	 for	 choice	advisers.126	While	up	 to	1994	New	Labour	attacked	 the	national	
                                                125	 The	 tables	 were	 maintained	 in	 spite	 of	 alleged	 demoralisation	 of	 schools	 working	 in	disadvantaged	areas	appearing	at	the	bottom	of	rankings	time	and	again.	126	See	for	ex.,	The	Schools	White	Paper:	Higher	Standards,	Better	Schools	for	All,	Volume	I.	
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curriculum	as	a	tool	to	command	what	ought	to	be	taught,	 the	slimming	down	of	the	curriculum	after	the	1993	boycotts	had	served	as	a	political	agreement	about	the	kind	of	 knowledge	every	 student	was	 entitled	 to	have	 (Tomlinson,	2001,	pp.	 82-83).	New	Labour	 increased	 the	 regulation	 of	 schools	 and	 teachers,	 linking	 their	 promotion	 to	performance	indicators,	which	were	related	to	student	performances	(Perryman	et	al.,	2011).	The	government’s	first	attempt	to	contextualise	the	comparative	raw	performance	information	came	with	the	publication	of	the	yearly	progress	of	school	performances	in	1997.	Instead	of	simply	providing	information	on	school	performances	for	that	one	year,	the	government	published	these	along	with	the	performance	of	the	previous	three	years,	both	 in	 tables	 and,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 in	 charts.	 The	 idea	 was	 to	 highlight	 schools’	individual	progress	 instead	of	 just	 raw	comparative	performance	with	other	 schools,	which	the	government	argued	was	dependent	on	a	number	of	factors	not	yet	introduced	into	the	tables,	notably	the	students’	socio-economic	status.	Moreover,	the	intention	was	to	rate	schools	on	the	progress	made	by	students	between	their	Key	Stage	3	National	Curriculum	Tests	at	age	14	and	their	GCSE	examinations	two	years	later.	Along	with	the	progress	of	each	school’s	performance,	information	on	the	progress	of	performance	of	Local	Education	Authority	and	for	England	(in	charts)	were	also	presented.127	The	initial	design	of	 the	proposed	 indicator	had	 to	be	amended	to	 take	on	board	criticism	from	head	teachers	that	it	was	unfair	to	ignore	the	progress	schools	had	made	on	students	below	age	14.	Though	motivated	by	considerations	of	fairness,	the	practical	impact	and	utility	of	the	new	indicator	on	parents’	decision	making	process	remained	open	to	debate.	For	one,	the	media	hardly	picked	up	on	the	new	indicator,	continuing	to	report	mainly	the	raw	 comparative	 data	 across	 schools,	 gradually	making	 society	 grow	 accustomed	 to	these	 numbers,	 whether	 intentionally	 or	 not.	 Secondly,	 numerous	 studies	 have	concluded	that,	while	benchmarking	the	performance	of	an	organisation	against	its	own	past	 does	 add	 valuable	 perspective	 on	 the	 progress	 achieved,	 comparative	benchmarking	 against	 the	 performance	 of	 other	 organisations	 ultimately	 creates	greater	 impact	 on	 and	 utility	 for	 decision-making	 (Ammons	 and	 Edwards,	 2008;	Charbonneau	 and	 Van	 Ryzin,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 as	 the	 government	 added	 contextual	information	without	stopping	the	publication	raw	performance	information,	it	could	be	expected	that	usage	of	raw	information	would	still	be	stronger	than	that	of	the	newly	disclosed	data.	
                                                127	In	1997,	the	results	of	‘GCSE	short	courses’	were	introduced	to	the	tables	for	the	first	time.	These	had	the	same	academic	standard	as	a	full	GCSE,	but	half	its	content.	
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During	the	same	period,	the	government	introduced	another	measure	to	compare	school	 performances:	 the	 average	 GSCE	 performance	 of	 schools.	 Some	 scholars	 of	education	considered	the	new	indicator	more	preferable	to	the	existing	measure	that	highlighted	 the	 percentage	 of	 students	 that	 scored	 high	 grades,	 because	 the	 former	considered	 achievements	 of	 all	 students	 and	 could	 theoretically	 keep	 teachers	 from	selectively	focusing	on	students	at	the	threshold	of	achieving	high	grades,	at	the	expense	of	 those	 above	 or	 below.	 Once	 again,	 however,	 the	 media	 largely	 ignored	 the	 new	indicator,	not	giving	it	the	platform	to	become	widely	advertised	and	popularised,	while	at	 the	 same	 time	 reinforcing	 the	 initial	 trajectory	 of	 the	RTP.	 In	 fact,	 a	 report	 of	 the	National	Audit	Office	found	that	much	of	the	national	attention	on	school	performances,	including	 judgements	 of	 the	Ofsted,	were	 based	 on	 students’	 raw	 exams	 results	 and	pointed	 to	 the	 need	 for	 contextualisation	 to	 accurately	 reflect	 the	 performance	 of	schools	(National	Audit	Office,	2003).		While	there	is	no	comprehensive	study	available	from	1998	to	illustrate	how	each	of	 the	prominent	British	newspapers	covered	 the	performance	of	 secondary	schools,	Maw	 (1999,	 p.	 6)	 showed	 that	 the	 same	 type	 of	 information	 disclosure	 for	 primary	schools	had	led	to	renewed	emphasis	on	reporting	based	on	raw	results	of	exams.	The	
Daily	 Mail	 presented	 the	 raw	 scores	 for	 English,	 mathematics	 and	 science	 without	contextualisation.	The	Times	School	Report	presented	the	schools’	performance	based	on	 exams,	 including	 a	 list	 of	 best	 and	 worst	 performing	 schools.	 It	 also	 presented	complementary	information	on	improvement	in	English	in	each	LEA,	showing	that	some	of	the	low	performing	LEA	had	made	significant	progress.	The	Independent	published	the	 performance	 information	 by	 local	 authorities	 and	 facilitated	 ranking	 of	 schools,	whereas	The	Guardian	and	The	Times	Educational	Supplement	opted	for	an	alphabetical	order	 following	 articles	 expressing	 the	 newspapers’	 reservations	 regarding	 the	methodological	soundness	of	the	measures	and	potentially	negative	effects	of	the	tables.		
2.3.	Internalisation	of	Concerns	About	Fairness	In	his	first	term	in	office,	Prime	Minister	Tony	Blair	embraced	school	performance	tables	with	 a	 similar	 vigour	 with	 which	 his	 Conservative	 predecessors	 had	 created	 them.	Blair’s	 second	 term	 proved	 no	 different.	 The	 type	 of	 changes	 promoted	 by	 the	government	to	ensure	their	sustainability	were	reflections	of	the	changes	made	in	the	national	 curriculum,	 evolutions	 towards	 value	 added	 and	 fairer	 measurement	 for	schools’	 performances,	 adjustments	 in	 response	 to	 unintended	 consequences,	 and	editions	 and	 exceptions	 to	 support	 other	 aspects	 of	 the	 government’s	 educational	agenda.	An	example	of	the	last	point	is	an	adjustment	made	to	the	tables	in	year	2000	linked	 to	 the	 government’s	 agenda	 of	 “social	 inclusion”.	 In	 order	 not	 to	 discourage	
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applications	from	overseas	pupils	with	little	or	no	English,	pupils	that	had	been	admitted	in	 schools	 in	 the	previous	 two	years	 from	a	 country	where	English	was	not	 the	 first	language	could	be	excluded	from	the	tables,	even	though	these	students	were	still	part	of	the	national	assessment	process.	The	initiative	stemmed	from	the	concern	that	these	students	could	drag	schools	down	on	the	performance	tables,	and	therefore	reduce	the	enrolment	rate	of	foreigners.128	For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 2000	 value	 added	 information	 was	 published	 for	 a	 small	sample	of	schools	being	piloted,	 in	an	attempt	 to	accommodate	criticisms	 to	 the	raw	measure.	The	pilot	measured	and	presented	the	test	results	of	KS3	(English,	Math	and	Science)	exams	and	the	value	added	from	Key	Stage	2	(KS2)	to	Key	Stage	3	(KS3)	and	from	KS3	to	GCSE/GNVQ	of	all	schools	that	volunteered	to	participate.	The	measurement	had	been	proposed	by	the	School	Curriculum	and	Assessment	Authority	(SCAA),	which	had	 “found	 that	 the	 best	 predictor	 of	 future	 performance	 was	 a	 pupil's	 previous	attainment	regardless	of	other	factors”	and,	thus,	uniquely	used	students’	performance	data	to	calculate	the	performance	indicators	that	parents	should	look	into	for	deciding	where	to	enrol	their	children.129	Value	added	in	the	pilot	exercise	was	calculated	as	the	difference	between	pupils’	GCSE/GNVQ	(General	National	Vocational	Qualification)	total	point	score	and	the	median	GCSE/GNVQ	point	score	for	all	pupils	with	a	similar	average	Key	Stage	3	score.		In	the	White	Paper	Schools	Achieving	Success,	published	in	2001,	the	government	defined	floor	targets	for	secondary	education	in	England.	According	to	these,	all	schools	were	expected	to	have	at	least	20%	of	their	students	achieving	five	or	more	A*—C	grade	GCSEs	 by	 2004	 and	 at	 least	 25%	 by	 2006.	 These	 marks	 were	 references	 for	 the	government	 to	 identify	 and	 take	 measures	 to	 support	 schools	 facing	 challenging	circumstances	to	achieve	such	targets.	Similar	to	the	previous	Conservative	government,	these	targets	were	not	reflected	on	the	performance	tables,	in	which	the	references	were	made	to	the	progress	measures	of	the	schools	(showing	the	percentage	of	15	year	olds	who	achieved	five	or	more	A*-C	grades	and	no	A*-G	grade	passes	in	the	targeted	year	and	the	three	previous	ones),	compared	to	others	in	the	LEA	and	England.	Though	New	Labour	 edited	 the	measures	 used	 in	 school	 performance	 tables	 and	 the	 information	published	in	the	tables	in	order	to	avoid	unintended	consequences	that	could	disrupt	its	policies	on	the	educational	sector,	it	preserved	the	use	of	the	tables	to	inform	choice	and	to	regulate	teaching.	As	suggested	by	Perryman	et	al.	(2011,	p.	182),	since	2000	
                                                128	Another	example	is	the	introduction	of	a	science	indicator	in	the	tables	in	2007,	presenting	the	percentage	of	 students	 in	 each	 school	 at	 the	end	of	KS4,	 in	 support	of	 the	government’s	agenda	in	innovation	and	development.	129	Note	of	the	DfE	for	the	1998	School	performance	tables.		
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	 Teaching	 is	 framed	 and	 driven	 by	 the	 National	 Curriculum	 and	 a	performance	 framework	 that	 is	 backed	 up	 by	 performance	management,	pay	 and	 target-setting.	 Evidence	 about	 performance	 is	 based	 on	 pupil	outcomes,	classroom	observation	and	personal	statements.	Pupils	become	objects	and	targets	and	the	headteacher	and	senior	management	team	are	publicly	 accountable.	 ‘Each	 move	 makes	 the	 next	 thinkable,	 feasible	 and	acceptable’.			Reflecting	 the	 market-oriented	 approach	 to	 education,	 teachers	 were	 eligible	 for	performance-related	 pay,	 and	 they	 could	 be	 assessed	 based	 on	 their	 students’	 exam	results;	 schools	 were	 eligible	 for	 Ofsted’s	 light	 touch	 regulation,	 performance	management	for	head	teachers,	and	teachers’	applications	for	Advanced	Skills	Teacher	status	(Mansell,	2011,	p.	295).	Government	might	have	been	open	to	publishing	more	information	to	clarify	the	value	added	of	schools,	but	not	to	scrap	the	tables.	After	Northern	Ireland	and	Wales	scrapped	their	own	school	performance	tables	in	2001,	the	National	Association	of	Head	Teachers	(NAHT)	issued	a	statement	arguing	that	"It	is	time	that	the	Government	saw	sense	and	got	rid	of	league	tables,	which	are	flawed	and	which	simply	do	not	present	a	fair	picture	to	parents	or	to	the	general	public".130	Likewise,	the	head	of	the	NUT	told	
The	 Telegraph	 that	 "with	 new	 pay	 and	 conditions	 and	 a	 35-hour	 working	 week	 in	Scotland	 and	 with	 performance	 tables	 removed	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	 Wales,	increasingly	 it	 will	 appear	 that	 teachers	 in	 England	 are	 being	 screwed	 down".	 Not	bowing	 to	 pressure	 and	 pretty	 much	 closing	 the	 subject,	 a	 spokesperson	 for	 the	Department	for	Education	announced	that	the	tables	would	be	continued	in	England,	adding	 that	 "Ministers	 here	 are	 fully	 committed	 to	 the	 continued	 publication	 of	performance	 tables	which	provide	valuable	 information	 for	parents	on	performance,	which	is	an	essential	part	of	our	standards	agenda".131	The	moves	against	the	tables	in	Northern	Island	and	Wales	were	results	of	consultations	that	did	not	provide	evidence	of	overall	support	for	the	tables,	and	immediately	led	English	teachers’	unions	to	call	for	abandonment	of	 the	 tables	 in	England.	A	decade	on,	Wales	 reintroduced	a	 system	of	schools’	 performance	 disclosure,	 “to	 drive	 up	 performance	 in	 all	 schools”	 (Welsh	Government,	2011).	Two	 years	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 New	 Labour’s	major	 innovation	 –	 the	 value	added	measure	–	to	the	performance	tables,	the	government	published	a	KS4	Contextual	
                                                130	Lightfoot,	L.	(2001)	Wales	scraps	'unfair'	school	league	tables.	The	Telegraph,	21	July.	131	 Thornton,	 K.	 (2001)	 Northern	 Ireland	 scraps	 'divisive'	 league	 tables.	TES	 Newspaper,	 12	January.	
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Value	Added	 (CVA)	Pilot.	 In	 this	 contextual	version,	 the	measure	considered,	besides	prior	 attainment,	 gender,	 mobility	 and	 levels	 of	 deprivation,	 factors	 identified	 as	influencing	pupil	performances	outside	the	schools’	own	control.	In	theory	this	measure	could	be	more	relevant	for	parents	to	choose	their	children’s	schools	(Allen	and	Burgess,	2011).	These	were	in	large	part	in	response	to	criticisms	of	the	value	added	measure.132		Similar	to	the	value-added	measure,	however,	a	number	of	studies	showed	serious	problems	with	CVA	and	its	use	as	a	tool	of	choice	to	predict	future	performance	and	to	compare	 individual	 schools.	 Moreover,	 at	 least	 one	 research	 showed	 that	 although	comparing	schools	with	others	of	similar	contextual	performance	was	fairer	to	schools,	the	 non-contextual	 comparison	 still	 seemed	 to	 be	 of	 more	 interest	 to	 parents	 and	citizens	 (Charbonneau	 and	 Van	 Ryzin,	 2015,	 p.	 300).	 Despite	 the	 government’s	statement	that	the	“value	added	measure	gives	the	best	indication	[…]	of	schools'	overall	effectiveness”	 the	 media	 continued	 publishing	 their	 school	 league	 tables	 based	 on	schools’	GCSE	data,	often	highlighting	the	best	and	worst	schools	in	England	based	on	such	indicator.	If	on	the	one	hand	the	media	put	in	check	the	new	measures	designed	by	the	 government	 to	 inform	 choice,	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 they	helped	 the	 public	 to	 grow	accustomed	to	the	idea	of	an	‘accountability	system’	based	on	students’	performance.	Moreover,	the	argument	for	continuation	of	publication	of	raw	performance	data	also	came	from	inside	the	government,	including	from	its	Delivery	Unit:			 This	is	why	I	never	accepted	the	idea	put	forward	by	many	in	education	that,	once	we	have	a	measure	of	value	added	or	progress,	this	should	replace	the	raw	data.	 I	have	always	advocated	 the	publication	of	both	 indicators.	The	value	added	figures	show	what	contribution	individual	schools	are	making,	which	is	important;	the	raw	figures	reveal	where	the	biggest	challenges	are	in	 achieving	 universal	 high	 standards	 and	 focus	 the	 system	 on	 those	challenges,	 which	 is	 even	 more	 important.	 By	 laying	 bare	 the	 problems,	league	tables	drive	action.	(Barber,	2007,	p.	96)		New	Labour	had	a	clear	aim	of	advancing	some	of	the	core	aspects	of	the	previous	government’s	 quasi-market	 model	 in	 the	 educational	 sector.	 The	 maintenance	 and	strengthening	 of	 the	 disclosure	 of	 performance	 tables	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 choice	 and	performance	regulation	was	a	significant	part	of	it.	Research	conducted	by	Perryman	et	al.	 (2011)	 in	 four	 English	 secondary	 schools	 conveyed	 the	 views	 of	 English	 and	
                                                132	 Goldstein	 (2003),	 for	 example,	 suggested	 three	 problems	with	 the	 value	 added	measure.	First,	 the	 input	 score	 used	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 indicator	 required	 further	 adjustment.	Second,	 for	small	school	cohorts	 the	confidence	 intervals	needed	to	be	emphasised.	Last,	 the	first	value-added	measure	took	no	account	of	pupils’	mobility,	which	affected	their	performance	and	that	of	schools.	
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mathematics	teachers	after	these	two	subjects	became	part	of	the	GCSE	statistics	for	five	‘good’	 passes	 at	 the	 GCSE.	 The	 authors	 reported	 statements	 that	 the	 schools’	 time	management	 and	 course	 planning	 was	 determined	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 indicators	published	by	the	Department	for	Education	and	Skills.	“I	think	government	knows	what	it	wants,”	one	 teacher	said,	 “it	 says	English	and	maths	because	 that’s	 fundamental	 to	learning	so	we,	as	a	school,	we’re	sort	of	being	pushed	in	that	direction.”133	By	2010,	when	New	Labour	left	government,	schools’	performance	had	become	an	important	information	in	parents’	exercise	of	their	assumed	right	to	know,	meaning	that	besides	the	offer	of	performance	information	there	was	also	demand	for	it.	According	to	the	2010	British	Social	Attitudes	research,	72%	of	British	parents	supported	the	basic	right	to	choose	their	children’s	school,	61%	of	parents	with	children	aged	16	or	under	believed	children	should	be	enrolled	in	“the	nearest	state	school”,	and	41%	of	parents	felt	it	was	acceptable	to	avoid	enrolment	in	the	nearest	state	school	where	this	school’s	exam	performance	was	weaker	than	in	a	school	elsewhere.	Though	the	right	to	choose	did	not	automatically	legitimise	the	existence	of	performance	tables,	it	did	reinforce	one	of	the	tables’	main	raisons	d’être.			
2.4.	Open	data	and	Ofsted’s	Effectiveness	Ratings	Assuming	 office	 in	 2010,	 the	 Conservative–Liberal	 Democrat	 Coalition	 government	placed	the	publication	of	school	performance	tables	as	a	pillar	of	the	education	system,	emphasising	its	potential	to	make	teaching	more	responsive	to	pupils’	progress.	Even	though	 already	by	 this	 time	 a	 long	 list	 of	 adjustments,	 changes	 and	mismatches	had	marked	 the	 life	 of	 the	 performance	 tables,	 and	 studies	 provided	 evidence	 of	 their	unintended	effects,	the	link	between	disclosure	and	schools	performance	remained	tight	(Burgess	et	al.,	2009;	Allen,	Burgess,	and	McKenna,	2014).	Having	advocated	overhauling	the	performance	tables	in	the	run	up	to	the	election,	the	2010	Education	White	Paper	dedicated	a	full	section	to	the	debate	(Department	for	Education,	 2010).	 The	 proposals	 included	 making	 more	 data	 public,	 publishing	information	 on	 expenditures,	 reforming	 tables	 to	 set	 high	 expectations	 for	 pupil	performances,	establishing	a	new	‘floor	standard’	for	primary	and	secondary	schools,	and	making	it	easier	for	schools	to	learn	from	one	another	through	disclosure	of	data	of	
                                                133	Some	of	the	other	declarations	were;	“You	know,	Maths,	English	and	science,	there’s	a	huge	pressure	on	them	because,	obviously,	being	core	subjects,	you	know,	if	they	don’t	get	their-	the	seventy	percent	A	to	C	then	it	has	a	big	impact	on	the	school’s	results	overall.”;	“Naturally	English	and	maths	have	to;	I	think	they	feel	that	they	need	to	be	a	bit-	or	they	are	more	accountable	for	the	 results	 and	 so	 on,	 so	 they	 do	 do	 more	 because	 that’s,	 obviously,	 what	 the	 government	measure	the	results	on.”	(Perryman	et	al.,	2011).	
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schools	in	similar	conditions.		The	performance	tables	published	for	2011	followed	the	Coalition	government’s	agenda	of	Open	Government,	supporting	the	publication	of	a	series	of	the	Department	of	Education’s	existing	sources	of	data	to	the	public.	Alongside	publishing	larger	sets	of	information	on	education,	 the	 same	performance	data	published	by	 the	New	Labour	government	was	made	 available,	 with	 some	modifications.	 From	 2011	 onwards,	 the	government	 introduced	 new	 performance	 indicators	 to	 the	 tables,	 such	 as	 Ofsted’s	overall	 effectiveness	 ratings	 for	 each	 school,	 and	 encouraged	 parents	 to	 refer	 to	 the	tables	 when	 making	 their	 decisions.134	 A	 research	 commissioned	 by	 the	 National	Foundation	for	Educational	Research	had	identified	that	Ofsted	information	had	become	more	relevant	for	parents	than	the	performance	tables	themselves.	The	Ofsted	reports	were	based	on	expert	evaluations	of	schools,	whereas	the	traditional	performance	tables	were	 based	 on	 schools’	 attainment	 information,	 which	 by	 2011	 had	 become	 a	continuously	amended	indicator.	The	use	of	Ofsted	reports	to	inform	parents’	choice	also	seemed	to	outweigh	the	use	 of	 school	 performance	 tables.	 In	 a	 research	 conducted	 for	 the	 NASUWT,	 when	parents	were	asked	the	 five	most	 important	qualities	 they	 looked	for	 in	a	school,	 the	school’s	 standing	 in	 the	 performance	 tables	 was	 mentioned	 in	 only	 21%	 of	 the	answers.135	Featuring	more	prominently	were	the	existence	of	supportive	staff	(54%),	a	good	inspection	report	(39%),	a	track	record	of	dealing	with	bad	behaviour	and	bullying	(38%),	and	good	buildings	and	facilities	(36%).	Similarly,	 in	a	research	conducted	by	NfER	(2015),	the	most	important	factors	for	parents	when	choosing	a	school	were,	in	the	order	of	importance,	(a)	“school	that	most	suits	my	child”;	(b)	location;	(c)	discipline	/	 behaviour	 that	 promotes	 effective	 learning;	 (d)	 Ofsted	 inspection	 rating;	 (e)	 well	qualified	 teachers;	 (f)	 examination	 results;	 (g)	 inclusive	 ethos	 where	 all	 pupils	 are	valued;	(h)	effectiveness	of	schools’	senior	leader	team;	(i)	reputation	for	taking	parents’	view	 into	 account;	 (j)	 links	with	 the	 local	 community;	 (l)	 freedom	 to	make	 decision	about	taught	curriculum.		Ofsted	had	been	publishing	its	inspection	results	on	its	own	page	since	2000,	with	the	 frequency	 of	 inspections	 varying	 over	 time.136	 Between	 2005	 and	 2009,	 Ofsted	
                                                134	In	2011,	schools’	effectiveness	was	categorised	in	four	levels	in	Ofsted	reports,	i.e.	grade	1	(outstanding),	 grade	 2	 (good),	 grade	 3	 (satisfactory	 /	 requires	 improvement),	 grade	 4	(inadequate).	In	2012,	given	changes	in	Ofsted’s	regulation,	‘outstanding’	level	was	only	given	to	schools	with	‘outstanding’	teaching.	135	Burns,	J.	(2015)	'Few	parents	check	league	tables	when	choosing	schools'.	BBC,	9	January.	136	 Ofsted	 (2015)	 Freedom	 of	 Information	 Request	 340668	 [Document	 in	 possession	 of	 the	author]	
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inspected	 all	 schools	 at	 least	 once.	 Subsequently,	 a	 risk	 assessment	 process	 was	introduced	 and	 inspections	 in	 schools	 previously	 judged	 good	 or	 outstanding	 were	extended.	Schools’	performance	informed	the	inspections;	the	national	curriculum	and	the	design	of	the	performance	tables	informed	schools’	performance.	Until	2012,	schools	were	 categorised	 based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	 inspections	 as	 outstanding,	 good,	satisfactory	or	inadequate.137	This	information	was	widely	shared,	including	via	housing	search	websites,	such	as	Watchsted	and	Zoopla,	and	distributed	by	estate	agents	when	showing	 houses	 and	 apartments	 to	 clients	 (Ouston,	 Fidler,	 and	 Earley,	 1997;	 Shaw,	Newton	and	Aitkin,	2003;	Rosenthal,	2004).	Remarkably,	unlike	the	school	performance	tables,	the	contents	of	Ofsted’s	inspection	results	had	only	changed	twice	since	the	time	of	 John	 Major’s	 Conservative	 government,	 although	 the	 conduct	 of	 inspections	 had	changed	more	often.	Similar	to	the	early	days	of	New	Labour,	the	Coalition	government	made	a	series	of	modifications	 to	 the	performance	 tables.	The	nature	of	 the	changes	was	 the	same	as	those	presented	by	the	previous	government.	One	of	the	changes	aimed	at	discouraging	“gaming	 behaviour”,	 wherein	 secondary	 schools	 were	 “changing	 the	 curriculum	 to	embrace	 equivalent	 qualifications	 which	 count	 heavily	 in	 performance	 tables”	(Department	 for	 Education,	 2010a).	 Other	 changes	 aimed	 at	 reviewing	 indicators	 to	further	 the	 government’s	 education	 goals.	 This	 was,	 for	 example,	 the	 reason	 for	revisions	to	the	publication	of	progress	reports	of	disadvantaged	pupils.	According	to	the	DfE	White	Paper	2010,	schools	should	be	“fully	held	to	account	for	using	the	Pupil	Premium	to	raise	 the	achievement	of	eligible	children”.	This	meant	 that	although	 the	education	gap	of	students	with	disadvantaged	backgrounds	was	to	be	actively	narrowed,	students	 from	 economically	 disadvantaged	 backgrounds	 should	 not	 be	 expected	 to	make	less	progress	from	the	starting	point	compared	to	other	pupils.138	Thus,	pupils’	attainment	information	was	not	contextualised	and	displayed	based	on	students’	exam	results.	 This	 was	 achieved	 through	 a	 query	 entitled	 ‘Narrowing	 the	 Gap’,	 providing	comparisons	 of	 a	 range	 of	 attainment	 measures	 of	 disadvantaged	 and	 advantaged	pupils,	and	in	the	Value	Added	(VA)	data,	which	provided	a	measure	of	the	evolution	of	pupils’	progress	from	KS2	to	KS4.139		Notably,	 the	Coalition	government	added	a	control	perspective	 to	 the	 tables,	by	
                                                137	Ofsted’s	effectiveness	judgement	for	schools	went	through	changes	in	its	scale	in	2012,	 in	which	‘satisfactory’	was	replaced	by	‘requires	improvement’.	138	The	government’s	pupil	premium	policy	aimed	at	providing	extra	resources	for	pupils	with	disadvantaged	backgrounds.		139	 For	 2011,	 the	KS4	 average	 point	 score	 and	 value	 added	measures	were	 calculated	 using	students’	best	eight	exam	results,	highlighting	bonuses	for	English	and	mathematics.		
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complementing	it	with	 information	about	government	spending	per	pupil	and	school	workforce.	Spending	per	pupil	included	comparative	(over	time	and	for	the	school,	local	authority	 median,	 greater	 area	 local	 authority	 median,	 and	 national	 median)	information	 about	 grant	 funding,	 self-generated	 income,	 total	 income,	 ICT	 learning	resources,	catering,	and	energy.	School	workforce	information	was	detailed,	including	headcounts	of	all	teachers	and	teaching	assistants	in	a	school,	pupil–teacher	ratio	and	mean	 gross	 salary	 of	 full-time	 teachers.	 Disclosure	 of	 financial	 information	 was	suggested	by	the	government’s	2010	White	Paper	to	promote	greater	transparency	of	schools	and	to	derive	better	value	for	money.	Increase	in	the	financial	transparency	of	schools	was	prompted	at	a	moment	of	review	of	school	funding,	in	which	the	focus	was	on	 increased	 control	 and	 value	 for	 money.	 Government	 also	 started	 comparing	 and	highlighting	schools	that	could	do	more	and	better	with	similar	student	intakes,	which	in	many	cases	also	meant	similar	budgets.		A	few	specific	changes	in	the	tables	were	also	done	to	add	a	new	layer	of	regulation	to	questions	of	 interest	 to	 the	government	and	 indirectly	 related	 to	 the	performance	measures.	 For	 example,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Education	 decided	 to	 retract	 from	publishing	information	on	authorised	and	unauthorised	absence,	making	space	instead	for	 information	of	overall	absence	per	school	and	the	percentage	of	pupils	who	were	persistently	absent,	meaning	those	that	were	absent	from,	no	longer	20%,	but	15%+	of	available	 sessions.	 The	 decision	 to	 retract	 followed	 two	 ideas	 put	 forward	 in	 the	‘Improving	Attendance	at	School’	Report:	first,	that	all	absence	is	negative	for	children’s	education	and,	second,	that	“…	focus	on	unauthorised	absence	deflects	attention	away	from	the	most	important	issue	[of	how	bad	overall	absence	is]”.140		
2.5.	Gaming,	Changes	and	Choice	In	the	summer	of	2012,	the	publication	of	GCSE	results	on	the	tables	caused	immediate	concerns	over	the	GCSE	English	qualifications,	given	a	national	decline	of	1,5%	(from	65.4%	in	2011	to	63.9%	in	2012)	and	a	significant	variability	in	results	at	school	levels	in	 comparison	 to	 previous	 years	 and	 to	 expected	 results.	 These	 results	 triggered	 a	national	debate	about	the	national	exams	and	their	disclosure.141	In	its	first	review	of	the	 case,	 the	 Office	 of	 Qualifications	 and	 Examinations	 Regulation	 (Ofqual),	 the	
                                                140	 The	 report	 was	 commissioned	 to	 Charlie	 Taylor,	 the	 Government’s	 Expert	 Adviser	 on	Behaviour,	exclusively	to	review	the	issue	of	pupils’	attendance	to	school,	that	was	considered	important	enough		141	Many	schools	received	unexpected	results	for	the	GCSE	English	results,	especially	around	the	grade	 C/D	 borderline.	 Grade	 C	 or	 above	 in	 English	 is	 highly	 important	 for	 educational	 and	employment	purposes.	
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independent	body	responsible	for	regulating	exams	and	qualifications,	found	that	the	issue	laid	with	the	January	2012	grade	boundaries,	based	on	a	much	smaller	cohort	of	students,	whose	grades	were	allegedly	marked	optimistically	by	teachers,	damaging	the	introduction	of	“comparable	outcomes”	as	had	been	decided	by	Ofqual	in	2010	for	the	2012	English	exams.	In	November	2012,	more	than	45,000	pupils	re-sat	the	exams.	The	Association	of	School	and	College	Leaders	called	this	move	a	“smokescreen”	to	detract	attention	from	allegations	that	Ofqual	had	put	pressure	on	exam	boards	to	make	sure	that	the	results	from	the	GCSE	English	exams	aligned	with	expectations.142	In	response,	the	 regulator	 claimed	 that	 the	 problem	 was	 with	 the	 marking	 and	 not	 with	 the	introduction	of	its	new	methods	to	grade	the	exams.	A	 week	 before	 Ofqual	 published	 its	 final	 report	 on	 the	 case,	 an	 alliance	 of	 six	professional	 bodies	 launched	 a	 legal	 challenge	 against	 the	 Assessment	 and	Qualifications	 Alliance	 (AQA),	 Edexcel	 (a	 multinational	 education	 and	 examinations	body)	and	Ofqual,	calling	for	a	regrading	of	the	June	results	for	GCSE	English,	and	arguing	that	 the	 decision	 to	 raise	 grade	 boundaries	 “by	 an	 unprecedented	margin”	 between	January	and	June	2012	had	left	10	thousand	pupils	missing	out	a	grade	C	as	a	result	of	changes.	The	 judicial	review	was	concluded	 in	early	2013	 in	 favour	of	 the	examining	bodies	 and	 Ofqual.	 In	 2	 November,	 Ofqual	 restated	 that	 despite	 “unpalatable	consequences”,	examining	and	awarding	had	worked	as	expected	and	flaws	in	the	design	of	 the	GCSE	English	qualifications	were	to	blame	for	high	variations	 in	results.	 In	the	occasion,	 Ofqual	 “pointed	 to	 evidence	 of	 over-marking	 by	 teachers	 on	 controlled	assessment	units”	and	placed	the	fault	for	the	incident	in	four	features	of	the	assessment	process,	 namely,	 “the	 modular	 structure	 with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 flexibility,	 the	 high	proportion	 of	 controlled	 assessment	 and	 generous	 standard	 marking	 tolerances,	 all	combined	with	significant	pressures	from	the	school	accountability	system”	(Education	Committee,	2013).143	
                                                142	An	exchange	of	letters	between	Ofqual	and	Edexcel,	one	of	the	examination	boards,	leaked	to	the	media,	 showing	 that	Ofqual	 had	put	 pressure	 on	 the	 latter	 to	 produce	 results	 that	were	closer	to	expectations,	as	had	been	the	case	with	other	awarding	bodies.	See,	for	example:	The	Guardian	 (2012)	 Exam	 board	 'pressed	 by	 Ofqual	 to	 alter	 GCSE	 grades'.	 The	 Guardian,	 11	September.	143	In	Glenys	Stacey’s	participation	in	the	oral	evidence	taken	before	the	Education	Committee	of	the	House	of	Commons	in	March	2013,	the	Chief	Executive	of	Ofqual,	Glenys	Stacey,	also	stated	“I	 think	 one	 of	 the	 key	 lessons	 from	GCSE	 English	 is	 that	 decisions	 about	 the	 design	 of	 the	qualification	and	the	detailed	design	of	assessment	need	to	be	made	in	the	real	world,	with	a	recognition	of	not	simply	what	is	regarded	as	best	assessment	practice	but	how	that	might	play	out	in	the	real	world	of	schools.	This	is	why	we	are	so	keenly	interested	in	the	government’s	current	 proposals	 for	 accountability.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 threshold	 grade	measure	 is	 still	 to	remain	central	to	accountability	in	mathematics	and	in	English,	we	will	have	to	take	that	into	account	in	the	design	rules	for	the	qualifications”.	
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Following	the	scandals,	in	September	2012	the	government	announced	a	plan	to	scrap	the	GCSEs	in	favour	of	a	new	English	Baccalaureate	(EBacc)	for	16	year	olds,	in	which	only	one	examining	board	would	grade	each	subject.	In	order	to	stop	the	“race	to	the	bottom”,	as	put	by	the	Secretary	for	Education	in	reference	to	exam	boards	being	tempted	to	offer	easier	qualifications,	the	government	intended	to	introduce	an	exam	which	would	be	more	demanding	than	the	GCSEs.	The	plan	was	vocally	criticised	by	a	diverse	range	of	interest	groups,	among	them	exam	boards,	teachers’	unions,	arts	groups	(given	the	lack	of	arts	subjects	in	the	core	EBacc	curriculum),	Ofqual,	a	number	of	MPs	and,	most	importantly,	the	Liberal	Democrats,	i.e.	criticisms	from	within	the	coalition.		With	the	result	of	exam	data	and	the	performance	tables	being	tied	to	one	another	since	inception,	then	chief	of	Ofqual,	Glenys	Stacey,	warned	the	Secretary	of	Education	of	the	problems	that	would	potentially	arise	when	using	data	provided	by	the	English	Baccalaureate.	Stacey	suggested	that	the	revised	English	GCSEs	in	the	previous	summer	showed	 “how	 school	 acceptance	 of	 outcomes	 can	 be	 damaged	 when	 unexpected	variations	 occur".	 She	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 new	 exam	 would	 lead	 to	 more	 limited	teaching	 and	 was	 not	 “ideally	 suited	 to	 forming	 the	 sole	 basis	 for	 accountability	measurement".144	In	practice,	the	EBacc	would	have	made	it	very	difficult	for	any	school	to	demonstrate	any	improvement.	The	government’s	plan	was	scrapped	in	early	2013.	Fiona	 Millar,	 an	 English	 education	 campaigner	 and	 journalist,	 suggested	 that	 the	government’s	 U-turn	was	 somehow	 “related	 to	 the	 accountability	 process”	 and	 “the	impact	 that	 the	 results	 would	 have	 had	 on	 the	 perceptions	 of	 the	 public	 for	 some	schools”.145		The	 retreat	 of	 the	GCSEs	did	not	mean	 the	 end	of	 reforms	 for	 the	 examination	system	and	for	performance	tables.	On	the	contrary,	both	underwent	new	changes	as	the	government	abandoned	the	idea	of	the	EBacc.	For	schools’	“accountability	system”	two	new	 measures	 were	 adopted:	 the	 percentage	 of	 pupils	 in	 each	 school	 reaching	 an	attainment	 threshold	 in	 the	 vital	 core	 subjects	 of	 English	 and	 mathematics,	 and	 an	average	point	score	showing	how	much	progress	every	student	had	made	between	Key	Stage	 2	 and	 Key	 Stage	 4	 across	 a	 range	 of	 subjects.	 The	 regulatory	 focus	 of	 the	government	was	stable.	The	 Department	 for	 Education	 initiated	 a	 consultation	 process	 about	 the	‘Secondary	School	Accountability’	in	2013,	mostly	in	anticipation	of	changes	that	would	be	made	to	reflect	the	modifications	in	the	qualifications	taught	from	2015	and	exams	
                                                144	Walker,	P.	(2012)	Michael	Gove	warned	by	exams	watchdog	to	rethink	EBacc.	The	Guardian.	5	December.	145	Millar,	F.	(2015)	Interview	on	15	December	2015.	[Recording	in	possession	of	author]	
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taken	from	2017	onwards	(Department	for	Education,	2013).	Acknowledging	that	“the	accountability	system	has	too	many	perverse	 incentives	and	can	distort	 teaching	and	narrow	 the	 curriculum”,	 the	DfE	 consultation	 document	 proposed	 the	 publication	 of	more	data	from	the	National	Pupil	Database,	the	creation	of	a	new	School	Performance	Data	 Portal	with	 all	 the	 information	 about	 schools,	 and	 preservation	 of	measures	 of	progress	(changed	to	show	how	pupils	had	performed	compared	to	expectations	at	the	end	 of	 Key	 Stage	 4	 considering	 their	 starting	 point),	 including	 the	 performance	 gap	between	 advantaged	 and	 disadvantaged	 pupils,	 and	 expectations	 about	 schools’	performance,	based	on	a	new	‘average	point	score	8’	measure.146		After	the	consultation	process	the	DfE	dropped	the	idea	of	publishing	a	threshold	attainment	measure	showing	the	percentage	of	pupils	achieving	a	C	grade	in	English	and	mathematics,	due	to	a	significant	number	of	concerns	raised	by	respondents,	including	by	Ofqual	and	other	assessment	experts.	The	criticism	was	that	this	would	continue	to	incentivise	“schools	to	target	teaching	resources	towards	a	small	number	of	pupils	close	to	a	‘borderline’	in	English	and	mathematics”	(Department	for	Education,	2013a).	They	suggested	 adopting	 the	 renewed	 accountability	 system	 from	 2016	 onwards,	 as	reforming	 the	 system	earlier	would	distort	 results,	with	 pupils	 having	 already	made	their	curriculum	choices	leading	to	the	2015	exams.		The	two	years	in	between	the	decision	and	implementation	of	the	tables’	proposed	reforms	were	dedicated	to	the	implementation	of	the	previous	government	decisions	to	the	 tables.	One	of	 them,	 in	2013,	was	a	measure	of	 ‘similar	 schools’,	 comparing	each	school’s	performance	with	55	other	schools	where	the	government	divided	information	for	pupils	with	similar	prior	attainment,	and	showing	the	school’s	relative	performance.	Comparison	among	schools	of	the	same	group	is	a	visual	way	to	contextualise	schools,	except	that	instead	of	adding	a	new	variable	to	an	indicator	it	excludes	pairs	that	are	in	practice	 different.	 In	 practice,	 this	 initiative	 resembled	 the	 Contextual	 Value	 Added	initiative	adopted	by	New	Labour.	In	 2014,	 in	 a	 retrenchment	 to	 the	 New	 Labour	 expansion	 of	 vocational	qualifications	 considered	 in	 the	 performance	 tables,	 the	 government	 supported	 the	perspective	voiced	earlier	by	Professor	Alison	Wolf,	a	public	policy	expert,	that	England	needed	 “a	 single	 list	 of	 good	 qualifications,	 which	 all	 have	 the	 same	 key	 structural	
                                                146	To	avoid	excessive	 focus	on	English	and	mathematics,	 the	average	point	score	8	measure	would	 reflect	 one	 slot	 each	 for	English	 and	mathematics;	 and	 three	 slots	 reserved	 for	 other	EBacc	subjects:	sciences,	computer	science,	geography,	history	and	languages.	The	remaining	three	slots	could	be	taken	up	by	further	qualifications	from	the	range	of	EBacc	subjects,	or	any	other	high	value	arts,	academic,	or	vocational	qualifications	(as	set	out	on	the	Department’s	list	of	vocational	qualifications	approved	for	inclusion	in	performance	tables).	
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characteristics,	 but	 cover	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 content.	 They	 need	 to	 be	 stretching,	standardised,	and	to	fit	easily	into	a	typical	pupil's	programme	and	into	a	school's	overall	timetable”.147	Wolf’s	review	of	vocational	education	estimated	that	from	2004	to	2010	non-GCSE	and	GNVQ	achieved	at	the	end	of	KS4	in	all	schools	had	risen	from	around	15	to	809	thousand.	Disregarding	criticisms	from	groups	that	no	longer	had	their	activities	counted	for	the	performance	tables,	such	as	the	Religious	Education	Council	of	England	and	Wales,	the	government	reduced	the	number	of	qualifications	reflected	on	the	tables	from	3,175	 to	125,	with	vocational	 and	academic	qualifications	displayed	 separately,	thereby	reclaiming	regulatory	powers	over	the	vocational	qualifications.	The	Coalition	government	gave	way	to	a	Conservative	government	following	the	general	election	of	2015.	Through	the	course	of	that	year,	new	and	unexpected	changes	made	on	the	performance	tables	led	to	renewed	criticisms	that	continuous	changes	in	metrics	 displayed	 on	 the	 tables	 did	 not	 allow	 the	 education	 community	 to	 properly	monitor	the	performance	of	schools.	In	a	new	push	towards	the	Coalition	government’s	agenda	on	education	performance,	the	DfE	phased	in	toughened	GCSEs	and	disregarded	old	ones	in	the	league	tables.	This	was	done	against	the	wishes	of	many	schools,	which	had	run	three-year	GCSE	programmes	(starting	in	Year	9,	with	some	exams	being	taken	in	 Year	 10	 and	 others	 in	 Year	 11)	 and	 expected	 that	 upcoming	 GCSEs	 to	 cover	unreformed	 older	 courses.	 According	 to	 the	 National	 Union	 of	 Teachers,	 the	government’s	 move	 made	 "yesterday's	 success	 story	 […]	 today's	 failure”	 without	improving	the	quality	of	a	single	school.148	Despite	criticisms,	continued	uncertainties	and	 constant	 changes,	 the	 tables	maintained	 their	place	at	 the	 core	of	 the	education	system,	 supporting	 the	 daily	 adoption	 of	 a	 standardised	 curriculum	 and	 the	 yearly	choice	of	parents.		
Conclusion	School	performance	tables	were	inaugurated	in	England	with	a	lot	of	protest	from	their	targets,	 and	 they	 remain	 controversial	 more	 than	 twenty	 years	 later.	 Since	 their	adoption,	 the	 tables	 went	 through	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 changes,	 only	 the	 most	relevant	of	 them	being	 included	 in	 this	 chapter.	As	described,	 these	 changes	were	of	different	 natures.	 Variations	 included	 the	 internalisation	 of	 different	 perspectives	 of	what	 indicators	better	 reflected	 schools’	performance	 (value	added,	 contextual	value	
                                                147	 Richardson,	 H.	 (2012)	 Most	 GCSE	 equivalents	 axed	 from	 school	 league	 tables.	 BBC,	 31	January.	148	Richardson,	H.;	Sellgren,	K.	(2015)	School	league	tables	branded	a	'nonsense'	amid	changes.	
BBC,	29	January.		
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added,	or	raw	indicators	presented	in	a	set	of	schools	with	similar	context),	the	support	to	some	of	the	government’s	initiatives	(display	of	prizes’	symbols	given	by	the	central	government	for	high	performing	units,	or	increasing	control	over	schools’	budgets),	and	the	 decrease	 of	 gaming	 (by	 publishing	 information	 on	 the	 average	 performance	 of	schools	instead	of	the	number	of	students,	for	example),	to	name	a	few.	However,	the	publication	of	 raw	data	 about	 the	exams	have	 remained	 stable,	with	 complementary	data	being	disclosed.	These	variations	were	not	random,	instead	they	reflect	the	high	intensity	of	central	government	(driver)	towards	regulation	through	transparency,	as	well	as	that	of	schools,	head	 teachers	 and	 teachers	 (targets)	 in	 contesting	 the	 specific	 design	 of	 the	 RTP.	Because	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic	can	increase	the	ability	of	central	governments	to	 regulate	 the	outcome	pursued	by	decentralised	policy	units,	 the	driver	has	a	high	stake	in	ensuring	the	continued	publication	of	the	tables,	often	adjusted	to	reflect	what	is	 considered	 a	 priority	 at	 a	 given	 time.	 As	 seen	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	 extent	 to	which	governments	 can	 move	 forward	 with	 proposals	 that	 strengthen	 or	 expand	 school	performance	tables	and	assessments	depends	on	their	net	intensity	in	favour	of	change	over	the	targets’	ability	or	willingness	to	resist	the	proposed	changes.	For	instance,	in	the	earlier	years	of	the	publication	of	performance	tables,	when	school	teachers	viewed	regulatory	 proposals	 as	 extreme	 and	 unacceptable,	 they	 organised	 themselves	 to	boycott	exams	or	 to	voice	 their	dissatisfaction	strongly	with	government	plans,	often	pushing	the	government	to	either	drop	or	amend	the	proposed	changes.	Despite	their	considerable	resistance,	however,	the	targets	of	disclosure	have	not	been	able	to	gather	enough	support	to	have	the	performance	tables	scrapped	altogether.	Over	time,	resistance	to	the	tables	turned	into	contestation	of	its	contents.	An	important	reason	for	this	seems	to	be	the	consolidation	over	time	of	the	idea	that	parents	(i.e.	the	beneficiaries	 of	 disclosure)	 have	 a	 right	 to	 know	 in	 order	 to	 choose	 their	 children’s	schools.	 As	 suggested	 by	 Fiona	 Millar	 (2015),	 everyone	 accepted	 that	 some	accountability	 system	 was	 necessary.	 The	 real	 matter	 was	 how	 such	 system	 was	designed.	In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 tables	 in	 2015,	 for	 instance,	 Shadow	Education	Secretary	Tristram	Hunt,	stated	that	parents	“deserve	to	know	exactly	how	their	child's	school	is	performing	-	but	under	this	Tory-led	government,	all	they've	got	is	confusion	surrounding	school	results	year	on	year.”149	With	parents	using	information	from	the	RTP	and	with	support	 to	 the	principle	 that	 it	 furthers,	 the	trajectory	of	 this	
                                                149	Richardson,	H.;	Sellgren,	K.	School	league	tables	branded	a	'nonsense'	amid	changes.	BBC,	29	January.	
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policy	is	very	likely	to	be	continually	contested,	although	it	seems	unlikely	that	it	will	retrench	 easily.	 The	 challenge	 for	 expansion	 or	 stagnation	 seems	 to	 be	 due	 to	 the	difficulty	 to	 create	 an	 indicator	 that	 concomitantly	 measures	 with	 fairness	 the	performance	of	schools	(to	guarantee	support	from	schools),	can	inform	parents	about	where	it	is	best	to	enrol	their	children	(to	ensure	use	by	beneficiaries),	and	can	regulate	schools	based	on	performance	(to	ensure	support	from	government).					 	
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Comparative	Analysis:	
The	Brazilian	and	the	UK	cases	in	the	logic	of	performance	
	
			The	performance	logic	of	regulatory	transparency	refers	to	the	publication	of	indicators	that	reflect	the	performance	of	decentralised	public	service	units,	according	to	specific	metrics.	As	shown	in	Chapters	4	and	5,	such	metrics	are	initially	developed	by	central	governments	(drivers	of	these	RTPs)	often	with	little	or	no	input	from	the	decentralised	policy	units	(the	targets)	that	they	aim	to	regulate,	as	well	as	from	citizens,	experts	and	organised	civil	society	(beneficiaries	and	intermediaries).	Unlike	in	some	cases	in	the	logic	of	control,	the	targets	in	the	performance	logic	have	no	or	limited	legislative	ability	to	oppose	disclosure,	although	they	do	have	the	ability	to	expand	it.		This	imbalance	of	power	 associated	with	 the	 type	 of	 information	 that	 is	 disclosed	marks	 the	 defining	feature	that	informs	the	trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic.		 As	 shown	 in	 the	 cases	 covered	 in	Chapter	4	and	5,	 central	 governments	have	adopted	the	transparency	of	performance	indicators	as	one	of	the	core	mechanisms	of	their	education	policies	aimed	at	increasing	the	performance	of	secondary	schools.	In	the	 body	 of	 the	 thesis	 I	 referred	 to	 Hirchmann’s	 (1970)	 theory	 of	 voice	 and	 exit	 to	explain	 the	 two	ways	 by	which	 governments	 can	 push	 decentralised	 policy	 units	 to	increase	 their	 performance	 through	RTPs.	 First,	 as	we	have	 seen	 in	 the	 examples	 of	Prova	 Brasil	 and	 Ideb	 in	 Brazil,	 the	 government	 tries	 to	 increase	 the	 ‘voice’	 of	beneficiaries	(parents	and	students)	and	intermediaries	(organised	civil	society,	media,	experts	and	society)	to	pressure	or	guide	schools	in	improving	their	performance,	based	on	the	goals	and	standards	reflected	on	the	performance	tables.	Second,	as	in	the	case	of	 the	UK,	 the	 government	 creates	 a	 quasi-market,	where	parents	 can	 choose	which	school	to	enrol	their	kids	in,	therefore	pressuring	schools	to	increase	their	performance	to	attract	more	 (and	potentially	better)	students,	as	well	as	other	benefits,	 including	financial	ones.			 However,	what	 the	 case	 studies	 have	demonstrated	 is	 that,	while	 the	 level	 of	engagement	from	beneficiaries	in	both	countries	were	varied,	schools	did	not	seem	to	wait	for	the	signals	from	the	beneficiaries	or	the	intermediaries	to	try	complying	with	the	 publicly	 available	 performance	 indicators.	 “The	 receptors	 of	 public	 service	
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organisations”,	noted	Meijer	 in	 relation	 to	a	 similar	 case	 in	 the	Netherlands,	 “do	not	react	to	signals	from	stakeholders,	but	pick	up	transparency	as	a	sign”	(2007,	p.	181).	From	matters	of	reputation	and	school	directors’	career	risks	to	additional	incentives	offered	by	governments	to	schools	that	demonstrated	improved	performance,	schools	had	many	other	reasons	to	comply	with	the	performance	indicators	made	available	for	public	scrutiny.			 Resistance	to	performance	indicators	among	targets	was	observable	in	the	case	studies	in	the	two	countries,	particularly	in	England.	But	in	neither	case	were	the	tables	scrapped	and	schools	seemed	to	have	continued	to	pursue	compliance	with	the	metrics	indicated	through	the	tables	for	the	reasons	referred	to	above.	It	might	also	be	said	that,	over	 time,	 the	paradigm	of	 accountability	 (rooted	 in	Layer	1	of	 culturally	embedded	norms)	and	the	idea	that	transparency	furthers	it,	became	more	widely	accepted	by	the	education	community.	Examples	of	strong	resistance	like	the	case	of	1993	boycotts	in	England,	for	instance,	were	not	repeated	during	the	periods	covered	for	both	cases.		While	 the	 targets	 may	 have	 resisted	 the	 performance	 indicators	 less	 on	 the	grounds	of	accountability,	they	consistently	challenged	or	sought	to	contribute	to	their	design,	definition	and	contextualisation	(or	lack	thereof),	precisely	because	of	the	high	stakes	in	their	impact.	Both	cases	demonstrated	high	levels	of	contestation	about	the	government’s	 publication	 of	 the	 performance	 indicators,	 with	 central	 governments	continuously	 updating	 performance	 indicators,	 supplemented	 by	 other	 data	 that	provided	 further	 contextualisation,	 in	 response	 to	 demands	 from	 the	 targets	 or	intermediaries	 (civil	 society	 organisations).	 In	 this	 scenario,	 RTPs	 have	 been	internalised	as	a	norm	and	have	evolved	in	a	state	of	continuous	contestation.		 Moving	 from	 this	 observation,	 we	 can	 propose	 that	 the	 most	 prominent	trajectory	 for	RTPs	 in	 the	 performance	 logic	 is	 that	 of	 contestation	 (Table	 8.4)	with	evolution	characterised	by	multiple	incremental	changes.	As	a	comparison	of	the	three	logics	 analysed	 in	 this	 thesis	 will	 demonstrate,	 the	 trajectories	 of	 the	 RTPs	 in	 the	performance	logic	are	the	most	consistently	contested	ones	throughout	time	among	the	three	logics.	Unlike	in	the	UK	MPs’	expenses	case	in	the	logic	of	control,	 for	example,	where	there	was	an	external	body	to	determine	the	path	of	the	RTP	after	an	intense	but	limited	period	of	 contestation,	as	 seen	 in	both	 the	Brazilian	and	 the	English	cases	of	education,	contestation	can	be	the	defining	 feature	of	 the	trajectory	of	an	RTP	 in	the	performance	logic.			 Contestation	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 controversial	 nature	 of	 publishing	 performance	assessments	–	or,	in	the	cases	covered,	the	results	of	student	attainments	as	an	indicator	for	school	performances	–	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	because	governments	define	measures	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 understanding	 for	 the	 need	 of	 achievement,	 which	
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frequently	proves	to	be	unpopular	with	the	targets	or	the	education	community.	This	was,	 for	 instance,	 the	 case	with	 the	 English	 Baccalaureate,	 which	 caused	 significant	resistance	 among	 a	 range	 of	 actors,	 and	 with	 the	 targets	 of	 Ideb,	 for	 which	 the	government	proposals	are	still	criticised	by	some	education	experts.		Secondly,	 given	 that	 a	 number	 of	 other	 variables	 influence	 the	 performance	 of	schools	and	the	ability	of	teachers	and	school	directors	to	influence	the	performance	of	students,	questions	of	 fairness	have	gained	 importance	 in	 the	debate	of	policy	units’	performance	 and	 of	 their	 respective	 transparency	 systems.	 The	 internalisation	 of	variables	 that	 influence	 school	 performances,	 such	 as	 considerations	 of	 the	 socio-economic	background	and	prior	attainments,	however,	raise	new	questions	about	what	performance	 to	 expect	 from	 schools,	 meaning	 that	 the	 raw	 results	 of	 tests	 are	 still	published.	What	 both	 case	 studies	 showed	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 that	 the	 solution	 to	 this	dilemma	 has	 been	 to	 offer	 beneficiaries	 with	 additional	 contextual,	 historical	 and	progress	 data,	 without	 scrapping	 the	 performance	 data	 composed	 of	 students’	attainments.				
Table	II.1.	Trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	Performance	Logic			 												Intensity	of	the	Target	 		 												(Resistance	to	RTPs)	 		_____________________________________________	
High																									Low	 	
	 			
	Intensity	of	Central	Govt.	(Pushing	for	RTPs)	
	
High	
	
	
Contestation	
		
	Low	 			
		
Increasing	use	of	information	
by	intermediaries/	
beneficiaries	
Increasing	use	of	information	by	intermediaries/	beneficiaries		
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		 It	 is	 important	 to	 underline	 the	 role	 played	 by	 intermediaries	 –	 civil	 society	organisations	and	experts	of	 the	education	sector,	and	 the	media	–	 in	contesting	 the	government’s	performance	tables	or	in	reinforcing	their	trajectory.	Particularly	in	the	case	 of	 Brazil,	 the	 intensity	 of	 the	 intermediaries	 in	 contesting	 the	 government’s	performance	indicators	often	surpassed	that	of	the	targets	themselves.	Organised	civil	society	 vocally	 challenged	 aspects	 of	 Ideb	 at	 the	 federal	 level,	 even	 where	 targets	complied	 with	 it,	 or	 when	 they	 pushed	 to	 expand	 it,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 the	municipality	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	the	states	of	Goiás	and	Minas	Gerais.	Additionally,	private	 initiatives	 like	 QEdu,	 launched	 by	 the	 Lemann	 Foundation,	 which	 were	developed	to	supplement	Ideb,	also	challenged	the	government’s	monopoly	on	defining	the	metrics	by	which	the	public	perceived	the	schools.	It	was	also	by	interacting	with	civil	society	organisations	that	INEP	included	socio-economic	contextualisation	in	the	disclosure	of	Ideb.	Therefore,	 it	 is	not	possible	to	suggest	that	the	intermediaries	are	always	 part	 of	 a	 coalition	with	 either	 the	 drivers	 or	 the	 targets.	 Intermediaries	 can	impact	 the	 trajectories	 of	 the	 RTPs	 from	 a	 different	 position	 altogether,	 which	 the	proposed	 actors’	 table,	 which	 assumes	 that	 beneficiaries	 and	 intermediaries	 always	push	for	increased	transparency,	admittedly	is	not	able	to	fully	reflect.			 As	an	intermediary,	the	media	has	also	reinforced	the	initial	disclosure	of	the	RTPs	in	the	UK	by	prioritising	news	reports	using	raw	results	of	students’	attainments,	even	after	governments	introduced	changes,	and	have	not,	in	most	cases,	contributed	to	the	debate	about	performance	of	education	in	Brazil,	as	news	report	tend	to	focus	on	the	schools	 that	 performed	 best	 or	 worst.	 This	 underlines	 that	 complex	 nature	 of	 the	evolution	of	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic	and	the	importance	of	mobilising	resources	(both	institutional	and	of	voice)	to	influence	their	trajectories.		 	
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PART	III.	
THE	LOGIC	OF	TRANSACTION	
			The	 basic	 policy	 assumption	 of	 any	 transparency	 mechanism	 is	 the	 existence	 of	information	asymmetry	in	given	contexts.	One	of	these	contexts	is	the	economic	market,	in	which	the	levels	of	information	about	products	and	services,	and	of	their	production	processes,	 tend	 to	 differ	 significantly	 between	 sellers	 and	 buyers.	 This	 imbalance	 of	information	 is	 the	core	aspect	of	a	 series	of	 transactional	problems.	As	 suggested	by	Akerlof,	in	the	70s,	in	a	competitive	market	with	information	asymmetry,	providing	free	access	 to	 information	 has	 the	 power	 to	 reduce	 the	 chance	 of	 ‘lemon	 choices’	 by	informing	consumers	about	the	relevant	characteristics	of	a	product	or	firm.	Regulatory	transparency	 policies	 in	 this	 logic	 can	 be	 adopted	 both	 to	 increase	 the	 level	 of	information	available	in	a	certain	market	and	to	fix	problems	caused	by	obfuscation	of	information	for	consumers	to	make	more	adequate	choices.	The	 two	 chapters	 analysed	 in	 this	 part	 cover	 narratives	 of	 selected	 regulatory	transparency	policies	adopted	in	the	Brazilian	and	in	the	British	retail	account	sectors.	The	cases	describe	the	adoption	and	trajectories	of	policies	to	support	various	objectives	in	the	sector,	such	as	increasing	competition,	reducing	information	asymmetry	between	the	private	sector	and	consumers,	promoting	consumer	rights,	and	advancing	initiatives	of	financial	education.	In	Chapter	6	I	argue	that	the	strengthening	of	consumer	rights	has	strongly	influenced	the	creation	and	evolution	of	the	RTPs.	In	Chapter	7	I	highlight	how	a	change	in	the	paradigm	of	rationality	could	affect	the	trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	transaction	logic,	while	suggesting	that	both	may	in	fact	co-exist.	In	both	chapters	I	argue	that	regulatory	transparency	policies	are	instruments	currently	used	to	foster	financial	education	in	the	two	countries.	In	the	conclusion	to	this	Part,	I		compare	the	case	studies	and	debate	the	determinants	of	the	RTPs’	trajectories	in	the	logic	of	transaction.				 	
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CHAPTER	6:	
INFORMING	FINANCIAL	CONSUMERS	IN	BRAZIL	
		 Regulation,	 competition	 and	 transparency	 are	essential	requirements	to	ensure	the	efficiency	of	any	sector	 in	 a	 modern	 economy.	 The	 financial	 system	should	be	open	to	interact	with	society.	In	other	words,	it	 should	be	 submitted	 to	 free	 competition,	 in	which	well-informed	citizens	freely	choose	the	services	that	suits	 best	 their	 interest.	 (Central	 Bank	 President	Alexandre	Tombini,	2013)150	We	 need	 clear	 rules,	 promoting	 transparency	 and	comparability	of	tariffs	that	give	the	client	comfort	in	knowing	how	much	 they	are	paying.	These	were	 the	guidelines	with	which	we	worked.	(Deputy	Director	at	Febraban	Ademiro	Vian,	2015)151			This	 chapter	 traces	 the	 creation	 and	 trajectories	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	 policies	enacted	 in	 the	Brazilian	banking	sector	over	a	period	of	approximately	one	decade.	 I	focus	 in	 particular	 on	 policies	 designed	 for	 general	 consumers	 of	 current	 accounts,	namely	the	disclosure	of	data	on	complaints	about	banks,	transparency	of	bank	tariffs	and	on	the	financial	education	of	citizens	by	the	Central	Bank.	I	show	that	while	the	RTPs	on	complaints	data	had	an	expansionary	trajectory,	the	RTP	on	bank	tariffs	has	mostly	stagnated.	The	chapter	also	shows	that	the	creation	of	regulatory	transparency	policies	in	the	transaction	logic	in	the	Brazilian	current	accounts	sector	is	very	much	associated	with	 strengthening	 the	 rights	of	 financial	 service	 consumers,	 the	beneficiaries	of	 the	policies	analysed	in	this	chapter.		The	sequences	of	events	in	which	the	drivers	of	RTPs	and	their	targets	are	engaged,	however,	vary.	In	the	case	of	the	publication	of	information	on	complaints,	the	Central	Bank	 could	 reduce	 the	 potential	 intensity	 of	 targets	 (against	 the	 RTP)	 based	 on	 the	practice	 of	 Brazilian	 consumer	 protection	 authorities.	 The	 main	 case	 of	 regulatory	transparency	 policy	 analysed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 that	 of	 the	 standardisation	 and	transparency	of	banks	tariffs,	was	adopted	after	a	contested	process	in	which	consumer	
                                                150	Tombini,	A.	(2013)	Speech	at	the	Brazilian	Federation	of	Banks.	17	November.	151	Vian,	A.	(2015)	Interview	on	23	June	2015.	[My	translation;	recording	in	my	possession.]	
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rights	organisations,	both	public	authorities	and	private	bodies,	mobilised	intensely	for	the	 adoption	 of	 the	 RTP.	 The	 chapter	 traces	 the	 trajectory	 of	 these	 cases,	 before	describing	some	RTPs	adopted	by	the	Central	Bank,	with	very	little	resistance	from	the	target	 actors,	 in	 order	 to	 strengthen	 the	Bank’s	 role	 of	 educating	 consumers	 for	 the	financial	world.152			
1.	Socio-Political	and	Institutional	Context	In	Brazil,	economic	openness	began	to	be	promoted	in	the	early	1990s,	followed	by	the	stabilisation	 of	 inflation	 promoted	 by	 the	 Real	 Plan	 (Plano	 Real),	 and	 by	 regulatory	reforms	during	the	last	part	of	that	decade.	Until	1994	Brazil’s	 long	history	of	hyper-inflation	 posed	 severe	 difficulties	 to	 the	 consolidation	 of	 a	 sound	 banking	 system,	despite	the	existence	of	the	Financial	Monetary	System,	established	in	1964,	and	two	other	important	laws,	which	defined	a	framework	for	organising	the	banking	system.153	In	December	1990,	accumulated	yearly	inflation	reached	1,621.00%,	according	to	the	Price	 Index	 for	 the	 General	 Consumer	 (Ijndice	 de	 Preço	 ao	 Consumidor	 Amplo),	measured	by	Fundação	Getúlio	Vargas.	In	1994,	immediately	before	the	adoption	of	the	Real	Plan,	it	measured	916.4%.	Two	years	later	it	went	down	to	single	digit	level	and	only	crossed	the	line	of	two	digits	twice:	in	2002,	when	it	reached	12.5%	(due	to	a	crisis	of	confidence,	appreciation	of	the	US	dollar	and	increase	in	the	prices	of	gas	and	foods),	and	 in	 2015,	 when	 it	 reached	 10.7%	 (mainly	 due	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 prices	 of	electricity,	water,	and	gas).	Newfound	 macroeconomic	 stability	 brought	 with	 it	 the	 opportunity	 and	 the	challenge	 of	 reviewing	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 banks,	 previously	 based	 on	inflationary	 gains,	 deficiency	 in	 the	 control	 of	 risks	 and	 limited	 competitiveness.	Reforms	meant	an	abrupt	shift	from	a	long	period	of	uninterrupted	state	intervention	in	the	 economy	 to	 a	 less	 intensely	 regulated	 economy,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 dominant	international	paradigm	of	market	liberalisation	and	globalisation	(Layer	2).	From	1995	onwards,	reforms	were	carried	out	aimed	at	strengthening	the	banking	system	through	processes	of	rescue	and	privatisation,	 improvement	of	prudential	regulation	to	reach	international	standards,	revision	of	norms	of	access	to	the	financial	sector,	expansion	of	access	to	bank	services	and	products,	and	improvement	of	competition	in	the	financial	
                                                152	 Due	 to	 the	 research	 design,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 looked	 into	 the	 existing	regulatory	transparency	policies’	provision	of	current	bank	accounts	for	individuals.	153	Respectively	by	Law	4,595/1964,	Law	6,024/1974,	and	Decree-Law	2,321/1987.	
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market.	Before	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008,	Brazil	had	accumulated	a	significant	foreign	reserve	cushion,	reduced	its	external	public	debt	and	improved	its	debt	profile.	During	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 2000s,	 the	 number	 of	 municipalities	 with	 ten	 bank	agencies	or	bank	correspondents	per	10,000	inhabitants	increased	to	63%,	while	the	percentage	 of	 municipalities	 with	 less	 than	 five	 bank	 representations	 per	 10,000	inhabitants	was	reduced	from	82%	to	6%.	The	number	of	clients	with	credit	operations	of	above	£1,200.00	expanded	from	approximately	five	to	thirty	million.154	As	services,	including	banking,	were	increasingly	being	transferred	to	the	private	sector	and	consumption	grew,	consumer	rights	bodies	and	initiatives	gained	growing	relevance	and	space	 in	 the	public	 agenda.	This	 space	was	 formally	 recognised	 in	 the	1988	Federal	Constitution,	which	obliged	the	adoption	of	a	code	establishing	consumer	rights.155	 In	 September	 1990,	 the	 Consumer	 Protection	 Code	 (Código	 de	 Defesa	 do	Consumidor	–	CDC,	hereafter	the	Code)	was	created.	The	Code,	which	came	in	effect	in	March	 1991,	 established	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 producers	 and	 sellers	 in	 promoting	competition,	defined	consumer	rights,	created	special	courts	and	prosecutorial	bodies	dedicated	 to	 enforcing	 consumer	 rights	 and	 defined	 sanctions	 for	 breaches	 of	 the	regulation.	The	Code	also	set	up	a	number	of	clauses	obliging	corporations	to	increase	transparency	 to	 inform	 consumer	 choice,	 protecting	 consumers	 from	 fake	advertisement	 and	warning	 about	 risks	 to	 their	 health	 and	 safety.156	 Similar	 clauses	were	also	adopted	for	the	banking	sector.	Since	its	creation	in	1964,	the	Brazilian	Central	Bank	(Banco	Central	do	Brasil	–	BCB)	 has	 been	 responsible	 for	 regulating	 and	 overseeing	 banks	 and	 financial	institutions,	 besides	 handling	 the	monetary	 and	 exchange	 rate	 policies.157	 For	 some	time,	the	BCB	has	obliged	banks	to	disclose	information	to	consumers,	in	diverse	ways	
                                                154	All	the	conversion	rates	in	this	chapter	are	from	the	Brazilian	Central	Bank	on	1	January	2015.	155	 The	 debate	 involving	 the	 consumer	 rights	 agenda	 dated	 back	 to	 the	 1970s.	 The	 first	Association	for	Consumer	Protection	was	created	in	Porto	Alegre	in	1975,	and	the	first	body	to	support	 the	 Judiciary	 to	solve	consumer	conflicts	was	created	 in	São	Paulo	(the	Program	for	Protection	and	Consumers	Defence	-	Procon),	in	1976.	In	1977,	for	example,	Congressman	Nina	Ribeiro	 introduced	a	bill	of	a	Code	for	Consumer	Protection.	The	CDC	was	approved	in	1990	though	Law	8,078/90.	156	Article	31	of	the	Code	defined	the	characteristics	and	type	of	such	information:	“[C]orrect,	clear,	precise	and	public	information,	in	Portuguese,	about	the	characteristics,	quality,	quantity,	composition,	price,	warranty,	expire	date,	and,	origin	of	the	product,	among	other	data,	as	well	as	the	risks	that	the	product	may	present	to	health	and	safety	of	consumers”.	157	It	also	serves	as	the	Executive	Secretariat	for	the	National	Monetary	Commission	(Conselho	Monetário	Nacional	 –	 CMN),	 responsible	 to	 safeguard	 the	 liquidity	 and	 solvency	 of	 financial	institutions.	The	CMN	is	composed	by	the	Minister	of	Finance	(CMN	President),	the	President	of	the	BCB	and	the	Minister	for	Planning,	Budget	and	Management.	
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until	 starting	 to	 adopt	 regulatory	 transparency	measures	 as	 analysed	 in	 this	 thesis.	Before	 major	 regulatory	 reforms	 started	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 banking	 sector	 in	 1994,	 a	Central	 Bank	 norm	 obliged	 financial	 institutions	 to	 make	 available	 in	 their	dependencies,	 in	a	venue	of	easy	access	and	visibility	 to	 the	public,	a	board	with	 the	services	provided	and	their	respective	fares.158	The	institutions	could	only	charge	clients	for	services	made	public	in	accordance	with	the	rule.		In	another	example,	as	an	attempt	to	reduce	information	asymmetry	about	bank	tariffs	to	the	public	and	to	safeguard	consumers	from	the	potential	unilateral	decisions	by	banks,	the	Central	Bank	enacted	a	norm	in	1996	obliging	banks	to	publish,	alongside	their	services	and	tariffs,	the	periodicity	with	which	these	were	reviewed.	Banks	were	also	obliged	to	announce	the	creation	of	new	tariffs	or	changes	to	existing	ones	at	least	30	days	in	advance	of	the	change.159	The	information	had	to	be	submitted	to	the	BCB	every	three	months	for	monitoring	purposes.	Financial	institutions	could	be	fined	over	£6,000	in	case	of	non-compliance.	An	extensive	number	of	contractual	clauses	were	also	adopted	in	years	2000	and	2001,	partially	in	response	to	consumer	complaints	at	the	Central	Bank	and	at	Procons,	to	inform	retail	banking	clients	about	further	clarifications	regarding	 tariffs	 and	 bank	 statements,	 upon	 the	 clients’	 request.160	 These	 included,	among	 others,	 making	 available	 information	 about	 fares	 and	 expenses	 charged	 for	starting	 a	 credit	 operation	 (including	 the	 periodicity	 of	 the	 fare,	 interest	 rate	 and	amount	debited	each	month);	providing	clarity	and	format	that	allowed	clients	to	easily	identify	payment	deadlines,	amount	of	money	invested,	 interest	rates,	administration	fees;	sanctions	for	using	unpaid	checks;	informing	all	tariffs	adopted	by	the	bank.161		Although	the	Central	Bank	did	oblige	banks	to	disclose	information	to	consumers,	as	is	shown	in	this	chapter,	as	pro-consumer	institutions	gained	strength	in	Brazil	and	
                                                158	Central	Bank	Circular	1,734/1990	159	Resolution	2,303/1996	160	Central	Bank	Resolutions	2,808/2000,	2,835/2001	and	Resolution	2,878/2001	161	 While	 pro-consumer	 organisations	 provided	 guidance	 and	 advice	 on	 consumer	 rights	related	to	the	use	of	bank	statements,	the	impact	and	effectiveness	of	information	disclosure	on	bank	statements	in	improving	customers’	understanding	of	their	finances	remains	uncertain	–	not	 least	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	 available	 research	analysing	 this	 impact	 for	Brazil.	However,	 the	experience	of	other	countries	may	give	us	some	insight.	Looking	at	the	US,	Shahar	and	Schneider	(2014),	 two	 critics	 of	 regulatory	 disclosures,	 underline	 the	 technicalities	 and	 the	 difficulties	involved	in	making	sense	of	such	disclosures.	They	cite	US	Senator	Elizabeth	Warren,	former	special	 advisor	 for	 the	 US	 Consumer	 Financial	 Protection	 Bureau,	 who	 said	 of	 credit	 card	disclosures:	“I	teach	contract	law	at	Harvard,	and	I	can’t	understand	half	of	what	it	says”	(Shahar	and	Schneider,	2014,	p.	8).	It	is	possible	that	the	impact	of	disclosure	was	also	limited	for	the	same	reasons	in	the	case	of	bank	statements	 in	Brazil,	although	this	cannot	be	proven	in	the	absence	of	empirical	research.	
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as	 the	 means	 for	 publication	 of	 information	 became	 more	 accessible	 through	technological	innovation,	so	did	regulatory	transparency	policies	in	the	banking	sector.			
2.	The	Disclosure	of	Complaints	by	the	Central	Bank	The	disclosure	of	bank	complaints	by	the	Central	Bank	was	adopted	in	the	early	2000s	following	high	intensity	of	the	driver,	the	Central	Bank,	and	low	levels	of	opposition	from	the	 targets	 at	 the	 time	 of	 its	 creation,	 due	 to	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 at	 that	 point	 the	complaints	 information	 provided	 by	 consumers	 to	 the	 Central	 Bank	 did	 not	 have	significant	 impact	 on	 the	 supervision	 and	 oversight	 work	 conducted	 by	 the	 Bank.	Second,	existing	policies	of	the	pro-consumer	authorities	to	disclose	information	about	complaints	against	firms	were	already	in	place	and	received	more	complaints	than	the	Central	 Bank	 itself.	 In	 1997,	 for	 example,	 the	 National	 System	 of	 Consumer	 Rights	(Sistema	Nacional	 de	Defesa	 do	 Consumidor	 –	 SNDC)	was	 created,	 composed	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice	 and	 all	 the	 other	 bodies	 of	 the	 federal,	 state	 and	 municipal	administrations,	as	well	as	civil	society	institutions	that	promoted	consumer	rights.162	One	of	the	most	important	and	best	known	institutions	of	the	SNDC	is	the	Foundations	Program	for	Protection	and	Defence	of	Consumers	(Programa	para	Proteção	e	Defesa	do	Consumidor	–	Procon),	which	functions	in	several	states	and	municipalities	with	the	aim	of	resolving	conflicts	between	consumers	and	providers	before	a	case	is	taken	to	court.	According	 to	 the	 legislation	 that	 created	 the	 SNDC,	 each	 Procon	 should	 set	 its	 own	Suppliers’	 Registry	 or	 Justified	 Complaint	 Registry	 (Cadastro	 de	 Fornecedores	 or	Cadastro	 de	 Reclamações	 Fundamentadas,	 hereafter	 Registry),	 which	 displayed	statistics	about	the	number	of	complaints	received	by	Procons.	The	 Registry	 was	 a	 regulatory	 transparency	 measure	 to	 deal	 with	 complaints	against	suppliers	within	each	Procon	 in	the	country.	Published	annually	and	updated	constantly,	 the	 Registries	 served	 as	 a	 repository	 of	 complaints	 and	 as	 essential	instruments	for	consumer	choice	in	Brazil.	Not	long	after	the	creation	of	the	SNDC,	it	was	agreed	among	 its	members	 that	 in	order	 to	 further	ensure	consumer	rights	and	strengthen	consumer	protection	 it	would	be	necessary	 to	provide	 the	Department	of	Consumer	Rights	and	Protection	(Departamento	de	Proteção	e	Defesa	do	Consumidor	-	DPDC),	the	body	responsible	for	the	coordination	of	SNDC,	with	aggregate	and	strategic	information	 about	 consumer	 complaints	 nationally,	 while	 keeping	 the	 various	subnational	 Procons	 in	 charge	 of	 resolving	 complaints.	 The	 National	 Informational	System	 of	 Consumer	 Protection	 (Sistema	 Nacional	 de	 Informação	 de	 Defesa	 do	
                                                162	They	integrate	the	SNDC	and	are	auxiliary	bodies	to	the	Judiciary,	present	in	842	subnational	units	in	Brazil	by	May	2015	(including	all	States	and	the	Federal	District).	
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Consumidor	 –	 Sindec)	 was	 designed	 and	 implemented	 at	 the	 SNDC	 in	 2004	 to	 all	activities	 carried	 out	 by	 Procons,	 while	 also	 allowing	 for	 an	 annual	 integrated	publication	of	the	Registry.163	In	 the	 early	 2000s,	 the	 number	 of	 complaints	 made	 to	 consumer	 protection	organisations	about	bank	services	increased	significantly.	In	São	Paulo,	for	example,	the	number	of	complaints	received	by	Procon	increased	by	61%	in	2002	in	relation	to	the	previous	year,	with	unfair	tariffs	topping	the	complaints	list.164	In	response,	the	Central	Bank	 increased	 the	 level	of	mandatory	 information	 to	be	provided	by	banks	 to	 their	clients	 especially	 through	 contracts.	As	 the	public	body	 responsible	 for	 regulation	of	banks,	 the	Central	Bank	also	had	 the	mandate	 to	 receive	complaints	about	 regulated	institutions.	In	line	with	the	experience	and	practice	of	Procons	and	of	the	SNDC,	in	2002	the	 Central	 Bank	 started	 publishing	 in	 a	 monthly	 ranking	 system	 the	 number	 of	complaints	it	received	and	considered	applicable	for	analysis	of	the	Bank,	i.e.	related	to	legislation	 adopted	 by	 the	 Central	 Bank	 or	 the	 National	 Monetary	 Council.	 For	 the	purpose	of	the	ranking,	the	Central	Bank	considered	complaints	that	were	received	due	to	merit,	 i.e.	 those	related	 to	 regulation	adopted	by	 the	Central	Bank	or	 the	National	Monetary	 Council,	 and	 solved.	 Being	 the	 regulator	 of	 the	 financial	 system,	 the	publication	of	complaints	statistics	was	a	matter	of	transparency,	and	of	reputation,	for	the	Central	Bank	itself,	as	the	SNDC	published	data	with	similar	content.		The	 publication	 tool	 was	 improved	 incrementally,	 as	 the	 rising	 volume	 of	complaints	or	the	regulation	of	bank	services	with	impact	on	consumers	made	certain	changes	necessary.	In	the	following	year,	 for	example,	the	Central	Bank	published	the	rankings	in	groups	of	similar	financial	institutions,	separating	larger	ones	from	smaller	institutions	(in	terms	of	the	number	of	clients)	in	order	to	increase	the	comparability	to	the	rankings.	 It	also	started	publishing	statistics	based	only	on	those	complaints	that	were	finalised	in	the	month	of	the	publication	of	the	ranking,	instead	of	the	ones	received	that	month.165	Some	of	 the	most	 important	 changes	 to	 the	 Complaints	Ranking	 at	 the	 Central	Bank,	however,	were	not	related	to	its	format,	content	or	periodicity,	but	to	the	use	of	the	information	by	the	regulator	itself.	From	2009,	the	Central	Bank	strengthened	the	
                                                163	“Integrated	Procon”	is	used	for	the	Procons	that	opted	to	join	SINDEC.	By	the	end	of	2008,	88	Procons	had	been	integrated	to	Sindec;	by	the	end	of	2012,	249;	and	by	the	end	of	2014,	360,	including	all	the	main	Procons	in	the	country,	according	to	the	coordinator	of	Senacon.	Silva,	J.	P.	S.	(2015)	Interview	on	13	March	2015.	[Recording	in	possession	of	the	author]	164	Estadão	(2002)	Procon:	reclamações	contra	bancos	crescem	61,24%.	Estadão,	17	April.	165	The	number	of	complaints	that	were	not	granted	by	the	Central	Bank	were	still	published,	but	not	considered	for	the	ranking.	
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use	of	the	information	as	a	source	of	information	for	its	activities	of	conduct	oversight.	As	the	Bank	gave	the	ranking	more	attention,	so	did	the	industry	and	the	media,	which	started	publishing	news	reports	highlighting	the	banks	on	the	extremes	of	the	ranking,	especially	 the	 ones	 that	 underperformed.	 The	 importance	 of	 the	 Registry	 was	strengthened	even	further	in	2012,	when	the	Department	of	Conduct	was	created	within	the	Central	Bank	to	oversee	the	conduct,	specifically,	of	banks.166	With	a	unit	dedicated	to	the	supervision	of	conduct,	the	use	of	the	ranking	better	fulfilled	its	objective.167	Evidenced	by	the	data	that	the	Central	Bank	provided	upon	a	FoI	request	I	placed	during	this	research,	the	complaints	rankings	were	not	used	on	a	mass	scale,	at	least	not	as	 a	 monitoring	 mechanism	 by	 consumers.168	 In	 2014,	 there	 were	 a	 total	 of	 160	thousand	visits	 to	 the	 section	of	 the	Central	Bank	website	 featuring	 the	 rankings.	 In	comparison,	 the	ranking	of	complaints	about	telecommunication	service	providers	at	the	Brazilian	Telecommunication	Agency	 received	 an	 average	 of	 500	 thousand	 visits	only	in	the	first	three	months	of	2015,	i.e.	approximately	12.5	times	more	than	that	of	the	Central	Bank	rankings.		Regardless	of	 the	number	of	accesses	and	 immediate	use	of	 the	 information	by	consumers,	however,	the	media	published	about	the	rankings	extensively	and	banks	and	financial	institutions	did	respond	to	the	disclosure	policy	by	adopting	measures	to	go	down	in	the	ranking	or	not	be	featured	in	it.169	This	points	to	the	mixed	character	of	the	transparency	logic	in	play	in	this	case.	Like	the	disclosures	promoted	by	the	SNDC,	the	Central	 Bank	 started	 disclosing	 complaints	 information	 primarily	 for	 its	 transaction	logic	–	i.e.	to	inform	consumer	choice	–	as	well	as	a	display	of	the	Bank’s	commitment	to	its	own	internal	 transparency.	However,	by	anticipating	the	action	of	consumers	who	consulted	the	list	or	of	the	Central	Bank	through	its	supervision	of	conduct,	banks	felt	pressured	to	improve	their	performance	by	taking	action	to	address	the	complaints.	This	movement	 increased	 further	as	 the	Central	Bank	strengthened	 its	 internal	use	of	 the	ranking.				
                                                166	Bittencourt,	A.	(2012)	BC	lança	Supervisão	de	Conduta.	Valor	Econômico,	October	22.	167	Abecip	(2016)	BC	aperta	a	fiscalização	dos	bancos.	Abecip,	October	16.	168	 Central	 Bank	 (2015)	 Freedom	 of	 information	 request	 protocolled	 under	 number	18600000817201579	[Request	and	response	in	possession	of	the	author].	169	See,	for	example:	O	Globo	(2016)	BMG	passa	ao	topo	do	ranking	de	reclamações	contra	bancos	em	janeiro.	O	Globo,	February	15.	
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3.	Regulatory	Transparency	of	Bank	Tariffs		
3.1.	Creation	and	Trajectory	of	the	Disclosure	of	Current	Account	Tariffs	In	December	2001,	the	National	Confederation	of	the	Financial	System	(Confederação	Nacional	 do	 Sistema	 Financeiro	 –	 Consif)	 filed	 a	 Request	 for	 Declaration	 of	Unconstitutionality	 (Ação	 Direta	 de	 Inconstitucionalidade	 -	 ADI)	 at	 the	 Supreme	Court.170	 Consif	 claimed	 that	 Article	 3	 §	 2º	 of	 the	 1990	Brazilian	 Code	 of	 Consumer	Protection	was	against	the	Constitution,	since	the	latter	defined	that	supplementary	law	would	regulate	the	National	Financial	System	and	the	CDC	had	been	enacted	by	ordinary	law.	 As	 argued	 by	 Consif’s	 lawyers	 in	 the	 ADI,	 the	 Code	 mistakenly	 imposed	 new	obligations	and	responsibilities	for	financial	institutions,	which	due	to	their	nature	of	intermediaries	should	not	be	obliged	to	provide	all	the	products	and	services	offered	in	advertisements	 for	 every	 consumer,	 as	 credit	 analyses	 needed	 to	 be	 individually	assessed.	While	the	ADI	was	still	being	debated,	in	2002,	the	Central	Bank	went	on	to	start	publishing	online	statistical	information	about	bank	complaints,	as	already	discussed,	and	bank	tariffs	themselves.	Additionally,	multiple	factors	increased	the	intensity	of	the	BCB	to	inaugurate	disclosure	of	bank	tariffs;	i.e.	the	rising	number	of	complaints	about	bank	charges	of	tariffs,	the	perceived	need	to	improve	competition	in	this	regard,	and	the	increasing	ease	with	which	information	could	be	published	on	the	internet.	At	this	point,	 tariffs	were	not	 standardised	and	were	published	without	a	 structured	 format	that	would	increase	the	ability	of	consumers	to	read	and	understand	the	information	disclosed.	Instead,	the	existing	structure	resembled	the	early	versions	of	MS-DOS	and	MS	Excel	tables.	At	best,	users	were	able	to	identify	whether	tariffs	were	legal,	which	in	a	newly	privatised	system	could	constitute	valuable	information.	Although	the	policy’s	design	 resembled	 that	 of	 an	 RTP,	 it	 aimed	 at	 furthering	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	regulator’s	 work	 and	 lacked	 the	 structured	 information	 that	 would	 allow	 for	comparisons	associated	with	the	transaction	logic.		 After	 a	 long	 judicial	 process	 and	 appeals	 from	 Consif	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 from	organisations	 responsible	 for	 promoting	 consumer	 rights	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 Supreme	Court	denied	the	ADI	in	last	instance,	ruling	that	the	Consumer	Protection	Code	(CDC)	applied	 to	 the	 structure	 and	 organisation	 of	 the	 Financial	 System,	 and	 that	 ordinary	legislation,	 including	 the	 Code,	 was	 applicable	 to	 all	 bank	 products,	 services	 and	operations.	The	decision	also	clarified	that	the	Brazilian	Central	Bank,	besides	regulating	
                                                170	ADI	2591.	Consif	 is	an	entity	that	puts	together	all	the	unions	of	financial	 institutions	and	alike	from	all	the	Brazilian	territory.	
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banks,	had	 the	right	and	 the	mandate	 to	oversee	 financial	 institutions	and	 to	control	eventual	 abuses,	 excessive	burdens	or	other	distortions	 in	 the	 contractual	 clauses	of	interest	rates.	From	2007	onwards,	a	series	of	transparency	measures	were	adopted	in	this	direction.	This	was	not	solely	in	connection	to	the	decision	of	the	Supreme	Court,	but	in	response	to	converging	initiatives	to	protect	consumers.	The	Consumer	Protection	Commission	at	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	was	conducting	a	comprehensive	work	to	debate	the	regulation	of	tariffs,	which	at	that	point	was	the	major	topic	of	complaints	by	bank	clients.	According	to	the	Deputy	Director	for	Products	and	Financing	at	the	Federation	of	Brazilian	Banks	(Federação	Brasileira	de	Bancos	–	Febraban)	the	six	major	banks	in	Brazil	collectively	had	more	than	700	tariffs	in	2007	(Vian,	2015):			 There	 was	 no	 parameter	 [for	 bank	 tariffs].	 The	 result	 of	 this	 was	 the	creation,	by	institutions	of	the	financial	system,	of	an	extraordinarily	large	amount	of	tariffs.	This	led	to	complaints	from	consumer	protection	bodies.	Clients	were	also	complaining	about	the	cost	and	the	amount	of	tariffs.	There	was	 no	 standardisation	 of	 tariffs;	 a	 client	 with	 accounts	 in	 two	 separate	banks	 could	 have	 the	 same	 tariff	 under	 two	 different	 names.	 It	 was	 not	possible	 for	 clients	 to	 compare	 tariffs	 in	 different	 banks,	 or	 know	 the	effective	 cost	 of	 the	 same	 service	 provided	 by	 different	 banks.	 This	prevented	clients	 from	understanding	the	system	for	bank	tariffs.	A	 lot	of	complaints	reached	Procons,	with	consumers	complaining	about	the	prices,	the	 ways	 of	 charging	 tariffs.	 Each	 bank	 had	 its	 own	 way	 of	 charging	consumers,	some	charged	monthly,	others	three	times	per	month,	yet	others	every	 fifteen	 days	 […]	 There	 was	 no	 standardisation,	 in	 general,	 in	 the	names,	 the	way	of	 charging,	 the	way	 to	 increase	 the	value	of	 tariffs;	 a	bit	chaotic	for	consumers.	(author’s	translation)		This	was	mostly	due	to	the	fact	that	tariffs	were	not	regulated,	except	in	relation	to	specific	 portfolios	 such	 as	 that	 of	 rural	 credit	 and	 of	 development	 banks.171	 As	 an	example	 of	 the	 freedom	 used	 by	 banks	 to	 charge	 tariffs,	 some	 banks	were	 charging	clients	who	wanted	to	pay	their	financed	credits	before	due	time,	arguing	that	advance	payments	represented	a	breach	of	contract.172	Sometimes	the	fee	for	advance	payments	would	be	so	high	that	it	would	become	more	expensive	than	paying	the	debt	itself.		The	Commission,	which	worked	in	cooperation	with	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	BCB,	members	of	the	Public	Prosecutors	Office	and	the	DPDC	(at	the	Ministry	of	Justice),	and	 with	 the	 participation	 of	 Febraban,	 aimed	 to	 address	 the	 ambiguities	 between	
                                                171	Vian,	2015	172	Proteste	(2007)	Fim	da	taxa	de	liquidação	antecipada	de	débitos.	Proteste,	17	September.	
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interest	rates	and	tariffs	that	made	it	very	difficult	for	consumers	to	understand	what	constituted	only	tariffs	and	what	were	interest	rates.	Additionally,	the	extensive	amount	of	acronyms	and	names	created	by	banks	to	refer	to	similar,	 if	not	identical,	products	and	services	caught	the	attention	of	consumer	protection	organisations.173	Parallel	to	the	work	of	the	Commission,	the	Public	Prosecutors	Office	started	two	procedures	to	investigate	 the	 legality	 and	 the	 application	 of	 tariffs	 and	 the	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	Monetary	Council,	of	which	the	Central	Bank	is	a	part,	in	relation	to	the	subject.	Based	on	 the	discussions	 it	 spearheaded,	 the	Consumer	Protection	Commission	proposed	increased	transparency	of	bank	service	charges,	the	standardisation	of	bank	tariffs,	and	limiting	the	services	that	could	be	tariffed.	According	to	Vian	(2015),	at	the	time	 of	 the	 debate	 in	 the	 National	 Congress,	 a	 number	 of	 bills	 were	 introduced	 to	regulate	 bank	 tariffs,	most	 of	 them	establishing	 and	 limiting	 the	 number	 of	 types	 of	tariffs.	The	Central	Bank	also	took	measures	in	relation	to	the	topic,	but	before	it	moved	towards	the	regulation	of	tariffs,	Febraban	assessed	the	issue	with	banks	and	identified	groups	of	tariffs	and	the	associated	client	dissatisfaction.	In	preparing	the	information	for	 regulation,	Febraban	would	have	a	chance	 to	clarify	 the	 tariffs	 that	were	charged	justifiably.		In	order	to	propose	a	strategy	to	give	transparency	to	tariffs,	Febraban	requested	the	 six	 largest	 banks	 in	Brazil	 that	 provided	 current	 accounts	 for	 individuals,	where	around	90%	of	individual	consumers	had	their	accounts,	to	share	with	the	Federation	all	the	tariffs	they	charged	in	current	accounts.	It	concluded	that	the	tariffs	were	close	to	impossible	to	understand	and	compare.	Having	had	access	to	all	tariffs	charged	by	banks	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 justifications	 for	 the	 charges	 associated	 with	 each	 of	 them,	Febraban	 arbitrated	 the	 name	 and	 categorisation	 of	 diverse	 tariffs,	which	were	 then	presented	and	approved	by	its	member	banks.	As	a	result,	in	September	2007	Febraban	published	the	System	for	Disclosure	of	Bank	Fares	(Sistema	de	Divulgação	de	Tarifas	–	STAR).174		At	 the	 time	 of	 its	 launch,	 STAR	 was	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 and	 easy-to-use	publicly	available	website	 for	comparing	 the	 fares	charged	by	banks	 for	a	 total	of	32	tariffs,	 still	 a	 large	 number	 for	 user	 comprehension.	 To	 facilitate	 understanding,	Febraban	created	three	groups	of	bank	accounts,	the	first	of	which	included	products	used	by	about	90%	of	 the	population.	 Information	could	be	 compared	per	 fares,	per	bank,	per	service	packages	and	the	relation	between	them.	Banks	agreed	with	Febraban	
                                                173	 Câmara	 dos	 Deputados	 (2009)	 Consultoria	 Legislativa.	 Tarifas	 Bancárias	 após	 as	 Novas	Regras.	Câmara	dos	Deputados.	174	Available	at	http://www.febraban-star.org.br/	
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that	 all	 the	 data	 about	 tariffs	 shared	 with	 the	 Central	 Bank	 would	 also	 be	 sent	electronically	 to	 STAR,	 which	 would	 create	 the	 necessary	 filters	 for	 publication.	According	to	Febraban,	intensive	advertisement	was	made	about	STAR	when	it	was	first	launched.	Since	its	first	months,	the	average	monthly	visits	to	STAR	has	been	around	400	thousand.	 The	 Federation	 has	 also	 been	 updating	 STAR	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 newest	applicable	legislation	about	bank	fares	and	packages	ever	since.		The	debates	and	recommendations	of	the	Consumer	Protection	Commission	at	the	Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 informed	 the	 regulation	 of	 tariffs	 by	 the	 Central	 Bank	 for	standardising	 the	 packages	 of	 tariffs.175	 The	 new	 legislation	 aimed	 at	 facilitating	consumer	understanding	and	comparability	of	current	account	products	and	services.	The	norm	expanded	its	scope	in	2010,	when	it	included	information	about	credit	cards,	in	response	to	its	growing	usage	by	the	population	and,	therefore,	to	an	also	increasing	number	of	complaints	 from	consumers	at	Procons,	reflected	on	the	SNDC	Registry.176	The	 resulting	norm	created	 four	categories	of	bank	services	 to	 consumers:	essential,	priority,	special	and	differentiated.	Publication	of	information	about	the	‘essential’	and	‘priority’	 accounts	 was	 standardised	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 comparison.	 For	 their	regulatory	purposes,	as	important	as	their	publication	was	the	standardisation	of	the	packages.	 The	 ‘essential	 package’	was	 free	 of	 charge,	 and	 the	 ‘priority	 package’	was	similar	to	the	essential	with	an	increased	number	of	financial	services	included.177	The	‘special’	and	‘differentiated’	packages	were	also	defined	in	terms	of	the	events	and	costs	per	number	of	events.	The	format	of	publication	of	the	packages	was	also	standardised,	displaying	name,	acronym,	reasons	for	which	they	could	be	charged,	and	the	channels	through	 which	 they	 could	 be	 delivered.	 Disclosed	 information	 also	 included	 the	individual	charge	per	service,	the	number	of	events	admitted	in	each	service	included,	and	the	price	for	the	package.	In	 the	 same	 context,	 the	Central	Bank	 regulated	 the	Total	 Effective	Cost	 (Custo	Efetivo	Total	–	CET).178	CET	was	defined	as	the	instrument	for	clients	to	understand	all	onuses	and	expenses	 in	a	credit	or	 leasing	operation,	 i.e.	 final	price	of	a	service	after	tariffs	and	interest	rates	were	incorporated	in	the	price.179	According	to	the	regulation,	
                                                175	Resolution	3,518/2007	176	Resolution	3,919/2010	177	For	example,	the	essential	services	package	allows	four	withdrawals	per	month	free	of	charge	while	the	standard	priority	package	provides	eight	withdrawals,	as	mentioned	in	the	beginning	of	this	section	178	Resolution	3,517/2007	179	 CET	 was	 initially	 calculated	 and	 made	 available	 to	 individuals	 and	 to	 small	 and	 micro-enterprises,	as	the	Central	Bank	regulators	believed	that	medium	and	large	corporations	had	the	capacity	to	calculate	and	negotiate	tariffs.	The	obligation	was	extended	to	micro	and	small	
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banks	had	to	provide	 information	about	 the	percentage	of	each	CET	component.	The	novelty	about	CET	was	that	it	facilitated	clients’	reading	and	understanding	of	the	final	value	 of	 a	 product	 or	 service	 they	 were	 purchasing,	 by	 reducing	 the	 cost	 of	comparability.		The	 Central	 Bank	 requested	 banks	 to	 provide	 the	 Total	 Effective	 Cost	 to	 their	clients	whenever	required	and	published	it	in	all	advertisements	of	banks	products	and	services.	Additionally,	banks	were	obliged	to	make	CET	available	to	the	Central	Bank	for	monitoring	and	transparency	purposes.	In	2013,	banks	were	obliged	to	provide	clients	with	not	only	 the	percentage	of	each	component	of	CET,	but	also	a	customised	chart	demonstrating	the	value	and	the	percentage	of	each	component.180	The	Central	Bank	informed	that	although	it	did	not	define	a	mechanism	to	monitor	the	impact	of	CET	on	consumer	 protection	 and	 the	 competition	 of	 bank	 services,	 it	 defined	 an	 overseeing	procedure	to	ensure	that	banks	and	other	financial	institutions	were	complying	with	the	norms.	One	of	the	challenges	for	the	success	of	the	regulatory	transparency	mechanisms	was	 to	 ensure	 that,	 before	purchasing	 a	 financial	 service,	 clients	would	 compare	 the	information	standardised	by	the	Central	Bank,	such	as,	 the	tariffs	adopted	by	diverse	banks	for	the	standard	package,	the	products	and	services	offered	by	the	essential	and	standards	 packages,	 and	 the	 fares	 charged	 for	 annual	 registry	 renewal,	 in	 order	 to	identify	 if	 the	 essential	 package	 was	 a	 more	 appropriate	 option.	 Facilitating	comparisons,	 alongside	 the	 one	 promoted	 by	 the	 Central	 Bank,	 were	 a	 number	 of	initiatives	created	by	private	parties.	One	of	them	was,	for	example,	ComparaOnline,	a	website	that	focused	on	the	comparison	of	financial	services,	including	credit	cards.	A	similar	 tool	 for	 comparison	was	 developed	 by	 a	widely	 known	 news	website,	 Terra,	which	 also	 reported	 on	 other	 initiatives	 that	 allowed	 for	 tariff	 comparisons.181	 Such	initiatives	were	 important,	 since	 for	budgetary	 reasons	 the	public	 sector	had	 limited	possibilities	 to	 engage	 in	 awareness	 raising	 campaigns	 about	 the	 transparency	 it	promoted.		
                                                enterprises	in	2010,	through	Resolution	3,909/2010.	The	recommendation	to	extend	it	to	micro	and	small	enterprises	had	been	done	in	a	Technical	Note	by	the	Consultancy	of	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	in	the	previous	year.	180	Resolution	4,197/2013	181	Terra	was	the	12th	most	accessed	website	in	Brazil	in	2013,	according	to	the	Alexa	Index.	Silva,	J.	A.	L.	(2013)	Os	50	sites	mais	acessados	do	Brasil,	segundo	o	site	Alexa.	InfoMoney,	13	September.	
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3.2.	Creation	and	Trajectory	of	Total	Effective	Value	Continuing	 its	 engagement	with	 consumer	 organisations,	 and	with	 a	 series	 of	major	international	 events	 to	 be	 hosted	 by	 Brazil	 approaching,	 such	 as	 the	 Pope’s	 visit	 to	celebrate	World	Youth	Day’s	and	the	FIFA	Confederation	Cup	in	2013,	the	BCB	adopted	an	 RTP	 for	 tariffs	 of	 foreign	 currencies.	 The	 Brazilian	 Central	 Bank	 did	 not	 regulate	minimum	 and	 maximum	 values	 for	 the	 tariffs	 charged	 by	 banks	 and	 financial	institutions	for	currency	exchange,	but	standardised	the	tariffs	included	in	the	purchase	of	a	foreign	currency.	The	first	problem	that	the	Total	Effective	Value	(Valor	Efetivo	Total	–	VET)	tried	to	address	was	to	reduce	information	asymmetry	of	consumers	about	the	final	price	that	they	had	to	pay	for	currency	exchange	(regardless	of	whether	it	meant	paying	more	for	tariffs	and	less	for	the	conversion	rate,	or	vice	versa)	and	the	confusion	created	due	to	the	fact	that	some	exchange	rate	agencies	included	taxes	in	the	final	value	and	others	did	not.	It	also	supplemented	the	regulatory	transparency	of	bank	tariffs.	The	creation	of	VET	dated	back	to	2011,	when	banks	and	financial	institutions	were	obliged	to	inform	clients	of	VETs	values	in	exchange	operations.	It	was	in	2013	that	banks	and	financial	 institutions	 were	 also	 obliged	 to	 inform	 VET	 tariffs	 of	 operations	 up	 to	US$100,000.00	to	the	Central	Bank	for	the	purpose	of	regulatory	transparency.182		Three	months	after	the	Central	Bank	started	receiving	information	about	VET	it	published	a	table	for	search	and	consultation	of	VET	average	prices	and	a	ranking	with	institution	names	and	prices	charged,	in	support	of	consumer	information.	The	prices	presented	 were	 not	 the	 ones	 used	 by	 the	 financial	 institutions	 at	 the	 time	 of	consultation,	but	those	used	in	the	previous	month.	In	other	words,	the	tool	created	by	the	 Central	 Bank	was	 not	 one	 to	 guarantee	 the	 price	 of	 currency,	 but	 to	 serve	 as	 a	reference	 for	 consumers	 about	 institutions	 that	 charged	 lower	 prices.	 The	 ranking	presented	the	average	monthly	VET	of	the	banks	and	financial	institutions,	calculated	based	 on	 the	 average	 of	 the	 individual	 operations	 adopted	 by	 these	 institutions,	considering	 operations	 with	 similar	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 transactions	 to	 sell	international	currencies	of	up	to	US$200.00	or	to	buy	international	currencies	in	a	range	of	US$1,000	to	US$3,000.		VET	 ranking	was	 also	made	 available	 as	 an	 app	 for	mobile	 phones,	which	 also	provided	 users	 with	 tools	 for	 finding	 the	 closest	 exchange	 office,	 conversion	 of	currencies,	BCB	daily	exchange	rates,	and	a	manual	with	clarification	of	the	rules	applied	for	exchanging	currencies	 in	Brazil	and	what	needed	to	be	 informed	to	the	Revenues	Department	before	travelling.	As	the	intensity	of	the	Central	Bank	to	adopt	the	measure	was	 very	 high,	 given	 the	 engagement	 of	 all	 federal	 public	 bodies	 in	 preparing	 for	 a	
                                                182	VET	was	regulated	respectively	through	Resolution	4,021/2011	and	Resolution	4,198/2013	
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number	of	major	events	until	 the	Olympics	 in	2016,	 the	 tool	was	developed	without	resistance	from	the	regulated	currency	exchange	offices.	As	the	Brazilian	economic	crisis	intensified	in	2015	and	2016,	the	VET	ranking	was	advertised	as	one	of	the	tools	at	the	consumers’	disposal	to	save	money	when	purchasing	foreign	currencies.183		
3.3.	The	Limits	of	the	Transaction	Logic	of	Bank	Tariffs	As	 a	 mechanism	 to	 inform	 consumer	 choice,	 standardising	 and	 promoting	 RTPs	 in	relation	to	bank	tariffs	and	packages	of	priority	services	addressed	an	important	issue,	i.e.	the	wide	difference	in	the	price	of	various	bank	tariffs	(up	to	563%	differences	in	some	tariff	prices	in	mid-2014,	and	447.50%	in	2016).184	Standardisation	limited	the	scope	of	possible	illegal	charges	placed	on	consumers	and	RTPs	increased	the	incentives	for	banks	to	adjust	the	price	of	tariffs.		The	success	of	an	RTP	in	the	transaction	logic,	however,	should	also	be	gauged	by	its	proper	use	by	beneficiaries	(in	this	case,	consumers	of	bank	services),	i.e.	whether	or	not	consumers	are	aware	of	their	purchase	needs	and	can	conduct	comparisons	taking	these	needs	into	consideration.	For	instance,	 if	a	customer	signs	up	to	a	bank	service	based	 on	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 different	 packages	 on	 offer	 without	 comparing	 the	packages	 with	 their	 realistic	 personal	 needs	 they	 may	 end	 up	 making	 suboptimal	decisions	(Veiga,	2009).	Consumers,	in	other	words,	need	to	be	aware	of	their	purchase	patterns	to	be	able	to	benefit	from	the	disclosed	information.	In	short,	the	creation	of	the	RTP	did	not	guarantee	its	full	effectiveness.		As	some	studies	suggest,	neither	did	the	behaviour	of	banks	always	advance	the	positive	effect	of	the	standardisation	of	tariffs	nor	were	transparency	policies	enough	to	inform	consumers’	 choices.	 In	2009,	 IDEC	suggested	 that	banks	did	not	 comply	with	their	duty	to	inform	clients	of	their	rights	in	terms	of	tariffs.	When	clients	changed	their	account	to	the	essential	package,	IDEC’s	research	suggested,	most	banks	did	not	provide	clients	with	a	document	confirming	the	change	and	some	banks	continued	to	charge	for	previous	tariffs,	which	illustrated	that	clients	were	still	not	fully	aware	of	their	rights	(IDEC,	2009).	Additionally,	according	to	Senacon,	some	of	the	leading	banks	in	Brazil	did	not	comply	with	the	standardisation	norms	and	still	tried	to	hide	tariffs	in	their	websites	in	order	to	make	comparisons	harder	for	consumers.	
                                                183	For	example:	Yazbek,	P.	(2015)	Onde	é	mais	barato	comprar	dólar,	segundo	o	Banco	Central.	
Exame,	11	May.	184	G1	(2014)	Valor	das	tarifas	bancárias	tem	diferença	de	até	563%,	diz	Procon-SP.	G1,	2	July;	Brasil	Econômico	(2016)	Tarifas	bancárias:	diferenças	de	valor	podem	chegar	a	447,50%,	revela	Procon-SP.	Brasil	Econômico,	June	30.	
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As	 a	 mechanism	 to	 promote	 competition	 and	 reduce	 the	 price	 of	 tariffs	 and	packages	 for	 customers,	 IDEC	 suggested	 that	 the	 standardisation	 and	 comparative	publication	of	tariffs	had	limited	effectiveness.	Between	March	2008	and	March	2011	the	price	of	fictional	service	packages	created	by	IDEC	for	research	purposes	increased	on	an	average	of	30%,	while	inflation	was	around	18%.	In	October	2012,	the	Institute	confirmed	the	same	trend,	i.e.	tariffs	for	certain	packages	kept	increasing	and	banks	still	promoted	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 changes	 to	 tariffs	 and	 service	 packages,	 causing	confusion	among	consumers.185	Standardisation	of	tariffs	and	packages	did	not	prohibit	the	 increase	 of	 fees.	 Therefore,	 even	 though	 consumers	 could	 now	 make	 better	comparisons,	they	continuously	had	to	pay	higher	prices	for	services.186	Limitations	of	transparency	and	standardisation	went	beyond	the	fact	that	banks	continuously	 increased	 tariffs.	 The	 most	 important	 factor	 determining	 individuals’	choice	of	banks	in	Brazil	was	geographical	location	(42.5%),	followed	by	perceptions	of	reputation	and	robustness	(28%),	and	the	ease	of	making	transactions	online	(26%).187	One	 of	 the	 reasons	 individuals	 considered	 banks’	 geographical	 location	 was	 the	expectation	of	encountering	a	problem	with	the	bank	at	some	point.188	Another	research	showed	that	Brazilians	with	revenue	above	£966.00	chose	their	banks	according	to	their	perception	 of	 bank	 stability,	 followed	 by	 geographic	 proximity,	 and	 only	 then	 by	tariffs.189	In	other	words,	what	consumers	were	looking	for	and	the	information	offered	to	them	through	RTPs	did	not	directly	or	sufficiently	match.	To	tackle	these	problems	and	increase	financial	consumers’	ability	to	make	the	best	decision	for	themselves,	the	Central	Bank	created	initiatives	of	financial	education,	within	the	framework	of	which	other	RTPs	were	developed.		
                                                185	Idec	(2012)	Enquanto	juros	caem	pouco,	tarifa	de	serviços	compensam	ganho	dos	bancos.	
Idec,	18	October.	186	In	the	context	of	the	decline	in	credit	operations	due	to	the	economic	crisis	that	Brazil	was	going	through	at	the	time	of	writing,	banks	were	alleged	to	increase	tariffs	in	order	to	avoid	a	drop	 in	 revenues.	 See,	 for	example,	Neto,	 J.	 S.;	 Scrivano,	R.	 (2016)	Com	menor	demanda	por	crédito,	bancos	aumentam	taxas.	O	Globo,	26	April.	187	Veronesi,	L.	B.	(2013)	Brasileiros	escolhem	bancos	por	localização	da	agência,	diz	pesquisa.	
InfoMoney,	15	July.	188	Ibid.	189	Other	criteria,	as	they	matter	to	consumers,	were:	speed	of	customer	service;	empathy	with	the	brand;	tailored	services;	quality	of	customer	service;	presence	of	agencies	in	the	national	territory;	interest	rates;	rate	tape.	Research	results	available	at	Accessed	on	May	28th	2015.	
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4.	RTPs	and	financial	education	of	citizens	From	 2008,	 a	 year	 after	 the	 decision	 that	 the	 CDC	was	 applicable	 for	 consumers	 of	financial	services,	the	Central	Bank	published	in	its	website	a	specific	section	entitled	“citizens”,	aimed	at	supporting	citizens	and	consumers	in	dealing	with	financial	subjects.	Following	that	decision	and	the	national	policies	on	consumer	rights,	the	focus	on	citizen	rights	as	 financial	 consumers	expanded	and	consolidated	within	 the	 structure	of	 the	Central	Bank.190	 In	2010	 the	 financial	 inclusion	 theme	was	established	as	one	of	 the	strategic	goals	of	the	Central	Bank,	together	with	promoting	the	efficiency	of	the	national	financial	system.	The	idea	was	that	with	millions	of	Brazilians	excluded	from	access	to	products	and	services	offered	by	the	financial	system,	it	was	difficult	to	claim	that	such	system	was	efficient	(BCB,	2010).	In	the	words	of	BCB	Director	Luis	Edison	Feltrim:		Sometimes	 the	 citizen	 does	 not	 know	 what	 the	 difference	 between	 a	common	bank	account,	a	simplified	account,	or	a	wage	account	is.	[…]	We	understood	that	financial	inclusion	and	financial	education	are	instruments	to	provide	protection	to	consumers;	not	in	the	sense	of	creating	a	bubble	for	the	 consumer	of	 financial	products,	 but	 to	 empower	 citizens	 so	 that	 they	know	how	to	use,	in	an	adequate	and	correct	manner,	all	financial	products	and	services	in	the	area	of	savings	or	credit.	[…]	These	three	instruments,	i.e.	 financial	 inclusion,	 education	 and	 protection,	 are	 pillars	 of	 financial	stability.	(Feltrim,	2015)	(author’s	translation)		By	2016	the	“citizens”	section	of	the	Brazilian	Central	Bank’s	website	offered	a	number	of	information	tools	for	consumers,	such	as	calculation	of	interest	rates,	future	values	of	capital,	calculation	of	credit	card	charges	after	interest	rates,	and	data	about	exchange	rates.	Two	specific	areas	of	the	website	allowed	consumers	to	compare	banks	or	bank	services.	The	 initiatives	 of	 financial	 education	 at	 the	 Central	 Bank,	 among	 which	 was	 a	number	of	smaller	transparency	measures,	were	strengthened	and	designed	in	a	more	comprehensive	fashion	after	2010,	though	isolated	initiatives	had	been	developed	long	before	then.191	The	basis	for	initiatives	of	financial	education	in	Brazil	was	aligned	with	
                                                190	The	emphasis	of	government	on	consumer	rights	led	to	the	creation	of	the	‘National	Plan	of	Consumption	and	Citizenship’	 (Plano	Nacional	de	Consumo	e	Cidadania	–	Plandec),	 in	2014,	aiming	 to	 strengthen	 consumer	 rights	 by	defining	 it	 as	 state	policy.	 Politically,	 the	Plan	was	associated	with	the	expansion	of	the	purchasing	power	of	Brazilian	society,	following	a	decade	of	real	increase	of	the	minimum	wage,	reflected,	for	example,	in	the	campaign	slogan	used	by	the	federal	government	to	launch	the	Plan:	“Now	that	we	have	more	rights	to	consume,	we	want	to	consume	with	more	rights”.	191	 In	mid	 1990s,	 the	 Central	 Bank	 started	 studies	 to	 assess	 the	 access	 of	 the	 lower	 income	population	to	financial	services,	as	well	as	evaluating	alternatives	for	 financial	 inclusion.	The	
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those	adopted	around	the	world,	related	to	the	liberalisation	of	the	financial	system	and	the	increased	transference	of	responsibility	of	financial	decisions	to	consumers.	But	two	other	 factors	pushed	 for	 financial	 inclusion	and	 financial	education	 in	Brazil,	both	of	which	supported	awareness	and	the	stability	of	regulatory	transparency	initiatives.	One	was	the	notion	that	due	to	a	history	of	high	inflation,	Brazilians	had	developed	a	strong	tendency	 towards	 consumption	 (Savoia,	 Saito,	 and	 Santana,	 2007).	 Secondly,	 a	 large	number	of	Brazilians	did	not	have	access	to	the	financial	system.	Together	with	the	goals	of	 social	 inclusion	 of	 the	 federal	 government,	 the	 Central	 Bank	 was	 responsible	 for	ensuring	financial	inclusion.192	Macroeconomic	stabilisation	allowed	for	the	possibility	of	medium	to	long	term	planning,	and	among	a	range	of	other	tools	one	way	to	pursue	that	goal	was	by	providing	more	structured	information	about	products	to	citizens.	In	 2012,	 the	 Central	 Bank	 created	 the	Directorate	 of	 Institutional	 Relation	 and	Citizenship	(Diretoria	de	Relacionamento	Institucional	e	Cidadania).	The	Departments	of	Communication,	Institutional	Relations	and	of	Financial	Education	were	all	part	of	the	Directorate,	which	had	as	its	mandate	all	the	communication	made	between	the	BCB	and	citizens,	consumers	and	the	media,	including	therefore	campaigns	to	raise	awareness	of	how	 to	 make	 financial	 choices	 and	 information	 available	 to	 support	 their	 financial	decision	 making	 processes.	 According	 to	 the	 then	 Director	 of	 the	 Department,	 its	creation	 was	 in	 response	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 an	 institutional	 area	 focused	 on	 financial	education	should	support	the	increasing	financial	inclusion.			 Today,	the	President	[of	the	Central	Bank]	put	two	challenges	for	us.	One	of	them	 is	 to	 consolidate	 the	 agenda	 of	 financial	 inclusion,	 including	 by	adopting	 financial	 education	 as	 a	 tool.	 Another	 challenge	 is	 the	 line	 of	interaction	of	financial	services	being	offered	through	technology;	[…]	which	financial	institutions	can	use	to	benefit	consumers,	if	they	know	how	to	use	the	 instruments	 that	 are	 regulated	 and	 that	 have	 a	 process	 of	 oversight.	(Feltrim,	2015)	
                                                ‘citizen	 calculator’,	 previously	mentioned,	was	 an	 initiative	 to	 support	 citizens	 in	 calculating	some	financial	services	which	had	been	created	in	1999,	although	its	practical	access	was	more	strongly	fostered	in	the	scope	of	the	financial	education	initiatives	in	2010.	In	2003,	the	Central	Bank	 created	 its	 first	 permanent	 initiative	 on	 financial	 education,	 the	 Financial	 Education	Programme.	 Until	 2005,	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 bank	 with	 citizens	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 the	Executive	Secretariat,	an	office	of	support	to	the	president	of	the	Bank,	and	from	2005	until	2012	by	the	oversight	areas,	to	receive	consumers’	complaints.	192	“There	is	a	certainty	that	the	search	for	mechanisms	of	financial	inclusion	is	fundamental	for	reducing	 social	 inequality	 and	 for	 an	 increased	 economic	 development,	 considering	 the	elements	of	a	virtuous	circle:	the	adequate	expansion	of	financial	inclusion	allows	access	to	the	formal	economy,	contributing	to	increased	economic	development,	which	facilitates	access	of	more	individuals	to	the	economy	and	the	financial	system,	mobilising	savings	and	investment	for	the	growth	of	the	productive	sector”	(BCB,	2010,	p.	7).	
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	Additionally,	there	was	a	clear	need	for	transparency	of	rules	applicable	to	bank	services	and	 for	 providing	 information	 for	 consumers,	 as	 it	 was	 concluded	 from	 the	 Central	Bank’s	work	with	Public	Prosecutors,	Chamber	of	Deputies	and	Senacon.193	While	 this	 thesis	was	being	 concluded,	 the	Brazilian	Central	Bank	 continued	 to	reduce	the	information	asymmetry	of	consumers	in	relation	to	products	and	services,	including	many	 that	 are	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research.	 In	 some	 cases,	 the	 Bank	followed	 the	 strategy	 to	 standardise	 information	 in	 order	 to	 tackle	 abuse,	 facilitate	understanding,	support	consumer	choice	and	increase	competition	through	disclosure.	Research	on	how	behavioural	aspects	of	financial	consumers	in	Brazil,	and	elsewhere,	influence	 their	choices	 in	 the	 financial	market	suggests	 that	 the	 impact	of	 regulatory	transparency	could	be	more	limited	than	assumed.	However,	evidence	also	shows	that	it	may	be	immature	to	write	off	consumers’	rationality	altogether	(e.g.	Cruz,	Kimura	and	Krauter,	2003;	Rogers	et	al.	2007;	Rogers,	Favato,	and	Securato,	2008;	Yoshinaga	and	Ramalho,	 2014).	 Financial	 education,	 therefore,	 still	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	transaction	logic.			
Conclusion	This	 chapter	 has	 surveyed	 the	 creation	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	 RTPs	 in	 the	 Brazilian	financial	services	regulation	for	a	period	of	over	a	decade.	In	the	three	main	areas	of	disclosure	covered	in	the	chapter	–	i.e.	those	of	complaints	about	firms,	bank	tariffs	and	account	packages,	and	financial	education	–	none	of	the	RTPs	in	question	experienced	retrenchment.	 The	 larger	 story	 narrated	 here	 shows	 a	 consistent	 increase	 since	 the	early	 1990s	 in	 measures	 and	 policies	 aimed	 at	 the	 protection	 of	 financial	 service	consumers	and	 the	use	of	RTPs	 to	regulate	a	sector	 that	was	 lightly	regulated	 in	 the	1990s.	The	increasing	presence	of	the	Central	Bank,	which,	as	of	2012,	has	as	one	of	its	formal	 mandates	 the	 financial	 education	 of	 citizens,	 as	 a	 formal	 regulatory	 body	supporting	further	disclosure	is	an	important	factor	in	explaining	the	growth	of	these	policies.	Another	factor	is	the	presence	of	high	intensity	intermediaries	–	i.e.	organised	pro-consumer	groups	–	as	drivers	of	RTPs.	The	expansion	of	 the	disclosure	of	complaints	on	 firms	 is	closely	related	 to	 the	Central	Bank’s	willingness	and	ability	to	disclose	the	information,	which	is	strengthened	
                                                193	Feltrim,	L.	E.	(2015)	Interview	on	13	March	2015.	[Recording	in	possession	of	the	author]	
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in	relation	to	that	of	targets	by	the	existing	practice	of	complaints’	transparency,	carried	out	by	Senacon,	and,	most	importantly,	by	the	fact	that	it	supports	its	mandate	as	the	Brazilian	Conduct	Authority	 for	Banks.	Therefore,	 the	possibility	of	expansion	of	 this	RTP	is	high.	In	fact,	at	the	time	of	writing,	in	August	2016,	the	complaints	list	was	being	expanded	yet	again,	 this	 time	 to	 include	 information	of	 complaints	by	credit	holders	related	to	credit	transactions	of	more	than	R$200.00	(£47.00),	 instead	of	R$1,000.00	(£235.00),	as	was	the	case	previously.	The	 RTP	 of	 standardisation	 of	 bank	 tariffs	 and	 accounts’	 packages	 displayed	 a	trajectory	 of	 stagnation.	 It	 was	 pushed	 primarily	 by	 a	 group	 of	 pro-consumer	organisations	with	high	intensity	for	disclosure	(drivers	of	the	RTP).	It	was	negotiated	among	 a	 number	 of	 actors,	 including	 the	 Consumer	 Protection	 Commission	 at	 the	Chamber	of	Deputies,	with	the	participation	of	the	targets	of	the	policy,	alongside	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	the	Central	Bank,	members	of	the	Public	Prosecutors	Office	and	the	DPDC,	pro-consumer	organisations	and	the	Federation	of	Brazilian	Banks	(Febraban).	Following	its	adoption,	the	RTP	was	expanded	one	more	time	by	the	Central	Bank,	but	its	main	path	since	has	been	one	of	stability,	i.e.	stagnation.			Finally,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	 adoption	 of	 transparency	 as	 a	 regulatory	 tool	 in	supporting	 the	 financial	 education	 of	 citizens	 in	 the	 complex	 world	 of	 modern-day	finance	is	among	the	formal	mandates	of	the	Central	Bank.	In	theory,	it	is	expected	that	financial	education	will	both	support	citizens	in	exercising	their	right	of	choice	and	also	help	 consolidate	 a	 desired	 rationality	 in	 the	 economic	market.	 As	 such,	 both	 from	 a	formal	mandate	perspective	and	from	the	perspective	of	principle,	RTPs	for	the	purpose	of	financial	education	are	likely	to	continue	expanding,	especially	when	the	information	disclosed	is	not	of	a	controversial,	nor	of	an	exclusive	nature,	against	which	targets	do	not	have	high	intensity	to	resist.				 	
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CHAPTER	7:	
TRANSPARENCY	IN	THE	UK	RETAIL	BANKING	
	
	 Consumers	might	be	shocked	to	learn	that	they	cannot	access	full	information	about	airline	safety	records,	for	example,	 or	 clinical	 trials	 that	have	gone	wrong.	They	cannot	find	out	what	our	regulatory	institutions	already	know	 about	 how	 broadband	 providers	 compare	 on	performance,	 which	 financial	 firms	 fail	 to	 respond	 to	consumer	complaints	within	the	statutory	time	period,	the	names	of	the	most	complained-about	solicitor	firms,	or	 details	 of	 builders	 formally	 warned	 by	 trading	standards	 about	 their	 conduct.	 (Member	 of	 the	 Legal	Services	Consumer	Panel	Steve	Brooker,	2006)	We	 don't	 agree	 with	 those	 who	 say	 complexity	 of	financial	 services	 means	 consumers	 will	 never	 drive	effective	competition.	That	 is	a	counsel	of	despair,	but	what	 our	 behavioural	work	 is	 showing	 time	 and	 time	again	that	it	is	a	case	of	the	right	information	at	the	right	time	 that	 prompts	 really	 effective	 engagement.	(Director	 of	 Strategy	 and	 Competition	 at	 the	 FCA	Christopher	Woolard,	2015)194		This	chapter	 focuses	on	 the	regulatory	 transparency	of	 retail	banking	services	 in	 the	United	 Kingdom,	 notably	 core	 and	 secondary	 services	 to	 personal	 current	 accounts	(PCA).195	 The	 UK	 banking	 system	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 largest	 and	 it	 has	 expanded	dramatically	in	the	past	four	decades,	with	total	assets	rising	from	100%	of	the	country’s	GDP	in	1975	to	a	staggering	450%	in	2013	(Bush	and	Knott,	2014).	In	2015,	the	retail	banking	 divisions	 of	 financial	 institutions	 constituted	 around	 60%	 of	 their	 total	revenues.196	In	this	context,	creating	competition	in	the	financial	market,	 including	in	
                                                194	Woolard,	 C.	 (2015)	New	Priorities	 for	banking	 reform.	 Speech	by	Christopher	Woolard,	Director	 of	 Strategy	 &	 Competition,	 FCA,	 delivered	 at	 the	 Warwick	 Business	 School	Westminster	Forum.	FCA,	17	June.	195	As	defined	by	 the	Office	of	Fair	Trading	 (OFT),	 core	banking	services	are	 “personal	and	business	 current	 accounts,	 overdrafts	 and	 savings	 products	 traditionally	 associated	 with	banks”	and	secondary	banking	services	are	“unsecured	and	secured	loans	to	personal	and	SME	customers,	including	credit	cards	and	mortgages”	(House	of	Commons,	2011).	196	Data	is	valid	for	the	five	largest	UK	banks	in	2015	(Barclays,	HSBC,	LGB,	RBS,	Santander	UK).	There	is	not	a	standardised	definition	of	‘retail	banking	division’,	thus	the	figure	of	60%	is	based	on	an	approximation	of	services	offered	by	banks	mostly	to	personal	and	SME	(start-up)	accounts.	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	(2015)	Retail	banking	market	investigation:	
Retail	banking	financial	performance.	
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the	provision	of	financial	services	for	holders	of	personal	accounts,	has	been	the	focus	of	 a	 number	 of	 independent	 bodies	 and	 consumer	 protection	 organisations	 and	independent	 reports.	 As	 further	 debated	 in	 this	 Chapter,	 one	 of	 the	 renowned	mechanisms	to	increase	competition	is	by	reducing	barriers	of	information	asymmetries	so	that	consumers	can	shop	around	for	different	products	and	services.		In	this	chapter	I	narrate	and	analyse	the	creation	and	trajectory	of	three	regulatory	transparency	 policies.	 I	 argue	 that	 one	 of	 these	 RTPs,	 the	 FSA	 Comparative	 Tables,	which	was	created	by	the	Financial	Services	Authority	(FSA),	was	adopted	within	the	framework	of	‘light	touch	regulation’	practiced	under	the	New	Labour	government	as	a	mechanism	 to	 foster	 competition	 by	 increasing	 consumer	 access	 to	 structured	information	so	that	they	would	shop	around.	While	the	FSA	was	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	this	RTP,	external	actors	(such	as	the	Cruickshank’s	recommendations	and	consumer	protection	organisations)	supported	the	publication	of	the	Comparative	Tables,	without	which	the	Tables	would	likely	have	had	significant	difficulty	being	adopted.	To	support	this	claim,	I	show	how	financial	institutions	(the	targets	of	the	RTP)	could	resist	to	it	in	two	ways:	first	by	collectively	opposing	to	it	during	consultations,	and,	second,	by	not	submitting	 information	 for	 subsequent	 disclosure.	 In	 spite	 of	 strong	 support	 for	creation	 of	 the	 Tables,	 I	 explain	 how	 they	 were	 scrapped,	 and	 question	 whether	technology	based	innovations	are	the	future	substitutes	for	RTPs.	The	two	other	sets	of	RTPs	analysed	in	this	chapter	are	primarily	adopted	in	the	logic	of	 transaction	(given	the	main	objective	of	disclosure),	but	also	produce	results	associated	with	the	logic	of	performance	(considering	the	sets	of	information	disclosed	and	the	impact	they	cause).	I	explain	how	and	why	the	targets,	i.e.	financial	institutions,	were	able	to	oppose	and	obstruct	their	creation	at	one	point,	but	lost	this	battle	at	a	later	stage,	after	which	their	trajectory	became	expansive.	Before	concluding,	I	explain	how	the	financial	education	agenda	advances	the	creation	and	evolution	of	RTPs.				
1. Socio-Political	and	Institutional	Context	Following	 the	victory	of	New	Labour	 in	1997	 the	government	conducted	a	 review	of	financial	 services,	 including	 those	 of	 banking,	 aimed	 at	 replacing	 the	 patchwork	 of	multiple	and	self-regulatory	bodies	of	the	UK	financial	sector	that	had	failed	to	prevent	a	series	of	scandals	in	the	1990s.	Until	then,	banks	were	for	the	most	part	self-regulating.	Although	banks	maintained	much	of	their	self-regulatory	capacity	under	New	Labour,	the	promoted	changes	also	increased	the	institutional	power	of	the	financial	regulator.		By	virtue	of	 the	Bank	of	England	Act	1998,	 the	Bank	of	England	 transferred	 its	
 191 
banking	 supervisory	 function	 to	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Authority,	 created	 as	 an	independent	non-governmental	body	accountable	to	Treasury	Ministers	and	financed	by	the	financial	industry.	Followed	by	consultations	during	two	parliamentary	sessions,	the	Financial	Services	and	Markets	Act	2000	(FSMA	2000)	came	into	force	on	November	2001,	 consolidating	 the	 competencies	 of	 the	 FSA,	 which	 were	 to	 promote	 market	confidence,	 public	 awareness,	 consumer	 protection,	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	 financial	crime.	 Two	 consultation	 arrangements,	 namely	 the	 Practitioners	 Panel	 and	 the	Consumers	Panel,	were	created	within	the	structure	of	the	FSA.197		Four	other	bodies	were	also	 involved	 in	 the	oversight	of	 financial	 services.	The	Office	of	Fair	Trading	(OFT)	was	responsible	 for	promoting	consumer	protection	and	competition	 law.198	 The	Competition	Commission	 had	 at	 the	 core	 of	 its	mandate	 the	conduction	 of	 in-depth	 inquiries	 of	 mergers	 and	 the	 regulation	 of	 competition	 of	industries	 in	 the	UK.	 The	 Financial	Ombudsman	 Service	 (FOS),	 also	 established	 as	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 FSMA	 2000,	 had	 the	mandate	 to	 settle	 disputes	between	customers	of	financial	services	and	the	firms,	including	banks.	Decisions	by	the	Financial	Ombudsman	were	based	on	 laws	and	 regulations,	 regulatory	guidance	and	standards,	codes	of	conduct,	and	relevant	practices	of	the	sector.199	The	Banking	Code	Standards	 Board	 monitored	 and	 enforced	 compliance	 of	 the	 Banking	 Code,	 a	 self-regulatory	 instrument	 applicable	 to	 retail	 banking	 products,	 which	 set	 standards	 of	good	 banking	 practice	 for	 banks	 and	 building	 societies	 to	 follow	when	 dealing	with	personal	customers	in	the	United	Kingdom	(The	Banking	Code,	2001).	While	debates	about	the	FSMA	bill	were	ongoing,	the	FSA	published	a	Consultation	Paper	 entitled	 ‘Comparative	 Information	 for	 Financial	 Services’	 (Financial	 Services	Authority,	1999).	The	paper	debated	the	adoption	of	tables	that	would	publicly	provide	consumers	with	comparative	information	about	specific	financial	products.	The	work	of	Consultation	 Paper	 28	 was	 based	 on	 five	 products:	 personal	 pensions,	 investment	bonds,	 unit-trust	 individual	 savings	 accounts	 (ISAs),	 savings	 endowments,	 and	mortgage	endowments.	The	Paper	suggested	that	consumers	needed	to	have	access	to	accurate,	easy	to	understand	and	available	information	about	the	price	and	quality	of	competing	 products	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 right	 choice,	 and	 that	 information	 in	 the	financial	sector	at	the	time	did	not	comply	with	such	standards.	According	to	the	Paper,	the	informational	problems	in	relation	to	current	accounts,	and	the	financial	market	in	
                                                197	FSMA	2000,	Part	I,	8.	198	In	2002,	as	a	result	of	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Enterprise	Act	2002,	the	OFT’s	mandate	was	expanded	and	the	body	became	formally	independent	from	the	government.	199	Before	assessing	a	complaint,	the	Financial	Ombudsman	Service	required	the	consumer	to	first	try	to	solve	the	problem	with	the	bank	or	other	financial	service	provider.	
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general,	not	only	posed	a	threat	to	consumer	protection,	but	also	to	market	competition.		The	‘Cruickshank	Report’	(hereafter	the	Report),	which	reviewed	competition	in	the	 UK	 banking	 industry,	 also	 described	 a	 series	 of	 problems	 with	 consumers’	understanding	 of	 the	 financial	 products	 that	 led	 to	 reduced	 levels	 of	 competition	(Cruickshank,	 2000).	 The	 document,	 published	 in	 year	 2000	 and	 welcomed	 by	 the	government,	 the	 FSA,	 and	 consumer	 associations,	 highlighted	 that	 consumers	 were	neither	 able	 to	 understand	 the	 terms	 of	 products	 they	 held	 nor	 to	 make	 informed	comparisons	with	 products	 of	 other	 providers.	 Adding	 to	 this,	 in	 terms	 of	 switching	financial	products,	 the	Report	highlighted	that	consumers	did	not	shop	around,	often	relied	 on	 their	 current	 account	 provider	 for	 the	 sale	 of	 other	 financial	 products,	perceived	switching	as	time	consuming	and	troublesome,	and	alleged	the	existence	of	severe	information	problems	in	the	process.		According	to	the	Report,	as	a	consequence	of	the	information	imbalance	between	financial	 services	 providers	 and	 consumers,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 problematic	 exit	 options,	competition	 in	 the	 retail	 financial	 market	 was	 limited.	 The	 Report	 put	 consumer	awareness	and	information	disclosure	in	the	centre	of	the	regulatory	approach	to	retail	banking	products.	To	curb	persistent	problems	with	bank	services,	the	Report	made	a	number	of	suggestions	to	empower	consumers	with	information	so	that	they	would	not	only	be	 informed	about	 the	products	 they	 could	purchase,	but	 could	also	 strengthen	competition	by	shopping	around.200		 This	 [low	 level	 of	 competition]	 may	 suggest	 that	 radical	 intervention	 is	required,	 particularly	 to	 address	 the	 problems	 in	 the	 supply	 of	 current	accounts.	However,	 the	Review	 judges	 that	 a	more	 hands	 off	 approach	 is	called	 for.	 […]	 Detailed	 product	 or	 behavioural	 regulation	 is	 unlikely	 to	provide	 the	best	outcome	 for	 consumers.	 Such	 regulation	 imposes	higher	costs	 for	 the	 industry,	 which	 then	 feed	 through	 to	 higher	 prices	 for	consumers.	 It	 stifles	 innovation	 and	 blunts	 incentives	 to	 compete.	 […]	Knowledgeable	 consumers	 provide	 the	 best	 incentive	 to	 effective	competition.	With	the	right	information,	consumers	can	take	responsibility	for	 their	own	 financial	wellbeing,	shop	around	and	exert	 the	pressures	 in	suppliers	which	drive	a	competitive	and	innovative	market.		The	view	that,	when	given	the	right	level	and	type	of	information,	consumers	could	take	the	responsibility	for	their	own	financial	wellbeing	and	that	the	FSA	should	be	the	body	responsible	to	publish	such	information	meant	a	shift	from	the	previous	exclusive	
                                                200	 It	 suggested,	 ipsis	 literis,	 establishing	 effective	 consumer	 representation	 and	 redress,	introducing	 benchmark	 products,	 providing	 comparative	 information,	 and	 developing	consumer	education.	
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corporate	self-regulation,	but	also	away	from	a	regulatory	approach	driven	exclusively	by	regulators	through	command	and	control	techniques.	This	new	approach	held	that	consumers	should	be	the	main	players	to	steer	retail	banking	providers.	In	this	context,	facilitating	 comparison	 of	 products’	 features	 and	 prices	 to	 reduce	 information	asymmetry	in	the	market	meant	more	than	protecting	consumers	from	market	failures;	it	 was	 shifting	 part	 of	 the	 regulatory	 responsibility	 from	 banks	 and	 regulators	 to	consumers.	The	 regulatory	 proposals	 for	 retail	 banking	 were,	 however,	 aligned	 to	 the	regulatory	 approach	 adopted	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 financial	 market.	 ‘Light	 touch’	regulation	 was	 an	 approach	 in	 which	 regulators	 did	 not	 intervene	 aggressively,	responding	 to	 crucial	 needs	 of	 intervention	 in	 a	 limited	 fashion.201	 Light	 touch	 was	supported	within	and	outside	government	for	a	number	of	reasons.	Most	importantly,	the	1990s	was	seen	as	a	period	of	success	of	free-market	capitalism,	notably	in	the	sector	of	 finance,	 which	 was	 consolidating	 as	 a	 central	 element	 in	 the	 UK	 economy.	Concomitantly,	and	as	a	corollary,	the	regulatory	framework	adopted	was	expected	to	support	the	rise	of	the	City	of	London	as	a	global	financial	centre,	along	with	New	York	and	 Tokyo.	 Finally,	 the	 previous	 Conservative	 governments	 had	 already	 noticeably	changed	the	economic	and	 institutional	 landscape	of	regulation	and	of	public	service	delivery,	which	compelled	New	Labour,	at	 that	moment,	 to	adopt	and	negotiate	more	business	friendly	measures.	In	such	a	context,	a	more	intrusive	regulatory	approach	was	regarded	as	a	threat	to	global	banks,	which	could	lead	them	to	seek	out	other	countries	where	regulation	was	less	strict.		If	 in	 the	 financial	 market	 transparency	 supported	 light	 touch	 regulation,	 the	measure	was	not	at	all	foreign	to	the	British	regulatory	framework.	Increased	disclosure	and	transparency	were	regulatory	measures	fostered	in	other	policy	areas	in	the	same	period.	The	transition	from	the	Conservative	government	to	New	Labour	saw	a	switch	in	the	regulatory	approach	from	‘deregulation’	to	‘better	regulation’	(e.g.	Baldwin,	2006).	Better	regulation	as	a	regulatory	approach	implied	the	adoption	of	informal	and	low-intervention	strategies,	as	opposed	to	command	and	control	methods	(Baldwin,	2010;	Better	Regulation	Task	Force,	2003).	The	Better	Regulation	Task	Force	(BRTF)	adopted	five	 principles	 of	 good	 regulation,	 i.e.	 proportionality,	 accountability,	 consistency,	transparency,	 and	 targeting	 (“focus	 on	 problem,	 and	minimise	 side	 effects”)	 (Better	Regulation	 Task	 Force,	 2003).	 The	 BRTF	 highlighted	 three	 available	 alternatives	 to	prescriptive	regulation,	all	of	them	relevant	to	understanding	the	context	under	which	regulatory	transparency	was	adopted	by	the	FSA.	‘Do	nothing’	was	a	call	for	regulators	
                                                201	Neligan,	M.	 (2009)	UK's	 FSA	 to	propose	overhaul	 of	 global	 bank	 regulation.	Reuters.	 17	March.	
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to	measure	whether	 intervention	was	at	 all	necessary	and	would	not	produce	 costly	unintended	 consequences.	 ‘Advertising	 campaigns	 and	 education’	 and	 ‘Using	 the	market’,	 the	 other	 two	 alternatives,	 both	 carried	 important	 informational	 aspects.	Whereas	the	first	aimed	at	influencing	the	behaviour	of	individuals	and	firms	through	information,	advice	and	persuasion,	the	second	argued	that	markets	could	work	well	if	consumers	were	better	informed	in	their	decision	processes.	It	was	in	this	socio-political	and	 institutional-regulatory	 environment	 that	 the	 FSA	 Comparative	 Tables	 were	introduced.			
2. Creation	and	Trajectory	of	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables		
2.1. The	Creation	of	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables	In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 whereas	 banks	 were	 regulated	 and	 had	 to	 go	 through	 an	authorisation	 process	 to	 operate,	 financial	 services	 did	 not	 need	 to	 be	 approved	 by	regulators.	 The	 consequence	 was	 that	 financial	 products	 had	 a	 range	 of	 different	features,	 not	 all	 products	 were	 priced	 or	 standardised,	 and	 comparisons	 were	 not	necessarily	easy.	In	spite	of	this	and	of	the	fact	that	the	Comparative	Tables	would	be	adopted	 in	 a	 voluntary	 fashion,	 in	 its	 Consultation	Paper,	 organisations	 representing	practitioners	and	financial	institutions	manifested	a	cautious	reaction	to	the	proposal.	In	Response	to	Consultation	Paper	28,	the	Small	Business	Practitioner	Panel,	for	example,	“expressed	‘strong	reservations’	feeling	that	‘the	provision	of	this	information	would	go	beyond	what	the	FSA	should	reasonably	be	expected	to	do.’”		Moreover,	 the	 FSA	 itself	 had	 expressed	 concerns	 that	 if	 it	 were	 to	 publish	comparative	information	under	its	own	name	it	could	be	implied	the	FSA	was	endorsing	the	 products;	 this	 was	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 why	 the	 FSA	 had	 postponed	 the	publication	 of	 the	 Tables.	 Regardless	 of	 the	 FSA’s	 concern,	 the	 Cruickshank	 Report	supported	the	FSA	in	advancing	the	policy	as	the	benefits	of	this	RTP	would	outweigh	any	of	its	eventual	risks.	Additionally,	pro-consumer	and	competition	organisations	had	also	strongly	pushed	for	the	adoption	of	the	initiative.	In	the	end,	with	two	of	the	FSA’s	four	mandates	being	public	 awareness	 and	 consumer	protection,	 aligned	with	 a	 less	interventionist	 regulatory	 approach,	 the	 Comparative	 Tables	 were	 introduced.	 In	justifying	the	creation	of	the	Tables,	the	FSA	stated	that	the	policy	was	“…appropriate	where	 the	 intended	 readership	 [was]	 a	 mass	 retail	 one,	 and	 the	 intended	 purpose	requires	a	standardised	format	and	presentation”.	This	implied	that	where	the	market	
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had	 the	 ability	 to	 promote	 credible	 and	 sound	 comparisons	 and	 interpretations	 of	products’	 characteristics,	 the	 FSA	 would	 not	 advance	 competition	 nor	 consumers’	protection	through	transparency.202	The	 first	 set	 of	 the	 phased	 implementation	 of	 the	 FSA	 Comparative	 Tables	included	 a	 list	 of	 standardised	 information	 about	 annuities,	 unit-trust	 ISAs,	 savings	endowments	and	mortgage	endowments.	For	each	financial	product,	consumers	were	able	to	compare	prices,	flexibility,	channels	for	purchase	(and	changes	in	price	in	each	channel,	 if	 applicable),	 range	of	 funds,	minimum	payments,	 and	markers.	A	 series	of	decisions	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 metrics	 to	 use	 for	 publication	 were	 taken	 during	consultations.	 In	 terms	of	price,	 for	example,	 the	FSA	adopted	the	Reduction	 in	Yield	(RIY),	for	being	the	one	used	in	banks’	disclosure	regime,	and	model	consumers,	given	price	variation	depending	on	the	specific	circumstances	of	individual	clients.	After	a	long	process	of	debates,	the	FSA’s	decision	to	promote	the	comparison	and	publish	the	information	itself	was	justified	in	order	to	ensure	impartiality,	accuracy	and	a	need	for	standardised	and	careful	publication	(in	relation	to	format	and	presentation),	notably	because	of	the	mass	readership	of	consumers	from	retail	banking.203	The	FSA	suggested	that	the	Tables	should	be	tailored	by	itself	while	the	market	did	not	promote	such	comparisons	in	an	adequate	manner.	In	Response	to	Consultation	Paper	28,	the	FSA	stated	that			 The	market	is	clearly	not	delivering	an	appropriate	level	of	information	at	present,	 and	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 retail	markets	 is	 one	of	 the	main	reasons	why	regulatory	intervention	is	necessary.	If	this	situation	changes,	perhaps	 through	 the	development	of	more	 consumer-orientated	ﬁnancial	services	websites,	then	the	FSA	will	reconsider	its	position.		The	 FSA	 Comparative	 Tables	 was	 voluntary,	 meaning	 that	 banks	 and	 financial	institutions	were	not	obliged	to	submit	data	to	the	FSA.	But	the	industry	had	at	least	two	reasons	to	have	its	products	featured	in	the	Comparative	Tables.	First,	the	initial	work	of	 the	Tables	was	to	standardise	classes	of	 information	to	be	published.	Products	are	easier	to	compare	when	they	are	expressed	in	terms	of	common	standards.	Research	shows	that	for	this	reason	consumers	will	prioritise	products	that	are	easily	comparable,	
                                                202	FSA	(2008)	Transparency	as	a	regulatory	tool.	FSA	Discussion	Paper	08/3.	FSA.	203	 “[T]hough	 the	 information	 in	 the	 comparative	 tables	 concerns	 ‘commercial’	 rather	 than	regulatory	matters,	we	felt	it	appropriate	to	directly	brand	and	house	those	tables,	in	order	to:	make	them	readily	available	to	consumers	(and	for	free);	give	consumers	confidence	in	the	data;	 and	 ensure	 the	 information	 and	 its	 presentation	 is	 standardised	 and	 genuinely	comparable.”	FSA	(2008).	Transparency	as	a	regulatory	tool.	FSA.	
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and	firms	that	do	not	adapt	to	standardisation	are	likely	to	lose	market	share	(e.g.	Gabaix	and	Laibson,	2006;	Gaudeul	and	Sugden,	2012).	Second,	names	of	institutions	that	were	asked	to	cooperate	and	did	not	submit	their	data	were	publicly	shamed	by	the	FSA.	Although	the	Tables	aimed	at	placing	on	consumers	the	main	drive	for	competition	in	retail	banking	–	and	“For	every	product	group	considered,	the	[Cruickshank]	Review	has	 identified	 central	 elements	 which	 consumers	 do	 not	 appear	 adequately	 to	understand”	–	response	from	consumers	were	unknown.	The	FSA	acknowledged	that	price	 was	 not	 necessarily	 the	 main	 characteristic	 that	 an	 individual	 or	 an	 SME	considered	 when	 purchasing	 a	 financial	 product	 or	 keeping	 one,	 but	 being	 an	information	 that	 consumers	 “should	 consider”	 and	would	 foster	 competition,	 it	 was	included	 in	 the	 Tables.204	 Price	 information	was	 expected	 to	 influence	 the	 switching	behaviour	 of	 personal	 banking	 consumers,	 which,	 as	 I	 mentioned	 before,	 was	considered	significantly	low.	Compared	to	six	other	products,	including	mortgages,	the	least	number	of	people	had	switched	providers	of	current	accounts,	with	only	six	per	cent	 (Waterson,	 2001).	 Similarly,	 an	 investigation	 conducted	 by	 the	 Competition	Commission	in	2002	identified	that	in	the	case	of	SMEs	only	10%	of	respondents	said	that	 price	 factors	 were	 the	most	 important	 when	 choosing	 a	 bank.205	 For	 the	 same	research,	when	 asked	which	 characteristics	were	 important	 in	 a	 bank,	 24%	of	 SMEs	mentioned	quality	of	relationship	with	a	manager,	23%	said	reasonable	charges,	fees	or	rates	of	interest,	22%	efficiency,	and	16%	location.		Even	though	the	relationship	with	banks	and	the	quality	of	the	service	provided	seemed	very	central	for	retail	consumers,	the	FSA	ruled	out	the	possibility	of	publishing	information	about	complaints.	Although	this	was	strongly	advocated	by	pro-consumer	associations,	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Authority,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Financial	Ombudsman	 Service,	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 technically	 difﬁcult	 to	 provide	 useful	comparative	 data	 in	 that	 regard,	 due	 to	 the	 very	 different	 types	 of	 complaints	made	against	ﬁrms,	and	its	lack	of	categorisation	by	the	regulator.	At	the	heart	of	the	decision	was	the	need	for	the	FSA	to	assure	the	industry	that,	contrary	to	their	fear,	not	every	
                                                204	In	its	Response	to	Consultation	Paper	28,	the	FSA	argued:	“On	the	beneﬁts	side,	individual	consumers	who	use	the	Tables	should	get	some	direct	beneﬁts,	but	there	may	also	be	more	general	beneﬁts	to	consumers	due	to	the	increased	transparency	that	the	Tables	should	bring	to	the	market.	If	our	assumptions	about	market	transparency	are	correct,	we	should	expect	prices	 to	 fall	 and	 the	 quality,	 or	 appropriateness,	 of	 products	 to	 improve	 as	 a	 result	 of	introducing	the	Tables.”	205	Competition	Commission	(2002)		
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information	they	shared	with	the	FSA	or	FOS	would	be	shared	with	consumers.206	Another	 set	 of	 information	 that	 the	 FSA	 decided	 not	 to	 publish,	 and	 caused	considerable	 unease	 notably	 among	 investment	 advisers	 and	 managers,	 was	 past	investment	performances.	Whereas	investment	managers	argued	that	price	was	not	as	important	 as	 performance,	 the	 FSA	 argued	 that	 there	 was	 no	 evidence	 of	 “any	correlation	between	any	measure	of	the	past	performance	of	a	particular	fund	and	the	future	returns	of	that	fund”	(FSA,	2000).	The	subject	became	the	centre	of	a	three	year	debate	 between	 the	 FSA,	 supported	 by	 consumer	 associations,	 and	 investment	managers,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 investigation	 by	 the	 FSA.207	 After	 being	 pressured	 by	 the	industry	 to	 include	 past	 performance	 in	 its	 online	 comparative	 tables	 of	 investment	products,	 the	 FSA	 not	 only	 denied	 the	 changes,	 but	 it	 also	 regulated	 the	 use	 of	 past	performance	 information	 by	 fund	 managers	 in	 advertisement,	 in	 line	 with	 an	 FSA	investigation	showing	that	past	performance	was	not	a	good	guidance	for	the	future.208	It	 was	 a	 victory	 for	 consumer	 associations,	 and	 in	 that	 regard	 for	 the	 FSA,	 which	persistently	argued	that	past	performance	was	no	good	indicator	of	future	performance.	However,	the	lack	of	consensus	between	the	FSA	and	the	industry	in	this	regard	became	one	of	the	reasons	why	a	number	of	investment	managers	declined	to	provide	figures	to	the	FSA	while	supplying	them	to	other	financial	advisers.	“We	feel	that	the	Tables	are	potentially	misleading	because	there’s	too	much	stress	on	charges	and	consumers	don’t	make	 decisions	 purely	 on	 cost”,	 justified	 the	 representative	 for	 Investment	Manager	Skandia.209	 Although	 the	 Tables	 aimed	 at	 supporting	 consumers	 to	 make	 better	informed	choices	and	 increase	competition	 in	 the	market,	 their	voluntary	nature	put	into	doubt	their	sustainability	as	a	policy	solution.			
                                                206	 Firms	 were	 obliged	 to	 provide	 consumers	 with	 details	 about	 their	 complaint	 handling	procedures,	and	it	was	voluntary	to	inform	that	the	financial	service	provider	was	covered	by	FOS.	207	 For	 example:	 FSA	 (2000)	 FSA	 research	 confirms	 that	 past	 investment	 performance	provides	 no	 guide	 to	 future	 performance.	 FSA,	 14	 August;	 The	 Observer	 (2002)	 Give	 past	performance	another	chance.	The	Guardian,	20	October.	208	From	June	2004,	advertisements	that	referred	to	the	past	performance	of	investments	were	obliged	 to	 include	 a	 standardised	 table	 showing	 the	 annual	 returns	 for	 the	 fund	 for	 the	previous	 five	 years,	 expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 percentage	 in	 order	 to	 give	 consumers	 a	 better	understanding	 of	 the	 volatility	 of	 the	 investment.	 Other	 obligations,	 such	 as	 reducing	 the	emphasis	on	past	performance	in	their	advertising,	were	also	adopted.	209	Wallis,	V.	(2003)	Have	the	tables	turned	on	the	FSA?	The	Guardian,	19	October.	
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2.2. The	Trajectory	of	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables	In	terms	of	expanding	the	Tables	to	include	more	products,	the	FSA	followed	six	criteria,	a	mix	of	propositions	coming	from	the	Cruickshank	Report	and	from	the	consultations	conducted	by	the	FSA:	the	product	needed	to	be	currently	in	the	market;	it	should	be,	or	had	the	potential	to	be,	mass	market;	products	for	which	greater	assistance	was	needed	should	 be	 prioritised;	 prioritisation	 should	 also	 be	 given	 to	 products	 for	 which	 the	consequences	of	an	‘uninformed’	decision	were	highest;	products	for	which	there	were	significant	variations	in	the	market;	relevant,	understandable	and	objective	indicators	could	be	achieved	(FSA,	1999).	However,	while	still	in	their	infancy,	in	2003	the	Financial	Services	 Consumers	 Panel	 alleged	 a	 major	 reason	 for	 failure	 of	 the	 Tables	 as	 a	transparency	initiative,	i.e.	the	majority	of	consumers	did	not	know	that	they	existed.210	Another	limitation	of	the	Tables	was	the	fact	that	they	were	mainly	an	online	tool,	this	being	one	of	the	reasons	that	consumers	who	needed	them	the	most	were	the	least	likely	to	have	access	 to	 them	(Cartwright,	2004).	Until	 the	2007-08	crisis,	 the	Comparative	Tables	seemed	fairly	stable.	Change	came	in	the	aftermath	of	the	financial	turmoil.	The	unrest	triggered	by	the	2007-08	financial	crisis	and	the	recent	approval	of	the	FoIA	 by	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 altered	 the	 norms	 institutionalised	 in	 Layer	 2	 and	strengthened	 the	 position	 of	 consumer	 associations	 against	 financial	 institutions	 in	relation	to	disclosure	of	complaints.211	Concomitantly	and	coordinated	with	the	debates	and	disclosure	of	data	about	complaints	by	the	Financial	Ombudsman	Service	(FOS),	the	proposal	 of	 the	 FSA	 to	 give	 transparency	 to	 complaints	 and	 complaints-handling	 by	firms	to	inform	consumer	choice,	ruled	out	in	2000,	gained	renewed	strength	(Financial	Services	 Authority,	 2008).212	 Unlike	 the	 statistics	 published	 by	 the	 Financial	Ombudsman	Service,	the	FSA	proposal	was	the	publication	of	firm-specific	complaints	and	 of	 complaint-handling	 (of	 data	 sent	 to	 the	 FSA	 by	 the	 industry,	 and	 not	 the	complaints	made	at	the	FOS).213	Consistent	with	the	FSA	Handbook,	firms	had	to	submit	to	the	FSA	data	about	complaints	they	had	received	and	their	complaints	handling	every	six	months.	 Complaints	 of	 all	 firms	were	published	 in	 a	 structured	 form,	 in	 order	 to	provide	consumers	with	information	about	the	quality	of	firms’	consumer	services	and	compliance	with	good	practices	of	treating	consumers	fairly.	
                                                210	Ibid.	211	This	shift	in	Layer	2	will	be	discussed	further	on	section	3	of	this	Chapter.	212	Financial	Services	Authority	(2008)	Discussion	Paper	08/3.	FSA.	213	Before	making	a	complaint	to	the	Financial	Ombudsman	Service,	consumers	were	obliged	to	complain	and	try	to	solve	the	problem	with	the	financial	service	provider.	Only	in	the	case	that	the	provider	could	not	solve	the	problem,	the	consumer	could	refer	to	the	FOS.	
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Whereas	representatives	from	consumer	associations	justified	that	transparency	of	complaints	to	firms	was	important	for	being	an	additional	source	of	information	for	consumers,	 company	 representatives	 argued	 that	 complaints	 data	 may	 not	 help	customers	make	good	purchasing	decisions,	and	highlighted	 the	potential	confidence	damage	it	could	generate	in	the	financial	services	industry.	Exactly	as	argued	by	larger	firms	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 publication	 of	 complaints	 by	 FOS,	 if	 the	 FSA	 published	 the	absolute	number	of	complaints,	without	taking	into	account	how	much	business	a	firm	did,	 they	 alleged	 it	would	 be	 unfair	 on	 these	 firms.	 Firm	 representatives	 also	 raised	concerns	regarding	the	FSA	breach	with	the	European	Markets	in	Financial	Instruments	Directive	 (Directive	 2004/39/EC),	 which	 limited	 transparency	 of	 firms’	 data	 by	 the	regulator.	Some	firms	fought	for	specific	types	of	contextualisation	of	the	information,	but	 agreed	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 argue	 against	 the	 principle	 of	 disclosure.214	 Others	suggested	that	the	FSA	continued	using	“its	existing	powers,	including	thematic	reviews	and	enforcement	processes,	instead	of	transparency”.	But	the	financial	crisis	had	made	clear	the	need	for	more	regulation	of	financial	service	providers.		Complaints	data	 started	being	published	by	 the	FSA	 in	August	2009.	Published	data	covered	 two	areas:	volume	of	complaints	received	according	 to	product,	 type	of	firm	and	cause	of	the	complaint,	and	complaints-handling.215	In	2010	the	FSA	required	firms	 to	also	publish	 their	data	every	 six	months	 in	 case	 they	 reported	500	or	more	opened	complaints	within	the	reporting	period	(FSA	Handbook	DISP	1.10).	In	many	of	its	statements,	it	was	clear	that	the	FSA	disclosed	complaints	information	as	a	tool	to	support	both	the	performance	and	the	transactional	logics	of	regulatory	transparency.	In	a	review	of	the	complaints	disclosure	data	in	2012,	the	FSA	identified	that	from	the	firms’	side	76%	used	complaints	data	to	compare	their	performance	against	their	peers,	59%	to	 review	 their	own	performance,	 and	only	6%	thought	 consumers	complained	more	 due	 to	 the	 disclosure	 scheme.216	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 consumers,	 22%	 of	respondents	were	aware	of	complaints	data,	38%	of	whom	claimed	having	used	the	data	when	choosing	a	financial	service	provider.	Both	bodies	were	convinced	of	the	benefits	of	disclosure	and	did	not	plan	to	restrain	the	disclosures	in	any	regard.	However,	with	the	beginning	of	the	Conservative	–	Liberal	Democrat	Coalition	government	in	2010,	a	sequence	of	changes	was	 introduced	in	the	approach	to	transparency	as	a	regulatory	tool,	in	the	framework	of	which	not	only	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables	but	also	the	FSA	
                                                214	Fitzsimons,	J.	(2008)	FSA	league	tables	meet	cool	reception	from	intermediaries.	Mortgage	
Solutions,	2	June.		215	Firms	 reported	 the	volumes	of	 complaints	according	 to	36	different	product	 categories,	divided	in	five	groups.	216	This	was	one	of	firms’	concerns	in	response	to	the	FSA	consultation	in	2008.	
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itself	would	soon	cease	to	exist.		
2.3. The	Scrapping	of	the	Comparative	Tables	The	financial	crisis	of	2007-08	had	revealed	that	some	of	the	financial	risks	were	often	disclosed,	but	the	market	lacked,	as	the	Coalition	government	argued,	the	understanding	of	 what	 was	 happening	 due	 to	 a	mix	 of	 cognitive	 bias,	 bounded	 rationality	 and	 the	complexity	of	financial	products.	On	 the	 organisational	 structure	 of	 the	 financial	 market,	 the	 British	 model	 of	concentrating	 in	one	 single	body	 the	mandates	of	prudential	 regulation,	 oversight	of	consumer	protection	and	market	conduct	lost	support.	Instead,	the	‘twin	peaks’	model	of	financial	regulation,	which	divides	the	responsibilities	of	prudential	regulation	and	financial	conduct	regulation	into	separate	regulatory	bodies,	became	stronger,	not	only	in	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 but	 also	 internationally	 (Ferran,	 2011).	 The	 Turner	 Review	suggested	 that	 combining	 prudential	 and	 conduct	 of	 business	 regulation	 and	supervision	created	the	danger	of	lacking	specialist	focus	on	either,	and	that	a	focus	on	conduct	could	come	at	the	expense	of	prudential	regulation	(Turner,	2009,	pp.	92).217	The	theoretical	incompatibility	of	mandates	heavily	supported	at	that	moment,	together	with	 the	 ‘failed	 experience’	 of	 the	 FSA	 prior	 to	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 strengthened	 the	political	 support	 for	 the	 twin	 peak	 model,	 bringing	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	organisational	 framework	 to	 protect	 consumers	 and	 foster	 competition,	 and	 in	 that	regard	to	regulatory	transparency	(Taylor,	2009).	In	the	area	of	consumer	protection,	assessments	about	the	efficacy	of	the	FSA	prior	to	the	crisis	were	mixed.	Among	its	harshest	criticisms	were	being	captured	and	failing	to	protect	consumers,	not	solving	the	issue	of	mis-selling	of	retail	financial	products,	and	being	insufficiently	robust	in	supervising	certain	consumer-oriented	practices	from	the	industry	(Parliamentary	and	Health	Ombudsman,	2008;	Financial	Services	Consumer	Panel,	2009;	Ferran,	2011).	On	the	positive	side,	it	had	imposed	substantial	sanctions	against	 firms	 that	 had	 not	 complied	 with	 negotiated	 decisions	 related	 to	 retail	consumers,	 it	 had	 sufficiently	 addressed	 financial	 capability,	 among	 others	 (Jackson,	2008;	Financial	Services	Authority,	2009;	Ferran,	2011).		Reforms	of	the	financial	market	still	 took	on	board	a	great	deal	of	transparency	requirements,	 which	 were	 then	 often	 complementary	 to	 command	 and	 control	regulation	and	informed	by	the	notion	that	disclosure	needed	to	“work	under	actual	(not	hypothetical)	market	conditions”	(Avgouleas,	2009).	But	the	crisis	put	in	check	the	FSA	
                                                217	See,	also,	the	speech	of	Mervyn	King	at	the	Bank	of	England	on	16	June	2010.	
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Comparative	 Tables.	 The	 Coalition	 government	 aimed	 at	 adopting	 a	 behavioural	approach	 to	many	 of	 its	 policies.	 According	 to	 this	 approach,	 if	 all	 consumers	were	rational,	 the	 availability	 and	 quality	 of	 information	 would	 sufficiently	 influence	consumer	 choices.	 However,	 as	 theories	 of	 bounded	 rationality	 demonstrated,	individuals	were	unable	to	maximise	their	benefit,	as	they	tended	to	lack	access	to	all	the	information	they	would	need	to	make	a	rational	decision,	and	indeed	even	if	they	did	have	access	 to	all	 this	 information,	 their	decision	would	still	have	biases	 (e.g.	Simon,	1972;	Paredes,	2003;	Barberis	and	Thaler,	2002).		In	2008	 the	Tables	were	published	on	 the	scope	of	 the	 ‘Money	Made	Clear’,	 the	initiative	of	the	FSA	with	the	Treasury	to	help	consumers	have	a	better	understanding	and	command	of	dealing	with	money	and	finances.	With	the	creation	of	the	Consumer	Financial	Education	Body	in	2010,	Money	Made	Clear	was	relocated	to	the	new	body,	rebranded	as	Money	Advice	Services	(MAS)	in	2011.	In	its	first	year	as	MAS,	it	removed	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables	and	provided	links	to	alternative	price	comparison	websites	and	guidance	on	how	best	to	use	them.	The	Tables	were	scrapped	without	much	concern	around	the	issue	of	credibility,	independence	and	ability	of	third	parties	to	provide	the	information;	 one	 of	 the	 very	 reasons	 that	 had	 led	 the	 FSA	 to	 create	 and	publish	 the	Tables	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 According	 to	 Dominic	 Lindley,	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Financial	Services	Consumer	Panel	at	the	time	of	research	and	a	prior	member	of	Which?	(a	social	enterprise	for	consumer	rights),	not	a	lot	of	people	knew	about	the	Tables	and,	therefore,	it	was	easy	to	scrap	them	and	switch	to	another	policy	solution.218		The	 decision	 to	 transfer	 the	 responsibility	 to	 provide	 comparative	 information	about	financial	products	to	third	parties	was	aligned	with	the	MAS´s	understanding	that	“people	do	not	always	act	in	their	 ‘rational	best	interest’”.	The	real	need,	according	to	this	view,	was	to	guide	and	advise	consumers	about	the	characteristics	of	products	and	what	to	consider	when	getting	them,	and	to	do	so	in	a	way	that	took	into	consideration	consumers’	 behaviours	 (Money	 Advice	 Service,	 2011).	 In	 terms	 of	 publishing	comparative	information	about	features	of	products	and	services	of	regulated	firms,	the	government	justified	it	should	only	be	fostered	in	case	the	market	did	not	play	such	role,	which	was	at	some	level	aligned	with	what	the	FSA	itself	claimed	when	the	Tables	were	created.			 In	some	cases,	there	may	be	a	further	role	for	Government.	There	may	be	markets	where	intermediaries	and	tools	such	as	price	comparison	sites	do	not	develop,	or	where	they	do	not	meet	the	needs	of	vulnerable	consumers.	In	these	cases,	there	may	a	role	for	Government	to	provide	funding,	backing	
                                                218	Lindley,	D.	(2016)	Interview	on	26	February	2016.	[Recording	in	my	possession.]	
 202 
or	 investment	 in	 intermediaries	 or	 tools	 (Department	 for	 Business,	Innovation	and	Skills,	2011).		This	idea	was	shared	by	Sue	Lewis	(2016),	a	member	of	the	Financial	Services	Consumer	Panel	 at	 the	 time	of	 this	 research,	who	pointed	out,	however,	 that	 it	was	also	due	 to	pressure	from	banks:		 I	 think	 the	 logic	 at	 that	 time	was	 that	 the	 industry	publishes	 comparison	tables,	so	there	is	no	need	for	the	Money	Advice	Service	to	do	it,	if	it	is	already	out	there.	[…]	Industry-owned	comparison	sites	are	not	impartial,	but	the	industry	put	great	pressure	on	 the	government	 to	stop	 the	Money	Advice	Services	from	publishing	impartial	comparisons.219		In	agreement	with	Lewis,	Dominic	Lindley	(2016)	suggested	that	comparison	websites	managed	 by	 private	 third	 parties,	 though	 not	 impartial,	 put	 a	 lot	 of	 effort	 in	 the	initiatives	as	they	operated	with	a	business	rationale.	He	also	highlighted	the	existence	of	not	for	profit	and	impartial	initiatives	that	aimed	at	informing	consumers:		 The	 thing	 about	 the	 private	 sector	 bodies	 is	 that	 they	 have	 gotten	 a	 big	incentive	for	them	to	promote	their	comparison	tables	very	effectively,	and	also	monitor	what	people	do	when	they	get	the	information.	Because	this	is	how	they	[private	sector	bodies]	get	paid.	So	for	every	person	that	clicks	on	them	 and	 goes	 on	 to	 buy	 a	 product,	 they	will	 get	 a	 commission	 from	 the	provider.	[…]	But	there	were	also	consumer	organisations;	so	you	had	Which?	offering	information	on	its	website	that	it	might	tell	you,	for	example,	the	top	five	best	buys	in	savings	accounts,	or	something	like	that.		 The	 concerns	 voiced	 by	 Sue	 Lewis	 and	 Dominic	 Lindley	 were	 recently	corroborated	by	a	consultation	led	by	the	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	(CMA)	on	‘Digital	Comparison	Tools’	(DCTs).	According	to	the	Report,	although	most	people	had	positive	views	and	experiences	of	DCTs,	several	had	concerns	of	what	they	may	do	with	their	personal	data	and	that	they	have	“led	to	the	hollowing	out	of	products,	that	is,	a	decrease	 in	quality	(e.g.	worse	 insurance	cover)	because	of	an	undue	focus	on	price”.	Moreover,	 the	 CMA	 raised	 strong	 concerns	 about	 the	 contracts	 between	 DCTs	 and	suppliers	of	services,	“which	prevent	suppliers	from	offering	better	prices	on	one	DCT	than	on	another	(so-called	wide	price	parity/Most	Favoured	Nation	clauses)	and	can	reduce	competition	between	DCTs.”		The	 FOS	 and	 FSA	 initiatives	 to	 disclose	 complaints	 information	were,	 however,	
                                                219	Lewis,	S.	(2016)	Interview	on	23	February	2016.	[Recording	in	my	possession.]	
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maintained,	as	these	were	sets	of	data	that	private	agents	did	not	have	access	to	in	order	to	allow	publication	in	third	parties	websites.	Additionally,	disclosure	of	complaints	was	a	 mixed	 category	 with	 the	 performance	 logic.	 Publishing	 sets	 of	 information	 that	fostered	such	 logic	of	regulatory	transparency	was	part	of	 the	 ‘Better	Choices,	Better	Deals’	 initiative	 of	 the	 Department	 for	 Business,	 Innovation	 and	 Skills,	 under	 the	objective	of	‘Opening	up	regulatory	data’.	Designed	to	foster	competition,	advocated	by	the	government	to	be	in	the	heart	of	a	dynamic	economy,	‘Better	Choices,	Better	Deals’	was	 a	 strategy	 created	 in	 2011	 to	 shape	 consumer	 behaviour	 in	 a	way	 promised	 to	improve	 the	 UK	 economy,	 making	 it	 more	 competitive	 and	 innovative	 without	 the	necessity	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 new	 regulations	 (Department	 for	Business,	 Innovation	 and	 Skills,	 2011a).	 The	 main	 objective	 of	 the	 initiative	 was	 to	provide	consumers	with	information	that	would	not	only	increase	the	amount	of	data	available,	 but	 would	 take	 into	 consideration	 their	 behaviour	 when	 making	 specific	choices	 and	 steer	 people	 towards	 better	 decisions	 (according	 to	 the	 government,	decisions	that	would	make	people	enjoy	healthier,	wealthier	and	happier	lives).	The	Financial	Services	Act	of	2012	abolished	the	FSA	and	created	three	separate	bodies	to	regulate	the	financial	market.	Of	these	three,	the	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(FCA)	was	the	main	substitute	of	the	FSA,	taking	over	the	FSA	mandate	of	protecting	consumers.	Besides	being	responsible	for	ensuring	the	integrity	of	the	market	and	for	regulating	financial	firms	to	provide	consumers	a	fair	deal,	the	FCA	became	responsible	for	guaranteeing	competition	of	 the	 financial	market.220	 In	both	mandates,	 to	protect	consumers	 and	 promote	 competition,	 the	 FCA	 worked	 heavily	 in	 ensuring	 that	consumers	had	access	to	information	that	they	could	understand	and	respond	to.	Not	all	of	this	information	was	offered	by	the	FCA	as	an	RTP,	rather	it	was	provided	in	an	equally	structured	 and	 comparative,	 but	 individualised	 fashion.	 Moreover,	 instead	 of	 RTPs,	independent	bodies,	 such	as	 the	Competition	and	Markets	Authority,	now	supported	individualised	access	to	financial	information,	in	order	to	boost	competition.		In	the	section	below	I	briefly	look	into	this	relatively	new	format	of	information	sharing	with	consumers	to	question	if	and	to	what	extent	these	new	initiatives	reflected	the	internationally	consolidating	ideas	of	bounded	rationality	and	nudging	and	can	be	considered	 policy	 substitutes	 to	 RTPs	 in	 the	 transaction	 logic	 and	 may,	 therefore,	influence	their	trajectory	currently	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	elsewhere.	2.4. Any	future	for	the	transaction	logic	in	retail	banking?	Instead	of	replacing	the	scrapped	Tables	with	another	RTP,	 the	Coalition	government	
                                                220	The	other	two	bodies,	operating	within	the	Bank	of	England,	were	the	Prudential	Regulation	Authority	(PRA)	and	the	Financial	Policy	Committee	(FPC).	
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launched	an	initiative	for	current	accounts,	known	as	Midata,	that	was	based	on	data	and	individualised	information	disclosure,	but	not	on	transparency	of	standardised	and	comparative	 information	 to	 the	 public.221	 This	 new	 initiative	 supplemented	 others	aimed	 at	 increasing	 market	 competition	 and	 consumers’	 chance	 of	 exit,	 such	 as	 a	Current	Account	Switching	Service	and	account	number	portability,	but	also	by	reducing	consumers’	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 banking	 sector.	 Midata	 was	adopted	as	an	initiative	with	voluntary	adhesion	by	banks	to	provide	their	“customers’	data	 available	 in	 a	 safe,	 simple,	 standardised	 format	 that	 can	 be	 easily	 fed	 into	comparison	sites	to	give	the	customer	more	clear	and	accurate	options	when	they	shop	around”	(Davies	et	al.,	2015).		The	thrust	for	the	creation	of	the	initiative	was	that	in	order	to	make	better	and	more	 informed	 decisions,	 consumers	 first	 needed	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 their	 consumption	habits.	This	is	also	true	for	RTPs,	although	disclosure	alone	does	not	explain	individual	consumption	patterns.	Even	though	consumers	already	had	the	right	to	access	their	own	data	held	by	businesses	before	the	creation	of	Midata,	this	right	was	unknown	to	most	consumers.	 Summarising	 the	 design	 goals	 of	Midata,	 Lindley	 (2016)	 explained	 that,	besides	fostering	competition	by	providing	consumers	with	information:		 One	of	the	other	purposes	[of	Midata]	is	helping	consumers	to	manage	their	money,	helping	them	to	use	their	existing	products	in	better	ways.	And	the	third	purpose	is	prompting	them	to	think	of	what	else	might	be	available	out	there,	to	help	them	compare	and	contrast	so	that	they	understand	how	much	they	are	paying	at	the	moment	and	helping	them	get	a	better	deal.		The	new	comparison	 tool	was	published	by	 the	private	website	Gocompare.com	and	allowed	 comparisons	 between	 the	 UK’s	 six	 largest	 current	 account	 providers.	 The	website	also	allowed	customers	of	these	providers	to	upload	a	statement	with	up	to	12	months	of	transactions	and,	based	on	the	customers’	specific	needs	and	past	spending	habits,	suggested	the	most	suitable	current	account	available.	The	initiative	was	aligned	with	disclosure	policies	in	other	areas	of	the	government	and	was	supported	and	promoted	by	the	Information	Commissioner:			 I	strongly	support	initiatives	to	promote	greater	openness	and	to	increase	the	control	citizens	have	over	their	own	personal	data.	The	‘mydata’	concept	
                                                221	Before	being	 launched	as	Midata,	 the	 initiative	was	referred	to	as	 ‘mydata’	at	the	design	stage.	
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is	 compatible	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 Data	 Protection	 Act.	 The	Consumer	Empowerment	Strategy	 rightly	points	out	 that	 the	privacy	and	security	dimension	will	need	to	be	properly	managed	if	both	compliance	and	public	confidence	are	to	be	maintained.		Instead	of	providing	a	 structured	set	of	 information	 for	 consumers	 to	 interpret	based	on	their	perceived	needs,	Midata	reduced	the	chance	that	bank	account	customers	misinterpreted	their	pattern	of	financial	services	purchase,	and	allowed	for	provision	of	a	customised	electronic	comparison,	diminishing	the	likelihood	of	biases	in	their	own	data	analysis.	Tailor	made	access	to	information	was	the	core	idea	of	Midata.	“A	key	part	of	the	government’s	long	term	economic	plan	is	to	boost	competition	and	transparency	in	banking	so	that	customers	can	get	the	best	possible	deal.	Addressing	the	balance	of	power	between	banks	and	their	customers	is	at	the	heart	of	this”	(HM	Treasury,	2015).	At	the	time	of	writing,	the	government	was	working	with	a	new	large	comparison	website	to	increase	consumers’	use	of	Midata.	But	results	and	the	future	of	Midata	were	still	inconclusive.	A	review	of	Midata	found	that	the	numbers	of	reported	downloads	of	data	were	a	small	fraction	of	downloaded	pdf.s	of	statements,	and	customers	that	had	used	the	tool	disapproved	of	the	government	working	with	third	party	websites,	due	to	data	security	concerns	(Department	for	Business,	Innovation	and	Skills,	2014).	Another	issue	 was	 that	 a	 number	 of	 personal	 current	 account	 holders	 did	 not	 have	 the	technological	knowledge	to	download	and	share	data	online.222	Unlike	RTPs,	initiatives	of	the	nature	of	Midata	created	problems	with	issues	of	security	and	secrecy.	The	issue	of	 concentrating	 on	 information	 disclosed	 on	 the	 Internet,	 however,	 was	 a	 common	problem	with	both	strategies.	In	 its	2016	 review	of	banking	 services,	 the	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	(CMA),	 once	 again	 recognised	 that,	 still	 dominated	by	 a	 small	 number	of	 high	 street	banks,	 markets	 were	 not	 competitive	 enough.	 The	 Review	 proposed	 a	 package	 of	remedies,	mainly	building	on	 technological	 ideas	similar	 to	Midata	 (Competition	and	Markets	Authority,	2016).	Open	Banking,	the	first	recommendation	from	CMA,	aimed	at	providing	consumers	with	reliable	and	personalised	financial	advice	through	defining	open	 API	 standard	 for	 banking.	 The	 second	 recommendation	 was	 again	 related	 to	transparency	 and	 required	 banks	 to	 publish	 indicators	 of	 service	 quality	 based	 on	customers’	willingness	 to	 recommend	 their	 banks.	 Another	 recommendation	was	 to	encourage	consumers	to	review	and	switch	their	bank	arrangements	more	frequently.	In	the	era	of	obfuscation,	maybe	the	most	important	on	CMA’s	list	of	recommendations	were	the	standardisation	requirements.	But	it	was	still	unclear	whether	the	tool	would	
                                                222	Peachey,	K.	(2016)	Getting	the	most	from	your	current	account.	BBC,	3	March.	
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improve	individuals’	financial	decision	making	ability.	In	 the	meantime,	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Consumer	 Panel	 pressured	 the	 FCA	 to	adopt	 regulatory	 transparency	 policies	 related	 to	 firms’	 reputation	 and	 conduct	 to	inform	 consumers	 about	 what	 to	 expect	 of	 a	 firm	 after	 financial	 services	 were	purchased,	suggesting	that	there	was	still	space	for	the	adoption	of	RTPs,	regardless	of	the	emerging	paradigm	of	bounded	rationality	and	nudging.		Ultimately,	providing	consumer-focused	information	in	this	way	may	help	to	frame	 the	 FCA’s	 supervisory	 and	 enforcement	 activity	 in	 a	more	 relevant	way	 than	 is	 currently	 the	case.	As	such,	 it	has	 the	potential	 to	 reduce	 the	information	 asymmetry,	 which	 currently	 exists	 in	 the	 financial	 services	sector,	empowering	consumers	to	‘co-regulate’	the	market	by	making	more	informed	choices	about	which	providers	they	use.	In	addition	to	having	a	direct	consumer	benefit,	respondents	in	this	research	feel	that	there	may	also	be	some	influence	exerted	on	providers	to	improve	practices	as	a	result	of	such	information	being	available.	This	indicates	the	potential	 for	 this	 type	 of	 intervention	 to	 increase	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	FCA’s	work	(Collaborate	Research,	2015,	p.	26).		Lastly,	what	the	creation	of	Midata	has	shown	so	far	is	that	citizens	value	ideals	such	as	security	of	their	private	data	and	may	be	reluctant	to	partake	in	initiatives	where	they	 have	 to	 share	 this	with	 third	 parties.	 In	 this	 regard,	 and	 given	 the	 promises	 of	regulatory	 transparency,	 it	 seems	 that	 initiatives	 of	 the	 two	 natures	 may	 after	 all	continue	to	co-exist,	rather	than	the	first	taking	over	the	latter.	This	is	the	case	currently,	which	 can	 be	 illustrated	 by	 the	 maintenance	 of	 transparency	 of	 bank	 complaints	information,	discussed	below.				
3. Creation	and	Trajectory	of	Complaints	Information	Transparency		As	 previously	 suggested,	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 2007-08	 financial	 crisis	 affected	 the	banking	sector	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	many	regards,	from	increased	concentration	of	its	retail	banking	divisions	to	its	regulatory	approach	and	organisations’	mandate.	The	general	 change	 in	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 was	 significant.	 The	 Turner	 Review,	commissioned	by	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	on	how	the	United	Kingdom	should	respond	to	the	world	financial	crisis,	stated	that	the	FSA’s	regulatory	approach	prior	to	the	crisis	was	based	on	beliefs	that	markets	are	in	general	self-correcting,	that	it	was	the	responsibility	of	senior	management	and	boards	of	individual	firms	to	primarily	manage	risks,	 and	 that	 consumer	protection	was	 “best	 ensured	not	 by	product	 regulation	 or	
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direct	intervention	in	markets,	but	by	ensuring	that	wholesale	markets	are	as	unfettered	and	 transparent	 as	 possible”	 (Turner,	 2009).	 Some	 of	 the	 changes	 adopted	 in	 the	regulatory	apparatus	of	banking	were	significant.	Four	years	after	the	crisis	had	shaken	the	City	of	London,	the	Economist	reported	that		 Before	the	financial	crisis	Britain’s	Financial	Services’	Authority	(FSA)	did,	indeed,	 try	 to	 impose	 the	 lowest	 possible	 burden	 and	 cost	 on	 a	 prizes	industry.	 But	 bank	 supervision	 has	 since	 become	 almost	 unrecognisably	tougher.223		In	the	turmoil	of	the	crisis,	the	Hunt	Review	on	the	Financial	Ombudsman	Office’s	accessibility	 and	 transparency	 policies	 was	 published,	 highlighting	 an	 extreme	polarisation	 of	 views	 in	 terms	 of	 publication	 of	 the	 complaints	 data,	with	 consumer	associations	 calling	 for	 full	 disclosure	 and	 the	 industry	heavily	 opposing	 to	 it	 (Hunt,	2008).	“The	reputational	risk	of	being	perceived	to	be	withholding	data”,	suggested	the	Lead	Ombudsman	at	the	FOS,	“would	exceed	any	danger	of	possible	misinterpretation	in	the	short-term”.224		Reducing	reputational	risk	was	highly	relevant	for	the	FOS,	but	the	body	also	had	a	 number	 of	 other	 reasons	 to	 move	 forward	 with	 the	 disclosure	 of	 complaints	information.	One	of	these	reasons,	the	Lead	Ombudsman	at	the	FOS	said,	was	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Freedom	of	Information	Act	(Mitchell,	2015).	Other	reasons	were	the	international	trend,	strong	and	constant	pressure	from	consumer	associations,	such	as	the	 National	 Consumer	 Council	 (NCC),	 which	 “encouraged	 ombudsmen	 to	 publish	details	of	 complaints	upheld,	 in	order	 to	use	 the	 influence	of	business	 reputation	on	consumer	choice	to	change	market	practices”	(National	Consumer	Council,	2008),	and	the	 fact	 that	 the	 courts,	 when	 dealing	 with	 similar	 cases,	 published	 their	 decisions,	already	 making	 part	 of	 the	 information	 available.	 Lastly,	 since	 2008	 the	 FOS	 had	registered	 a	 significant	 increase	 of	 complaints	 about	 some	 banking	 services	 in	comparison	to	previous	years,	which	could	be	decisive	for	customers	when	they	were	choosing	financial	service	providers.225	
                                                223	The	Economist	(2012)	Light	touch	no	more.	The	Economist,	1	December.	224	Mitchell,	C.	(2015)	Interview	on	24	November	2015.	[Recording	in	my	possession].	225	 In	 2007-08	 complaints	 were	 mostly	 driven	 by	 heavy	 volumes	 of	 complaints	 about	unauthorised	overdraft	charges.	In	2008-09,	“default	charges”	of	card	credits	increased	and	became	a	big	issue.	In	the	following	two	years	the	Ombudsman	Financial	Service	received	a	great	amount	of	complaints	related	to	clients’	financial	hardship,	and	in	the	period	of	2012-2013	there	was	an	increase	in	relation	to	section	75	of	the	Consumer	Credit	Act	1974,	under	which	a	credit-card	provider	could	be	jointly	liable	with	the	supplier	of	the	goods	or	services,	where	 a	 consumer	 had	 a	 valid	 claim	 for	 misrepresentation	 or	 breach	 of	 contract.	 The	
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The	 FOS	 started	 to	 disclose	 complaints	 data	 periodically	 (every	 six	 months),	showing	the	number	and	outcome	of	the	cases	handled	in	alphabetical	order.	In	order	to	facilitate	comparisons,	including	for	the	purpose	of	choice,	the	media	created	rankings	and	news	reports	with	firms	and	financial	products	topping	the	list	every	time	that	it	was	published.226	In	late	2016,	when	this	chapter	was	being	finalised,	firms	still	called	for	overhauling	FOS	complaints	reporting,	alleging	that	the	Ombudsman	provided	raw	data	on	complaints,	and	did	not	consider,	for	example,	the	number	of	clients	that	firms	had	 when	 publishing	 the	 data.227	 Despite	 these	 criticisms,	 however,	 the	 regulatory	transparency	policy	has	been	maintained.		Moreover,	the	FOS	suggested	that,	besides	informing	consumers’	choice,	one	of	the	most	 important	 outcomes	 of	 the	 disclosure	 reports	were	 the	 comparisons	 that	 they	allowed	the	industry	to	make	in	relation	to	their	peers	as	well	as	to	learn	about	their	most	serious	complaints	problems	in	order	to	solve	them	internally.	The	publication	of	the	complaints	reports	was	also	quickly	picked	up	by	media	organisations,	which	went	on	to	create	rankings	to	highlight	best	and	worst	performing	firms.	This	put	significant	pressure	on	the	banks,	which	continued	both	to	criticise	the	publication	of	reports	and	attempted	to	improve	their	position	in	the	rankings.	That	the	firms	were	pushed	to	make	improvements	 in	 their	 consumer	 relations	 attributes	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	 this	 set	 of	information	mixed	characteristics	of	the	performance	logic.						
4. RTPs	and	financial	education	of	citizens	For	the	transaction	logic	to	reach	its	intended	objective,	consumers	need	to	know	what	information	is	available	and	how	to	navigate	the	financial	market.	The	policy	agenda	that	
                                                outstanding	 complaints	 in	 the	 following	 two	 years	 were	 also	 due	 to	 mistreatment	 of	consumers	when	they	were	facing	difficulties	with	their	 financial	situation,	similar	to	those	from	2010	to	2012.	226	For	example:	Robins,	W.	 (2016)	Sesame	tops	FOS	complaint	 list.	CityWire,	6	September;	Peachey,	K.	(2016)	Banks	face	up	to	old	and	new	complaints.	BBC,	23	February;	Collinson,	P.	(2016)	 Financial	 Ombudsman	 still	 receiving	 thousands	 of	 PPI	 complaints,	The	 Guardian,	 6	September.	227	The	number	of	clients	mattered,	the	argument	went,	because	the	more	clients	a	firm	had,	higher	the	net	number	of	complaints	it	would	likely	receive.	Marriner,	K.	(2016)	Adviser	call	for	overhaul	of	FOS	complaints	reporting.	Money	Marketing,	14	September.	
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currently	 pushes	 for	 the	 engagement	 of	 consumers’	 learning	 is	 financial	 education,	which	is	an	area	that	is	also	highly	relevant	for	RTPs	in	the	transaction	logic.	In	the	UK,	as	with	many	countries	around	the	world,	regulatory	disclosure	in	the	financial	market	is	 also	 being	 advanced	 in	 response	 and	 in	 supplement	 to	 the	 agenda	 of	 financial	education.	The	creation	and	rise	of	financial	education	is	based	on	the	view	that	financial	decision	making	has	become	increasingly	more	technical	and	complicated	and	that	the	absence	of	financial	knowledge	may	lead	individuals	to	be	in	worse	financial	situations	than	they	could	be.	According	to	the	OECD,	financial	education	is		The	 process	 by	 which	 financial	 consumers/investors	 improve	 their	understanding	 of	 financial	 products,	 concepts	 and	 risks	 and,	 through	information,	 instruction	 and/or	 objective	 advice,	 develop	 the	 skills	 and	confidence	 to	become	more	aware	of	 financial	 risks	and	opportunities,	 to	make	informed	decisions,	to	know	where	to	go	for	help,	and	to	take	other	effective	actions	to	improve	their	financial	well-being	(OECD,	2005).		Financial	education	is	therefore	directly	related	to	the	capacity	of	consumers	to	process	financial	information	(Garcia,	2013,	p.	303).	It	fosters	the	idea	that	information	for	 financially	 educated	 individuals	 will	 enable	 them	 to	 make	 optimal	 saving	 and	investment	decisions	(Clark	et	al.,	2006;	Hilgert,	Hogarth,	and	Beverly,	2003;	Hirad	and	Zorn,	2001;	Mastrobuoni,	2009;	Staten,	Elliehausen,	and	Linquist,	2002).	Marron	(2014)	suggested	 that	 “financial	 capability”	 became	 a	 part	 of	 the	 UK	 financial	 regulatory	framework	in	the	past	decade,	associated	with	the	growing	importance	of	the	financial	sector	 for	 the	 British	 economy,	making	 it	 a	 pressing	 objective	 to	 increase	 consumer	understanding	of	financial	products.	More	capable	consumers	could	both	ensure	their	wellbeing	in	the	modern	world	and	empower	consumers	to	hold	the	financial	industry	to	 account,	 including	 through	 fostering	 competition	 by	 searching	 for	 better	 deals.	Together	with	the	debate	on	information	provision	and	behavioural	economics,	a	body	of	 literature	 has	 also	 opened	 discussion	 about	 the	 odds	 of	 financial	 education	 and	financial	 behaviour	 (Bernheim,	 Garret,	 and	Maki,	 2001;	 Bernheim	 and	Garret,	 2000;	Cole	and	Shastry,	2009;	Duflo	and	Saez,	2003;	Duflo	and	Saez,	2004).		In	the	fall	of	2003,	the	FSA	and	a	series	of	organisations	(in	the	government,	the	financial	 services	 industry,	 employers,	 trade	 unions,	 and	 educational	 and	 voluntary	sectors)	 created	 the	 ‘National	 Strategy	 for	Financial	Capability’	 to	 consult	 and	create	policies	to	increase	public	understanding	of	the	financial	system,	one	of	its	regulatory	objectives.	 A	 product	 of	 this	 partnership	was	 the	 Financial	 Capability	 Survey,	which	interviewed	a	total	of	5,328	people	and	identified	that	people	took	risks	and	did	not	shop	around	to	get	a	better	deal;	a	significant	number	of	UK	bank	users	did	not	save	enough;	and,	those	under	40	years	of	age	dealt	with	a	great	amount	of	bank	interactions,	even	
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though	they	could	not	afford	mistakes	(Financial	Service	Authority,	2006).	Some	of	these	actions	 had	 been	 institutionalised	 previously	 and	 were	 brought	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 the	Strategy	for	a	more	comprehensive	approach	to	financial	education.	Complementary	to	the	measures	to	increase	financial	education	and	awareness,	in	2003	 the	FSA	expanded	 the	use	of	RTPs	 to	 further	 financial	 inclusion	and	published	tables	with	 comparative	 information	 for	basic	bank	accounts,	 i.e.	 accounts	 for	 adults	who	could	be	refused	by	traditional	current	account	facilities	due	to	credit	scoring.228	The	action	was	adopted	 in	 response	 to	 the	commitment	of	 increasing	 the	number	of	people	 with	 at	 least	 a	 basic	 bank	 account	 as	 defined	 in	 the	 ‘New	 Commitment	 to	Neighbourhood	Renewal’,	 an	 action	 plan	 by	New	Labour	 against	 exclusion	 of	 people	based	on	where	they	lived	in	the	UK.229	It	was	discontinued	in	the	same	context	of	the	end	 of	 the	 FSA	Comparative	 Tables,	 even	 though	 the	 public	 of	 this	 regulatory	 policy	would	have,	in	theory,	more	difficulties	to	be	users	of	initiatives	such	as	Midata.		In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis,	 with	 the	 Financial	 Services	 Act	 2010	emphasised	the	FSA’s	objective	of	“contributing	to	the	protection	and	enhancement	of	the	 stability	 of	 the	 UK	 financial	 system”,	 and	 obliged	 it	 to	 establish	 the	 ‘Consumer	Financial	 Education	 Body’	 (CFEB).	 Among	 many	 of	 its	 functions,	 the	 CFEB	 had	 to	promote	awareness	of	the	benefits	and	risks	associated	with	different	kinds	of	financial	dealing	 and	 to	 provide	 information	 and	 advice	 to	 members	 of	 the	 public.230	 The	approach	 of	 the	 CFEB	was	 based	 on	 the	 conviction	 that	 better	 informed	 consumers	could	 take	 greater	 responsibility	 for	 their	 financial	 affairs.	 The	 subsequent	 Financial	Capability	Strategy	for	the	UK	was	approved	in	2015,	after	a	series	of	consultations	and	research.	One	research	showed	an	alarmingly	low	level	of	financial	literacy	in	Britain,	with	41%	of	adults	not	knowing	their	current	account	balance,	one	in	six	people	being	over	 indebted,	 22%	 of	 bank	 clients	 not	 being	 able	 to	 read	 the	 balance	 of	 a	 bank	
                                                228	In	2004,	The	Treasury	estimated	that	around	8%	of	households	in	Britain	still	not	have	a	bank	account.	Towards	the	end	of	2004	the	government’s	goal	was	to	open	1.4	million	new	bank	accounts	within	two	years,	(according	to	the	British	Bank	Association	1.64	million	basic	bank	accounts	were	opened	from	2003	to	2006).	The	basic	banking	accounts	could	be	either	operated	through	branches	and	ATMs	or	through	post-office	counters;	being	the	last	the	one	used	by	the	Treasury	to	monitor	progress	towards	the	financial	inclusion	goal.	229	The	initiative	of	the	leaflet	was	adopted	fostering	a	number	of	previous	policies	to	expand	access	to	the	basic	bank	accounts.	In	2002,	for	example,	besides	requesting	high	street	banks	to	offer	basic	bank	accounts,	 the	government	started	to	pay	 its	benefits	direct	 into	people’s	bank	accounts,	pushing	for	people	who	did	not	have	a	bank	or	savings	account	to	open	one,	and	for	banks	to	improve	develop	their	services.	230	The	FSMA	2010	defined	 that	before	preparing	or	varying	an	annual	plan,	 the	consumer	financial	education	body	needed	to	consult	(a)	the	Treasury,	(b)	the	Secretary	of	State,	(c)	the	Office	of	Fair	Trading,	(d)	the	Practitioner	Panel,	(e)	the	Consumer	Panel;	and	any	other	body	it	deemed	necessary	or	profitable.	
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statement,	40%	of	the	people	not	understanding	the	impact	of	inflation	on	the	real	value	of	 money,	 and	 a	 large	 number	 of	 people	 without	 a	 financial	 strategy	 for	 the	 future	(Money	Advice	Service,	2015,	p.	14).		The	Strategy	focused	on	developing	people’s	financial	skills	and	knowledge,	and	their	attitudes	and	motivation,	in	order	to	improve	their	ability	to	manage	money	well	day	to	day,	prepare	for	and	manage	life	events,	and	deal	with	financial	information	and	difficulties	(Money	Advice	Service,	2015,	p.	15).	The	2015	version	of	the	Strategy	also	had	an	“Evidence	and	Evaluation	Priority”,	to	grow	evidence	about	the	policy	impact	of	financial	capability.			
Conclusion	This	 chapter	 has	 surveyed	 the	 creation,	 the	 expansion	 and	 (in	 one	 case)	 the	retrenchment	 of	 RTPs	 in	 the	 retail	 banking	 sector	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	 The	 FSA	Comparative	Tables	were	not	adopted	to	disclose	only	new	information	to	the	market,	but	 also	 to	 present	 existing	 information	 in	 a	 structured	 and	 impartial	 form	 to	consumers,	in	order	to	prevent	‘obfuscation’	in	the	market	and	guide	consumers	in	their	decision-making	processes.	Created	by	the	FSA	as	part	of	its	mandate,	and	within	the	framework	of	the	New	Labour	government’s	‘light	touch’	regulation,	it	was	also	strongly	supported	 by	 pro-consumer	 organisations.	 Hence,	 its	 initial	 trajectory	 was	 towards	further	expansion,	with	new	sets	of	information	being	added	every	year.		The	Tables	were,	however,	scrapped	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis,	which	brought	changes	and	ultimately	 the	end	of	 the	FSA.	 It	 also	 followed	 the	change	of	government	in	2010,	which	brought	with	it	the	beginning	of	a	paradigm	shift	from	regulatory	transparency-based	solutions	towards	behavioural	approaches,	taking	into	account	the	bounded	rationality	of	consumers.	The	end	of	the	Tables,	however,	was	not	officially	justified	in	relation	to	this	paradigm	shift,	but	for	the	fact	that	third	parties	had	started	to	publish	online	similar	comparative	information.	The	retrenchment	of	the	RTP	was	not	resisted	by	the	pro-consumer	organisations	that	had	pushed	for	it	earlier.	The	apparent	low	usage	of	the	Tables	by	beneficiaries	appeared	to	have	contributed	to	this	lack	of	resistance.	Also	explaining	this	lack	of	resistance	was	the	fact	that	a	great	deal	of	the	information	disclosed	was	not	exclusive	and	was	already	available	elsewhere.			 In	contrast,	the	trajectory	of	the	disclosure	of	bank	complaints	data	was	one	of	contestation	(by	its	targets),	 followed	by	stagnation.	Its	creation	took	place	when	the	FOS	and	the	FSA	(the	drivers	of	the	RTPs)	received	support	from	external	bodies	and	pro-consumer	 groups	 for	 disclosing	 the	 complaints	 data	 they	 held.	 The	 RTP,	 which	embodied	 elements	 of	 performance	 logic	 as	 well	 as	 transaction	 logic,	 was	 initially	
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resisted	by	firms,	shortly	for	the	underlying	principle	of	transparency	and	afterwards	for	the	design	of	the	disclosure.	Instead	of	scrapping	the	RTP,	the	firms	demanded	better	contextualisation	of	the	data	disclosed	on	grounds	of	fairness.	Indeed,	both	the	FSA	and	the	FOS	continued	publishing	the	information	as	they	believed	data	on	complaints	were	highly	 important	 for	 consumers	 to	 decide	 with	 which	 firm	 they	 could	 transact.	Moreover,	disclosure	could	lead	to	improvements	in	the	firms’	treatment	of	customers.	Unlike	 the	 FSA	 Comparative	 Tables,	 the	 information	 on	 complaints	 continued	 to	 be	published	beyond	the	lifetime	of	the	FSA.	As	I	showed	in	the	narrative	of	the	case,	this	was	due	to	the	high	intensity	of	the	FCA	to	give	transparency	to	information	not	freely	available	 in	 the	market	and,	by	doing	so,	support	 the	 fair	 treatment	of	consumers	by	firms.							 	
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Comparative	Analysis:	
The	Brazilian	and	the	UK	cases	in	the	logic	of	transaction	
	
		The	transaction	logic	of	regulatory	transparency	refers	to	the	publication	of	information	to	 support	 the	 decision	making	 processes	 of	 consumers	 by	means	 of	 promoting	 the	transparency	of	 features	of	products	or	 services.	The	nature	of	 the	 creation	of	RTPs	observed	 in	 the	 transaction	 logic	 were	 mostly	 contested,	 except	 for	 a	 few	 cases	addressed	in	Brazil.	The	trajectories	of	the	policies,	on	the	other	hand	were	varied:	many	experienced	very	slow	expansion,	some	stagnated	and	a	couple,	in	the	United	Kingdom,	retrenched,	mainly	 in	 response	 to	 pressure	 from	 interest	 groups	 or	 due	 to	 external	changes	(such	as	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008	or	a	change	of	government,	as	in	the	UK	 in	2010).	The	 targets	of	RTPs	 in	 the	 transaction	 logic	are	private	parties	and	 the	drivers	are	interest	groups	or	regulatory	agencies	with	a	mandate	that	can	be	fulfilled	also	 through	 regulatory	 transparency.	 Unsurprisingly,	 by	 the	 power	 balance	 of	 the	drivers	 and	 targets,	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 formal	 regulatory	 agency	 that	 maintains	 the	periodic	disclosure	of	data	seems	crucial	for	the	RTP’s	expansion	or	stability	after	its	creation.		As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 6	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 creation	 and	 disclosure	 of	 the	standardisation	and	publication	of	bank	tariffs	in	Brazil,	when	both	the	driver	and	the	target	have	high	intensity	in	opposite	directions	in	relation	to	an	RTP,	any	of	the	two	sides	can	mobilise	resources	to	strengthen	their	position,	resembling	Wilson’s	interest	group	politics.	What	we	observe	is	that	following	the	end	of	the	contestation,	the	RTP	tends	to	stagnate.	In	the	case	of	the	transparency	of	standardised	tariffs,	years	after	their	creation,	 the	 Central	 Bank	 and	 Febraban	 still	 published	 the	 information	 and	 pro-consumer	organisations	monitored	whether	banks	 complied	with	 their	 obligation	 to	publish	the	same	information	through	appropriate	channels.	The	RTP	has	had	a	couple	of	changes	to	adjust	their	design,	but	have	not	seen	any	notable	expansion	since	then	until	the	time	of	writing	(Table	III.1).	 	
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Table	III.1.	Trajectory	of	RTPs	in	Transaction	Logic	(Brazil)			 												Intensity	of	Banks	 		 												(Resistance	to	RTPs)		_____________________________________________	
High																								Low	 	
	 			 Contrary	to	the	Brazilian	case,	where	pro-consumer	groups	were	the	main	drivers	that	first	enlisted	the	involvement	of	the	Central	Bank	in	the	RTP	process	related	to	the	standardisation	and	publication	of	bank	tariffs	in	Brazil,	in	the	UK	Comparative	Tables	case,	a	regulatory	body	(the	FSA)	was	the	main	driver	of	expansion	of	the	RTP.	Despite	support	 from	 consumer	 organisations	 being	 crucial	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 FSA	Comparative	Tables,	it	was	the	FSA	that	created,	published	and	determined	the	pace	of	expansion	of	the	Tables.	With	the	abolition	of	the	FSA	following	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008,	and	without	a	norm	that	institutionalised	the	disclosure	of	the	comparative	information	by	the	regulator	itself,	the	Tables	were	scrapped	without	opposition	from	pro-consumer	organisations	(Table	III.2).	 	
	 	
		Intensity	of	Pro	Consumer	Org.	(Pushing	for	RTPs)				
	
High		
	
Contestation	
		
	
Low	
		 	Stagnation	
Increasing	use	of	information	
by	intermediaries/	
beneficiaries	
Increasing	use	of	information	by	intermediaries/	beneficiaries		
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Table	III.2.	Trajectory	of	RTPs	in	Transaction	Logic	(UK)			 												Intensity	of	Financial	Firms	 		 												(Resistance	to	RTPs)	 		_____________________________________________	
High																					Low	 			
				Consumer	 rights	 groups	 did	 not	 resist	 the	 retrenchment	 of	 the	 Tables	 for	 two	reasons:	first,	the	perceived	low	use	of	information	by	beneficiaries	and	the	pressure	from	the	industry	against	Tables.	This	reason	points	to	the	fact	that	in	those	moments	when	scrapping	an	RTP	is	considered,	the	level	of	the	beneficiaries’	engagement	with	the	 RTP	 can	 play	 a	 decisive	 role.	 The	 second	 reason	 was	 that	 the	 information	 was	already	available	in	public	(i.e.	most	of	it	was	not	exclusively	owned	by	the	regulator,	but	 organised	 and	 made	 more	 clear	 by	 the	 FSA)	 and	 it	 was	 believed	 that	 financial	information	would	continue	to	be	published	by	private	parties	and	intermediaries	(such	as	the	website	Gocompare.com),	especially	because	other	bodies	were	being	created	to	oversee	consumer	rights.		This	second	reason	leads	to	a	general	observation	about	the	trajectory	of	an	RTP	and	 the	 type	 of	 information	 it	 discloses	 in	 the	 transaction	 logic.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	evidence	presented	in	the	cases,	we	can	argue	that	when	information	is	not	exclusive	or	controversial,	there	will	be	low	actor	mobilisation	either	to	support	the	RTP	or	to	resist	it.	This	comes	across	as	a	key	characteristic	determining	the	trajectory	of	RTPs	in	the	transaction	logic,	supporting	one	of	the	initial	expectations	of	this	research.	In	contrast	
		Intensity	of	Pro	Consumer	Org.	(Pushing	for	RTPs)			
	High		
	
	
	Expansion	(under	FSA)	
	
Low	
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(after	FSA)	
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beneficiaries	
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to	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables,	for	example,	the	FSA’s	complaints	data	continued	to	be	disclosed	 under	 the	 newly	 established	 FCA,	 which	 assumed	 the	 mandate	 of	 its	predecessor.	Unlike	the	Tables,	the	complaints	data	was	exclusive	information	held	by	the	regulator	and	consumers	would	not	have	access	to	it	otherwise,	which	arguably	was	a	factor	in	its	maintenance.		The	Brazilian	financial	sector	regulation	case	also	revealed	one	type	of	regulatory	transparency	policy	that	expanded	without	significant	resistance	or	contestation.	These	were	the	RTPs	adopted	by	regulatory	bodies	for	purposes	related	to	financial	education.	What	can	explain	the	high	intensity	of	drivers	in	this	case	is	the	regulators’	mandate	to	promote	the	financial	education	of	citizens.	And	what	explains	the	low	resistance	from	the	targets	is	the	fact	that	the	information	published	was	often	not	new	or	original;	it	existed	 in	 less	 organised	 forms	 in	 the	market.	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 role	played	by	 the	Brazilian	Central	Bank	was	similar	to	that	of	a	dedicated	intermediary.			 	
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CONCLUSION	
		In	 the	 Introduction	 to	 this	 thesis,	 I	 proposed	 categorising	 regulatory	 transparency	policies	in	three	logics,	i.e.	the	control	logic,	the	performance	logic	and	the	transaction	logic.	In	the	Theoretical	Framework,	I	put	forward	a	‘scholarly	pluralistic	approach’	to	studying	institutional	change	in	transparency	policies.	On	the	basis	of	this	approach,	I	further	argued	that	a)	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing	processes,	i.e.	they	are	likely	to	follow	the	 original	 path	 they	 were	 intended	 for;	 b)	 their	 trajectories	 on	 this	 path	 are	determined	by	 the	 relative	 intensity	 of	 those	 actors	 that	 push	 for	 disclosure	 against	those	who	resist	or	contest	it;	and	c)	examining	the	logic	(or	the	underlying	rationale)	of	 an	 RTP	 can	 give	 us	 insights	 into	 its	 trajectory	 based	 on	 the	 type	 of	 information	disclosed	and	the	distribution	of	actor	intensities.	In	Parts	I	to	III,	I	narrated	cases	from	Brazil	and	the	United	Kingdom	and	analysed	the	creation	and	the	trajectories	of	various	RTPs	in	all	three	logics.	At	the	end	of	each	part,	in	the	comparative	analysis	sections,	I	provided	across-case	comparisons	and	drew	conclusions	about	the	specific	logic	under	scrutiny.	In	this	Conclusion,	I	return	to	the	arguments	put	forward	at	the	beginning	of	this	 thesis	 and	 evaluate	 them	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 from	 the	 case	studies.		Across	 the	 cases	 covered	 in	 this	 thesis,	 RTPs’	 trajectories	 evolved	 in	 different	ways.	Shaped	by	political	institutions	(Layer	2),	which	are	established	upon	culturally	embedded	norms	and	dominant	paradigms	(Layer	1),	the	different	logics	of	regulatory	transparency	organised	actor	relations	in	specific	ways	and	played	a	key	role	in	these	changes.	In	light	of	the	main	empirical	findings	of	this	thesis	(summarised	in	Table	8.1	below),	I	will	discuss	each	of	the	abovementioned	hypotheses	to	draw	final	conclusions	for	the	thesis.	In	the	end,	I	will	turn	to	wider	debate	regarding	institutional	change	and	transparency	 to	 evaluate	 the	 societal	 and	 academic	 relevance	 of	 this	 research,	 and	attempt	to	formulate	an	agenda	for	future	research.					 	 	
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		 	 	 Table	8.1.	Summary	of	findings
1. RTPs	as	Self-Reinforcing	Processes		In	Chapter	1,	 I	argued	that	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing,	 i.e.	once	an	RTP	is	created,	 it	 is	likely	to	continue	on	the	path	it	started	from	due	to	increasing	returns	processes.	The	cases	 that	 are	 analysed	 in	 this	 research	 largely	 confirm	 this	 claim.	 All	 of	 the	 RTPs	examined	 across	 two	 countries	 and	 three	 logics	 pursued	 their	 primary	 purpose	 of	creation	throughout	 their	 lifespans.	This	suggests	 that	even	though	RTPs	can	and	do	retrench,	a	series	of	factors	make	it	more	likely	that	they	will	either	stagnate	or	expand.	As	evidenced	by	the	case	studies,	the	discussion	of	regulatory	transparency	policies	as	self-reinforcing	processes	requires	us	to	consider	creation	and	the	later	trajectory	as	distinct	 phases	 in	 the	 life	 of	 an	 RTP.	 In	 other	 words,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 different	dynamics	at	work	(and	a	different	analytical	focus	to	examine	them)	at	the	moment	of	creation	of	an	RTP.	The	three-layered	approach	to	institutional	change	provides	a	useful	tool	for	this	distinction.		
1.1. The	Moment	of	Creation	In	the	moment	of	creation	of	an	RTP,	culturally	embedded	norms	and	powerful	political	 institutions	 in	 Layers	 1	 and	 2	 have	 been	 seen	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role,	providing	compelling	arguments	and	institutional	support	to	actors	that	push	for	–	or	accept	 –	 the	 disclosure	 of	 information.	 In	 the	 cases	 of	 regulating	 the	 actions	 and	behaviours	of	politicians	in	the	control	logic,	analysed	in	Part	I,	the	relevant	ideals	were	those	of	openness,	accountability,	public	oversight	and	fiscal	discipline	of	government,	and	the	belief	or	hope	that	transparency	would	further	these	ideals.	In	the	Brazilian	case	of	 the	 Transparency	 Portal,	 for	 example,	 these	 norms	 have	 been	 institutionalised,	among	 others,	 in	 the	 2000	 Law	 of	 Fiscal	 Responsibility,	 the	 2012	 Freedom	 of	Information	Act,	as	well	as	in	the	creation	and	mandate	of	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	General	(CGU)	which	was	the	architect	of	the	RTP.	Similarly,	it	was	a	FoIA	obligation	to	disclose	 information	pro-actively	 and	 a	 FoIA	 request	 by	 a	 journalist,	which	 together	with	media	 leaks,	 triggered	 the	MPs’	 expenses	 scandal	 in	 the	UK.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	prevailing	norms	 increased	the	costs	 for	politicians	who	resisted	 the	RTPs	 to	openly	argue	against	the	principle	of	transparency.		That	 transparency	has	been	also	 increasingly	accepted	as	a	 solution	 to	 issues	ranging	 from	 improving	 the	 performance	 of	 subnational	 units	 to	 increasing	market	efficiency	has	arguably	meant	that	the	targets,	for	the	most	part,	failed	to	prevent	the	creation	of	the	RTPs	in	these	logics.	This	does	not	mean	resistance	did	not	take	place;	as	
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discussed	below,	for	instance,	the	type	of	information	disclosed	in	the	performance	logic	has	lent	to	public	debates	about	fairness.	However,	the	resistance	by	targets	in	the	cases	of	 performance	 and	 transaction	 logics	 analysed	 in	 Parts	 II	 and	 III	 was	 ultimately	insufficient	 to	prevent	 the	creation	of	 these	policies	altogether,	whether	by	 trying	 to	promote	debates	related	to	the	scope,	format	and	contents	of	disclosure,	or	opposing	the	very	idea	of	transparency	per	se.		Whether	 it’s	 the	 assumption	 that	 disclosure	 of	 information	 will	 change	behaviours,	 the	 hope	 that	 it	 will	 quell	 a	 public	 outcry,	 or	 the	 calculation	 that	 the	politician	or	the	CEO	under	pressure	will	appear	to	be	doing	something	(Birchall,	2014,	p.	77),	 the	existence	of	 transparency	as	a	paradigm	has	 supported	 the	emergence	of	RTPs.	In	other	words,	it	could	be	said	that	drivers	of	disclosure	generally	seem	to	have	had	 history	 on	 their	 side.	 As	 such,	 the	 socio-political	 and	 institutional	 context	supporting	the	enactment	of	transparency	policies	significantly	shape	the	willingness	and	ability	of	drivers	and	targets,	as	well	as	intermediaries	and	beneficiaries,	to	push	or	resist	an	RTP	at	its	moment	of	creation.	Although	the	number	of	cases	analysed	in	this	research	 does	 not	 allow	 me	 to	 make	 generalisable	 conclusions,	 the	 adoption	 of	regulatory	transparency	policies,	in	its	three	logics	and	as	conceptualised	here,	does	not	seem	 to	 relate	 to	 specific	 political	 parties,	 to	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 cabinets,	 or	 to	politicians’	 uncertainty	 of	 future	 control,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	 adoption	 of	 FoIA.	Because	RTPs	are	mostly	enacted	as	secondary	legislation,	to	understand	the	dynamics	of	their	creation	it	is	necessary	to	refer	to	the	socio-political	and	institutional	context	and,	consequently	and	most	importantly,	to	actors’	intensities.	The	institutional	power	of	the	drivers	of	RTPs	vary	both	across	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	within	logics.	The	cases	analysed	in	the	control	logic	are	particularly	illuminative	of	how	institutional	powers	are	 important	 in	 the	creation	of	RTPs.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	Brazilian	Transparency	Portal,	provision	of	more	transparency	by	SIAFI,	the	accounting	and	financial	reporting	system	of	the	federal	government,	was	a	promise	in	a	political	campaign.	 After	 elections,	 the	 publication	 of	 financial	 expenditure	 information	 was	negotiated	 between	 the	 CGU,	 which	 had	 the	 institutional	 power	 to	 promote	transparency,	and	the	Treasury	Secretariat,	which	managed	SIAFI.	Following	a	technical	procedure	to	create	an	RTP	that	would	display	detailed	information	of	the	government’s	financial	 execution	 to	 prevent	 corruption,	 the	 government	 complied	 without	 no	resistance	from	the	targets.	While	it	could	be	alleged	that	the	Portal	had	multiple	targets,	neither	in	its	creation	nor	during	the	expansion	of	the	policy	did	targets	significantly	mobilise	 against	 it.	 In	 the	 MPs’	 expense	 case,	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 also	 had	 the	institutional	 power	 to	 decide	 on	 the	 level	 of	 information	 disclosed	 pro-actively	 in	relation	to	its	expenditures.	However,	when	a	journalist	requested	a	higher	and	more	
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detailed	level	of	transparency,	MPs	used	their	institutional	power	to	oppose	the	request.	Publication	of	the	information	petitioned	by	the	journalist	was	only	promoted	after	the	media	 and	MPs,	 the	 targets	 of	 disclosure,	 had	 exhausted	 all	 the	 available	 means	 of	appeal	 and	 leaks	 of	 the	 information	 revealed	 a	 number	 of	 publicly	 compromising	privileges	that	were	granted	to	MPs.	The	comparison	between	these	two	cases	in	the	control	logic	also	sheds	light	on	the	importance	of	actors’	willingness	to	support	the	creation	of	RTPs.	Actors’	interest	to	mobilise	resources	and	to	collectively	organise	in	favour	or	against	the	creation	of	an	RTP	is	noticeably	different	in	both	cases,	although	the	principles	and	norms	mobilised	–	 such	 as	 the	 belief	 that	 disclosure	 of	 financial	 expenditures	 is	 an	 effective	 anti-corruption	measure	–	are	for	the	most	part	similar.		The	role	played	by	actors	influencing	the	creation	of	RTPs	is	further	emphasised	in	 the	 case	 of	 English	 secondary	 schools,	 where	 the	 targets	 (school	 teachers	 and	administrators)	resisted	the	publication	of	performance	tables	and	contested	their	lack	of	 contextualisation	 at	 the	moment	 of	 creation.	 Taking	place	 in	 1993,	 a	 boycott	was	organised	and,	in	consequence,	the	government	had	to	revisit	the	performance	tables	and	address	some	of	the	concerns	of	teachers,	such	as	introducing	external	marking	(in	order	to	reduce	their	workload).	This	picture	had	already	changed	by	1997,	when	the	New	 Labour	 government	 came	 to	 power	 and	 decided	 to	 continue	 the	 school	 tables,	allegedly	to	better	inform	parents	of	their	choices.	Other	boycotts	still	took	place,	but	they	became	more	sparse	and	isolated.231	The	tables	were	published	and	maintained,		although	frequent	changes	in	its	format	and	contents	created	additional	difficulties	for	educators	 in	 adjusting	 and	 maintaining	 long-term	 teaching	 plans	 and	 strategies	 or	parents	in	following	the	evolution	of	a	school’s	performance.	As	will	be	discussed	below,	once	an	RTP	is	created,	actors’	interaction	take	place	in	a	newly	established	institutional	framework,	where	powers	have	been	redistributed	and	a	new	context	has	been	set.		
1.2. The	Evolution	of	RTPs	The	 socio-political	 and	 institutional	 context	 supports	 the	 creation	 of	 RTPs	 but	what	happens	 afterwards?	 Fung	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 suggested	 that	 “the	 political	 imbalance”	 of	transparency	 policies	 –	 concentrating	 costs	 on	 small	 and	 organised	 groups	 while	distributing	benefits	to	dispersed	users	–	make	them	difficult	to	sustain	after	creation.	In	other	words,	transparency	policies	were	self-undermining	by	default.	Based	on	the	cases	examined	in	this	thesis,	however,	I	suggest	that	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing,	i.e.	they	
                                                231	See,	for	example:	Lipsett,	A.	(2008)	Top	private	schools	to	boycott	tables.	The	Guardian,	April	28.	
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tend	to	follow	the	original	purpose	they	were	created	for.	This	divergence	may	be	partly	a	result	of	differences	in	expectations:	In	this	thesis,	I	considered	stagnation	as	a	sign	of	sustainability,	 not	 degeneration.	 Put	 differently,	 an	 RTP	 does	 not	 need	 to	 expand	continuously	 and	 disclose	 new	 types	 of	 information	 in	 order	 to	 be	 considered	sustainable;	 it	 simply	 should	 not	 retract,	 formally	 and	 in	 producing	 its	 regulatory	objective.		A	 key	 factor	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 sustainability	 of	 RTPs	 is	 the	 redistributive	effect	 that	 disclosing	 information	 has	 on	 existing	 power	 arrangements.	 Once	information	 about	 them	 is	 publicised,	 politicians,	 decentralised	 units	 or	 financial	institutions	transfer	some	of	their	power	to	the	drivers	as	well	as	the	beneficiaries	and	intermediaries.	 RTPs	 often	 empower	 new	 actors	who	 could	 then	 have	 an	 increased	interest	in	the	maintenance	of	the	policy.	In	the	case	of	the	performance	tables	in	the	English	secondary	schools,	for	example,	I	noted	how	the	notion	of	the	‘right	to	know’,	once	advocated	by	Prime	Minister	John	Major,	has	been	gradually	internalised	by	the	media	and	a	seemingly	increasing	number	of	parents,	who	make	use	of	the	disclosed	information	and	may	be	unwilling	to	have	this	‘right’	taken	away	from	them.	Another	example	would	be	local	administrators	in	Brazil	who,	despite	being	targets	of	the	RTP,	also	benefit	 from	the	Transparency	Portal	as	 it	 improves	 their	ability	 to	monitor	 the	transfer	of	funds	from	the	federal	government	to	their	municipalities.	It	is	difficult	to	prove	this	point	due	to	the	absence	of	cases	in	which	there	was	an	attempt	to	remove	an	 RTP	 that	 was	 popular	 with	 beneficiaries	 and	 intermediaries;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	perhaps	this	absence	should	be	considered	an	argument	for	the	sustainability	of	RTPs.	The	 role	 of	 the	 socio-political	 and	 institutional	 layers,	 which	 ascribe	 “a	 quasi-religious	significance	in	debate	over	governance	and	institutional	design”	(Hood,	2006,	p.	 3)	 to	 transparency,	 is	 also	 influential	 in	 the	 sustainability	 of	 RTPs	 after	 creation.	Indeed,	in	both	countries	and	across	the	three	logics	examined,	regulatory	transparency	policies	 continued	 to	 persist	 under	 the	 period	 of	 study	 despite	 frequent	 changes	 in	government.	 In	 the	 performance	 and	 transaction	 logics,	 successive	 governments	 in	Brazil	 and	 the	 UK	 endorsed	 transparency	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 enhance	 control	 over	 both	subnational	 units	 and	 the	 financial	 sector.	 As	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 increasing	 the	performance	of	secondary	schools	was	a	campaign	promise	of	the	Lula	administration	in	Brazil,	who	chose	regulatory	transparency	as	one	of	the	means	to	reach	this	goal.	And	as	 the	 cases	 of	 financial	 sector	 regulation	 in	 the	 UK	 demonstrate,	 regulatory	transparency	 served	as	a	desired	approach	 for	governments	 to	maintain	or	 increase	control	over	the	financial	sectors,	which	were	lightly	regulated	during	the	1980s	and	the	1990s.	These	observations	support	the	view	in	the	literature	that	points	to	the	role	
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of	 international	 discourse	 and	 organisations	 as	 promoters	 of	 transparency	 across	diverse	policy	areas	(Erkkilä,	2012;	Ruijer	and	Meijer	2016).		The	evidence	presented	in	this	thesis	suggests	that	high	levels	of	engagement	by	beneficiaries	and	intermediaries	do	support	the	sustainability	of	RTPs,	although	further	dedicated	research	would	be	helpful	in	corroborating	this	finding.	One	example	is	the	push	for	the	RTP	in	the	MPs’	expenses	case	during	periods	of	high	media	scrutiny	and	public	attention.	On	 the	other	hand,	 low	engagement	can	make	resistance	 to	an	RTP	more	effective,	 such	as	 in	 the	case	of	 the	FSA	Comparative	Tables.	Low	engagement,	however,	does	not	on	its	own	guarantee	its	retrenchment,	as	there	may	be	other	factors,	such	as	political	goals	or	 institutional	mandates,	as	discussed	above,	that	continue	to	support	the	goals	of	transparency	even	in	the	absence	of	high	beneficiary	use	or	public	attention.	Unsurprisingly,	what	seems	to	be	more	effective	here	than	the	use	of	an	RTP	by	 individuals	 is	engagement	with	 it	by	organised	groups,	 such	as	 the	media	or	civil	society	organisations.	A	 final	 factor	 that	 is	 relevant	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 RTPs	 as	 self-reinforcing	processes,	and	for	which	this	research	only	allows	me	to	draw	partial	conclusions,	 is	related	to	the	costs	involved	in	the	creation	and	evolution	of	the	policies.	As	I	argued	in	Chapter	1,	the	creation	of	a	mechanism	for	extraction	and	publication	of	data	is	a	costly	process.	However,	once	created,	the	costs	decrease.	Numerous	examples	from	the	cases	support	this	point;	 for	instance	the	internal	procedures	that	were	established	for	the	publication	 and	 framing	 of	 information	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 anti-corruption	 case.	 In	 the	former,	the	CGU	conducted	negotiations	with	the	National	Treasury	to	devise	a	strategy	to	open	up	SIAFI	to	the	larger	public.	The	two	bodies	finally	agreed	on	the	creation	of	a	new	 format	 for	disclosure	using	a	new	and	much	simplified	 language,	 leading	 to	 the	creation	of	the	Transparency	Portal.	While	abandoning	the	Portal	may	not	be	financially	costly	for	the	government,	replacing	it	with	a	different	regulatory	solution	to	increase	the	CGU’s	oversight	ability	would	require	considerable	investment,	both	political	and	financial.		These	 findings	support	 the	hypothesis	 that	RTPs	are	self-reinforcing	processes.	However,	as	also	argued	in	this	thesis,	even	if	their	foundational	purpose	remains	the	same,	 the	 trajectory	of	RTPs	 can	undergo	 frequent	 changes.	These	 trajectories	 are	 a	function	of	the	specific	logic	of	an	RTP	through	the	actor	dynamics	that	they	shape	and	by	the	type	of	information	they	disclose.			 	
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2. Type	of	Information	and	Actors’	Intensity		In	this	part,	I	first	draw	conclusions	from	the	case	studies	that	support	the	argument	that	 the	 knowledge	 about	 the	 type	 of	 information	 disclosed	 gives	 insights	 into	 the	possible	trajectory	of	the	RTPs.	Secondly,	I	discuss	the	role	played	by	the	actors	involved	in	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 RTPs	 and	 comment	 on	 how	 their	 intensities,	 i.e.	 ability	 and	willingness,	shape	the	trajectory	of	regulatory	transparency	policies.		
2.1. 	Type	of	Information	Disclosed	The	 type	 of	 information	 disclosed	 informs	 the	 trajectory	 of	 regulatory	 transparency	policies	by	determining	actors’	rationale	vis-à-vis	disclosure.	In	the	logic	of	control,	for	example,	the	type	of	information	disclosed	is	factual,	i.e.	it	reviews,	fully	or	partially,	the	facts	about	a	specific	circumstance,	practice	or	behaviour.	But	since	it	is	often	difficult	to	establish	how	much	transparency	is	necessary	and	how	much	can	be	‘too	much’,	the	targets	 of	 disclosure	 can	 contest	 the	 design	 of	 an	 RTP	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 perceived	capacity	 to	 foster	 the	 objectives	 envisaged.	 Instances	 of	 this	were	 the	 cases	 of	MPs’	expenses	and	the	Brazilian	shadow	case	of	the	BNDES,	in	which	the	drive	for	financial	disclosure	was	opposed	to	by	 targets	due	to	allegations	of	excessive	 transparency	to	reach	set	purposes.	Additionally,	in	the	cases	of	the	Brazilian	Transparency	Portal	and	of	the	UK	MPs’	Register	of	 Interests,	 I	demonstrated	the	possibility	 for	the	drivers	of	transparency	 to	 reveal	 detailed	 information	 incrementally.	 Incrementalism,	 though	expected,	may	also	be	a	consequence	of	selective	openness	through	limited	or	aggregate	disclosure,	which	often	limits	the	access	of	intermediaries	and	beneficiaries	to	relevant	conducts	only	identifiable	through	detailed	information.	Therefore,	 in	such	cases,	the	targets	who	oppose	disclosure	tend	to	be	in	the	difficult	position	of	having	to	challenge	the	normative	ideal	of	transparency	per	se.		In	 contrast,	 the	 type	 of	 information	 displayed	 through	 the	 performance	 logic	entails	the	development	of	a	metric	that	will	be	used	to	measure	and	give	transparency	to	 what	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 performance.	 “Governance	 by	 targets	 and	 measured	performance	indicators”,	Beer	argues,	“is	a	 form	of	 indirect	control	necessary	for	the	governance	of	 any	 complex	 system”	 (1966,	 apud	Bevan	and	Hood,	2006,	p.	 518).	As	Desrosières	(1998)	suggests,	statistical	systems	were	essential	for	the	development	of	the	 modern	 state,	 as	 they	 allowed	 wider	 knowledge	 about	 society,	 institutions	 and	individuals,	in	indicators	and	measures	that	provided	states	with	understandable	views	of	 society.	 “Knowing	 society,	 however,	 as	 the	 development	 of	 nomenclatures	 and	taxonomies	reflects,	requires	a	simplification	of	society	–	society	has	to	be	legible”	(Van	
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de	Walle	and	Roberts,	2008,	p.12).	How	simple	or	simplistic	depends	significantly	on	the	indicators	chosen	to	reflect	a	reality,	and	this	is	the	focus	of	many	opponents	in	the	logic	of	performance,	which,	therefore,	opens	space	for	debates	about	fairness,	accuracy,	and	adequacy,	for	example,	without	necessarily	having	to	challenge	the	normative	value	of	transparency.		Finally,	the	information	disclosed	in	the	transaction	logic	reveals	specific	aspects	of	products	or	services,	to	reduce	the	imbalance	of	 information	between	their	sellers	and	 consumers.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 regulators	 request	 firms	 to	 disclose	 specific	information	for	regulators	themselves,	to	share	detailed	contractual	information	with	clients,	and	to	publish	defined	sets	of	information	about	themselves	or	their	products	to	the	general	public.	This,	as	economic	theory	has	suggested,	allows	consumers	to	gather	information	or	use	that	which	is	interpreted	by	intermediaries,	compare	products	and	make	the	best	available	choice,	informed	as	they	are	by	what	matters	in	their	purchase.	Similar	to	the	type	of	information	disclosed	in	the	control	logic,	here	the	information	published	is	also	factual	in	the	sense	that	it	is	the	price,	quality	or	other	features	of	a	certain	product	 or	 service	 that	 is	 displayed.	The	 act	 of	 disclosing	 information	 in	 the	transaction	logic	implies	that	information	is	comparable.	Therefore,	actors	that	support	or	oppose	disclosure	try	to	influence	the	policies	by	shaping	the	rules	that	lead	to	the	comparability	of	products	and	services,	and	therefore	their	future	publication.			
2.2. Actors’	Intensities	In	Chapter	1,	I	suggested	that	the	intensity	of	actors	should	be	understood	as	the	ability	(institutional	 and	political	power)	and	 the	willingness	 (interest	 calculation,	whereby	actors	consider	their	perceived	costs	and	benefits	to	decide	how	much	of	their	ability	to	invest	in	favour	or	against	an	RTP)	of	an	actor	or	a	group	of	actors	to	push	or	oppose	a	particular	RTP.	As	discussed	above,	this	thesis	has	demonstrated	that	actor	intensities	can	 differ	 during	 the	moment	 of	 creation	 and	 afterwards.	 In	 this	 subsection,	 I	 draw	further	conclusions	about	actors’	intensities	during	the	lifespan	of	RTPs	after	creation.		As	demonstrated	by	three	case	studies	in	the	logics	of	control	and	transaction	(the	MPs’	expenses,	disclosure	of	tariffs	in	Brazil,	and	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables)	the	opposition	of	targets	to	RTPs	tends	to	drop	after	creation,	even	though	during	inaugural	moments	of	these	policies	they	may	have	had	high	intensity	to	resist	disclosure.	This	is	because	 once	 a	 specific	 regulatory	 transparency	 policy	 is	 adopted,	 it	 shapes	 the	behaviour	 of	 targets	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 information	 disclosed	 and	redistributes	powers	to	new	actors	that	will,	as	drivers	or	beneficiaries	hope,	monitor	such	behaviours.	Because	actors	avoid	misbehaving	(at	least	publicly)	or	change	their	
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strategy	in	response	to	the	disclosure	of	information,	the	intensity	of	the	targets	reduce	throughout	the	lifespan	of	RTPs.	This	does	not	mean	that	the	targets’	intensity	becomes	null,	but	attempts	to	scrap	RTPs	become	less	frequent.	Intermediaries	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 this	 regard,	 as	 they	 are	 expected	 to	make	use	of	the	information	and	reduce	the	intensity	of	the	targets	to	mobilise	against	transparency.	The	powerful	role	by	the	traditional	media	as	an	intermediary	in	pushing	the	RTPs	in	the	path	that	they	were	created	is	widely	noted.	Journalists	often	pay	close	attention	to	disclosure	of	new	information	published	by	governments	and	regulators,	and	media	organisations	possess	 the	means	and	 the	channels	 to	reach	and	 influence	large	numbers	of	citizens	and	consumers	with	their	analyses	and	interpretation	of	the	data	and	information	disclosed.	In	Chapter	3,	for	example,	journalists	were	the	driving	actors	 in	 breaking	 the	 story	 and	 getting	 the	 public	 engaged	 in	 the	 behaviour	 of	politicians,	 including	after	the	initial	storm	caused	by	the	breaking	story	had	winded	down.	The	 intensities	of	actors	remained	high	 throughout	 the	 lives	of	 the	RTPs	 in	 the	other	cases	examined:	across	all	the	cases	in	the	performance	logic	(to	which	we	can	also	include	the	cases	of	the	disclosure	of	complaints	against	banks	in	the	transaction	logic,	because	of	their	mixed	character),	in	the	case	of	the	Brazilian	Transparency	Portal,	and	 in	 the	MPs’	Register	of	 Interest.	 In	 the	 latter	 two	cases,	 the	maintenance	of	high	levels	 of	 intensity	 is	 related	 to	 the	 imbalance	 of	 power	 between	 the	 driver	 and	 the	targets	 (and	 intermediaries).	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 drivers	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 push	 for	transparency	as	a	result	of	their	mandate	and	institutional	powers,	and	do	so	when	their	willingness	increases.		Out	 of	 the	 three	 logics,	 performance	 stands	 out	 as	 the	 one	 in	 which	 actor	intensities	remain	high	throughout	the	life	of	an	RTP.	Several	factors	might	explain	this:	First,	 because	 power	 is	 redistributed	 among	 actors	 at	 inaugural	 moments,	dissatisfaction	with	the	RTP	by	third	parties	may,	parallel	to	expansion	of	the	policy,	create	new	levels	of	opposition	that	may	impact	the	intensity	of	drivers.	This	is	the	case,	for	example,	of	not-for-profit	education	organisations	in	the	Brazilian	education	case.	Whereas	several	directors	of	schools	approved	the	publication	of	the	results	of	Prova	Brasil	 and	 Ideb,	 a	 number	 of	 civil	 society	 organisations	 still	 advocated	 for	contextualisation	or	statistical	improvement	of	the	measure.	Secondly,	as	is	shown	in	the	case	of	the	UK	School	Performance	Tables,	every	time	that	information	is	published,	schools	are	presented	with	new	performance	results	about	themselves,	in	comparison	to	other	schools,	and	have	to	explain	what	measures	were	or	are	being	taken	to	increase	their	performance.	Though	‘accountability’	is	one	of	the	alleged	objectives	of	the	RTP,	schools	and	teachers	routinely	have	to	provide	information	about	their	performance,	
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often	on	the	basis	of	exams	which	enforce	a	certain	education	system	with	which	they	may	not	agree.	Moreover,	it	is	not	guaranteed	that,	even	if	they	planned,	that	schools	would	find	a	space	for	dialogue	in	society.	In	this	regard,	the	media	as	an	independent	actor	 has	 its	 own	 preferences	 and	 priorities	 that	 affect	 the	 way	 they	 interpret	information,	which	may,	intentionally	or	not,	support	a	specific	trajectory	of	the	RTPs.	One	tendency	that	is	particularly	notable	in	the	media	is	the	‘sensationalisation’	of	the	 data	 disclosed,	 with	 news	 reports	 featuring	 rankings	 and	 stories	 that	 focus	 on	extreme	cases,	without	necessarily	providing	more	nuanced	analysis	of	what	the	data	means.	Another	tendency	is	the	use	of	old	measures	even	when	an	RTP	is	updated,	such	as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Performance	 Tables.	 Indeed,	 sensationalist	 reporting	 of	 the	disclosed	information	was	present	across	the	case	studies:	in	the	control	logic,	the	focus	of	the	media	was	on	the	most	striking	payments	made	by	MPs	on	accommodation,	travel	and	other	administrative	expenses.	In	the	cases	of	the	performance	logic,	newspapers	published	school	rankings	by	sensationalising	the	best	and	the	worst	performing	ones.	Finally,	in	the	transaction	logic,	what	mainly	caught	the	attention	of	the	journalists	was	the	 banks	 with	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 complaints.	 The	 effect	 of	 such	 funnelling	 of	information	can	imply	unintended	consequences	for	the	RTP’s	trajectory	and	its	effect,	due	to	media’s	intensity,	limiting	or	reinforcing	the	expansionary	potential	of	the	policy.			
3. The	Logics	of	RTPs	as	Determinants	of	Their	Trajectories	The	 limited	number	of	 case	 studies	and	 the	variations	observed	within	 the	 chapters	make	 it	 imprudent	 to	offer	definitive	generalisations	about	 the	 logics	of	RTPs	as	 the	determinant	of	their	trajectory.	Nonetheless,	the	cases	offer	important	insights	into	how	RTPs	 can	 evolve	 under	 different	 conditions	 within	 given	 different	 logics	 of	transparency,	which	can	be	refined	and	scrutinised	in	further	studies	of	RTPs.	The	key	observations	 that	 come	 through	 from	 the	 case	 studies	 and	 in	 light	 of	 the	 discussion	above	are	as	follows:		 In	 the	 control	 logic	 of	 transparency,	 a	 defining	 condition	 seems	 to	 be	 the	presence	or	absence	of	a	formal	regulatory	body	with	a	mandate	to	push	for	disclosure,	or	what	 Lindstedt	 and	Naurin	 (2010,	 p.	 316)	 refer	 to	 agent	 controlled	 transparency	(implemented	by	the	agent	herself)	versus	non-agent	controlled	transparency	(pursued	by	a	 third	party,	 such	as	 a	 free	press).	When	adopted	 in	 response	 to	 self-regulation,	expansion	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 occur	 in	 a	 punctuated	 way,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 external	interventions.	 In	 the	 presence	 of	 such	 a	 body,	 RTPs	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 expand	 in	 a	gradual	and	incremental	manner	and	facing	less	resistance.	This	finding	supports	the	
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argument	 by	 Fung	 et.	 al	 (2007)	 that	 “producing	 groups	 of	 disclosers	 that	 expect	transparency	 to	 further	 their	 interests”	 can	 alter	what	 they	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 political	imbalance	of	transparency	and	encourage	sustainability.	 		 In	the	performance	logic	of	transparency,	contestation	is	the	main	and	stable	characteristic	 of	 an	 RTP’s	 trajectory.	 After	 inauguration,	 contestation	 in	 the	 logic	 of	performance	tends	to	be	over	the	definition	or	design	of	disclosure,	rather	than	over	disclosure	 itself,	 as	 it	 is	 often	 difficult	 to	 challenge	 the	 principles	 in	 the	 Layer	 that	supported	the	inauguration	of	disclosure.	As	a	result,	changes	often	happen	as	the	driver	adds	 new	 metrics	 to	 the	 indicator	 in	 order	 to	 ‘contextualise’	 the	 existing	 data	 in	response	to	pressure	from	the	targets	or	 intermediaries.	Furthermore,	RTPs	that	are	developed	 to	 inform	 consumers’	 choice	 and	 provide	 exit	 option,	 but	 also	 disclose	performance	information	when	doing	so,	tend	to	evolve	like	RTPs	in	the	performance	logic.	It	is	not	surprising	that	this	is	,	as	the	transaction	logic	opens	space	for	exit.	“The	chances	 for	 voice	 to	 function	 effectively	 as	 a	 recuperation	 mechanism”,	 argues	Hirschman	 (1970,	p.	 82),	 “are	 appreciably	 strengthened	 if	 voice	 is	backed	up	by	 the	threat	of	exit”.		 In	the	transaction	logic	of	transparency,	a	key	factor	that	emerged	from	the	cases	is	the	type	of	information	that	is	being	disclosed.	If	the	information	is	novel	and	exclusive	to	the	discloser,	there	may	be	higher	intensity	from	the	side	of	the	drivers	or	the	intermediaries	to	maintain	it.	If	the	information	already	exists	in	the	market,	and	is	therefore	 not	 novel	 or	 controversial,	 it	 can	 retrench,	 especially	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	regulatory	 body	 with	 a	 mandate	 to	 produce	 it,	 or	 high	 use	 of	 the	 data	 by	 the	beneficiaries.				
4. Reflections	on	the	‘pluralistic	approach’	and	ideas	for	further	
research		The	conceptual	framework	of	this	thesis	was	based	on	the	idea,	shared	by	an	increasing	number	 of	 prominent	 scholars	 of	 institutional	 change,	 that	 a	 ‘pluralistic	 approach’	combining	aspects	of	different	traditions	may	be	necessary	to	understanding	how	and	why	institutions	change	(Williamson,	2000;	Grief	and	Laitin,	2004;	Streeck	and	Thelen,	2005;	Hall,	2010).	In	this	vein,	I	took	the	stance	that	the	two	main	traditions	in	this	field	–	historical	institutionalism	and	rational-choice	–	were	best	viewed	as	asking	questions,	developing	 concepts	 and	 proposing	 methodological	 approaches	 to	 address	 the	trajectories	of	regulatory	transparency	policies.		
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While	 expressions	 of	 approval	 and	 support	 for	 a	 pluralistic	 approach	 have	become	increasingly	common	in	the	literature,	works	that	actually	attempt	to	formulate	a	theory	of	scholarly	pluralism,	or	at	least	develop	and	test	pluralistic	hypotheses,	are	still	quite	rare.	It	could	be	argued	that	staying	within	the	boundaries	of	an	established	tradition	is	a	less	risky	decision	than	exploring	the	more	uncharted	waters	of	scholarly	pluralism.	 However,	 for	what	 it’s	 worth,	 it	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 this	 thesis	 has	 taken	 in	 its	theoretical	framework.		I	 developed	 the	 three-layer	 approach	 to	 institutional	 change	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	combine	 and	 operationalise	 the	 analytical	 tools,	 focus	 and	 concepts	 of	 historical	institutional	 and	 rational-choice	 traditions,	 recognising	 that	 they	 both	 had	 valuable	insights	 to	 contribute	 to	 each	 other.	 Historical	 institutionalism,	 as	 I	 pointed	 out	 in	Chapter	1,	is	highly	effective	in	highlighting	the	role	of	history,	past	decisions	and	social	and	cultural	norms	in	the	study	of	institutional	change,	especially	in	the	medium	to	long	term.	On	the	other	hand,	as	a	number	of	works	have	recognised	(Grief	and	Laitin,	2004;	Streek	and	Thelen,	2005;	Aoki,	2007;	Mahoney	and	Thelen,	2010),	its	focus	on	critical	junctures	and	the	grand	narratives	of	history	can	make	it	difficult	to	detect	continuous	actor	interactions	and	changing	power	relations	during	periods	of	apparent	stability	on	a	path.	This	is	a	strength	of	the	rational-choice	approach,	which	focuses	on	the	balance	of	powers	and	negotiation	of	 interests	among	actors.	For	 its	part,	 the	rational-choice	tradition	 could	 benefit	 from	 the	 wider	 perspective	 of	 historical	 institutionalism,	especially	in	setting	the	structural	basis	on	which	actors	interact.	While	 admittedly	 not	 a	 perfect	 model,	 and	 could	 benefit	 from	 further	operationalisation	with	a	larger	number	of	cases	across	more	varied	national	settings	and	diverse	sectors,	 the	three-layer	approach	nonetheless	offers	a	multi-dimensional	way	of	thinking	about	institutional	change	that	tries	to	take	into	account	both	the	slow-changing	 (macro)	 structural	 factors	 and	 the	 fast-moving	 (micro)	 actor	 dynamics.	Consequently,	 the	 model	 also	 attempts	 to	 account	 for	 both	 the	 instances	 of	punctured/exogenous	change	and	processes	of	incremental/endogenous	change.		Like	 any	 “quasi-religious”	 concept,	 transparency	 is	 both	 a	 powerful	 norm,	shaping	institutions	and	in	turn	actor	behaviours,	and	a	political	tool,	utilised	by	various	actors	 for	 purposes	 that	 can	 vary	 from	 benign	 to	 Machiavellian	 from	 a	 democratic	standpoint.	 The	 pluralistic	 approach	 employed	 here	 recognises	 the	 symbiotic	relationship	 between	 ideas,	 institutions	 and	 interests.	 The	 influence	 of	 norms	 and	overarching	institutions	in	creating	and	sustaining	RTPs	have	been	noted	throughout	this	thesis	and	in	this	Conclusion.	It	is	these	ideas	and	institutions,	represented	in	Layers	1	and	2	of	the	three-layered	approach,	that	play	an	important	role	in	distributing	the	initial	intensities	of	actors	as	they	set	out	to	push	for	or	resist	the	creation	of	an	RTP.	
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However,	 although	 constrained	 and	 shaped	 by	 them,	 individuals	 are	 not	 simple	recipients	of	culturally	embedded	norms	and	political	institutions.	They	have	their	own	strategic	interests,	political	calculations	or	conceptions	of	fairness	(Streeck,	1997;	Hall,	2010)	that	determine	in	which	direction	they	mobilise	these	norms	and	institutions	and	how	 they	situate	 themselves	vis-à-vis	other	actors.	At	 the	 level	of	policymaking,	 this	means	that	understanding	the	trajectories	of	RTPs	requires	a	careful	examination	of	the	different	and	often	fluid	motivations	behind	actors’	intensity	in	support	of	or	opposition	to	the	disclosure	of	certain	types	of	information.		On	the	basis	of	these	reflections,	it	is	possible	to	suggest	a	number	of	issues	and	areas	that	might	be	of	 interest	 for	 further	research.	One	particularly	urgent	question	involves	the	impact	of	recent	challenges	and	setbacks	experienced	by	liberal	democratic	norms	and	institutions	on	the	creation	and	trajectories	of	transparency	policies.	Anti-liberal	 nationalist	 movements	 have	 quickly	 become	 a	 powerful	 societal,	 and	increasingly	political,	force	in	large	parts	of	the	world,	including	in	established	liberal	democracies.	 Although	 it	 is	 premature	 to	 declare	 the	 end	 of	 the	 liberal	 democratic	paradigm,	 it	 appears	 under	 more	 serious	 attack	 both	 from	 above	 (“unfettered	globalisation”)	and	below	(populism)	than	ever	before.	How	is	this	affecting	the	ability	of	drivers	of	disclosure	to	mobilise	the	ideas	of	openness,	publicity	and	accountability	in	pushing	for	and	justifying	transparency	policies?	Admittedly,	this	investigation	also	requires	a	critical	review	of	the	actual	role	of	existing	transparency	policies	and	regimes	in	 furthering	 good	 governance,	 improving	 democracy,	 strengthening	 trust	 in	government	 and	 serving	 the	 public’s	 interests	 (O’Neill,	 2002;	Meijer,	 2009;	 Roberts,	2012).		Consequently,	one	important	subsection	for	further	research	in	this	area	should	look	at	the	alleged	conflict	between	what	Erkkilä	(2012)	calls	“the	new	economic	-	and	performance-driven	understanding	of	transparency”	and	its	old	interpretation	as	a	tool	for	improving	democratic	accountability.	In	this	endeavour,	the	dynamics	of	different	logics	 (i.e.	 underlying	 rationale	 or	 purpose)	 of	 transparency	 as	 proposed	 in	 this	dissertation	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 useful	 guide	 in	 examining	 the	 ideological/institutional	background,	as	well	as	actor	 interests	and	intensities	that	drive	both	the	old	and	the	new	 interpretations.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 further	 research	 motivated	 by	 Erkkilä’s	differentiation	could	help	us	further	our	understanding	of	the	logics	themselves,	as	well	as	their	relationship	with	and	impact	on	each	other	and	on	the	normative	discourse	of	transparency	in	general.	Another	 area	 for	 further	 research	 featuring	 a	 less	 dramatic	 instance	 of	 a	paradigm	shift	involves	the	impact	of	the	rising	importance	of	behavioural	economics	on	the	use	of	transparency	as	a	regulatory	tool.	The	thesis	has	already	demonstrated,	in	
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the	case	of	the	FSA	Comparative	Tables	in	the	UK,	the	move	away	towards	the	idea	of	‘nudging’	as	a	way	to	shape	consumer	behaviour.	As	I	was	writing	the	final	words	of	this	thesis,	the	Nobel	Prize	for	economics	in	2017	was	awarded	to	US	scholar	Richard	Thaler	for	his	pioneering	work	on	behavioural	economics.	This	was	 just	another	sign	of	 the	growing	importance	and	recognition	of	the	field,	which	has	challenged	age-old	notion	of	rationality,	 in	 which	 the	 justification	 for	 transparency	 in	 general,	 and	 regulatory	transparency	 in	 particular,	 is	 rooted.	 Further	 research	 could	 investigate	 how	 this	process	is	shaping	transparency	policies,	and	what	it	means	for	the	future	of	RTPs	in	terms	of	adaptation	or	policy	scrap.	In	terms	of	research	design,	a	potential	criticism	for	this	work	could	be	that	it	has	attempted	 to	 analyse	 a	 large	 number	 of	 variables	 (layers,	 logics,	 trajectories,	interactions)	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	 cases.	While	 this	 design	 choice	 provides	 a	 richer	account	for	each	of	the	cases,	it	naturally	limits	the	number	of	generalisable	conclusions	that	the	thesis	can	draw	from	the	empirical	findings.	Further	research	could	decrease	the	 number	 of	 variables	 analysed	 and	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 cases	 to	 test	 the	observations	and	conclusions	presented	in	this	thesis.	In	this	vein,	future	research	can	analyse	variations	in	the	creation	and	evolution	of	RTPs	in	a	wider	range	of	countries	with	 similar	 and	 diverse	 freedom	 of	 information	 levels.	 Another	 potential	 area	 of	research	could	include	the	impact	of	political	variables,	e.g.	the	size	and	composition	of	cabinets,	in	the	creation	and	evolution	of	RTPs.		 					 	
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APPENDICES	
	
	
Appendix	I.	Evolution	of	main	query	options	on	the	Transparency	Portal	
	
	
	
Category	 Queries	Direct	Federal	Expenditures	 Transfers	of	Federal	Money	[2004]	- by	State/Municipality	
- by	Program	
- by	Action	
- by	Beneficiary	Direct	Expenditure	[2005]	
- by	Type	of	Expense	
- by	Federal	Body	which	Executes	the	Expenditure	
- by	Program	
- by	Action	
- by	Beneficiary	Search	by	Budgetary	Function	
- by	Function	(Area)	
- by	Sub-function	(Objective)	Per	Diems	Corporate	Credit	Cards	[2005]	
- by	Federal	Body	
- by	User	[2008]		Revenues	[2010]	 - by	Federal	Public	Body	- by	type	of	Revenue		Agreements	[2004:	Money	Transfers		2006:	Agreement	Information]		
- All	Agreements	
- by	State/Municipality	
- by	signatory	Federal	Body	
- by	Transfers	
o In	the	Week	
o In	the	Month	
Sanctions	 - Registry	of	Non-Reputable	or	Suspended	Companies	[2008]	
- Barred	Private	Non	Lucrative	Entities	[2012]	
- List	of	Officials	Expelled	from	the	Federal	Administration	[2012]		Federal	Officials	 Civil	and	Military	Federal	Officials	
- by	Name	or	National	ID	
- by	Working	Body	
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[2012:	Wage]	 - by	Body	of	Assignment	- by	Post	or	Function	of	Trust	and	Federal	Body	- by	Post	or	Function	of	Trust	List	of	Officials	Expelled	from	the	Federal	Administration	[2012]		Federal	Executive	Apartments	[2012]	
- by	Apartment	
- by	User	
Federal	Expenditure	with	 Intern.	Games	[2010]		
- Fifa	World	Cup	2014	
- Olympic	Games	Rio	2016	
Diverse:	 - Download	of	Data	[2010]	
- Portal	in	Graphs	[2010]	
- International	Technical	Assistance	[2013]		Source:	Transparency	Portal	Bulletins	and	OECD	Integrity	Review	of	Brazil		 	
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Appendix	II.	Summary	of	the	evolution	of	the	Brazilian		
assessment	system	for	primary	and	secondary	education		 	
Year	 Objectives	
1990	 To	develop	and	deepen	the	evaluative	capacity	of	the	management	units	of	the	education	system	(MEC,	state	departments	and	municipal	agencies);	and,	to	regionalize	the	operationalization	of	the	evaluative	process,	creating	links	and	 incentives	 to	 development	 of	 infrastructure	 research	 and	 education	evaluation	(Brazil/MEC/INEP,	no	number)	
1993	 Provide	information	to	support	the	definition,	reformulation	and	monitoring	of	policies	to	improve	the	quality	of	education	(Brazil/MEC/INEP,	1995);	to	increase,	decentralize	and	devolve	the	technical	and	methodological	capacity	in	the	area	of	education	assessment	(Brazil/UNDP,	1992)	
1995	 To	inform	the	policies	aimed	at	improving	the	quality,	efficiency	and	equity	of	education	in	Brazil	(Brazil/MEC/INEP,	1995)	
1997	–		
2003	
To	collect	and	organise	information	about	the	quality,	efficiency	and	equity	of	education	in	Brazil,	in	order	to	allow	for	their	monitoring232	
2005	 To	collect	and	organize	information	about	the	quality,	efficiency	and	equity	of	 education	 in	 Brazil,	 which	 together	 with	 the	 National	 Evaluation	 of	Performance	 of	 Education	 (Avaliação	 Nacional	 do	 Rendimento	 Escolar	 -	Prova	Brasil)	constitute	the	Evaluative	System	of	Basic	Education	(Sistema	de	Avaliação	da	Educação	Básica);	Prova	Brasil	will	evaluate	public	schools	of	fundamental	and	high	school	education233				 	
                                                232	INEP	(2002)	Saeb	2001	–	Novas	perspectivas.	Mimeo.	233	MEC	(2005)	Portaria	MEC	931,	21	March	
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Appendix	III.	Example	of	report	for	the	performance	of		
individual	school	in	Prova	Brasil	2005		
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 249 
Monograph,	36.	Georgetown	University.	Stirton,	L.;	Lodge,	M.	(2000).	Regulating	in	the	Interest	of	the	Citizen:	Towards	a	Single	Model	of	Regulatory	Transparency?	International	Political	Economy	Group	-		University	of	Warwick.	__________	 (2001).	 Transparency	mechanisms:	 building	 publicness	 into	 public	 services.	
Journal	of	law	and	society	,	28	(4)	Streeck,	W.	(1997)	The	German	economic	model:	does	it	exist?	Can	it	survive?	In:	Crouch,	C.;	Streeck,	W.	Political	Economy	of	Modern	Capitalism.	Sage	Streeck,	W.;	Thelen,	K.	(2005)	A	theory	of	gradual	institutional	change.	In:	Institutional	Change	in	Advanced	Political	Economies.	Oxford	University	Press	Taylor,	M.	(2009)	The	Road	for	“Twin	Peaks”	-	And	the	way	back.	Connecticut	Insurance	
Law	Journal,	16	(1)	Thaler,	 R.;	 Sunstein,	 C.	 (2008)	 Nudge:	 improving	 decision	 about	 health,	 wealth	 and	
happiness.	Yale	University	Press,	New	Haven	Thatcher,	M.	(2010)	The	Downing	Street	Years,	1979	–	1990.	HarperCollins.	Thelen,	 K.	 (1999).	 Historical	 institutionalism	 in	 comparative	 politics.	 Annual	 Review	
Political	Science,	2	Thelen,	 K.;	Mahoney,	 J.	 (2010)	Explaining	 Institutional	 Change:	 Ambiguity,	 Agency	 and	
Power.	Cambridge	University	Press	Thomas,	S.	(1998)	Value-Added	Measures	of	School	Effectiveness	in	the	United	Kingdom.	
Prospects,	28	(1)	Thomas,	 S.;	 Mortimore,	 P.	 (1996)	 Comparison	 of	 value-added	 models	 for	 secondary	school	effectiveness.	Research	papers	in	education,	11	(1)	Tomlinson,	S.	(2001)	Education	in	a	post-welfare	society.	Open	University	Press	Van	de	Walle,	S.;	Roberts,	A.	(2008)	Publishing	performance	information:	an	illusion	of	control?	In:	Van	Dooren,	W.;	Van	de	Walle,	S.	(eds.)	Performance	information	in	the	public	
sector:	how	it	is	used.	Palgrave	Vargovčíková,	J.	(2015)	The	States	of	Making	Visible	in	Lobbying	Regulations:	The	Case	of	 Attempts	 at	 Regulating	 Lobbying	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 4th	 Global	 Conference	 on	
Transparency	Research,	4-6	June.	Veloso,	F.	(2011)	A	evolução	recente	e	propostas	para	a	melhoria	da	educação	no	Brasil.	In.:	Bacha,	E.	L.;	Schwartzman,	S.	(2011)	Brasil:	a	nova	agenda	social.	LTC.	Vidal,	E.	M.;	Vieira,	S.	L.	(2011)	Gestão	educacional	e	resultados	no	Ideb:	um	estudo	de	caso	em	dez	municípios	cearenses.	Estudos	de	Avaliação	em	Educação,	22	(50)	Waterson,	 M.	 (2001)	 The	 role	 of	 consumers	 in	 competition	 and	 competition	 policy.	
 250 
Warwick	Economic	Research	Papers,	607	Wehner,	 J.;	 De	 Renzio,	 P.	 (2013)	 Citizens,	 Legislators	 and	 Executive	 Disclosure:	 the	Political	Determinants	of	Fiscal	Transparency.	World	Development,	41	Weil,	D.	(2012)	The	benefits	and	costs	of	transparency:	a	model	of	disclosure	based	regulation.	Working	Paper,	Transparency	Policy	Project.	John	F.	Kennedy	School	of	Government.	Werler,	 F.	 O.	 C.	 (2011)	 Polıt́icas	 de	 avaliação	 em	 larga	 escala	 na	 educação	 básica:	 do	controle	 de	 resultados	 à	 intervenção	 nos	 processos	 de	 operacionalização	 do	 ensino.	
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